Saying no : withholding and withdrawing medical treatment from non-PVS patients. by Terry, Louise Mary
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Saying no : withholding and withdrawing medical treatment from non-PVS patients.
General rights
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-
commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to
supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third
party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation,
libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the
claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.
SAYING NO: WITHHOLDING AND 
WITHDRAWING MEDICAL TREATMENT FROM 
NON-PVS PATIENTS 
Louise Mary Terry 
A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Law, March 2001. 
88,324 words 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how decisions to withhold or withdraw potentially curative medical treatment from 
patients (not in a vegetative state) are made and the impact that NHS funding has. The factors taken into 
account by doctors are identified by examining relevant literature and conducting semi-structured interviews 
with a number of consultant level doctors from a variety of specialities. The interviews show that decisions 
to withhold treatment are made differently from decisions to withdraw treatment. It is apparent that decision- 
making causes much anxiety, particularly when the outcome is death or life of poor quality. Inadequacy of 
resources has a major influence on some consultants' practices. Existing models, relevant case law and 
proposals for resource allocation and the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment from both adult 
and child patients are critiqued. A decision-making model which can operate ethically in an environment of 
limited resources is urgently needed. A better approach to decision-making is proposed which is underpinned 
by respect for autonomy, openness, distributive justice and developing non-discriminatory practice. At the 
macro resource allocation level, this involves the creation of an independent Strategic Body to identify what 
conditions the NHS, as a state-funded institution, should treat and advise on which treatments are ethically, 
medically and legally most acceptable. A decision-making model for the Strategic Body to follow is suggested. 
At the individual patient level, a decision-making model for doctors to follow is also proposed. It is suggested, 
as well, that the present situation whereby conflicts move from the bedside to the courts is unhelpful since the 
expertise of the judiciary is primarily in law not ethics or medicine. Therefore, a tribunal system should be 
developed which could weight more equally ethical, medical and legal expertise. Additionally, in-house ethics 
committees should play a greater role than at present. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment can be either planning decisions made for society by a 
public body or clinical decisions made regarding an individual patient by a physician. ' Though often these 
decisions remain secret, ' occasionally they become the focus of intense media interest as in the case of 'Child 
B' which highlighted the difficulties faced by patients, families, doctors and healthcare purchasers. ' Much is 
written about non-treatment decisions resulting in the death of the patient, particularly regarding those in low 
awareness states. Less is written about decisions where patient/family preferences are out of step with medical 
or healthcare purchaser opinion despite Goodman's call for research in this area. ' The NHS, like any human 
service organisation, needs to be `efficient, effective, equitable and humane'. ' Rationing tends to be covert. ' 
The political convention is to deny its existence. ' Doctors are told to both `give priority... on the basis of need' 
and to recognise `the effects their decisions may have on the resources and choices available to others'. 8 
Tension between individual and societal interests results. As Klein et al note, `there is remarkably little direct 
evidence about how funding constraints influence medical decisions or about the criteria used when allocating 
scarce resources to individual patients'. ' 
In broad terms, this thesis sets out to examine the process of decision-making with regard to the withholding 
and withdrawing of treatment. It was felt important to conduct empirical research and elicit the views of 
clinicians since this way `we get to walk in other people's shoes' and their stories `open our eyes to... ethical 
dilemmas and dramas surrounding life and death'. 1° There is disagreement over whether there is an ethical 
difference between withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment. The BMA sees no difference" but 
'Drummond MF. Resource allocation decisions in healthcare: a role for quality of life assessments? In Dowie J, Elstein A. Professional 
judgment -a reader in clinical decision-making. 1988 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge at pp436-455, at p437. 
'One decision, known to the author from her previous career within the NHS as a microbiologist, which remained hidden from public scrutiny 
because the patient concerned had no living relatives was that of `Emily'. She was 87 years old when admitted to hospital. She was then 
discovered to have diabetes unrelated to the admitting cause. Poor bed care led to her developing a sore on one heel which turned gangrenous. 
The heel was amputated. The gangrene persisted. Her leg was amputated below the knee. The gangrene persisted. She was, by then, very frail, 
but still mentally competent though confused by what was happening. A further amputation at the hip was carried out, ignoring her protests, 
and, because of her frailty, it was conducted under local anaesthetic. She died three weeks later. This thesis is dedicated to her memory. 
'R v Cambridge District HA, exparte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. See also: RvRv North West Thames RHA exparte Daniels [ 1994] 109 BMLR 
67; Rv North West Lancashire HA ex parse A, D&G. [2000] WLR 977 and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
'Goodman N. Resource allocation: idealism, realism, pragmatism, openness. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 179-180at p180. 
5Dingwall R. Don't mind him - he's from Barcelona: Qualitative methods in health studies. In Daly J, McDonald I, Willis E. Researching Health 
Care: Designs, Dilemmas, Disciplines. 1992 Tavistock/Routledge, London pp161-175, at p162. 
6Seedhouse D. `Core Health Services, Social Values and Democracy'. In Campbell AV, GillettG. Ethical Issues in Defining Core Services. 
Discussion papers prepared for The National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services. 1993 NAC, Wellington. 
New Zealand pp67-76 at p71. 
'Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p105. 
'Klein R, Day & Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting andRationing in the National Health Service. 1996 Open University Press, 
Oxford at p34. 
'Klein R, Day & Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting and Rationing in the National Health Service. 1996 Open University Press, 
Oxford at p83. Since the work for this thesis commenced, Chris Ham has analysed, from the perspective of the different parties, both the Child 
B case and similar ones since then. See: Ham C, Pickard S. Tragic Choices in Health Care: The case ofChildB. 1998 King's Fund, London 
and Ham C, McIver S. Contested Decisions: Priority setting in the NHS. 2000 King's Fund, London. 
1°Dula A. The Life and Death of Miss Mildred: An Elderly Black Woman. Clinics in Geriatric Medicine. 1994; 10,3: 419-430 at p429. 
"British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMA, London at p 170. The House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics likewise sees no difference. Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21 1994 HMSO, 
London. 
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others believe that doctors and families feel there is a difference. '2 This thesis started out with a premise that 
withholding and withdrawing treatment were the same but found that the `feels different' 13 factor cannot be 
ignored by healthcare decision-makers wanting public backing nor can it be ignored by those who wish to 
analyse such decisions. Consequently, the analysis was changed from being conducted according to the 
outcome of the decision (immediate/imminent death; eventual death and reduced quality of life) with 
withholding and withdrawal decisions being considered jointly because it became evident that not only would 
this inappropriately validate outcomes models of resource allocation but would ignore key differences in the 
way decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment are made by doctors. No distinction is made between 
`ordinary' treatment and `extraordinary'. 14 Although there was a change of government at the time of 
conducting the empirical research a political critique has been avoided. 
1.1 Research Aims and Objectives 
" To investigate how decisions to withhold or withdraw potentially curative treatment from patients are 
made 
" To identify what factors are taken into account 
" To critique existing methods and proposals for resource allocation and the withholding and 
withdrawing of medical treatment from both adult and child patients 
" To suggest how the process can be improved. 
1.2 Methodology 
A comprehensive literature search of books, journals and government documentation was conducted using 
traditional methods and internet search engines. 15 The field is constantly developing so the search for materials 
and analysis thereof continued throughout. The background reading enabled the issues which formed the basis 
of the empirical research to be identified. " It was decided that the most appropriate research model to 
investigate the views of doctors would be the qualitative style. There are three main models of sociological 
research which could have been employed: the experimental model; the quantitative model and the qualitative 
model. The experimental model, most commonly adopted when comparing different types of treatments, eg. 
the randomised controlled trial, was inappropriate as the purpose was not to compare one theory or method 
against another. A quantitative approach, typified by the making of surveys, is designed to compare and 
analyse large amounts of data and is the most commonly undertaken form of healthcare research. It holds great 
attraction as the method to employ; however, restrictions of time and resources meant rejecting this model as 
12Shaw A. B. Acts of commission, omission, and demission or pulling the plug. J. Royal. Soc. Med. 1995; 88: 18-19, at pl8. See also: Campbell 
AGM. Baby Doe and Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment. In Caplan AL, Blank RH, Merrick CJ (Eds). Compelled Compassion. 1992 Humana 
Press, Totowa, New Jersey pp207-236 at p224 and Bayles M, High DM (Eds) Medical Treatment of the Dying: Moral Issues 1978 GK Hall 
& Co, Shenkman Publishers at p6 and p122. 
"Shaw, op cit n12 at p18. 
14Such distinctions have likewise been rejected by others: Smith DH, Veatch RM (Eds). Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining 
Treatment and the Care of the Dying. A Report by the Hastings Center. 1987 The Hastings Center, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
and Indiapolis at p5. 
"Occasionally, popular press articles will be referred to since this thesis will argue that it is important for the public to participate in debates about 
healthcare allocation so it seems proper to include these as a reflection on what topics are being debated. 
"Medical terminology is necessarily used and a glossary of terms and their meaning is found in Appendix Four. The terminology employed is 
that used by Lord Walton of Detchant. Walton. Dilemmas of life and death: Part One. J. Royal Soc. Medicine 1995; 8: 311-315 at pp312-3. 
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sufficient data to enable a statistical analysis to be made could not have been generated. Also, as Daly and 
McDonald recognise, `the process of categorisation and quantification necessarily imposes the researcher's 
assumptions and concepts onto the field of study'. " Hence, quantitative surveys can miss the social interaction 
aspect that is an important part of the doctor-patient relationship. The qualitative approach, however, enables 
the social interactions between the different parties in the healthcare relationship to be studied since it is 
`hypothesis generating'. 18 It can be used to study patient-doctor relationships and their effect on the 
development of healthcare provision, and also, to study the `cultural, historical and political circumstances' 
influencing the delivery of healthcare. 19 The qualitative method allows the collecting of data from diverse 
sources: tape-recorded interviews; reports; published studies and academic articles. The researcher should 
`listen and ask questions until they understand how each group makes sense of its experience'. 20 The analysis 
that has been made seeks to lead to a `maximal understanding... of the phenomena being studied'. 21 The 
interview setting can affect the responses given so interviews were conducted as, where, and when, the 
consultant suggested though the quality of the analysis is more important than `the recruitment of the sample 
or... the format of the interview. 22 The known background of the interviewer can influence the responses given 
but the twin backgrounds of the researcher as both a healthcare professional and post-graduate law student 
possibly operated to neutralise this effect. 23 Some suggest that in order to judge a tradition, one must have 
entered it as an apprentice. 24 Several interviewees tested my medical knowledge early on and, once satisfied 
that I understood the medical details mentioned, they visibly relaxed and talked freely. Some commented that 
they would have been less willing to be interviewed if I had only had a law background since I would have been 
perceived as having limited understanding of their world and their subjects, which would have meant they not 
only had to explain their views but also explain the conditions/treatments to which those views related. Thus, 
with most of the consultants interviewed, the interviewer and interviewee became `peers' which Silverman 
asserts is important in order to gain `deep understanding'. " However, becoming `peers' did not mean `going 
native' and I attempted to maintain objectivity throughout. Z" 
In order to investigate how decisions are made about continuing/discontinuing/withholding medical treatment, 
it was decided that consultant-level clinicians should be targeted since they would be the most experienced and 
are usually highly regarded within their profession. Because such studies generate large amounts of data from 
each individual source, most, like the one conducted for this thesis, have a small sample size. This makes it 
difficult to extrapolate legitimately the results found to how a larger group of similar people react in the same 
situation. To minimise this difficulty, it was decided to survey consultant clinicians. Thus, the information 
generated would be more capable of being legitimately extrapolated and generalised. 27 By targeting consultants 
from various specialties, it was felt possible to obtain a broader spectrum of responses which would avoid the 
bias that could be introduced if only high-profile conditions such as organ transplant or cancer therapy were 
"Daly J., McDonald I& Willis E. (Eds) Researching Health Care: Designs, dilemmas, disciplines. 1992 Routledge, London at pp8-9. 
18Najman JM et al. Comparing alternative methodologies of social research. In: Daly J, McDonald I, Willis E. Researching Health Care: 
Designs, Dilemmas, Disciplines. 1992 Tavistock/Routledge, London at pp138-157 at p140. 
'9Ibid. 
20Ibid. 
2'Hitchcock G, Hughes D. Research and the Teacher. 2nd Edn. 1995 Routledge, London at p296. 
=-'S ilverman D. Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction. 1993 Sage Publications, London at p22- 
23 Ibid, at p95. 
24Kuczewski MG. Fragmentation and Consensus: Comm unitarian and Casuistic Bioethics. 1997 Georgetown University Press, Washington 
DC at pp 11-12. 
''Silverman, op cit n22 at p22. 
26Miles MB, Huberman M. An Expanded Sourcebook: Qualitative Data Analysis 2nd Edn. 1994 Sage, London at p63. 
27Najman JM et al, op cit n18, at pp145-6. 
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studied. The consultants were attached to one or more of four different hospitals which were all relatively close 
to each other (a table showing hospital sizes is given below). 28 An attempt was made to include a large 
teaching hospital in a different region from the other hospitals to neutralise any possible regional bias. 
However, although an initial, seemingly positive, meeting with the medical director was held, attempts to 
follow this up by letter and telephone to gain clear agreement to my contacting consultants within the hospital 
received no response. Consequently, a modified approach was taken with the other hospitals. The person 
considered the ethics expert was identified29 and an introductory meeting held during which the purposes and 
methodology of the research project were outlined. Following these meetings, each confirmed that the research 
raised no ethical concerns and did not require formal approval from the LREC and each gave permission for 
his/her name to be used when contacting consultants. 30 
Hospital Annual Budget of 
NHS Trust (£ approx) 
Number of 
Beds(approx) 
Type of Hospital 
A 100,000,000 1000 City General + Specialist Services 
B 100,000,000 1000 City General + Specialist Services 
C 150,000,000 >1,000 City Teaching General + Specialist Services 
D 30,000,000 300 Town General 
1.3 Data Collection 
A questionnaire was designed by the author and slightly modified following scrutiny by more experienced 
researchers. 31 An initial trial was carried out by contacting consultants at the smallest hospital to gauge the 
level of interest and whether the questionnaire worked satisfactorily. The response rate was good, the 
interviewees provided plenty of time and much enthusiasm for the project was shown. Therefore, the format 
was kept the same and the next stage carried out by contacting consultants at three other hospitals. During the 
field work, notes were kept relating to the research forming a `data analysis chronology'. 32 
Consultants at four hospitals in total were identified but considerably more difficulty was experienced obtaining 
consultant names from hospital C which had become the centre of media attention. 33 Some randomisation was 
introduced by writing only to every other consultant name at hospitals B and C and every third name at hospital 
28The table broadly outlines the characteristics of the four hospitals. Detailed descriptions will not be provided in order to prevent 
identification 
of the hospitals concerned. The information was extracted from The IHSM Health and 
Social Services Year Book 1997/98 1997 Financial 
Times Healthcare, London. 
29This was usually the most senior clinician on the Local Research Ethics Committee. 
S/he was identified by telephoning the hospitals. 
3"Local Research Ethics Committees are charged with the role of considering the ethics of research projects which will involve human subjects 
and to advise the NHS body whether the project should proceed or not. LRECs must 
be consulted if the research involves recruiting patients. 
foetal material; the recently dead; access to health records or access to NHS facilities 
(Department of Health. Local Research Ethics Committees 
1991 HMSO, London at paras 1.1-1.3). In fact, two of the hospitals shared an LREC as is not uncommon. Access to 
NHS facilities wwas the 
only relevant factor but not a necessity although, 
in reality, all the interviews took place on NHS premises. It was held by the ethics experts 
consulted for approval that the research came under the exception given to `Enquiries and 
Surveys in the Public Interest where no reference to 
an LREC is necessary' (Local Research 
Ethics Committees Appendix A) 
"See Appendix Three. 
32Miles MB, Huberman M, op cit n26, at p282. This showed the timing of the sending out of the initial letter to the first hospital and subsequent 
responses to interview requests, the process of making appointments 
for interviews etc. Other items included were the initial attempts to find 
a `user-friendly' way of transcribing the tapes which ended up in a long-term loan of a proper 
(and expensive) transcription machine. 
"The three other hospitals had been happy to supply lists of the consultants but Hospital C was not prepared to do this which meant the pool of 
consultants ww as smaller than really appropriate 
for the size of the hospital. A major scandal had just hit the headlines with several doctors at 
Hospital C being accused of professional misconduct. 
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A. 34 Letters were sent outlining the nature of the research requesting time for an interview. 35 Appointments 
were made with those who responded affirmatively. 36 Three consultants responded by letter only setting out 
their views. 37 At the start of each interview, confidentiality was reaffirmed and the consultants were offered 
the choice of having it taped or handwritten notes made instead. Four consultants opted for the latter option 
and one, after a few minutes, said she felt relaxed enough to let me tape the rest which was done. The majority 
of interviews lasted half an hour but several lasted up to ninety minutes. Three were very short because of 
urgent calls upon the consultant's time so have not been used. After some of the interviews, the researcher's 
own reflections/comments were added to the tape. 38 Eighty-four tapes/interview notes were successfully 
transcribed in full resulting in a total of 375 pages of original material. 39 

















A 51 36 0 36 9 71 
B 36 20 1 19 1 61 
C 37 21 1 18 4 59 
D 26 18 1 17 3 73 
Totals 150 95 3 88 17 65 
1.4 Data Analysis 
Although data analysis was carried out after completion of the surveys, informal data analysis naturally occurs 
during the interviewing process in the sense that the researcher attempts to rationalise what is being said in 
light of existing knowledge and understanding. A semi-structured interview technique was utilised but to 
minimise any distortion that might occur as a result of premature informal analysis, the format was kept as 
consistent as possible with further questioning restricted to clarification of statements made. 4° Some 
interviewees were unsure whether I was only looking for comments about resource allocation when the 
questioning moved from the early questions regarding the effect of resources on their practice to questions 
regarding the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment from individual patients. This indicated a 
minor flaw in the design of the questionnaire but one that was easily overcome by clarification of the question. 
An awareness was maintained that prior opinion and the influence of the earlier interviews could prevent 
totally unbiased analysis and a concerted effort was made to approach the interviews `without any advance 
"This was done by selecting within the specialties rather than alphabetically. At Hospital D, the pilot hospital, 
letters were sent to all the 
consultants. Some consultants were attached to more than one of the hospitals. 
"See Appendix One. 
"it is recognised that this can be a source of research error in that the inaccessibility of some consultants could 
be due to excessive workload 
and/or uncooperativeness and valuable and/or balancing insights could consequently be missed: 
Miles MB, Huberman M, op cit n26, at p264. 
"This option had not been offered but the ones who did this were too busy in the near future to offer an appointment 
but wished to make their 
views known. Only one of these has been used (131) because it followed an extensive telephone 
discussion during which we went through the 
questionnaire but, at her request, she then 
followed up with a letter setting out her views upon further reflection. 
"The comments added later included ones which explained interruptions such as fire-alarms being set off and also where the 
interview took place 
if it was not the consultant's own office since this might have prevented the consultant feeling relaxed etc. 
No attempt to interpret body language 
was made. None of the factors which were noted seemed to have distorted the interview 
in any way. 
"Including two pages of comments extracted from the letter sent by consultant D1. One of the tapes had inadvertently been recorded over 
by 
a subsequent interview. A couple of tapes suffered 
damage and had some sections that were inaudible, however, mostly they were usable, even 
the one where a faulty fire alarm kept going throughout the interview. 
"Silverman D, op cit n22 at p93, accepts Selltiz' rules and taboos about interviewing: `Interviewers should ask each question precisely as it is 
worded and in the same order it appears on the schedule. They should not show surprise or disapproval of an answer, offer 
impromptu 
explanations of questions. suggest possible replies or skip certain questions. ' 
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knowledge or assumptions' . 
4' The questions were designed not to `lead' and were mostly open questions which 
enabled the interviewee to interpret them freely. The semi-structured interview was favoured because it allows 
the interviewer to clarify issues and probe producing in-depth material. 42 Disadvantages include the inhibitions 
structuring imposes on the way ideas are normally exchanged but good interviewing skills on the part of the 
researcher can establish the rapport necessary to `socialise' the interview. 43 Although interviewing can be seen 
as a `masculine paradigm'44, maintaining professionalism can avoid gender-related distortions. 45 After the 
`formal' interview had ended and the tape-recorder turned off, several of the consultants then talked more 
freely and related some controversial anecdotes. A note was made of the content of this discussion on leaving 
the interview premises. However, this information has not been drawn upon as part of the data for this thesis 
because it would be subject to inaccuracies in recording and possible bias since the author was able to engage 
in debate about the topic. 46 
In order to analyse the data, `patterns, themes, consistencies and exceptions to the rule' were sought. ' This 
meant engaging in detailed conceptual analysis of the interviews, reading each several times and noting the 
themes and patterns that began to emerge whilst guarding against distortion. 48 Each transcript was analysed 
question by question with typical and atypical responses noted. 49 The analyses and the interviews were all 
conducted by the same person which some consider necessary for purity. 50 These were then appraised in the 
light of preceding discussions regarding current legal and ethical opinion in order to sensitise the issues. 
Awareness was maintained that the transcripts could reflect both `true accounts' and `situated narratives"' but 
were taken as `informed statement(s) by the person whose experiences are under investigation'. " Direct 
quotations were extracted from the transcripts of the interviews in order to illustrate the analysis but care was 
taken to ensure that the quoted material had coherence with the rest of the interview to avoid erroneous 
misrepresentation. 53 Miles and Huberman note that the researcher operating alone, as in this case, `runs several 
risks of generalising wrongly from specific instances'. 54 In particular, care has been taken to avoid `drawing 
inferences from nonrepresentative processes' due to 'nonrepresentative.. . events;. . . good 
fit into emerging 
"The approach taken was as objective as possible to overcome the researcher's own views. It accorded closely with that described by Häggman- 
Laitila: Häggman-Laitila A. The Authenticity and Ethics of Phenomenological Research: How to overcome the researcher's own views. Nursing 
Ethics 1999; 6,1: 12-22 at p12. 
"Hitchcock G, Hughes D. Research and the Teacher: A Qualitative Introduction to School-based Research. 2nd Edn. 1995 Routledge, 
London at p157. 
43Ibid, at ppl58-160. 
"Oakley A. Essays on Women, Medicine and Health. 1993 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh at p222. 
"See: Hitchcock & Hughes, op cit n42, at p166 and Oakley, op cit n44 at pp221-242. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate in the 
light of Oakley's thesis whether a satisfactory interview can be conducted by a woman researcher `interviewing' males of a traditionally dominant 
group such as doctors. 
46There was also a tacit understanding that such comments were `off the record' and consequently not to be used and this has been respected 
although it could be argued that since the purpose of the meetings was to elicit information about how doctors make decisions nothing was off- 
record. 
"Hitchcock & Hughes, op cit n42, at p296. 
"The approach taken was based on that advocated by Miles and Huberman who suggest the following tactics should be employed: `Noting 
patterns, themes... seeing plausibility and clustering... making metaphors... counting... making contrasts/comparisons ... partitioning 
variables... subsuming particulars into the general... factoring... noting relations between variable... finding intervening variables... building a logical 
chain of evidence... making conceptual/theoretical coherence'. Miles MB, Huberman M, op cit n26, at pp245-6. 
49Lewando-Hundt G et al. How to do (or not to do)...: Comparing manual with software analysis in qualitative research: undressing Nud. ist. 
Health Policy and Planning 1997; 12,4: 372-380. 
50lbid, at p15. 
''Silverman, op cit n22 at p108- 
52 Ibid, at p107. 
''Silverman has repeatedly pointed out the danger that the researcher may use `favoured examples to make a point and thus to tell a"story` about 
the data that is rhetorically rather than scientifically convincing'. Silverman D. Applying the qualitative method to clinical care. In: Daly J, 
McDonald I, Willis E. Researching Health Care: Designs, Dilemmas, Disciplines. 1992 Tavistock/Routledge, London pp 176-188, at pI85. 
Also, Silverman D. Telling Convincing Stories: A Plea for Cautious Positivism in Case-Studies. In: Glassner B, Moreno J (Eds) The Qualitative- 
Quantitative Distinction in the Social Sciences. 1989 Kluwer, Dordrecht at p57-77. 
541; 1 Iles MB, Huberman M. An Expanded Qualitative Data Analysis 2nd edn. 1994 Sage, London at p264. 
- Chapter 1 page 6- 
explanation; holistic bias'. 55 To maintain balance, contrasting cases have been identified and the population 
of senior decision-makers (consultant grade doctors) was randomly sampled. Conclusions will not be drawn 
as to whether one specialty has differing views from another since the number of consultants within a particular 
discipline was necessarily small. 56 Thus, the analysis will consider how consultants in general make decisions 
about withholding and withdrawing treatment. At times it will be appropriate to compare and contrast 
individual statements and, occasionally, anecdotal evidence (patient case histories) will be reported. Statistical 
analysis of the number of consultants stating certain views has not been carried out because, overall, the 
numbers involved were small and from disparate specialties although, occasionally, comments/numbers have 
been included as to whether a majority or minority of responses reflected a certain approach. 57 As Silverman 
holds, `work that is not based on experimental or statistical methods need not be anecdotal'. 58 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Research aims, objectives and methodology are outlined in this chapter (one). The next chapter (two) examines 
British state-funded healthcare provision in the 1990s and identifies the nature of the conflicts. Chapter three 
describes how doctors make decisions to withhold medical treatment whilst chapter four describes decisions 
to withdraw treatment. The different factors taken into account by doctors when making decisions to withdraw 
treatment as opposed to non-commencement of treatment are identified. At this stage it is possible to start to 
identify what criteria any normative proposals regarding treatment decisions must fulfil. The next two chapters 
investigate and evaluate models others suggest are appropriate. Chapter five examines politico-economic, 
medical and `ethical' models for allocating resources and determining who receives or does not receive 
treatment. It establishes that these models are isolated from each other and only produce partial solutions to 
the problem of when to treat or not to treat. Chapter six explores how the law determines whether treatment 
should be given or not and identifies the extent to which medical opinion dominates judicial reasoning. This 
has the consequence that elderly and learning/physically disabled patients seem insufficiently protected against 
discriminatory practices. Chapter seven critiques key reform proposals that have been made since the empirical 
research for this thesis was conducted. It concludes that these, like the existing models described in chapters 
five and six, fail to fully resolve the problems identified in chapters two, three and four. Therefore, in the final 
chapter (eight), recommendations for ways to improve decision-making are made and a new process is 
proposed. 
'5lbid. 
"It is probable, though, that differences between specialties and hospitals, partly due to the culture of the specialty and organisation and partly 
due to other factors, exist. For instance, see Pijnenborg Let al: Withdrawal or Withholding of Treatment at the End of Life - Results of a 
Nationwide Study. . 4rch. 
Intern. Med. 1995; 155: 286-292. They report that surgeons make the most non-treatment decisions and cardiologists 
the fewest. A list of consultants by specialty and hospital size can be found in Appendix Two. Each has been given an individual code which 
will be used whenever a direct quote from the interview with that consultant is made. The four hospitals included are labelled A-D, and then 
consultants within each are numbered. 
''There are conflicting views as to whether statistical analysis should be carried out: Najman, op cit n 18, at pp146-7, suggests it is appropriate. 
In contrast, Silverman believes that `quantification can arbitrarily impose categories on complex, naturally occurring phenomena'. Silverman 
D. Applying the qualitative method to clinical care. In: Daly J, McDonald I, Willis E. Researching Health Care: Designs, Dilemmas, 
Disciplines. 1992 Tavistock/Routledge, London at p 185. Miles and Huberman, op cit n54 at p253, hold that qualitative researchers should resort 
to numbers only for the following reasons: `to see rapidly what you have in a large batch of data; to verify a hunch or a hypothesis; and to keep 
yourself analytically honest, protecting against bias'. 
Silverman, op cit n57 at p187. 
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1.6 Limitations of the Research 
Only a limited number of doctors/hospitals were involved and no GPs, health authority purchasers or 
patients/relatives were interviewed. Physical illness was concentrated on rather than mental illness. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BRITISH STATE HEALTHCARE PROVISION 
IN THE 1990's 
The NHS was created in 1948. ' It was intended to achieve the 'establishment ... of a comprehensive 
health 
service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people... and the prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of illness. '2 Financial barriers to healthcare should disappear. ' Justice was the 
underlying principle though many have questioned how equal access to healthcare is. 4 The promise was that 
`every man and woman and child can rely on getting all the advice and treatment and care which they need' 
and they shall get `the best medical and other facilities available'. ' Since its conception the NHS has witnessed 
advances in medicine and changes in social attitudes which have tested its ability to provide universal 
healthcare provision at a satisfactory, and fiscally sustainable, standard. ' Major reforms were introduced at 
the start of the 1990s to try to address some of the challenges facing the NHS. These were modified towards 
the end of this period following the replacement of an eighteen year Conservative administration by a Labour 
government. This chapter examines the NHS as it was at the time of conducting the research for this thesis 
and the changes introduced following the 1997 election. The problems besetting doctors as decision-makers 
are identified. The following chapters will then examine how individual decisions to withhold or withdraw 
medical treatment are made. 
2.1 Background to the 1990 Reforms 
Although based on a `pay as you go' system' it was obvious very early that NHS demand would outstrip 
affordable supply. ' Diseases of old-age became more common. ' Childhood deaths became rare and were 
accompanied by a sense that the NHS had let the child down. 1° Critics point out that `(m)edical advance has 
been a major driver of increased healthcare expenditure over the past few decades'. 
" Doctors are blamed 
because `the major - and most expensive - part of medical technology as applied today appears to 
be more for 
the satisfaction of the health professionals than for the benefit of consumers of healthcare. 
"' By 2001,8% of 
the population is expected to be `very elderly' (ie over 75 years) using nine times the healthcare resources a 
'By the National Health Service Act 1946. The founding principles are found in the 1944 White Paper: A National Health 
Service. (Cmnd 
6502) Ministry of Health: Sir John Hawton. 1944 HMSO, London. 
2The National Health Service Act 1946. Ch81 Part 1 Section 1. 
; Although long-stay residential and nursing home care was means-tested. Responsibility for both medical care and residential care rested with 
the Medical Officer of Health. 
'See for instance, AV Campbell: Medicine, Heath and Justice. 1978 Churchill Livingstone, London and Daniels N: Just Healthcare. 1985 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Also, Attfield R: The global distribution of healthcare resources. J. Med. Ethics 1990; 
16: 153-6. 
5Klein R: The New Politics of the NHS. 1995 Longman, London at p9. 
`Rivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London. See pp213-215. See also: Butler J. The Ethics of Health 
Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p232. 
7Which meant that income raised through national insurance or taxation from those with earnings or 
income above a certain level, is immediately 
paid out to support those whose income 
is non-existent or too low to enable them to purchase the necessities of life, including healthcare. 
'The Guillebaud Report. The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service. Chairman: 
CW Guillebaud. 
(Cmnd 9663) HMSO, London. 
9Department of Health. The National Health Service: A Service it ith Ambitions. 1996 The Stationery 
Office, London at p35. 
"As evidenced by the media coverage of the Child B case: Rv Cambridge District 
HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
"Department of Health, op cit n9 at p36. 
"Abel-Smith B: Value for Money in Health Services 1976 Heinemann, London at p221. 
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working-age person uses. 13 
Early reforms of the NHS meant that the many tiers and increased number of administrators complicated 
planning and led to a dissociation from the local community never fully resolved since. " RAWP (the Resource 
Allocation Working Party) recommended that funding to Regional Health Authorities should firstly be based 
on the population they served and then adjusted to take account of local variations regarding standardised 
mortality ratios, national age and gender specific hospital usage rates, the additional costs of providing 
healthcare in London compared with the rest of the country and the flow of patients between different regions. ' 5 
The intention was to reduce regional inequalities but the RAWP formula was adjusted to allow poorer regions 
to catch up with wealthier ones rather than lowering standards in better-funded regions. It had a major effect 
on the London area which had been previously well-funded with the result that in the 1980s, London health 
authorities had to make cuts in services. 16 The NHS is designed not only to deliver medical care to individuals 
but also to `allocate and reallocate resources' hence, reforms focus on improving management. " In 1979, the 
NHS aimed to promote individual health; provide equality of entitlement and access to health services; provide 
a broad range of services free at the time of use; satisfy reasonable expectations and be responsive to local 
needs. 18 
Such objectives, even with the omission of improving the nation's health, are difficult for any government to 
achieve regardless of political persuasion. Structural reforms based on Patients First19 were introduced to 
reflect `social geography' more than local authority boundaries. Sir Roy Griffiths criticised the lack of 
accountability within NHS management and `consensus management'. 2° His recommendations resulted in the 
appointment of managers accountable for improving efficiency but they lacked powers to restrict the spending 
of clinicians who kept their `right of clinical freedom' agreed at the start of the NHS. In 1988, a distinction 
was made between policy aims and service objectives21 to clarify how health authorities use their allocated 
funds. 22 Emphasis was placed on improving the health of the population. 23 GP and dentist contracts were 
reformed with financial incentives introduced to improve patient health/prevent disease. 24 Working for 
Patients, presented changes to increase efficient use of resources and address management problems. 25 Caring 
for People", responded to the concerns of the 1988 Griffiths Report. 27 RAWP was modified to enable resources 
13Government Statistical Service. Health and social service statisticsfor England. 1994 HMSO, London. See also, Skedelsky R: Cuts to benefit 
the nation. The Sunday Times I1 February 1996. 
14Sir Alec Merrison. Royal Commission on the National Health Service. (Cmnd 7615) 1979 HMSO, London. He was the vice-chancellor of 
Bristol University and was asked to conduct the investigation in 1976. See also: Kelly M, Glover I. In search of health and efficiency: the NHS 
1948 - 1994. In Leopold J et al (Eds) Beyond Reason? 
The National Health Service and the Limits of Management. 1996 Stirling Management 
Series, Avebury at p19. 
SRAWP: Sharing Resources for Health in England. 1976 HMSO, London. 
'6Baggott R. Health and Healthcare in Britain. 1994 McMillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p187. 
"Levitt R, Wall A. The Reorganised National Health Service. 3rd Edn. 1984 Croom Helm, London at pp 17-18. 
Sir Alec Merrison. Royal Commission on the National Health Service (Cmnd 7615) 1979 HMSO, London at p9, para 2.6. 
'9Department of Health and Social Security. December 1979 HMSO, London. 
20Sir Roy Griffiths. The NHS Management Inquiry. October 1983. HMSO, London. 
21 Service objectives included the introduction of the Patient's Charter in 1991 which set out what patients should expect 
in terms of waiting times, 
cancellations and handling of complaints. 
22Department of Health. Health of the Population: Responsibilities of Health Authorities. HC(88)64 1988 HMSO, 
London. 
23Secretary of State for Health. Promoting Better Health (Cm 249) 1987 HMSO, London. Guidance was 
issued in the following documents: 
Health Services Development. Resource Assumptions and Planning Guidance (HC(88)43,1988 & HC(89)24,1989) and NHS Priorities 
in 1991/2 (EL(90)154,1990), all HMSO, London. 
14Benzeval M et al. Tackling Inequalities in Health: An Agenda for Action. 1997 Kings Fund, London. In particular, see p 
100 for a critique 
of the payments to GPs in deprived areas. 
25Secretary of State for Health. Jvorkingfor Patients (Cm 555) 1989 HMSO, London. A critique of the reforms proposed in this 
document can 
be found in: Maynard A: Whither the NHS. 1989 Centre for Health Economics, York. 
26Secretary of State for Health. Caring for People. (Cm 849) 1989 HMSO, London. 
"Sir Roy Griffiths. Community Care: Agenda for Action. 1988 HMSO, London. 
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to be allocated on the basis of the size of the RHA28 and the age and health of residents. 29 Local authorities 
were to identify healthcare needs of the local population and formulate community care plans with the NHS 
authorities. Emphasis was placed on `targeting' resources to appropriately meet a person's assessed needs. 
The difficulty of separating `needs' from `wants' is a perennial problem and the failure to account for 
`socioeconomic determinants of the demand for healthcare' created problems. 3° Ward closures; the failure of 
government to fund NHS pay awards fully leaving health authorities to make up the difference; the effects of 
RAWP and the death of a patient whose operation was cancelled five times led to the reforms of 1991.31 
2.2 The 1990 Reforms 
Government saw the NHS as `gridlocked' with healthcare professionals resisting attempts to improve 
efficiency. 32 The reform proposals demonstrated a belief that `competition leads to efficiency' and `professions 
should be subject to managerial accountability and control'. 33 They could be interpreted as a natural 
progression of society `from status to contract'. 34 However, the move towards interpreting healthcare 
relationships as fiduciary35 suggests that a contract model is inappropriate. The key reforms were the 
introduction of a new system of contractual funding; new methods for allocating resources and changes to 
strengthen management and control clinical activity. 36 An ever-increasing role for private37, charitable and 
voluntary sector provision was envisaged with tax incentives for individuals taking out private health 
insurance. 38 There were proposals that charges should be introduced for those who could pay. 39 The proposals 
were based on the `public contract' model of healthcare adopted by several European countries. 40 The idea was 
that publicly funded healthcare should be delivered via a decentralised market economy approach replacing 
state/professional paternalism with new emphasis on individual autonomy. 4' 
The National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 came into force in 1991 after a `stormy passage'42 
"Regional Health Authority. 
"See: Ham C: The New National Health Service: Organization and Management. pp51-7.1991 Radcliffe Medical Press Ltd, Oxford and 
Sheldon TA et al: Weighting in the dark: resource allocation in the new NHS. BMJ 1993; 306: 835-9. 
'OBenezeval M et al op cit n24 at p97. 
"Baggott R, op cit n16 at pp173-4. 
32lbid, p 176. 
330'Hara SP. The NHS - Past, present and future. Biomedical Scientist 1996: 605-7 at p605. 
i4Hughes D, Dingwall R. Sir Henry Maine, Joseph Stalin and the Reorganisation of the National Health Service. J. Social Welfare Lcnv 
1990,5: 296-309 at p296. 
35Harrington JA. Privileging the medical norm: liberalism, self-determination and refusal of treatment. Legal Studies 1996,16,3: 348-367 at 
p364-6. 
36National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. 
"The first PFI (private finance initiative) funded hospital, built near Dartford, Kent by Tarmac, opened September 2000. Others are set to open 
at Bromley and Carlisle. The Dartford hospital will be leased to the NHS for the first 25 years and at the end of that time, there is an option for 
ownership to pass from Tarmac to Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust. (personal communication). This means that just as the building is 
starting to age and need maintenance and modification to suit healthcare provision from 2025 onwards, ownership may pass to the state -a 
situation not dissimilar from that faced by the NHS at its inception. There were also suggestions that healthcare charges should be introduced 
for those who could afford to pay them (Healthcare 2000. UK Health and Healthcare Services: Challenges and Policy Options. 1995). 
18The Health and Medicines Act 1988 gave health authorities the right to sell land, services etc. at the market rate and the National Health Service 
and Community Care Act 1990 enabled the introduction of Private Finance Initiatives(PFI) to attract private funding into healthcare. £5 billion 
worth of projects was agreed before the change ofgovemment: Butler J. The privatisation of the National Health Service. J. Royal Soc. Medicine 
1997; 90: 3-7 at p5. 
"Healthcare 2000. UK Health and Healthcare Services: Challenges and Policy Options. 1995 Healthcare 2000, London. 
4"Hurst JW. Reforming healthcare in seven European countries. Health Affairs 1991; 10,3: 7-21. 
"Edgar A. Healthcare Allocation, Public Consultation and the Concept of `Health'. Healthcare Analysis 1998; 6: 193-8 at p 193. 
42The BMA spent £3 million on a campaign opposing the reforms and the loss of the medical veto on changes to the NHS. Timmins N .: 
\ HS50th 
Anniversar :. 4 history of the NHS 1996 The Financial Times. Reprinted 1998 NHS 50, NHS Executive, Leeds. It commissioned its own report 
on the proposals. BMA. Special Report on the Government's White Paper `Working for Patients'. 1989 BMA, London. 
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not least because of its heavy reliance on 'delegated legislation'. 43 The strength of opposition meant the 
reforms were more gradual than envisaged. ` An `internal market' within the NHS was created despite the lack 
of pilots to test the philosophy first. As Baggott later pointed out, Williamson, in 1975, had shown that 
markets were `less effective than hierarchies' in circumstances such as those that exist in healthcare: 'small 
numbers of specialist providers; where great uncertainty and technical complexity exist; where providers or 
purchasers can be tied into contracts for long periods; where there is imperfect knowledge about costs. and, 
where scope for `opportunistic behaviour' exists'. 45 Research into treatment outcomes and health economics 
produced increasing emphasis upon cost-effectiveness ('opportunity costs'). 46 Measurements of health 
outcomes became `central to assessing the performance of health authorities and NHS Trusts'. 47 Cooperation 
between the different agencies was essential for the system to work effectively but in reality proved difficult 
to achieve. Local authorities were given responsibility to purchase residential care and monitor its provision. 
This, combined with the gradual erosion of state funding, means more old people have to fund their own care. 48 
a9 Patients block hospital beds due to a lack of local authority provision. 
The `purchaser: provider split' was introduced with Health Authority 'purchasers '50, whose role was `to 
purchase treatment from whichever provider can offer the most appropriate and cost-effective package', and 
District General Hospitals `providers'. Each provider was perceived to be in competition with its neighbour. 
Treatment 'episodes"' or `packages of care' were to be costed and tenders submitted to purchasers just as 
businesses tender for service contracts. However, these `contracts' were not intended to be enforceable under 
normal contract law52 and the situation was likened to pre-perestroika Soviet law. 53 Public and private 
providers were theoretically competing fairly54 but the private sector could set up loss-leader services to gain 
entry to the market. 55 There was active encouragement for hospitals and ambulance services to take quasi- 
private status as NHS Trusts to gain greater autonomy. 56 The structure of the NHS was changed to strengthen 
the position of managers. 57 The Secretary of State for Health, ultimately accountable to parliament for the 
43Hughes D. The Reorganisation of the National Health Service: The Rhetoric and Reality of the Internal Market. Modern Law Review 
1991,54: 88-103 at p88. The same criticism can be made regarding the use of `Henry VIII clauses' in the 1999 Health Act. 
44Baggott R, op cit n16, at p188. 
451bid, at p181. 
4 Department of Health. Primary Care: Delivering the Future. December 1996. The Stationery Office Ltd, London at p34. 
47Department of Health. The National Health Service: A Service with Ambitions. November 1996. The Stationery Office Ltd, London at p45. 
48Butler J. The privatisation of the National Health Service. J. Royal Soc. Medicine 1997; 90: 3-7 at p5. The changes were made because the 
cost of funding residential care had risen from £39 million in 1982 to £2.5 billion in 1993: Health Committee. First Report: Long-Term Care: 
NHS Responsibilities for Meeting Continuing Healthcare Needs. HC 19-1 para. 15.1995 HMSO, London. 
"Department of Health. The nerv NHS Modern Dependable (Cm3807). December 1997. The Stationery Office, London. 
"Previously, the Health Authorities had run the hospitals directly. 
"An episode' of care might be loosely defined as the care given to an individual patient for an individual healthcare need. This can lead to 
`creative' accounting in that when a patient is transferred from one consultant to another within a hospital, the first consultant is credited with 
having completed a treatment episode and a new, separately chargeable episode then begins with the second consultant. 
"Jacob JM. Lawyers go to hospital Public Law 1991,255-281. 
"Hughes D, Dingwall R, Sir Henry Maine, Joseph Stalin and the Reorganisation of the National Health Service. J. Social Welfare Law 
1990,5: 296-309 at pp304-5. 
54A new system of charging for capital was introduced to encourage better use of capital assets and recognition of their costs. This meant that 
when NHS providers tender for contracts they did soon an even basis with private providers who had always had to include elements 
for capital 
costs within their tenders. Auditing of accounts was moved to the Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National 
Health Service: 
National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 s20. 
"Tenders could be sought for all elements of hospital care from providing the catering, laundry or cleaning services to providing pathology 
services and hip replacements. One example the author knows of from her previous experience in pathology 
is of a Cornish hospital which lost 
much of its biochemistry work to a private laboratory based in South Wales which used motorbike couriers to transport specimens several times 
a day from the local GPs to Wales and provided the GP surgeries with computer links directly to the 
laboratory for instantaneous transfer of 
results. 
"'Hospitals taking trust status would cease to be accountable to the DHAs and would be directly accountable to central government. The concept 
of Trust status was never satisfactorily explained. The Trusts did not fit the usual legal understanding of what a 
`trust' is but nor did the 
`contracts' between District Health Authorities and NHS Trust fit into the normal concept of a `contract'. See: Hughes D op cit n43 at pp90-92. 
57 Under the Secretary of State and the Department of Health, the next tier comprised, as separate entities, the Special Health Authorities, the 
Regional Health Authorities and the NHS Trusts. These are directly accountable to the Secretary of State and include the 8 London teaching 
authorities, the NHS Training Authority and the Mental Health Act Commission. The AHA administrative tier was abolished. 
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provision of healthcare, was placed in charge of the Department of Health which, together with a policy- 
making unit, the NHS Executive, and the Management Executive was expected to deliver clear guidelines for 
NHS operations and expenditure. There were slimmed-down, more business-like DHAs and Family Health 
Services Authorities with reduced lay input. 58 The number and persuasiveness of Community Health Councils 
was reduced, seemingly at odds with the credo of `consumerism'. 59 
Purchasers had to assess the healthcare needs of their local population and determine what, and how many, 
treatments to purchase whereas before, they were allocated money to provide services within their hospitals. 
At first, many purchasers left allocation of funds to doctors and opportunities for rational planning were 
missed. 6° Purchasers lacked expertise and skills. b' Contracts fell into three main types: block contracts (eg for 
maternity care where it is impossible to predict demand), cost and volume contracts (a basic level of treatment 
is purchased and extra payments are made for treatment above this level) and cost per case contracts where a 
fixed price is paid for each case (often used for expensive treatment and extra-contractual referrals eg. heart 
transplants). 62 Purchasers had little freedom since they were expected to meet government targets on national 
priorities. 63 In some regions, clinicians were involved in agreeing protocols for referral into the system. 64 As 
Klein says, `demand for healthcare is what the medical profession makes it'65 raising a fundamental question 
as to whether health professionals should have a major role in resource allocation. There was a gap between 
`aspirational priorities' and the financial commitments made. " Some consider gaps unavoidable. 67 The 
amount available for purchasers to spend held potential for `blanket' exclusions of certain patients who might 
otherwise benefit from treatment68 with little redress available to individuals since judges will not interfere 
with `clinical' decisions and the Ombudsman, to his dissatisfaction, was precluded by statute from so doing. 69 
`Postcode' rationing became reality. 70 
There was also injustice caused by the differing amounts charged privately by providers. " There was little 
581990 Act sI; Sch. I, paras. 2&3. Selection bias towards certain backgrounds and social standing remained unaddressed possibly because it 
was efficient because of the articulateness of those chosen. `Alienation' occurred as a result. Randall A. In Healthcare: Resources, Choices 
and Decisions Si Catherine's Conference Report No37 1993 The King George VI and Queen Elizabeth Foundation of St Catherine's 
Cumberland Lodge, Windsor at p13. 
'`'BMA. Special Report on the Government's White Paper `Workingfor Patients'. 1989 BMA, London at para. 8.7. There was no obligation 
on an NHS Trust to open its meetings to CHC representatives. Similarly, health authorities no longer needed to have local authority 
representatives on their boards leading to further distancing of health from social care. 
60Baggott R, op cit n16 at p187. 
6'Klein R. Why Britain is Reorganizing its National Health Service - Yet Again. Health Affairs 1998; 17,4: 111-125 at p117. 
62Shepherd Jet al: Privatising the NHS: dentistry paves the way. BMJ 1996; 312: 922-3. See also: Baggott R. Health and Healthcare in Britain. 
1994 McMillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p187. 
63The UK is a signatory to the WHO document, Targets for Health for All as discussed in Smith A, Jacobson B (eds). The Nation 's Health: 
a strategy for the 1990s 1988 King's Fund for London, London at p119. See also the WHO Ljubljana Charter reproduced in BMJ 1996; 
312: 1663 with discussion at 1622-3. 
64For instance, guidelines were drawn up for referrals for D&C operations in Buckinghamshire: Holton S, Needham G. Successful 
purchasing. from information to action. 1995 King's Fund College, London. Case study 3 p17-22. 
65Klein R. Dimensions of rationing: who should do what? BMJ 1993; 307: 309-311. 
`'`Klein R, Day P& Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting and Rationing in the National Health Service. 1996 Oxford University 
Press, Oxford at p56. 
67Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at pp9-11 and ppl6-39. 
68For instance, regarding whether to resuscitate or not. Smith E et al. Resuscitation Status of the Elderly. J. Roy. Coll. Physicians 1992; 26: 377. 
Similarly, few hospitals offer speech therapy to those over 65 years of age and physiotherapy treatment may be available only on a very limited 
basis to those over 70 years. 
69 See, for example: Report of the Health Service Commissioner. October 1993 - March 1994 HMSO, London. Case No W711/92-93 - Refusal 
to fund in-vitro fertilisation treatment. p111-116. He has now been given the authority to investigate clinical decisions as part of increasing 
clinical accountability. 
"'See, for instance, Audit Commission. United they stand: Coordinating Care for Elderly Patients with Hip Fractures. 1995 HMSO, London. 
"In February 1996 Chelsea and Westminster Hospital was eventually cleared of a charge of breaching NHS rules by charging only £800 per 
treatment cycle (cost price) compared with the £1500-f2000 charged by most private clinics. The Times 21 February 1996. 
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incentive for providers to reduce costs since their potential to increase their market share was limited. 12 Despite 
their `trumpeted'" freedom NHS Trusts were restricted by `political expediency and public expenditure 
considerations'. 74 There was a lack of guidance leading to uncertainty which, coupled with a fragmented 
approach and resource constraints made it `difficult to offer comparable levels of care across similar services'. 75 
GP practices could elect to become `GP Fundholders"' which meant that, not only did they provide primary 
care but they were allocated funds to directly purchase treatment from providers like the DHAs but enhanced 
per capita payments meant the DHAs were at risk of being starved of funds. " Patients were removed from GPs 
lists for causing the doctor to miss target payments. 78 There is also a paradox in that doctors were not to be 
trusted to use money wisely within hospitals yet GPs were considered capable of handling large sums of public 
money wisely despite the lack of training. 79 The argument that they were in touch with the local population, 
and so could allocate resources more appropriately, was undermined by the manipulativeness of individual 
patients and the failure of GP Fundholders to place `health for their patients'8° before structural improvements 
to their privately owned premises. 8' Controlling doctors through financial incentives was seen as vital despite 
the evidence that most are motivated by commitment to a `caring, high-quality health service' not money. 8 
Emphasis was placed on clinicians becoming more aware of financial issues and `opportunity costs'. 83 More 
non-clinical managers came in to supply the necessary business skills thereby increasing administration costs84 
and contributing to demoralisation within the NHS. 85 Some doctors took on the role of both manager and 
clinician and tensions developed. 86 Good working relationships dissolved as competition and distrust became 
paramount in an effort to overcome the difficulty that there was often `no real choice' over where to obtain 
services, a problem recognised by the government prior to introducing the reforms. " Contracts were short-term 
so long-term service development suffered. 88 The reforms became `a major contributor to the financial 
pressures on core and emergency NHS hospital services"' possibly because in `a free market... supplying what 
the patient wants, rather than what the patient actually needs, will frequently result in greater reward'. 90 
The modification of RAWP led to anomalies such as psychiatry having targets to reduce suicide but funds were 
"Mulholland G, McAllister D. The Quasi Market in Health Care: Pre-requisites, Problems and Prospects. Public Policy and Administration 
1997; 12,1: 21-3 3 at p31. 
"Corby S, Mathieson H. The National Health Service and the limits to flexibility. Public Policy and Administration 1997; 12,4: 60-72 at p61. 
74 Ibid, at p67. 
"Broderick A. Ethical Considerations in Community Care: Implications for Policy and Service Provision. Public Policy and Administration 
1997; 12,1: 34-52 at p50. 
76Initially, they had to have more than 9,000 patients but the number of patients was soon reduced to 7,000. 
"The money allocated is deducted from the amount allocated to the DHA. In theory, it should mean that an equal amount of money is allocated 
per person within a certain district. However, as part ofthe incentives to encourage `opting-out' by GPs, an increased amount per capita has been 
allocated to fund-holders raising fears that if too many GPs became fund-holders in a certain area, the DHA would be left with no money to 
purchase care for patients of non-fund-holding GPs. 
"Rogers A et al. "If a patient is too costly they tend to get rid ofyou: " The impact of people's perceptions of rationing on the use of primary care. 
Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 225-237. 
71Schwartz Let al. Rationing Decisions: From Diversity to Consensus. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 195-205. 
"Audit Commission: Fundholding: the main report. The Stationery Office, London 1996. 
"Keeley D. General practice fundholding and healthcare costs. BMJ 1997; 315: 139. Keesley reports that GP Fundholders were permitted to 
spend money saved on patient care on `other ways of enhancing services to patients' with the result that 
in 1995-6 `fundholders in England spent 
81 % (of the saved money) on premises, materials and equipment'. 
"See Baggott R, op cit n16 at pp183-4. 
"This is the approach being taken by Cambridge and Huntingdonshire HA. Thornton S (Chief Executive) 
Response to Consultation on the 
Annual Plan 1997'8. February 1997 Cambridge and Huntingdonshire HA, Cambridge. 
"Paton C. Present dangers and future threats: some perverse incentives in the NHS reforms. BMJ 1995; 310: 1245-8. 
"Sorell T. Morality, consumerism and the internal market in healthcare. JMed. Ethics 1997; 23: 71-6 at p72. 
86See, for instance, Bruggen P. 1t'ho Cares? True stories of the ; VHS reforms. 1997 Jon Carpenter Publishing, Charlburv 
"Hughes D et al op cit n53, at p298. 
"Paton C, op cit n84 at p1245. Developments that did occur were often associated with the `cosmetics' of business so as to appear attractive 
to `consumers'. 
"Keeley D. General practice fundholding and healthcare costs. BMJ 1997; 315: 139. 
"Persaud RD. What future for ethical medical practice in the new National Health Service. J. Med. Ethics 1991,17: 10-18 at p 16. See also, Klein 
et al who report that GP fundholding produced no reduction 
in referral rates: Klein et al, op cit n60 at p85. 
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allocated on the mortality rates in different regions. Rationing of healthcare seemed more common and/or 
more apparent and less in line with popular opinion. 9' Money was expected to follow patients but failed to do 
so. 92 Less choice about where to refer patients resulted. 93 Giving the DHA control over extra-contractual 
referrals (ECRs) produced `low visibility rationing'. 94 It gave them control over where, or if, the patient was 
treated whereas, before, doctors decided this. Some hospitals, faced with difficulties funding ECRs, began to 
provide services themselves rather than using the nearest specialist centre producing disparity over expectations 
regarding improved choice and the actuality although some `supraregional' centres of excellence were 
introduced. 95 Family Health Service Authorities controlled the allocation of money to non-fund-holding GPs. 
The underlying philosophy was to encourage a climate in which it would eventually seem natural for 
privatisation of the NHS. 96 Patients gained `rights'97 without concomitant responsibilities. 98 The Charter was 
blamed for introducing imbalance in allocation of resources with `time on waiting list' taking precedence over 
clinical need. 99 New complaints procedures were introduced10° leading to an escalation in public discontent. "' 
Controversially, managers were given more control over consultants in terms of appointment, job description 
and contract - evidence of growing distrust of professionalism. Miller points out that doctors finally had to 
recognise that their `inefficient or unprofessionally irresponsible behaviour' could `imperil the economic 
survival of their employing institution'. 102 Senior doctors had to justify treatment costs to hospital managers, 
many of whom had no healthcare background, resulting in tensions. 1' Doctors were expected to become more 
accountable for resource management. Their independence, guaranteed at the start of the NHS, was replaced 
by non-clinical regulation. "' 
In 1995-6, NHS expenditure reached nearly £41 billion ie. 16% of all public spending. 105 In 1996, the 
government said that the NHS should be available to anyone who wishes to use it; high-quality, applying the 
latest knowledge and the highest professional standards; available on the basis of clinical need, without regard 
for the patient's ability to pay and responsive to the needs and wishes of patients and carers. 106 The search for 
`better and more efficient ways to meet the needs of patients must be relentless'. 1°7 Success would be judged 
"For instance, see the media debate over Child B (the ten-year old with leukaemia for whom the decision to refuse further treatment was initially 
expressed by the Health Authority as due to the costs involved and the need to fund care for others) and Rhys Daniels (whose bone marrow 
transplant was cancelled due to the closure of the unit treating him) and also the debate over Taxol for breast cancer patients. See discussion 
in Chapter 8. 
"Klein R. Why Britain is Reorganizing its National Health Service - Yet Again. Health Affairs 1998; 17,4: 111-125 at p117. 
93Mulholland & McAllister, op cit n72 at p26. 
"Klein et at, op cit n60 at p81. 
95Mulholland G, McAllister D op cit n72, at p26. 
96Jacob JM. Lawyers go to hospital Public Lmv 1991,255-281,260-1. 
97Via a Patients' Charter introduced in 1992 as part of the reforms under the 1990 Act (The Patients' Charter and You: A Charter for England 
1991 (revised 1995) Dept. of Health, Wetherby). See also: Dyke G. The New NHS Charter -A Different Approach November 1998 Department 
of Health, Wetherby. 
"This is being addressed with the introduction of a Zero Tolerance approach towards violent attacks on healthcare staff: Department of Health. 
We don't have to take this: Resource Pack. L20/002 November 1999 DoH, Wetherby. 
"Royce RG. Observations on the NHS internal market: will the dodo get the last laugh? BMJ 1995; 311: 431-3 at p432. 
"'Introduced in 1988 under the Hospital Complaints Act 1985. The initial procedure was modified later: NHSE. Complaints, Listening..., 4 cling 
Improving: Guidance on Implementation of the NHS Complaints Procedure. March 1996 NHS Executive, Leeds. This followed criticisms 
in the Wilson Committee Report (Being Heard 1994 Dept. of Health, London) and the government response in 1995 (Government Response 
to Review of NHS Complaints Procedures Incorporating Acting on Complaints EL(95)37 Dept. of Health, London). 
'°'For a commentary on the effect of the Patients' Charter and the encouragement of a complaints culture see Bruggen P. Who Cares? True 
stories of the VHS reforms. 1997 Jon Carpenter Publishing , 
Charlbury, in particular pp132-133, pp 142-3,176-191. 
"'Miller F. Competition Law and Anticompetitive Professional Behaviour. Mod. Law Review 1992; 55,4: 453-481 at p462. 
"'Ibid. 
104Hughes D op cit n43, at p99. 
1°5O'Hara SP. The NHS - Past, present and future. Biomedical Scientist 1996: 605-7. According to the Dept of Health publication On the State 
of the Public Health 1995 (HMSO, London at p19) the resident population of England was 48.9 million. 
""Secretary of State for Health. The: Vational Health Service:. 4 Service with Ambitions (Cm 3425) The Stationery Office Ltd, London at pp4-5. 
107Ibid, at p5. 
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under the headings of equity, efficiency and responsiveness with a strong focus on primary care. S Government 
measures to encourage self-sufficiency resulted in a `two-tier' healthcare system1°9 despite efforts to prevent 
this. 1° The quasi-market generated `powerful forces creating inequality of access'. "' The Major reforms 
concentrated more on effectiveness than fairness. 1' Medical audit was positively encouraged, 1' a process the 
present government is reinforcing. Technology began to be introduced to disseminate information. 1' Priorities 
within the acute sector focused on reducing waiting times with increased use of day beds for elective surgery. 
National and international trends encouraged greater social responsibility in healthcare. "' The internal market 
helped to distance the government from blame as rationing decisions and waiting lists could be represented 
as reflecting local priorities or poor business management. A danger was identified that `today's healthcare 
managers find themselves drifting between idealism and pragmatism, outwardly committed to a human service 
ideal yet conditioned by a survival mentality to favour the bottom line of financial well-being'. "' As Wall 
objects, people without clinical qualification or professional/statutory codes of conduct to guide them were 
making resource allocation decisions. "' Market economists are suspicious of the public service ethos yet the 
market economy depended upon the altruism of the voluntary sector to fill in the gaps in state provision. 1' The 
public became increasingly critical. "' Legal challenges against refusal of funding for treatment were 
highlighted alongside stories of `postcode' rationing in the media. 120 It became clear that the market economy 
in health was failing. 121 
2.3 Reforming the Reforms 
The change in government in May 1997 led to an immediate announcement of the ending of the internal 
market' 22 and an avowal to reintroduce the forgotten principle of equity in outcome which universality of access 
does not ensure. 12' Ham rightly predicted that, like the New Zealand healthcare reforms which abolished 
"'Department of Health. On the State of the Public's Health. 1995 HMSO, London at p130. See also, NHS Executive. Priorities and 
Planning Guidance for the NHS: 1997/98. June 1996 Dept. of Health, Leeds. Total spend on primary care in 1996-97 was around £12.45 
billion and represented 36% of the total revenue of the NHS: Department of Health. Primary Care: Delivering The Future. December 1996 
HMSO, London. 
'o9Kammerling R, Kinnear A: The extent of the two tier service for fundholders. BMJ 1996; 312: 1399-1401. Contra: Klein R. Why Britain is 
Reorganizing its National Health Service - Yet Again. Health Affairs 1998; 17,4: 111-125 at p118. 
"'Cutler T, Waine B. The politics of quasi-markets. Critical Social Policy 1997; 17,2: 3-26 at p9. 
"'Ibid, at p20. 
"2Milbum A. For a healthier Britain. Fabian Review 1997; 109,3: 22. 
"'GPs were given prescribing, analysis and cost data enabling them to monitor drug expenditure. The development of diagnostic methods 
suitable for use by GPs or nurses meant less emphasis on hospitals for diagnosis thus changing the shape of primary care in the future. 
"'In 1995, the NHS superhighway was launched which means that patient's files can be transferred across the country in seconds facilitating 
referrals and the obtaining of second opinions. Similar technology is used for fast delivery of laboratory results to GPs and wards. 
"5Catford J. Public health -past, present andfuture. The NHS Handbook. 10th Edn. JMH Publishing, London. 1995. See also: Jacob JM. 
Lawyers go to hospital Public Law 1991,255-281 at p258 and Department of Health. The Health of the Nation. 1992 HMSO, London. 
"'Levey R, Hill M. Between Survival and Social Responsibility: in search of an ethical balance. J. Health Administration Education Spring 
1986; 225-231 at p230. 
"'Wall A. Ethics and the Health Services Manager. 1989 King Edward's Fund for London, London. 
"'Ham C. Contestability: a middle path for healthcare. BMJ 1996; 312: 70-71. 
`For a description of some of the media stories see: Klein et al, op cit n60 at pp78-82. 
120For instance, one of the most contentious forms of inequality is the provison of in-vitro fertilisation therapy. Woman's Weekly 11 June 1996 
reported that Dudley HA funds 70 IVF cycles per year and North Birmingham funds 60-70 yet just down the road South Birmingham and 
Solihull HAs fund no IVF treatment. Moving a couple of miles can make the difference between having to pay or not. See also: Rationing by 
Postcode. Health Which? June 1999 pp14-17 which reports which health authorities fund IVF, Beta interferon for multiple sclerosis, cochlear 
implants and reversal of sterilisation. Also: Anon. IVF 'rationed by postcodes'. Health Manager Today April/May 1999. 
12'Ham C. Contestability: a middle path for healthcare. BMJ 1996; 312: 70-71. 
'22A letter was sent by the incoming Labour administration to all Chief Executives of HAs. NHS Trusts and GPs announcing the end of the 
internal market. NHS Executive Changing the Internal Market EL(97)33.22 May 1997. The Dept. of Health announced the End of the 'two- 
tier' system: Dept. of Health. Fairness and Equity for Hospital Treatment. DOH 97/169.16 July 1997. Ham C. Reforming the New Zealand 
health reforms. BMJ 1997: 314,1844-5. 
'Z'For a description of evolutionary reforms in healthcare systems see Abel-Smith B.. -1 review of Healthcare systems in seventeen OECD 
countries 1994 OECD, Paris at ppl5-27. 
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competition, there would be a similar emphasis on primary care and health outcomes. 124 However, NHS reform 
measures are consistently grounded in politico-economic considerations and lack the identification, and 
analysis, of ethical issues that can be provided by specialist advisors. 12' Whichever political group holds power, 
decisions still have to be made about how much money the state can safely remove from its citizens before 
rebellion occurs, and then how that money should be spent. 12' More money is being put into the NHS" but 
despite predictions in 1997, a `health tax' to fund the NHS has not been introduced. 12' Such a tax had been 
considered prior to the 1990 reforms129 but they can `stifle growth in times of economic recession; reduce 
government's budgetary flexibility (and/or) raise questions of accountability, if an independent body decides 
how much tax to raise'. 13' Instead, the focus is on educating the public about the costs of ill-health to 
individuals and to society. 13' 
Initial plans, aiming to `build on' what the 1990 reforms had achieved, 132 were revealed in The new NHS: 
Modern Dependable. 133 The main stated aim is to improve quality thereby reducing 'unfairness' . 
13' The move 
from `secondary care' to primary care was not universally welcomed but is being developed further by this 
administration. 13' Greater control over professionals and the standards of care they provide is sought via the 
introduction of `clinical governance' 13' a concept whose meaning is only gradually becoming clear. 13' This will 
end their nineteenth-century `autonomy from both executive and legislative power'. 135 New disciplinary bodies 
are scheduled to be introduced possibly because of concerns over self-policing. 131 
The Acheson Report confirmed that inequalities in health were still rife. 14' Saving Lives then set out a `third 
way"4' with two key aims for the NHS as part of an overall strategy encompassing housing, environmental and 
'24Ham C. Reforming the New Zealand health reforms. BMJ 1997; 314,1844-5. 
115 Wall A. Best Behaviour. Health Service J: Health Management Guide May 1995 at pp3-7. 
126Kaletsky A. Has the Chancellor got his priorities right this time? The Times 10 March 1999. 
'27Department of Health Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation. (Cm 4386) July 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
128Grice A. Brown plans health tax to aid NHS. Sunday Times 29 June 1997. 
129Baggott R, Health and Healthcare in Britain. 1994 McMillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at pp 175-6. 
"'Donaldson C. Why a National Health Service? The Economic Rationale. 1998 IPPR, London at p6. 
"'Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127, Chapter 2. The individual costs are represented as years of life lost; years of health lost and 
health disadvantage. 
"ZAbel-Smith B, Glennester H. Labour and the Tory health reforms. Fabian Review 1995,107,3: 2-4 at p3. The programme of reforms is 
designed to take place over a ten year period indicating a belief that the present government will be reelected at the next general election. 
Secretary of State for Health. A First Class Service: Quality in the NHS (1 July 1998) The Stationery Office, London. 
"'Secretary of State for Health. The new NHS: Modern Dependable (Cm 3807) December 1997 The Stationery Office, London. 
14Ibid, at para 3.2. Also cited: A First Class Service op cit n132, at p4. 
"SFulop NJ. Does the National Health Service want hospital-at-home? I Royal Soc. Medicine 1997; 90: 212-215. 
16A First Class Service op cit n132, at para 3.3. There is a concurrent emphasis on `life-long learning' which aims to avoid the situation of 
professionals not bothering to keep up-to-date with new developments resulting in poor quality care being provided by some (para 3.28). 
"'The explanation given by the NHS Executive (HSC 1998/228: LAC(98)32: The New NHS Modern Dependable NHSE, Leeds at para. 20) 
was that it encompassed ten points: Quality improvement processes (clinical audit); quality organisation; clinical team leadership; evidence-based 
practice; evaluated practice and ideas; clinical risk reduction; identification of adverse events; patient feedback; identification of poor clinical 
performance; monitoring of clinical care and continuing professional development. This has many similarities with the 1990 reforms which 
emphasised compulsory participation in medical audit and new contracts setting out more clearly the duties and responsibilities of doctors (in 
addition to the more controversial resource management responsibilities). Control by managers will be replaced by control by scientists. 
"'Kelly M, Glover I. In search of health and efficiency: the NHS 1948 - 1994. In Leopold J et al (Eds) Beyond Reason? The ;\ aiional Health 
Service and the Limits of Management. 1996 Stirling Management Series, Avebury at p26. For a comment on the likely problems this will 
cause see: Klein R. Why Britain is Reorganizing its National Health Service - Yet Again. Health Affairs 1998; 17,4: 111-125, at p112. 
' "For example, the failure of the General Medical Council to strike off a doctor whose patient was starved to death and died weighing only 3 
stone, 12 pounds: Horsnall M. Doctor tells why he gave order to starve patient. The Times 23 March 1999; Wilson E. GP in mercy killing case 
escapes being struck off. Daily Mail27 March 1999. Another example of failure in self-policing can be seen in the decision by United Kingdom 
Central Council for Nurses not to proceed with disciplinary hearings against four nurses identified as having carried out abuses of patients over 
a three year period: Camden & Islington Community Health Services NHS Trust Beech House Inquiry: Report ofthe internal inquiry relating 
to the mistreatment ofpatients residing at Beech House, St Pancras Hospital during the period March 1993 - April 1996. Issued Februar 
1999. 
'40Sir Donald Acheson. Independent Inquity into Inequalities in Health. 1998 The Stationen Office, London, available on www. official- 
documents. co. uk. This showed little change from the Black Report findings: Sir Douglas Black. Report of the Working Group on Inequalities 
in Health. 1979 HMSO, London. 
14 'The NHS Confederation. The green papers for England and Scotland. 1998 The NHS Confederation, Birmingham. 
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other areas to improve health. 142 First, `to improve the health of the population as a whole by increasing the 
length of people's lives and the number of years people spend free from illness' and secondly, `to improve the 
health of the worst off in society and to narrow the health gap'. 143 As Benzeval points out, `the availability of 
social care services.. . can have an important impact on the abilities of health authorities to meet the needs of 
their populations'. 144 Government departments must identify the health implications of proposed 
developments. 145 Some commentators separate the healthcare system into two components: health 14' and 
sickness14' but currently there is no clear distinction. '48 The government wants increased public involvement 
in identifying health need and greater input in terms of expert advice. 14' However, there is no evidence as to 
what course will be adopted when lay and professional input conflict. Shickle suggests that public preferences 
for healthcare indicate a 'willingness to pay for experimental, `high-tech' life-saving treatments' at the expense 
of other treatments which would increase utility overall; a preference for treating the young or those with 
dependents at the expense of the old or those without dependents and a general willingness to discriminate on 
grounds of responsibility for own illness. "' Running the NHS by ballot could produce as great a lottery 
regarding treatment availability as has existed in the past. The views of the most persuasive and vociferous 
will prevail. The predicted `stakeholder' approach to healthcare has not been introduced15' although this could 
reduce wasteful over-use of its resources. 152 Ten `Health Action Zones', designed to develop frameworks for 
the NHS trusts and local authorities etc. to work together, were set up as pilots in 1998.153 Non-acute 
healthcare purchasing could become the responsibility of local authorities. 154 The `public contract model' is 
to be replaced by the `public integrated model'. 15' Ending the increasing inequality in health is seen as vital's' 
but `postcode' rationing is still evident three years into the Labour administration. 15' The continuing 
philosophy, decried by some as a 'fallacy', 158 favours `liberating humanity through providing health for 
all.. . using scientific rationality to solve problems of human morbidity and organizational inefficiency in the 
"'Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n127. In particular, see para 4.2. 
"'Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127, paras 1.23 &3.10. The Stationery Office, London. Four areas, heart disease, cancer, mental 
health and accidental injury, will be targeted since there is great inequality across the country as to who suffers from them and what provision 
is made for treating them (para 3.10). 
"4Benzeval M et al. Tackling Inequalities in Health: An Agenda for Action. 1997 Kings Fund, London at p99. 
'". Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n127, paras 4.45-4.47. Article 129 of The Maastricht Treaty, adopted in 1993 by the United 
Kingdom requires the impact upon health tobe considered by governments when formulating policies. The present government has given positive 
reinforcement to this requirement by the appointment of a Public Health Minister. 
146The WHO has defined `health' as `a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being'. World Health Organisation. Constitution of 
the World Health Organisation. Geneva: WHO 1946. 
'47Marmor T, in Healthcare: Resources, Choices and Decisions St Catherine's Conference Report op cit n58 at p15. 
'48The problems this creates can be seen in the conflict over whether Viagra should be freely available on the NHS with doctors using clinical 
judgement or whether impotence not related to diseases like diabetes and multiple sclerosis should be seen as a non-health issue outside the remit 
of state provision. Chisholm J. Viagra: a botched case for rationing. BMJ 1999; 318: 273-4. 
"'Saving Lives op cit n 127, Chapter 3- see particularly paras 3.22 & 3.40. See also: A First Class Service op cit n 132, para 4.59. The first 
nationwide survey of 150,000 NHS patients and users views was announced in 1998: Dept. of Health. DOH 98/333,12 August 1998. For a 
discussion of some of the difficulties involved in eliciting public participation in healthcare, see Donovan J, Coast J. Public Participation in 
Priority Setting: Commitment or Illusion? In Coast J, Donovan J, Frankel S (Eds) Priority setting: the health care debate. 1996 John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd, Chichester at pp203-234. 
150Shickle D. Public preferences for healthcare: prioritisation in the United Kingdom. Bioethics 1997; 14,3 & 4: 277-290. 
15'Verity A. Revealed: Labour's plans for pensions. The Sunday Times 18 May 1997. 
'52Plender J. A Stake in the Future: the Stakeholding Solution. 1997 Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London. See also, Plender J: A stake of one's 
own. Prospect February 1997 at pp20-4. 
"'Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127, at para 3.51. The `first wave' of these was to receive £4 million in 1998-9 and it was 
pledged that in 1999 £30 million would be given to Health Authorities to spend on joint initiatives with Local Authorities. The government 
intends to set up a second set of Health Action Zones in 1999. 
154Paton C. Present dangers and future threats: some perverse incentives in the NHS reforms. BMJ 1995; 310: 1245-8, at pp 1246-7. 
t55Abel-Smith B. A review of Healthcare systems in seventeen OECD countries 1994 OECD, Paris at pp45-51. 
"`Wise J. Britain has become less equal in death. BMJ 1997; 315: 384. Reporting the findings of the Rowntree Foundation. Joseph Rowntree 




157For example, the death rate from coronary heart disease is three times higher in Manchester than Kingston in Surrey. Saving Lives: Our 
Healthier Nation op cit n 127, at para 2.9. 
"'Kelly M, Glover I. In search of health and efficiency: the NHS 1948 - 1994. In Leopold J et al (Eds) Beyond Reason? The National Health 
Service and the Limits of Management. 1996 Stirling Management Series, Aveburvv, at p30. 
- Chapter 2 page 18 - 
NHS'. '59 
The Health Act 1999 ended the market economy and GP fundholding. The Lords was concerned at the 
presence of `Henry VIII' clauses allowing the possibility of 'draconian' powers. 16' Feedback on the responses 
to the consultation paper16' was only issued after the first reading of the Health Bill. '62 The prognosis for 
meaningful debate on healthcare provision seems uncertain. All GPs now belong to Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) which are similar to the pre-existing GP commissioning groups. 16' Their responsibilities continue to 
be meeting `national... health priorities and policy. "' It is envisaged that the PCGs will agree with `secondary 
care providers' (ie. hospitals) what services are provided at primary, secondary and community level. 16' Little 
attention seems to have been paid to Benzeval's concerns regarding similar proposals in 1994 that, as health 
authorities `withdraw from direct purchasing... interventions directed at communities and groups that are more 
disadvantaged will be significantly reduced'. 166 The PCGs will control `prescribing, referral, discharge... based 
on clinical and cost effectiveness. "67 Delays in the Health Bill reaching the statute book meant that both PCGs 
and GP Fundholders existed side-by-side for a time. 16' Ex-GP fundholders are finding PCGs frustrating 
because they require too much `discussing issues' and have reintroduced queuing at the expense of meeting 
patient needs fast. 16' Although emphasis was placed on reducing administration costs, closing down 
fundholders was expensive1' and concerns were raised that costs would increase by £300m pa. "' Health 
Authorities who meet the national targets given in the Health Improvement Programmes will be rewarded 
financially"' as will PCGs. 13 This continues the much-criticised policies of the previous administration. 
Discretion to fund treatments according to the purchaser's perception of `local need' resulted in local 
discrimination but the aim now is local delivery according to `national yardsticks'. 174 National Service 
Frameworks have been introduced as proposed in A First Class Service to `set national standards' and targets 
for improvements in health. 17' However, government changes of mind remain problematic' 76 since these 
Frameworks are dedicated to change. "' Initially, four target areas were identified but, although work is in 
progress on heart disease and mental health, the work on cancer and accidental injury seems to have been 
"'Leopold J et al (Eds) Beyond Reason? The National Health Service and the Limits of Management. 1996 Stirling Management Series, 
Avebury at pp5. 
'60Crail M. Lords tune into The Bill. Health Service J. 18 February 1999 pp9-11. 
16'A First Class Service op cit n 132. 
'62Health Service Circular HSC 1999/033 NHS Executive, London, 19 February 2000. 
'6'The order establishing Primary Care Groups was made 15 October 1998. National Health Service Act 1977: Directions by the Secretary of 
State As To The Establishment of Primary Care Groups by Health Authorities. 
"'A First Class Service op cit n 132, at p29. See also: Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127. 
'65The New NHS: Modern Dependable op cit n133, at para. 82 (ii). It has also been proposed that `hotel' charges should be introduced for 
patients whose nursing care would still be funded by the NHS. Timmins reports that this was 
first proposed by the Labour Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, in 1951: Timmins N. NHS 50th Anniversary op citn42, at p4. 
16'Benzeval M et al. Tackling Inequalities in Health: An Agenda for Action. 1997 Kings Fund, London at p101. 
167Ibid. 
16'Anon. PCGs and fundholding will run in tandem following £ 19m legislation timing hitch. Health Service J. 4 
February 1999 at pp4-5. Chris 
Ham considers that some doctors are reluctant to participate in PCGs since this could mean 
having to directly ration care to patients. Ham C. 
The next 10 years. The Lancet 1998; 352: 56-7. 
"'9Lambden P. Remember the fun in fundholding. The Health Summary July/August 2000 at p25. 
170 Anon. What's in the Health Bill? Health Service J. 4 February 1999 at pp4-5. 
"'Crail M. Lords tune into The Bill. Health Service J. 18 February 1999 pp9-1 1. 
172Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n127. 
"'The New NHS: Modern Dependable op cit n133, at paras. 81 & 84 (c) and Annex 4A. 
14A First Class Service op cit n132 at p7, para 1.14. Measured by the National Survey of Patient and User Experience: plO, pars 1.17. 
15A First Class Service op cit n132 at para 2.34. The initial four areas identified were: heart disease, cancer, mental health and accidental 
injury 
as indicated in Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127. 
17 Rotherham HA launched its five year health strategy in August 1993 based on the government White Paper, The Health of the , Vation 
(1992 
HMSO, London). However, its three aims of achieving health gain, making services people-centred and making effective use of resources 
had 
to be modified in 1996 when the government focus changed to having a `primary care-led NHS'. 
Greagsby P et al. Life Preservers Health 
Service J. July 4 1996 pp28-29 at p29. 
177 A First Class Service op cit n 132 paras 2.34 - 2.43. 
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displaced in favour of `older people' and `diabetes'. ` Lack of continuity in government approach wastes 
resources. The focus in A First Class Service is on equity, efficiency and appropriateness1' but in Saving Lives 
it is outcomes with little mention of improving access to healthcare. 18° This confusion over whether the goal 
is equity of outcome or equity of opportunity is problematic. 'S' GPs have to place national health priorities 
before their perception of local needs. For example, government guidance requires suspected breast cancer 
cases to see a specialist within two weeks so the system is flooded with referrals, some of which are 
inappropriate, and the really urgent cases are not receiving treatment (as opposed to diagnosis) as fast as 
before. 182 
There are new quangos. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE)18' will promote `clinical and 
cost-effectiveness through guidance and audit' and `advise on best practice in the use of existing treatment 
options, appraise new health interventions, and advise the NHS on how they can be implemented'. 184 The 
Commission for Health Improvement will `improve clinical quality'. 18' The sub-text that what is/will be 
achievable is subject to resource availability is less overt: `an emphasis on quality and the need for financial 
responsibility are not contradictory or incompatible aims'. 18' Restrictions on drug prices will be introduced. "' 
This could mean it becomes uneconomical to licence some products for use in this country so effective 
treatments, available elsewhere, are withheld from British patients. 18' Pharmaceutical companies are also 
concerned that NICE will `impact' on the `uptake of effective new treatments'. 189 This is likely since there will 
be delays whilst NICE conducts evaluations. Since clinical effectiveness is not paramount, cost-effectiveness 
will still play a strong part in decisions by governmental agencies as to whether new treatments become 
available or not. If the cost to society is too high it may outweigh the cost to the individual in terms of 
receiving inferior treatment. There is evidence that some clinicians consider this trade-off acceptable and 
ethical even if the public do not. 190 It is questionable whether the focus of effectiveness will, or should, `trump' 
ethical concerns about patients being denied treatment because their illness is lifestyle induced. 19' Therefore, 
it is unsurprising that the feedback on A First Class Service indicated concerns about `the risks of raising 
public expectations to a level which services could not fulfill"92 although the `stronger national focus' and 
`commitment to.. . consistency 
in quality of clinical care' were welcomed. 193 Claims like, `it must be for the 
"'Health Service Circular HSC 1999/033 19 February 2000 NHS Executive, London at p7, para 14. 
19A First Class Service op cit n132, at p13, para 2.3. These principles are implicit rather than explicit in the text. 
180Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation op cit n 127, Executive Summary. 
18' Hope J. Death sentence for our cancer patients. Daily Mail 1 July 2000. 
182Rogers L. Doctors criticise failure of breast cancer reform. The Sunday Times 23 April 2000. 
"'NICE will cover only England and Wales. In Scotland, a similar organisation, to be introduced under the Scottish legislation, will be known 
as the Clinical Resource and Audit Group and the Clinical Standards Board. 
181A First Class Service op cit n 132, at para 2.6. The name and resultant acronym forth is new body has similar `symbolic connotations' to those 
identified in the use of `the Trust' in 1991 by the Conservative administration by Hughes op cit n43, at p95. 
185A First Class Service op cit n132, at para 4.4 (See also, Health Act 1999 ss 19-20 and Sch. 2). 
116 See, for instance, para 3.2 A First Class Service op cit n132, para 3.2. 
187Health Act 1999 ss33-38. The Secretary of State had the power, under the National Health Service Act 1977 s57, to control the prices of 
drugs prescibed for NHS patients, by setting a maximum limit, but this power was never exercised. Miller suggested, in 1992, that use of this 
power could replace the anti-competitive `voluntary' agreements regarding drug pricing that have been a feature of British healthcare since 
Medicaments Reference [1971] AER 12: Miller F. Competition Law and Anticompetitive Professional Behaviour. Mod. Laiv Review 
1992; 55,4: 453-481, at pp478-9. 
''There are also proposals to curb GP spending on prescriptions which reach further than even the Conservative administration dared attempt. 
Fraser L. Blair's bitter pill for doctors. Mail on Sunday 9 November 1997. See: The New NHS: Modern Dependable op cit n 133, paras. 32-34 
and A First Class Service op cit n 132, at paras 2.24 & 2.30. 
'x9NHS Executive. Health Service Circular HSC 1999/033 1999 NHSE, Leeds at p6, para 8. 
19"Culyer AJ. Maximising the health of the whole community. BMJ 1997; 314: 667-9. See also: Dobson R. Brain cancer patients denied 'wonder 
drug'. The Sunday Times 30 April 2000. 
191Shickle has pointed out that a majority of the public would preference treatment for non-smokers over smokers. Non-treatment of smoking 
related heart disease has been justified on the grounds that it would be ineffective due to continued smoking. Shickle 
D. Public preferences for 
healthcare: prioritisation in the United Kingdom. Bioethics 1997; 14,3 & 4: 277-290, at p288. 
'12HSC 1999/033 op cit n189, at page 5, para 5. 
'93Ibid, at page 5, para 3. 
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individual clinician to decide what is in the best interest of the individual patient. Each patient is different and 
treatment must be tailor-made to their specific needs"94 will be seized upon despite the cautionary note that 
`NICE will produce clear guidelines for clinicians about which treatments work best for which 
patients... (and)... assess new drugs, treatments and devices for their clinical and cost-effectiveness'. 19' Harris 
suggests that `it is a fallacy to suppose that the measure of what is best for the individual patient or condition 
can also be the measure of the most efficient or best way of distributing resources... when this amounts to 
prioritising patients for treatment rather than treatments for patients'. 19' The independence of clinicians to 
choose how to treat their patients seems increasingly threatened. 
2.4 The NHS Plan 
The `National Survey of Patient and User Experience', designed to elicit the views of local people on the 
services they receive and require, raised more concerns than any other proposal. 19' Such surveys, used well. 
could yield important information but, used cynically by a government looking for re-election, are likely to 
produce placatory measures only. Levitt and Wall suggest that `governments are there to satisfy the electors 
rather than change society' and doubt that any government will act in a way that truly reduces inequality in 
health. 198 A long-term strategy for the NHS was outlined following a badly designed `survey' of public 
opinion. 19' A lack of design robustness means opinions elicited will have little value. 20' A set of core principles 
have been committed to. Universal access on the basis of clinical need will be maintained. 20' The `consumer's 
only right is to have access to the healthcare system: once that has been achieved, it is for the professional 
providers to determine what treatment is appropriate"" Scope is present to redefine `clinical need'. Currently, 
it is doctor-determined. It could become increasingly politically-determined. A comprehensive range of 
services will be provided where `clinically appropriate (and) cost effective'. 203 Services will be centred around 
`the needs and preferences of individual patients, their families and their carers'. 204 However, this statement 
is misleading. There is an unacknowledged tension inherent in allowing `citizens' to have a say in what 
services will be provided to meet patient needs. 205 Patients may believe that services will be more 
194A First Class Service op cit n132, at para 1.11. 
'9'Ibid, at para 1.15. 
"'Harris J. The case against: what the principle objective of the NHS should really be. BMJ 1997; 314: 669-672,670. 
'97A First Class Service op cit n132, at para 4.59 and HSC 1999/033 op cit n189, ppl 1-12, paras 32-34. However, Edgar indicates that the 
input of mass media can actually be more important than formal state consultation procedures which `serve to stifle the spontaneity for public 
disagreement and concern'. Edgar A. Healthcare Allocation, Public Consultation and the Concept of `Health. Healthcare Analysis 1998; 6: 193-8 
at p198. 
'9RLevitt R, Wall A op cit n17 at p282. 
'v9DepartmentofHealth. The NHS Plan: A planfor investment, aplanforreform. (Cm4818-1) 2000 The Stationery Office, London. Available 
on www. nhs. uk/nhsplan accessed 7 August 2000, Preface. 
20°The recent Department of Health consultation exercise `Have your say on a better NHS' conducted on in June 2000 can be criticised for its 
lack of research robustness. There were delays over sending out the printed leaflets which meant the date by which responses were to be received 
(5 June 2000) had to be changed. The leaflets only appear to have been produced in standard, written, English which meant that many users of 
the NHS (for example, ethnic minorities; people with poor literacy skills; sight-impaired and learning disabled) were excluded from the 
consultation exercise. 
"'Ibid, principle 1. 
""Klein R: The New Politics of the NHS. 1995 Longman, London at p232. 
203 The NHS Plan op cit n199, Preface, principle 2. 
204Ibid, principle 3. 
205Ibid. 
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individualised because they fail to realise that the investment to achieve this will not be forthcoming so choices 
will continue to be made. Discrimination will be challenged. 20' The needs of different populations will be 
met207 but these cannot be clearly known since the survey failed to reach many of these 'different 
populations'. 208 Regional inequalities will continue even though RAWP will be reviewed again. 20' Devolution 
to the regions will be on the basis of `earned autonomy' but Halpern points out that the reality of the Plan is 
to increase centralisation. 21° He concludes that there is `little real understanding' of health inequalities 
shown. 21 Improving Health in Wales reveals how un-national the NHS is likely to be in the future. 212 There 
will be `a new pluralism in NHS policy making'. 213 Community Health Councils (CHCs), which have provided 
`coherent and well-documented criticism', are being abolished in England in favour of more politically- 
controlled scrutineering by Patients' Fora and Patients' Advocates (PALS) which will lack the independence 
and statutory powers of the CHCs. 214 However, CHCs will continue to exist in Wales alongside PALS. 215 
Health Authorities will be abolished in Wales producing a flatter structure with Local Health Groups `tackling 
health inequalities and the wider issues that impact on people's health - such as housing, education and 
economic development'. 216 There will be more free prescriptions, dental care and eye-tests in Wales. 217 
New ways to address funding inequalities in primary care will be investigated. 218 The NHS Performance 
Assessment Framework will measure improvements in access to services for black and ethnic minority 
groups. 21' There is no guarantee that the necessary funding for an effective alternative to RAWP will be found. 
Improvement in service quality and reductions in negligent errors will be sought. 22° Much of the extra money 
allocated in the March 2000 budget to the NHS is liable to be lost in meeting medical negligence claims. 22' 
The NHS will support and value its staff but the reality is that many staff feel undervalued and demoralised. 222 
The pressure to continue training and personal development223, the threat of litigation, and an increasingly 
controlling attitude from central government with the introduction of `nationally agreed policies and 
206Ibid. 
207Ibid, principle 4. 
208THS. Commentary on the NHS Plan. The Health Summary July/August 2000 at p13. 
209The NHS Plan op cit n 199, Chapter 13, para 13.9. 
2"'Halpern S. The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform: Kids get an apple a day... Br. J. Health Care Management 2000; 6,8: 349- 
350 at p349. 
Z"Ibid, at p350. 
212National Assembly for Wales. Improving Health in Wales: A Plan for the NHS with its partners. January2001 National Assembly for Wales, 
Cardiff. 
2"Ibid, at p4. As part of this, Professor Peter Townsend is carrying out a'major resource allocation review' for the National Assembly (loc cit). 
2"Health and Social Care Bill, (Session 2000-2001) introduced to the House ofCommons 20 December2000, c1l. 11-16. See also, BMA. Press 
Release: General Practitioners' Response to the Health and Social Care Bill. 21 December 2000 British Medical Association, London; THS. 
Hear no evil, See no evil, Speak no evil. The Health Summary January 2001 pp1-4; British Medical Association Press Release: BMA warns 
that patient consent and confidentiality are threatened by the Health and Social Care Bill. 7 February 2001 British Medical Association, London 
(see cl62(3) and (4)of the Bill) and Association of Community Health Councils. Watchdog or Lapdog? November 2000 ACHCEW, London 
(www. achcew. org. uk). It is worth noting that the CHC gave a well-considered submission to the Bristol Inquiry: www. bristol-inguiry. org. 
"'National Assembly for Wales, op cit n213 at p38. 
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'"Ibid, at ppl2-14. 
218The NHS Plan op cit n 199, Chapter 13, para 13.10. 
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22'The escalation in medical negligence litigation was predicted in 1991: Jacob JM op cit n95, at p265. 
222Bruggen P. Who Cares? True stories of the NHS reforms. 1997 Jon Carpenter, Charlbury, at p14. See also some of the consultant's 
comments in this thesis. See also: Webster et al. Doctors challenge NHS Plan. The Times 28 July 2000 and comments made by Tony Blair, which 
suggested that much ofwhat is wrong with the NHS is the fault of doctors: Miles, A. Can the NHS be Saved?: Last Chance The Times 26 May 
2000. 
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standards"" are likely to do little to address this. For instance, targets on tackling heart disease require that 
ambulance response times are shortened. 225 Patients may sue the ambulance service for slow response. 226 
The NHS will not `subsidise individuals' privately funded healthcare'. 227 This is an important step that may 
enable hospitals to recover the costs of medical treatment where the patient was initially treated privately but 
post-operatively the patient required intensive care treatment which the private sector could not provide. 
Partnerships in care will be sought `to ensure a seamless service for patients'. 228 The political separation of 
health and social services will not be addressed despite `the longest unrequited courtship since the last Doris 
Day movie'. "' Duplication of personnel, equipment and inevitable delays in identifying patient need and 
delivering appropriate care will continue. The needs of the elderly are clearly delineated. 23' Similar principles 
would be appropriate for other disadvantaged groups such as the mentally ill, learning or physically disabled. 
The goal is to keep the elderly out of hospital and as independent as possible. 23' Whilst this is what many want, 
it could have a detrimental long-term effect of making the elderly seem less entitled to hospital treatment. 
Effort will be focused on health promotion measures. 232 Health Improvement Programmes233 are being 
introduced alongside Health Action Zones. 234 Individual responsibility for health is being encouraged which 
means that individual blame can follow. The clinical priorities will be cancer, heart disease and mental 
health. 235 The `new technologies', particularly the `new genetics' will be developed `in the interests of society' 
as a whole. 236 Currently, the main role of the new genetics is to identify those at risk, particularly foetuses, of 
developing certain conditions. Pressure will be placed upon individuals to undergo abortion rather than have 
a disabled child. 23' Patients will have responsibility to minimise risks, including those to which their genes 
make them vulnerable. 238 `Blame' will become increasingly prevalent within an ill-informed society. 239 Any 
encouraging of a `blame culture' seems short-sighted given the damage it has done through the rise in medical 
litigation. Doctors may demand, through the courts, that screening tests are carried out on children in order 
to start treatment. 24° The potential for a genetics underclass to develop is present particularly given that the 
government has, unlike any other government worldwide, authorised the use of gene tests by insurance 
companies. 241 
2241bid. 
2251bid, Chapter 14, para 14.21. 
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More consultant posts are planned particularly in order to improve oncology services but the achievability of 
this is doubted. 242 Changes are proposed to prevent consultants taking on private work to the detriment of the 
NHS. 243 These are opposed by junior doctors. 244 More doctors and nurses are working in the NHS than in 1997 
but it is unclear whether total hours have increased. 245 Lack of staff cover, or appropriately qualified staff, 
means treatment may be withheld. 246 Patients will be encouraged to complain more about their local services 
because their views will help decide the level of funding. 247 This can only lead to further demoralisation. 
Waiting lists have continued rising thereby denying some patients necessary and appropriate care248 so the NHS 
will start to use private hospital facilities in a new 'concordat' . 
24' The disparity between facilities in the NHS 
and what is achievable within the private sector will become more apparent. This could encourage the public 
to consider whether the NHS model of healthcare should be rejected in favour of alternative provision. 
Ironically, Labour could achieve the attitude change the Conservatives sought, but failed, to introduce. 
2.5 Perceptions of the Problems 
There is a strong public feeling that inequality in healthcare provision exists and that the lowest socio-economic 
groups have the worst health as the Black Report suggested. 25° Not all welcome devolution and believe it may 
exacerbate problems. 25' The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 is nearly in force but the English 
equivalent has been postponed until after the election. It seems that disparity of treatment for the mentally and 
physically disabled is condoned. 252 The adoption of a `minimal welfare state' principle during the Conservative 
administration has left its mark. 253 Whether there should be an NHS is being questioned. 254 Variable 
approaches to decision-making lead to conflict and accusations of arbitrariness or unfairness. Cases like Child 
B suggest that resource allocation is a significant cause of conflict. 255 Cases like Bland.. and Glass257 indicate 
that quality of life interpretations lead to conflict. As Klein et al point out, `despite all the changes in the 
structure of the NHS, decisions about which patients should be treated, when and how, remain the prerogative 
Z42Ferriman A. Doctors doubt whether cancer targets can be met. BMJ 2000; 321: 850. 
243 The NHS Plan op cit n 199, Summary. 
244Rufford, N. Hundreds of surgeons plan to quit NHS in contract row. The Sunday Times 26 November 2000. 
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NHS: Commission for Health Improvement. Investigation into Carmarthenshire NHS Trust. November 2000, available on 
www. doh. gov. uk/chi/index. htm. 
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of the health care professions'258 although the strength of public concern has led to attempts to pass protecti\ e 
legislation. 259 Therefore, whilst appropriateness of treatment obviously encompasses economic, medical and 
ethical considerations, it is important to identify what doctors, themselves, consider to be the main difficulties 
when making decisions. 
2.5.1 Empirical Research Analysis 
In order to discover the extent to which medical decisions were challengeable, possibly through the courts, the 
eighty-five consultants were asked the following questions: 
Do you have any input into how resources are allocated? Have you had to restrict the medical treatment or 
tests available to certain patients as a result of limited resources? If so, have you used QAL YS? 
Have you ever had conflict with the patient, their relatives or other members of the hospital team over a 
decision to treat or not to treat a patient? If so, how was it resolved? 
What has been the hardest decision to treat or not to treat a patient that you have ever been involved in? What 
principles guided you? 
Many of the consultants minimised the number of instances of conflict. The initial response was to deny 
experiencing conflict then most related various instances of conflict with fellow professionals, patients or, most 
commonly, relatives. The effect of resource allocation upon the decision-making process varied considerably 
with some consultants reporting no significant restrictions upon resources and others feeling lack of resources 
was a major source of problems. Some consultants, when asked to describe their most difficult decision, 
described situations where there was potential for conflict, or even decisions where it would have been proper 
to have applied to court first. Respecting patient autonomy and good communication seemed crucial to 
avoiding conflict or preventing complaints or litigation. 
2.5.1.1 The Impact of Limited Resources 
Only twenty-two had direct input into resource allocation decisions by the purchasers or input within their own 
hospital regarding global allocation of resources. "' Several felt alienated by the disregard for their input, one 
passionately: 
I have the status of a floor cleaner! A23 
... Klein et al, op cit n60 at p83. 
Z59 For example, in the 1999-2000 session, the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons 
without success. 
"There were 4 Medical Directors; 6 Clinical Directors; 2 Surgical Directors; 1 Chair &1 Senior member of the Renal Management Team; 1 
member of Paediatric Advisory Committee; 1 Chair of Neurosurgery; 1 member of Paediatric Directorate; I Lead Physician; 1 member of the 
Urology Board; 1 member of Psychiatric Advisory Committee; 1 member of Surgical Board; 1 member of Ophthalmology Board. 
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Fighting for resources was a source of major frustration for the majority of consultants regardless of how they 
rated their input: 
One has to make a case for developments as they arise and for updating existing procedures and 
treatments. It is always a battle. C 15 
We run a management team versus the managers' team on how to use resources... My role is to lead 
that team. A21 (his emphasis) 
We get allocated resources based on last year's activity... you get between 3-7% less resources the 
next year to provide the same service. This is in a specialty... where probably you need a 20 % 
increase just to keep up with technological advances. B 15 
We're allowed to voice opinions although I don't think those opinions have a major effect on the 
budget. C 10 
The majority had restricted treatment offered to patients because of inadequate, or poorly managed, resources 
sometimes when the proposed intervention was a minuscule proportion of the cost of care of the patient. 
Different ways of restricting treatment were evident: 
Yes... we're overspent. D3 
Delaying admission is a way of restricting treatment. C3 
Arbitrary and implicit... (rationing's). occurred by the back door. C4 
The pharmacy would only prescribe me two doses of it. This stuff is £7.00 an ampoule... there are 
some people that are always sick after anaesthetic and it stops this. D6 
The Patients' Charter... every body has to be treated within a certain time. B 19 
Some had withheld treatment but not withdrawn treatment once begun. Sometimes the separation of budgets 
between care providers meant treatment was withheld because one refused to fund continued treatment: 
There was an issue involving the cost of drugs for HIV (starting treatment)... (but)... I've never had to 
withdraw treatment. A35 
If I want to put a patient on such a drug26` I have to ask the GP if they are going to prescribe it long- 
2" He quoted one that he uses for Parkinson's disease as costing £8,000 pa per patient. 
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term once I have stabilised the patient. If they won't I effectively have to deny that patient the 
treatment. D9 
Eleven felt their practice had not yet been affected: 
We have cut every corner there is to still maintain treatment levels... the price is there are no more 
cuts left. B15 
I don't think money's the problem in the health service. D2 
None was satisfied with the current model of resource allocation because it was poorly-managed and not 
patient-centred: 
The health authority... will allocate resources on the basis of mortality figures and waiting lists... it 
doesn't look at quality of life. A33 
The concept of money following the patients doesn't actually materialise. D13 
We tend to get important operations... or where they have been messed about in the past... or people 
who've made arrangements for their dog to go into the kennels. D8 
The thing that really causes problems... is fundholding and contracting and all that purchaser- 
provider business where there was competition between the trusts. D2 
Several consultants expressed concerns that the current system was unethical, one because there was no system 
for facilitating rapid discharge once they were fit for discharge: 
If a patient is fit they should go home... On average, patients stay in hospital two days longer than 
necessary simply because arrangements have not been made for them to go home. A23 
Others felt the system was unjust: 
I don't want different criteria applied in different parts of the country so I think that some drug or 
resource rationing has to become part of our culture. A1 
It shouldn't be different in one district from another. C9 
I feel most uncomfortable about decisions about what is provided occurring as a result of where you 
happen to be, which month are we in... The rationing of care according to the fact that this area has 
used its quota for a particular treatment I find completely untenable and the rationing of care 
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according to the budget allocation is at least as unethical, if not more so, particularly when it comes 
to children. C14 (his emphasis) 
QALYs were rarely used. This lack of use could be due to professional suspicion, ethical concerns, lack of 
direction from local purchasers or lack of sufficient concrete information to make them usable. 
We are not using QALYs at the moment though that may be forced on us in relation to cancerous 
disease. B6 
I know what they are but I have never used them. C1 
We don't use QALYs. D13 
QALYs are anti-elderly. B18 
QALYs are very badly flawed. They usually have no capacity to look at multiple diagnoses. A22 
Only three admitted using them. This was solely to justify treatments which otherwise would not be funded: 
I tend to use QAL Ys in the context of feeling I can support certain types of treatment... on 
children... but I don't formalise it. C2 
If we want a new drug for prevention of kidney transplant rejection one of the grounds on which we 
have to justify our desire to use that drug is on a cost per QALY analysis. A15 
We have, in one area, used QAL Ys to try to argue a case. 262 C6 
There was evidently much dissatisfaction with the current model. The almost total rejection of QALYs except 
where they could be used for patient advantage indicates that there is a formidable division between healthcare 
managers and doctors over resource allocation. One concentrates on provision for all, the other on individuals. 
Only if a model overcoming this division can be found can healthcare allocation be improved. 
2.5.1.2 Patient-centred Considerations 
2.5.1.2.1 The patient's `best interests' 
Decisions were made using best interests and/or autonomy but only one consultant spoke of consciously, 
employing principled reasoning: 
262The case they were trying to make to the local Health Authority was in favour of a particular chemotherapy treatment for ovarian cancer where 
another Health Authority had carried out detailed QALY assessment and approved its use. 
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Sometimes I'm a bit slower doing in withdrawing treatment than they would wish... It's because I've 
got to do this consistently, and properly, and using the principles, and only when it is the right time 
by my judgement. I have to do it the same way every time. A6 
There was recognition that not all doctors act in the patient's best interests: 
Doctors may fail to take proper account of the patient's best interests sometimes: Doctors... will do 
things because it is possible. They over-treat and they don't take a commonsense view of it and say 
is it actually going to be of benefit. D7263 
Conflict with relatives arose over identifying `best interests': 
I've had conflicts often with relatives over how to manage their relative. D5 
The parents didn't want to continue treatment... the medical team felt it was not appropriate to 
stop.. . premature 
baby who had some complications ... the 
family already had one handicapped 
child... the father had muscular dystrophy... it was more than they could cope with... Eventually he was 
taken into care. A7 
If we are all acting in the patient's best interest then there is no actual conflict of interest - it's just 
a case of deciding what is the patient's best interest. D7 
Some consultants would prioritise the patient's needs over the relatives: 
Although I'm meant to be bound to the patient I also have a wider perception of the needs of the 
family but if there is a conflict, I would always have to side with the patient. BI 
In other cases, pacifying relatives sometimes trumped patient best interests: 
I was asked to do a tracheostomy... it was not an appropriate use of resources... if we had not... the 
family would never have been happy... if you simply had the interests of the patient, we probably 
should not have done it... but the family was depending on him as afocus. 264 D8 
An 18 year old boy... was brain dead but his lovely mother wouldn't believe it. I obtained an 
EEG265... which showed a complete lack of brain activity which convinced her and she allowed me to 
stop ventilation. D6 
263This reflects the `commonsense' morality espoused by Wear AN, Brahms D. At the coalface: to treat or not to treat: the legal, ethical and 
therapeutic considerations of treatment refusal. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 131-135. 
2"The patient was described as not just having cerebral palsy but being completely blind, completely deaf and very small and underweight. 
265EEG stands for electro-encephalogram, a test which depicts the electrical activity of various parts of the brain. A complete absence of activit\ 
indicates that the brain is dead. 
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Doctors who allowed relatives to overrule their clinical judgment failed to see this could cause problems for 
the future although several regretted the erosion of trust in doctors: 
I thought it was inappropriate to carry on treating the patient and the son was firmly opposed to that 
decision. It wasn't conflict because I went along with it because if they have got firmly expressed 
views, I think it is better to give it a go. A6 
I'm not sure whether people totally trust their Doctor as they used to. D 13 
There was recognition that relatives may have their own agenda: 
We actually had... three or four cases of suspicious burns. In that situation you don't care what the 
relative says, you treat the patients... one of these young brides who was admitted with very extensive 
burns... the sooner you get rid of that burn tissue the better. But what happens is you end up tivith 
maybe an 80% burn and (then) they have an 80% open wound. B9266 
I'm wary of relatives who say, oh she really wouldn't want it... (and she has a big house all to herself 
and we will inherit it). D8 
Conflicts are normally nothing to do with medical issues but to do with family dynamics. A36 
2.5.1.2.2 Patient preference 
The principle of autonomy was given great weight by many of the doctors and patient refusal would be 
recognised: 
Patients are perfectly at liberty to (refuse). I tend to accept that... providing they understand. Then 
it's an informed decision and we can't assume just because we are doctors and that we have 
treatments available to us that might benefit a particular patient and therefore that patient should 
have it. B5 
She was in a bad way, bleeding a lot, and she said she was a Jehovah's Witness ... to 
have her on the 
operating table, exsanguinating and not being able to transfuse was difficult... I've never had one die 
on me - but if that particular girl did, that would have been unfortunate for her and her family but 
I would have had no personal emotional feelings. Al 
One consultant described a situation similar to ones where the courts have been petitioned for authority to 
proceed by the doctors in charge of the patient's care: 
2'"A consultant, who had practised in an area with a high Asian population, speaking of injuries which could have been murder or attempted 
murder. 
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Some years ago... a woman who was in labour... it wasn 't going very well... we suggested Caesarian 
delivery, and she refused and labour continued and eventually she gave birth to a healthy baby... She 
withheld consent and that was that. Al 
Conflicts between family members could also be apparent: 
A lady, who 's dying - at risk of sudden death from an aortic aneurism. 16' She's asked for a long time 
for dialysis to stop but her husband is very much against this... so she's stopped asking. A30 
A young lad who decided that he didn't want any more dialysis and his wife vehemently disagreed 
with him and was extremely traumatised by it. He was traumatised by her upset but nevertheless 
wasn't changed in his decision by the way she felt about it. The nursing staff of the dialysis unit were 
extremely upset about it, the Doctors were extremely upset about it... I was upset by it as well. A 15 
It is interesting to note the apparently opposite approaches the patients concerned take towards the family. One 
places her own wishes subordinate to those of her family, the other places his own preferences before anyone 
else's. 268 
Three consultants raised the issue of children refusing treatment. 26' All wished to respect the child's views: 
You have to take it individually because the child's intellectual capacity will vary naturally. I have 
really quite disabled children where... one would involve the consultant paediatrician 
and-Psychologists ... 
If 
.. the child was expressing their own 
informed opinion then I would... respect 
the child's wishes. B 16 
A 17 year old boy who doesn't want (dialysis)... in the care of the local authority.. .1 
have very many 
legal documents saying I am required to treat this patient. .. 1 
have tried to point out... that is all very 
well but I don't know how I could practically do it without sedating (him) 24 hours a day. A34 
We do not take the parents ' views as proxy for the child - they're the parents' views... as soon as the 
child is old enough (their views) may have to be taken into account. C14 
These examples raise the question as to the extent to which a child's views should be determinative when the 
refusal of treatment will lead to death. Can children have sufficient decision-making capacity to choose death? 
26'An aortic aneurism is where the aorta, one of the main arteries of the heart, has a weakness making it liable to rupture upon which the patient 
haemorrhages to death in a matter of a few minutes. 
268Whether the age of the patient's had significance as regarding personal conduct is a question beyond the scope of this thesis but would be 
interesting to investigate given the markedly consumerist, and allegedly selfish society we now live in. 
269See Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11 and Re W (a minor)(medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64 
regarding refusal of treatment by children and Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 regarding child and parental 
refusal of blood transfusion which confirm that children's refusal of medical treatment will not be supported by the courts if the court believes 
treatment is in their best interests. 
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If the child does have the requisite level of understanding and competence as judged by the treating doctor, 
should the decision be subjected to independent review even if it falls within the `band of reasonableness'? 
2.5.1.2.3 Patient expectations 
Several consultants mentioned potential conflict with patients over demands for inappropriate tests or 
treatment. Patients were felt to be better informed about healthcare than before but this led to unrealistic 
expectations: 
They think they ought to have a brain scan because of headaches and my analysis ... was that the 
patient was clinically depressed... these were not headaches with the pains... typical of organic disease. 
C1 
Sometimes unrealistic demands resulted from a lack of medical knowledge to interpret the huge amount of 
healthcare/medical information now available appropriately. Some demands might be medically valid but 
financially unrealistic because of resource constraints: 
Relatives of patients say, `I've been searching the Internet and I've come up with these new 
treatments - why aren't my relatives on this? ' B2 
When faced with such questions it seemed clear that the answer given by the consultant might vary according 
to whether he or she was prepared to be open about financial constraints. To reduce conflict the impression 
may be given that the alternatives were less appropriate for the patient. Sometimes, questioning patients would 
be sent for a second medical opinion: 
I recently had a 91 year old with a hip problem that could be treated with a hip replacement. She 
also has severe airway disease and severe cardiac condition... she insisted on being treated so I've 
sent her for a second opinion. D 10 
The second medical opinion approach was used often as a way to secure confirmation of the original treatment 
plan. However, as Doctor D 10 explained, if the second opinion was in favour of treating, he would then review 
the patient again, hoping that the time delay would eventually encourage her to change her mind. If she didn't 
then he would be prepared to put her onto the waiting list for surgery. 
2.5.1.2.4 Patient `merit' 
Another consultant described the case of a young man who had `fallen' from a train, been badly electrocuted, 
suffered multiple injuries but his head had escaped injury. During resuscitation in Casualty, one of the 
psychiatrists came in and recognised the patient as a `significantly bad schizophrenic with suicidal tendencies' 
who had obviously jumped, not fallen, from the train... 
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It was then a question of how aggressive we were going to be. What happened was, he recovered and 
remained a bad schizophrenic with suicidal tendencies. B13 
2.5.1.3 Professional Disagreements 
Conflict with colleagues as to what was the right course of action was often a possibility since a patient will 
often be under the care of more than one consultant but good communication could avoid problems: 
I usually feel if I've been honest.. . any difficulties have been resolved... it wasn't certain offering 
dialysis was going to be the right thing... my colleague was very uncomfortable about instituting 
dialysis, he was looking after her at the time... subsequently, her own kidneys picked up again and it 
wasn 't necessary. A2 
We discuss things... but in the hospitals up the road, they're all at each other... because they are 
having to fight for resources and fight for survival. D2 
It's usually possible for everyone to agree with a bit of sensible debate. D7 
A few identified religious extremism as a source of conflict with colleagues - an issue identified in Bland as 
preventing doctors exercising `their own discretion in accordance with medical ethics"": 
Occasionally, a member of staff may have a particular religious or philosophical view about what 
is and is not okay that is fixed and non-changeable. B11 
I have encountered extremists of both sorts: who would not treat and who would. C9 
Several consultants identified conflict with nursing staff as more common than with fellow doctors possibly 
because the consultants took a more objective approach than the nurses who focused on caring for the patient 
and family as a whole: 
Nursing staff.. are usually keener to withdraw treatment sooner because they spend so much time with 
the relatives and they see themselves as the patient's advocate. A6 
One consultant described his decision to try to save the life of a three year old boy with 90 % bums to his body: 
It was a question of whether the staff were ready for it... they weren't .. the 
family couldn't get the 
support... from the nursing staff. We had a lot of people saying you're playing God by treating this 
child whereas we were saying we're not playing God by treating the child, we'd be playing God by 
not treating the child because death would be certain. B9 
"'Airedale , VHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at p880. 
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2.5.1.4 Fear of litigation 
Sometimes, to avoid conflict, treatment would be continued or implemented but unenthusiastically: 
I've certainly not been over vigorous in my resuscitation ... 
I don't think the nurses who cared for the 
child wanted to do it; they sidled up to me and said 'they're not breathing'... not that they were in any 
hurry to do it. (It was) a slow code situation. A13 
One consultant described an incident where normal professional behaviour was inhibited by the fear of `the 
policeman over your shoulder': 
I had a very disturbing case where... nobody would discuss what was going to happen to this patient... I 
would normally take a team decision... whether to pursue resuscitation ... 
He was probably brain- 
dead... Nobody was prepared to talk... We ended up operating - he died on the table. I discovered 
afterwards that Casualty was being videoed, there are monitors and videos in the bays so logical 
decisions couldn't be made. A27 
It was clear that most doctors felt that patients were encouraged to complain following the introduction of the 
Patients' Charter: 
I occasionally get into the complaints procedure with a patient if they don't feel they're getting what 
they need .. 
it's because they are demanding something that's not appropriate. A4 
We've got a problem with one couple who want IVF. The man's in Rampton - gbh, drugs, heroin 
addict and alcoholic in the past. He'd been beaten round the testicles. She had two kids in care. 
Under the HFEA we have to consider the welfare of any child that will be born. "' A29 
A few of the doctors mentioned concern over the legal implications of their actions: 
We've recently been told... we can section people for anorexia for force feeding. We 've almost been 
instructed to do it. It was a very clear statement that it is permissible to give a treatment under the 
Mental Health Act and you would be in great difficulty in the courts if you allowed someone to die. 
A4 
One or two (patients) who have asked for a sort of euthanasia which I haven't been able to offer. 
A24272 
271, gbh' stands for Grievous Bodily Harm (s 18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861). Rampton is one of the three 
Special Hospitals in the UK 
where violent criminal offenders who have been sectioned under the Mental Health Act 1983 are sent. 
IVF is in-vitro fertilisation. HFEA is the 
Human Fertilisation and Embry ology Act 1990. 
"'The issue of whether, if euthanasia were legalised, they would carry it out was deliberately not explored. 
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Sometimes, doctors inadvertently made potentially unlawful decisions: 
A case of `nearly brainstem death' that wasn't quite because he had the ability to take a few breaths 
every minute so didn't quite fulfil the criteria. I said it was futile... but the mother felt strongly life 
was life at any cost... but she came round but by then he was brainstem dead so it wasn 't an issue... but 
I'm not obliged to give futile treatment. A31 
One consultant described a patient where doubt over the woman's competence should probably have been 
assessed independently prior to sterilisation by hysterectomy. It was likely that the woman was held competent 
by the treating doctors because they felt that the operation was in her best interests anyhow: 
I've been involved as an expert in a case over a woman... there was some doubt that she wasn't going 
to be competent, but she was. She opted for sterilisation but it was very much that pressure was put 
on her to have the operation and she changed her mind and is now suing. B 19 
One case, in particular, stood out. The decision was presented as based on her best interests although, as a 
competent patient, she should have been involved in the decision not to have antibiotics to treat the septicaemia 
which killed her. 273 In reality, it seemed based on the best interests of the consultant: 
A young 20 year old girl... congenital deformity... skin... heavily colonised with bacteria and fungi to 
such an extent that she smelt terrible, you couldn't go in that room without gagging... She had, as a 
result... become blind, and deaf She communicated by sign language by feeling your fingers. You 
couldn't communicate with this girl without touching her. So you had the natural abhorrence that 
came from the smell and then the touch factor. She was mentally competent. She... travelled 
underneath a blanket because of her appearance... Infection spread from the skin to the bloodstream, 
and a decision had to be made as to whether we should actually treat her... (Her mother) had quite 
strong views... wanted us to treat her. Ultimately mother agreed we shouldn't treat her but it took her 
a lot of time to make that decision. A35 
2.5.2 Discussion 
Patient autonomy was considered to be highly important but sometimes seemed infringed by doctors or 
relatives. Expecting doctors to make decisions about withholding and withdrawing treatment places them 
under a heavy burden - possibly evidence of failure to respect doctors' own needs. A variety of coping 
mechanisms were adopted but for some, it was easier to practice bad medicine by failing to withhold/withdraw 
treatment appropriately than have conflict. There was clear commitment to patient `best interests' but 
sometimes this was interpreted as what was best for the whole family or best for the healthcare team. 
The septicaemia was described as easily treatable with standard antibiotics. 
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There was concern over the legal ramifications of decision-making and possibly undue reliance on the belief 
that provided their peers did not condemn them, it was acceptable. Using `slow codes' or `unenthusiastic' 
treatment as a way to appear to have `done everything possible' was not uncommon but fails to respect patients 
by breaching the principle of fidelity274 and exposing them to inappropriate interventions. It contravenes the 
benefit-burden balance since, presumably, treatment is considered futile or unduly burdensome hence the 
benefit can only be in protecting the doctor from litigation or in reassuring relatives. 
Regarding the last patient described, it is extremely concerning that the non-treatment decision was not 
reviewed by the courts assuming that the doctors could rely upon therapeutic privilege to avoid involving the 
patient herself... It would involve a novel point of law: whether the courts or anyone else has jurisdiction to 
make healthcare decisions on behalf of a competent patient where the barriers to eliciting the patient's views 
are psychologically insurmountable to the carers. Whether withholding antibiotics would have been found in 
her best interests is debatable. The court might have recognised that it was in the interests of the staff involved 
with her care but whether it would have approved withholding treatment for such a reason is doubtful. Such 
a step might be for parliament alone. 27' As it was, the decision-making process seems legally and ethically 
unsupportable. It is important to note that there was no suggestion that the patient was incompetent. Her 
condition had caused blindness and deafness, but she was able to communicate with her mother. Waiting until 
her condition had deteriorated so that she was unable to participate in her treatment decisions seems 
extraordinary behaviour on the part of the doctors particularly since they recognised that her mother, to whom 
they then turned for `approval' of their actions (or omissions) was very reluctant to agree that she should be 
`treated to die'. It would appear that the doctors realised that their care plan was challengeable and wished 
to avoid this by gaining the mother's agreement. In other words, they were practising defensively. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Sound treatment decisions can only be made when it is recognised that healthcare ethics is not solely about 
doctor-patient relationships. Social policy and political ideology, influenced by lobbyists, affect resource 
allocation. " ' More openness is needed by those involved in the resource allocation process. The NHS is 
manipulated for political gains, but disguising the problems of limited resources and reduced (Conservative) 
government commitment to the welfare state as measures to increase public choice failed the public. It did 
grave disservice to clinicians who try to achieve the best for individual patients. The competition culture 
produced competitiveness and selfishness in individuals regarding public resources. 27' The passing of power 
to unelected managers was `not only harmful to patients, but also massively wasteful'. 27' The limits to what 
. '. See: Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics Fourth Edition 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford, in particular, at 
pp 429-440. 
275As was suggested in Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
276The Law Commission possibly suggests that the interests of those treating the patient could be relevant when they spoke of their 
recommendation being `directed to those cases where the `best interests' criterion cannot be invoked to resolve the dilemma of treatment 
providers'. Law Commission for England and Wales. Report No 231: Mental Incapaciy 1995 HMSO, London at para 6.20. 
277 Campbell AV. Nonesuch (University of Bristol Magazine) Autumn 1996 pp 27-29. 
278Sorell T. Morality, consumerism and the internal market in healthcare. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 71-6. 
279Black D. Paying for health. J., MMed. Ethics 1991; 17: 117-123 at p123. 
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any country, or person, can spend on healthcare have to be recognised but the extent to which financial 
considerations should be decisive is questionable. Geographical differences in the healthcare provided should 
be as unacceptable as differences based on gender, race, social importance or ability/disability. Doctors should 
not feel viewed with suspicion. Their contribution to the debate is vitally important as possessors, and 
imparters, of medical information. Cost-effectiveness is only part of the debate which needs to address the 
potential efficacy of treatment. 
Any proposals to improve the decision-making process regarding withholding or withdrawing medical 
treatment will have to address the conflicts and differences demonstrated in this chapter. The proposals must 
provide a way for such decisions to have greater acceptability to the patients themselves, their families (or 
significant others); the healthcare team and to society in general than the present process produces. This will 
reduce conflict which is emotionally, and sometimes financially, expensive for the parties concerned and for 
society. Strengthening autonomy will be important but also a way to achieve fairness and proportionality must 
be sought. Openness, not just about treatment options, but about resource limitations and the choices which 
have to be made also seems important in the interests of maintaining a democratic and just society. It will be 
necessary to decide the extent to which children and adults of questionable competence can determine their own 
treatment options. Some of the examples shown suggest that patient autonomy only receives strong support 
when the patient agrees with what the doctor considers appropriate. Autonomy is abused by doctors who wish 
to exclude the decision-making process from independent scrutiny. Openness about the barriers to good 
decision-making is necessary. There is potential for the decision-making process to be affected by the 
information available as with the `train jumper' described above. It will be necessary in an age of information- 
overload to identify which information is relevant and should be considered and which prejudices or distorts 
the decision-making process. The next two chapters examine in depth the current decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WITHHOLDING MEDICAL TREATMENT 
This chapter describes how and when medical treatment is withheld. The outcome of withholding treatment 
can vary and analysis will be made accordingly. It will examine how decisions to withhold treatment are made 
in general, grouping them according to whether the outcome of the non-treatment decision is imminent and 
certain death; eventual death or reduced quality of life. Then the way the consultants interviewed for this thesis 
said they made decisions to withhold treatment in individual cases is considered. 
3.1 Outcome of Imminent and Certain Death 
This group includes clinical situations such as very premature babies, cardiac arrest, major haemorrhage' and 
major trauma. ' 
3.1.1 Babies 
McHaffie and Fowlie suggest that there are three groups of babies for whom withholding medical treatment 
may be considered: the congenitally malformed where death is inevitable regardless of treatment; the severely 
impaired `whose prognosis for a future quality of life is so poor that non-treatment is considered preferable to 
continued existence' and the severely impaired who do not require intensive treatment to support life but whose 
`quality of life is expected to be extremely poor'. ' Others recognise up to eight subgroups where non-treatment 
may be `morally preferable'. ' The nature of the debate is, essentially, `Sanctity of Life versus Quality of Life. 'S 
Such debates are unresolvable since those who value all life equally, regardless of quality, will not be reconciled 
to the view that living might not be in the infant's `best interests'. ' Others accept that improved success in 
reducing neonatal mortality means it is `inevitable and proper that an increasing proportion of the deaths will 
follow `non-treatment decisions". ' 
'For instance, as a result of trauma, aortic aneurysm (rupturing of the aortic blood vessel to the heart normally caused by heart disease) or, rarely, 
haemorrhagic viral infections (infections caused by viruses which destroy the red blood cells causing major bleeding into the internal organs and 
tissues of the body). 
'For instance, severe head injury, amputation or extensive burns. 
'McHafe HE & Fowlie PW. Life, Death and Decisions: a reflection on neonatal practice. 1996 Hochland and Hochland, Cheshire at pp7-8. 
'Sauer PJJ. Ethical decisions in neonatal intensive care units: the Dutch experience. Pediatrics, 1992; 90,5: 729-732. Reporting on the approach 
taken by the Dutch Paediatric Association. McHaffie op cit n3 at p8, lists the categories. 
5Separovic ZP. Massa carnis or human beings? in Jus Medicum 1984, Centrum Voor Medish Recht, Rijkunwersiteit, Gent pp 169-172 at p 171. 
`Long T. Infanticide for handicapped infants: sometimes it's a metaphysical dispute. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 79-81 at pp70-80. This article 
discusses the stances taken by Ramsey (sanctity of life) and Kuhse & Singer (Quality of Life). See: Ramsey P. Ethics at the edges of life. 1978 
New Haven, Yale University Press and Kuhse H, Singer P. For sometimes letting - and helping - die. Law Medicine and Health care 1986; 
3,4: 149-153. 
7Campbell AGM. Treatment dilemmas in neonatal care. Annals of the New YorkAcademy ofScience. 1988; 530: 92-103 at p96 (his emphasis). 
He reports that withholding/withdrawing treatment was directly related to the death of the neonate in 51 %ofcases. He also recognises (at p96) 
the difficulty, little recognised by society, of the `particularly difficult and poignant dilemma... posed by the neonatal survivors of failed late 
abortions'. His findings are supported 
by Balfour-Lyn and Tasker study which found that almost two-thirds of deaths in a paediatric intensive 
care unit were linked to a decision to 
limit medical treatment: Balfour-Lyn IM & Tasker RC. Futility and death in medical intensive care. 
J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 279-281. 
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Often the cut-off point for attempting to save life' is gestation of 24 weeks or less9 or birthweight of 500 grams 
or under1° because evidence indicates that such neonates either die despite full technological intervention, or 
survive with major, very life-impairing handicaps. Within the range 500-1000 grams, survival rates remain 
very low and the presence of sensorineural disability" very high. 12 Technological and pharmaceutical 
improvements have improved outcomes, 13 resulting in `increasing willingness and ability to treat tiny babies'. '4 
Blank has concluded that decisions are made in the delivery room by the doctor and that parental involvement 
is a myth. 15 If correct, once the baby has separate existence, the mother is excluded from the decision-making 
process by a profession which has created for itself a prerogative over life and death. The conferring of legal 
personhood on the infant does not fully explain how, in this country, the power of life and death over a 
handicapped foetus is vested in women right up to the time of delivery yet women can be marginalised after 
delivery because doctors are exercising a power which they have conferred on themselves and which the courts 
have been unable or unwilling to interfere with. 16 
Bohin believes that the U. K. adopts a `conservative policy towards infants born before 24 weeks gestation 
and... resources expended on them are limited'. " Some infants may be the survivors of failed late abortions and 
this can affect the care they receive. 18 Few survivors are monitored: `(o)ur ability to assess and report the 
outcome of very low birthweight infants has lagged behind our willingness to resuscitate them'. 19 Doyal 
concludes that treatment should continue since the low numbers of those with severe handicaps does not over- 
burden society. 2° His brief examination of the ethics of societal resource allocation seems typical of many 
medically-directed articles. Placing the medical model paramount indicates a belief that society should not 
interfere with what doctors consider appropriate. Three approaches to instigating treatment are possible: the 
wait until certainty strategy (ie. treat all infants vigorously until it is virtually certain they are not benefiting 
or are being harmed); the statistical probability strategy (ie. withhold treatment from all infants where the 
prognosis is `uncertain or grim') and lastly, the individualized prognostic strategy (ie. start treating in all cases 
but review regularly for indications of certain death or severe brain damage). 21 
'I. e. the adoption of the curative model of care. 
'Which coincides with the provisions ofthe Abortion Act 1967 (s 1(1)(a)) for legal terminations of pregnancy in the absence of handicap or grave 
risk to the woman. 
"'Normal birth weight is in the region of 2499 grams or more. 
"For instance, as evidenced by cerebral palsy, deafness, blindness or delayed development. 
12Doyal Let al. Improved outcome into the 1990s for infants weighing 500-999 grams at birth. Archives ofDisease in Childhood 1997; 77: F9 I- 
F94. 
"Over the last twenty years, such developments have led to greatly improved prognosis for neonates in this weight range both in terms of survival 
and the absence of major disability although the lower weight range neonates (500-750g) still have higher sensorineural disability rates than those 
with birthweights over 750g. Doyal Let al op cit n 12, at F94. Also, Hack M et al. School age outcomes in children with birth weights under 
750 g. N. Eng. J. Med 1994; 331: 753-9. 
'4Doyal et al op cit n 12, at pF93. However, the apparent increase in willingness to treat such low birthweight infants is not uniform and when 
treatment is refused on the grounds of weight the parents may be understandably upset as for instance when treatment was refused for a neonate 
weighing only 567 grams: Anon. Scottish inquiry vindicates decision not to resuscitate baby. BMJ 1997; 315: 9. See also: 
Cramb A. Doctor left 
my premature baby to die. The Daily Telegraph Tuesday, June 10,1997. 
15BIank RH. International Symposium on Critically Ill Newborns. J. Legal. Med. 1995; 16: 183-188 at p185. 
'The legal situation will be examined in a later chapter. For a critique of the anomalies of this situation see McHaffie HE., Fowlie PW. 
Life, 
Death and Decisions: a reflection on neonatal practice. 1996 Hochland and Hochland, Cheshire at pp5-6. 
"Bohin S et al. Impact of extremely immature infants on neonatal services. Arch. Dis. Child. 1996: 74: F110-F113 at F113. 
"Campbell AGM. Treatment dilemmas in neonatal care. Annals of the New York Academy of Science. 1988; 530: 92-103 at p96. The author 
of this thesis was told by a young nurse of such an incident in which she was involved. She was reprimanded 
by her manager for taking the infant 
to the neonatal unit where it died a few hours later. 
'9Rennie J. M. Perinatal Management at the lower margin of viability. Arch. Dis. Child 1996; 74. F214-F218 at F215. 
20Doyal et al op cit n 12, at pF94. He suggests that in 1991-2, about 8 children who had had extremely low birth weight would survive with severe 
handicap compared with about 1000 children born with normal birth weight (NBW) yet with severe handicap. He does not attempt to discuss 
the reasons for the severe handicap in the NBW children. However, other authors indicate that there 
has been an increase in the number of 
children with cerebral palsy and disability as a result ofthe increased use of neonatal intensive care: 
Oakley A. Essays on Women, Medicine and 
Health. 1993 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh at p118. 
21 Rhoden NK. In: Treating Baby Doe: the ethics of uncertainty. Hastings Centre Report, 1986; 16: 34-42. 
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Better outcomes are obtained by specialist centres" with parents receiving the most current information 
possible enabling informed decisions to be made23 some opting for non-treatment with others wanting 
everything possible. 24 Rennie suggests decisions are strongly parent-led, a model apparently deferring clinical 
experience to parental preference although clinical and parental views may clash. 25 Once a viable infant is 
born, should parents be able to bar treatment? 26 Parental decision-making never before faced such dilemmas. 
Parental freedom of choice is likely to be reduced by the growth in evidence-based medicine. Since NHS 
resources are limited, and often outcomes are 'appalling"', deciding on the basis of outcome predictors may 
seem appropriate. 28 However, Oakley is concerned that most policies regarding non-treatment of neonates 
ignore differences between populations regarding birthweight and congenital abnormality. 29 Inadvertent 
discrimination could occur. Whilst perinatal mortality seems linked to the mother's social class, no study 
seems to have examined whether there is a link between parental social class and the decision to withhold 
active treatment although there is some evidence that lower classes are more tolerant of handicap than higher, 
more professional classes. 30 Oakley suggests that statistics are misused to make a `case based on a set of values 
and assumptions about who are the appropriate people to promote health in any community, and about the 
allocation of moral responsibility for health to particular groups within it'. 3' 
Resource allocation by health authorities relies upon clinicians deciding whom to treat. 32 Rationing, to the 
detriment of individual neonates and emotional costs to the healthcare team, occurs due to shortage of cots. 33 
Avery reports that `(p)ublic policy has placed a steady cost squeeze on care of the tiny premature, regardless 
of ethical intent' and that Canadian researchers had suggested care was only cost-effective for babies weighing 
more than 1250g. 34 Such data quickly becomes obsolete because of rapid advances in what is technologically 
achievable35 making the withholding treatment debate difficult. 36 
=Following the reforms introduced by the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 this was frequently impossible due to the 
extra- contractual nature of such referrals and the shortage of intensive care cots. 
"Rennie JM op cit n 19. Her research shows that neonates born between 23 weeks and 26 weeks, 6 days gestation have marginal viability: 50% 
die and 50% survive with some disability. Her findings are supported by others: Hodges D et at have analysed the effect of place of treatment 
on survival of premature babies and concluded that infants who received all their perinatal care at one of the five large centres had significantly 
better outcomes than infants treated throughout at one of the 12 smaller units in the Trent region: Hodges D et al. Survival and place of treatment 
after premature delivery Arch. Dis. Child. 199 1; 66: 408-411. 
"Rennie, op cit n 19 at F215, considers that it is `reasonable not to.. resuscitate babies of 23 and 24 weeks gestational age.. if the parents agree, 
and the baby is born in poor condition' and would advise against resuscitation at 22 weeks and in favour at 25 weeks. In contrast, Roberton 
considers that `the case is proved that we must look after, properly, babies of a birth weight greater than 500g or a gestation of 24 weeks or more. 
Furthermore, for babies of22 or 23 weeks gestation who are in a satisfactory condition at delivery, or those whose birthweight is j ust below 500g 
and who are also in a satisfactory condition, a long term neurologically intact survivor is also a distinct possibility, and such babies should also 
receive appropriate levels of care'. Roberton NCR. Should we look after babies less than 800g? Arch. Dis. Child. 1993: 68: 326-329 at p328. 
25For instance, where the parents of the baby refuse resuscitation at 26 weeks when there is a reasonable chance of survival without handicap 
or where the clinician has agreed pre-delivery not to attempt resuscitation of a 24 week gestation infant who is subsequently born with a better 
clinical picture than anticipated. Rennie, op cit n 19 at F215. With the pre-term, low weight baby, there is no time to get the authority of the court 
when the parents insist on treatment being withheld but doctors would be able to rely upon the doctrine of necessity. 
2'For instance regarding babies with Down's syndrome requiring heart or abdominal surgery if they are to live: Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. Delays in instituting resuscitation and intensive care therapy are fatal. Relevant case law is discussed 
in a later chapter. 
2'Rennie op cit n19, at F216. 
2RRennie, ibid, at F217 suggests that more information on clinical outcomes following resuscitation of low birthweight neonates is needed and 
may be forthcoming in the Confidential Enquiry into Stillbirths and Deaths in Infancy or from the current UK study of very premature infants 
(EPICure). 
"Oakley A. Essays on Ii omen, Medicine and Health. 1993 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. See pp112-3. 
3"Li L, Moore D. Acceptance of Disability and its correlates. J. Soc. Psychology 1998; 138,1: 13-25. See also: Sheppardson B. Abortion and 
Euthanasia of Down's Syndrome Children - the Parents' View. J. Med. Ethics 1983; 9: 152-7. 
"Oakley, op cit n29 at p122 (her emphasis). 
"Care for maternity services including neonatal care, is, on the whole, funded as a block based upon evidence of the previous `ear's figures. 
33Bruggen P. 11'ho Cares? True Stories of the NHS Reforms. 1997 Jon Carpenter Publishing, Charlbury at pp199-202. 
34Avery GB. Ethical Dilemmas in the Treatment of the Extremely Low Birth Weight Infant. Clinics in Perinatology 1987; 14,2: 360-5 at p362. 
"1bid, at p361. 
36 Ibid, at p363. 
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Clinical evidence seems the main criterion for deciding to treat/not treat these neonates coming before any 
consideration of `best interests', 37 i. e. before application of the principles of beneficence or non-maleficence. 38 
However, it can be trumped by parental preference which is not necessarily the same as the child's `best 
interests'. Nelson considers that treatment can be withheld if doctors believe it is `contrary to a child's best 
interests, is futile, harmful or disproportionately burdensome, but only after completing a process aimed at 
reaching an honest agreement and specifying the parents' and physician's values'. 39 Nelson cautions that the 
decision may incorporate the doctor's `value judgment' and `(t)he parents' values may not be heard or properly 
respected if this value judgment is hidden beneath the cloak of medical futility'. 40 Knowing that a severel\ - 
disabled life is very unpleasant does not necessarily mean that death is preferable. As Devettere says, `(w)hat 
we would consider a terrible loss may not be experienced as such a loss by him because he has never had what 
he now lacks'. 41 Withholding treatment means deciding that the harm (maleficence) of treating outweighs the 
benefits yet this conclusion is only possible if life is considered of limited value. 42 If any life is considered an 
overriding `good' anything preserving it must be intrinsically good despite appearing to be intrusive and 
burdensome. Curative treatment is inappropriate where evidence indicates palliation. In the case of 'Baby 
K'43, had the clinical appropriateness of ventilating her been considered first, it would not have been 
implemented. 44 She clearly received inappropriate treatment but access to SCBUs45 still appears to be `first 
come, first served' disregarding viability. 46 However, recognition of legitimate resource constraints does not 
imply acceptance of infanticide. In Holland, two physicians were prosecuted for deliberately causing the death 
of neonates by lethal injection but were acquitted as their action was held `medically necessary'. 47 This is a 
step too far for many. 
3.1.2 The critically-ill and withholding resuscitation 
Decisions to withhold resuscitation48 are made in a variety of situations: major heart disease; untreatable cancer 
or simply `old age'. 49 The most influential factor is the predicted outcome of attempting resuscitation. " 
"Doyal L, Wilsher D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawing of life prolonging treatment in neonatal medicine. 
Arch. Dis. Childhood, 1994: 70,1: F66-70 at F66. Doyal and Wilsher suggest withholding treatment is only legally and ethically acceptable if 
the decision has been made `in the child's best interests'. 
"In 1997, the Royal College of Child Health and Paediatrics, in an attempt to provide some guidance and uniformity of decision-making, issued 
a set of guidelines which listed five categories of patient where it would be appropriate to withhold or withdraw treatment. These are (1) the Brain 
Dead Child, (2) the Permanent Vegetative State, (3) the `No Chance' situation, (4) the `No Purpose' situation and (5) the `Unbearable' situation. 
These guidelines will be considered later. 
"Nelson LJ. Ethics and the provision of futile, harmful, or burdensome treatment to children. Crit. Care Med. 1992; 20,3: 427-433 at p427. 
40Ibid, at p428. 
41Devettere RJ. Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics. 1995 Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, USA at p329. 
42McHaffie op cit n 16, at p I0 is concerned that if, in certain circumstances `we ourselves would opt for death rather than a seriously impaired 
life, we are in effect saying that some lives are not worth prolonging'. 
"The `Baby K' story is told by several authors. An excellent discussion is to be found in Devettere op cit n41 at pp352-6. 
14Luce JM Physicians do not have a responsibility to provide futile or unreasonable care if a patient or family insists. Crit. Care Med. 1995; 2: 760- 
766. 
"Special Care Baby Units. The term is employed to include Neonatal Intensive Care Units. 
It is rare to have a hospital having two or more premature babies delivered at the same time when only one cot is available. 
Such instances 
normally occur in multiple births and these have usually been detected prior to delivery so that availability of ITU cots 
is assessed although 
situations can arise where one twin is treated at the delivery site and the other has to be referred elsewhere. 
"van der Heide A et al. Medical end-of-life decisions made for neonates and infants in the Netherlands. 1997 The Lancet 350: 251-5, at p255. 
The survey reported found that 8% of deaths in neonates and infants was the result of lethal injection. 
"The decision not to attempt resuscitation in the event of a cardiac arrest is generally framed as a 'Do Not Attempt Resuscitation' Order (DNAR). 
"Crimmins TJ. Ethical Issues in Adult Resuscitation. Annals Emerg. Med. 1993; 22,2: 229-235 at p231. 
50Audits have shown that resuscitation attempts in the UK, USA and Europe will restore life in 44% of cases but only 15% will recover 
sufficiently to be discharged from 
hospital and feNN er still will be alive a year later. Saklayan Metal. In-hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation. 
Medicine 1995; 74: 163-175 at pp168-172. 
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Physicians often find directly discussing this issue with patients difficulty' because it confronts both with the 
inevitability of death52 but discomfort should not prevent discussion occurring. " Unrealistic expectations about 
resuscitation outcomes may influence patient wishes. 54 Proxy decisions (including the treating physician) and 
patient's wishes often differ. 55 If the patient is to make an informed decision s/he needs honest and accurate 
information. 56 How information is presented can bias the decision. 57 A decision not to be resuscitated may fail 
to reflect the patient's true desires and could cause distress the patient feels unable or ashamed to express. 58 
Alternatively, some physicians may initiate resuscitation against the patient's wishes, 59 even when clinically 
futile60 thereby failing to withhold treatment appropriately. 61 There is a suggestion that the doctor must `do 
something - don't do nothing"' which, possibly because of the fear of litigation, bureaucracy, or personal 
failure means that doctors, particularly in the U. S. A., have been taught, `don't let the patient die on your 
shift'. 63 Enabling the patient to `die well' means recognising that `life is not the ultimate good nor death the 
ultimate evil'. 64 However, the public seems to regard DNAR orders with suspicion. 65 In 1968, the media 
compared a medical director prepared to write DNAR orders to the commandants of Nazi concentration 
camps. 66 By the year 2000, little had changed and there was media outcry over a patient who was asked if she 
51Bedell SE & Delbanco TL. Choices about cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the hospital: when do physicians talk with patients? NEJA1 
1984; 310: 1089-93. Similarly, van Delden found that in only 14%ofcases had the patient been involved in the making of their DNAR decision: 
van Delden JJM et al. Deciding not to resuscitate in Dutch hospital. J. Med. Ethics 1993; 19: 200-5. It has to be recognised that in Holland, if the 
decision is based on grounds of futility, the patient need not be involved (p203) but van Delden discovered that often, where `futility' was cited, 
the physician did not really believe attempting resuscitation was futile so the conclusion can be made that `futility' is used inappropriately, or 
a wider meaning of `futile' was adopted. 
12The consequence of withholding resuscitation is that, the `death' of patient having already occurred, no attempt is made to reverse the clinical 
situation and restore life. An additional problem can be found in the cultural or religious background of the patient as to whether such a 
discussion is appropriate. The Jewish view, according to O'Donovan, is that `the welfare ofthe patient takes precedence over all considerations' 
and nothing must be done to `sap his confidence in recovery'. O'Donovan O. Begotten or Made? 1984 Oxford University Press, Oxford at p 119. 
"One study on decisions to forego life support in which it was stressed that patient autonomy was not to be violated found that NO discussions 
about the patient's wishes regarding resuscitation took place because either the patient never raised the issue; the patient raised the issue and the 
doctor resisted hearing it, or the doctor raised it but not emphatically enough to get an answer. Safar P et al. Philosophical, ethical and legal 
aspects of resuscitation medicine. Critical Care Medicine 1988; 16: 1068-1076 at 1072. 
54Bruce-Jones PNE. Resuscitation decisions in the elderly: a discussion of current thinking. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 286-291. 
ss Whitnack E. Letter: Substituted judgment and the decision to withhold life support. Ann. lnt. Med. 1991; 115,9: 743-5 at p744. She suggests that 
patients should be told that they would find themselves in Intensive Care following successful resuscitation with a tube in their mouth preventing 
speech plus a variety of other tubes, lines and catheters inserted; that they may have to be restrained; that they would `move their bowels' in bed 
and that they may also have brain damage, heart damage and develop pneumonia, kidney failure, sepsis, haemorrhage. Seckler has concluded 
that proxy decisions frequently bear little resemblence to the decision the patient would have made him/herself: Secler AB. Substituted j udgement: 
how accurate are proxy predictions. Annals Intern. Med. 1991; 115: 92-98. 
56Liddle Jet al. The views of elderly patients and their relatives on cardiopulmonary resuscitation. I Royal Coll Physicians 1994; 28: 228-9. This 
study of 100 patients after discharge found that 78% would have wanted CPR in the event of a cardiac arrest but only 11 % were recorded as 
for resuscitation. 
57Taylor EM et al. Patients' receipt and understanding of written information about a resuscitation policy. Bioethics 1998; 12,1: 64-76. Taylor 
evaluated the effectiveness of providing information in a booklet distributed to patients prior to hospital admission. Only 51% received the 
booklet; only 38% read it; only 27% understood it. Worryingly, 15% felt the DNAR policy may be misused in order to save money and a further 
4% approved of resource allocation limiting the availability of resuscitation. 
58For instance, the patient may wish resuscitation to take place even if the long-term prognosis is very poor as a `successful' attempt may restore 
life long enough for his/her family to reach the hospital to say goodbye, or for the patient to see their first grandchild. 
"The patient who has attempted suicide is not considered as having given a valid refusal to resuscitation and doctors and ambulance personnel 
would be considered to have failed in their legal and professional duties if they did nothing. Similarly, a patient request that resuscitative 
measures were not taken in the event of a cardiac arrest may not be valid if the patient lacked the capacity to give a valid refusal of treatment 
for reasons due to mental illness and any discussion abouttreatment can only hold weight if the patient has capacity to make decisions about their 
own healthcare. 
"For instance, if the patient was known to have an aortic aneurism - once cardiac arrest occurs in such a patient cardiac output is impossible to 
restore. 
61Asai A et al. Medical decisions concerning the end of life: a discussion with Japanese physicians. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 323-7. He reported 
that whether or not DNAR orders were followed depended on whether the physician or relatives were present at the patient's bedside at the time 
the arrest occurred. 
62Attempts to resuscitate may merely prolong the process of dying in 25% or more of cases. See: Thomas R et al. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
in a district general hospital. Arch. Emerg. Med. 1990; 7: 200-5 and Saklayan M. In hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation. 1995 Medicine 
74: 163-175. Reasons given are variously: the reluctance of doctors to accept death in young patients; the refusal of some doctors to acknowledge 
that their patients have reached the end of a terminal disease; failure to communicate the DNAR order; fear of medico-legal sanctions and the 
'heroes'. Also, one survey found that of 300 patients, 86 were unsuitable for resuscitation yet only 26 had DNAR orders and only 10 of these 
orders were known to the nursing staff. Aarons E& Beeching N. Survey of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders in a district general hospital. BMJ 
1991; 303: 1504. 
63Safar P et al. Philosophical, ethical and legal aspects of resuscitation medicine. Critical Care Medicine 1988; 16: 1068-1076 at p1075. 
C'Handley A. Should we resuscitate? Care of the Critically 111 1990; 6: 152-3 at p153. 
". 'Do Not Attempt Resuscitation. 
"Towers B. Public debate on issues of life and death. J. Med. Ethics 1983; 9: 113-5 at pl 13. 
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wished for resuscitation attempts to be made in the event of a cardiac arrest. 67 American patients are routinely 
asked such questions. 68 Theoretically, a DNAR order is fully compatible with continuing to give the highest 
level of other care. 69 In reality, care is often reduced and physio/speech therapy will be withdrawn because of 
pressure on these services. 70 Thus a valid decision based on clinical values results in an invalid decision 
grounded in economic values. 
Also debatable is whether resuscitation research can be carried out on the `dead' person without consent. " 
Those who favour doctors carrying out `desperate, uncontrolled trials of novel pharmacologic and physical 
agents' suggest that if the treatment fails, the patient is no worse off and if it works the patient has benefited 
from having life restored. " The answer must be that if the patient refused resuscitation, any attempt to carry 
it out is non-consensual but if the patient did agree, once the usual protocol has failed, it may be permissible 
to try out novel treatment. The patient is rarely involved in the resuscitation decision so it seems that doctors 
could decide, regarding the same patient, to either withhold treatment as futile or to provide treatment mainly 
as a learning exercise. 
Guidelines are important regarding the withholding of resuscitation. 73 All accept that DNAR orders should 
be reviewed regularly. 74 Factors to include are the quality of life prior to the illness (highly subjective and 
known only to the patient), the expected quality of life (medical and social) assuming recovery and the 
likelihood of resuscitation being successful. Hospitals are free to draw up individual protocols. Whilst the 
ethics of CPR in adults has been widely debated, less attention has been paid to children. 75 Unlike the elderly 
patient a resuscitated infant could potentially live sixty years or more. 
3.1.3 The patient with major trauma/advanced disease and the withholding of life support 
Hall suggests that ethical debate fails to understand the power of the adage, `if the technology exists, use it'. 76 
This emphasis continues because the `paucity of knowledge about prognosis, compared to diagnosis causes 
physicians to seek a high standard of certainty before making decisions to withhold or withdraw therapy'. " 
"Hope J. Doctors `pressured to stand back and let their patient die'. Daily Mail 28 June 2000. 
18The Patient Self-Determination Act 1990 means American patients are asked these questions routinely. 
"Many hospitals, following the advice ofthe UK Resuscitation Council and Ombudsman's criticism, have policies regarding how DNAR orders 
are to be made, how they are to be recorded. These often include a statement to the effect that the making of the order is compatible with the 
continuing of other care as appropriate to the patient's needs: Resuscitation Council (UK) Decisions Relating to Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation: A joint statement from the British Medical Association, the Resuscitation Council (UK) and the Royal College of Nursing. 
January 2001 Resuscitation Council (UK), London, para 15. All hospitals are now expected to have such policies: NHS Executive. Resuscitation 
Policy (HSC 2000. /028) September 2000 Department of Health, London. 
"Candy CE. Not for resuscitation: the Student nurses' viewpoint. J. Advanced Nursing 1991; 16: 136- 146 at p142. 
"Safar P et al. Philosophical, ethical and legal aspects of resuscitation medicine. Critical Care Medicine 1988; 16: 1068-1076 at p1070. 
Suggestions were made that the `emergency exception to consent' could be invoked but the American approach is that the concept of `deferred 
consent' is adopted. 
72Safar P et al. Philosophical, ethical and legal aspects of resuscitation medicine. Critical Care Medicine 1988; 16: 1068-1076 at p1070. 
"In the UK the first BMA and RCN joint statement was issued which stated that it is appropriate to withhold resuscitation by means of a DNAR 
order where the patient's condition indicates that effective cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is unlikely to be effective; CPR is not in accord 
with the recorded sustained wishes of the patient who is mentally competent or successful CPR is likely to be followed by a length and qualit' 
of life which would not be acceptable to the patient. Joint Statement on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation issued March 1993 (No 000 244) 
This Nvas issued after the Chief Medical Officer wrote to hospitals following a complaint to the Health Service Ombudsman (PL/CMO(91)22) 
which will be discussed in a later chapter. More recent guidance has been issued since: Resuscitation Council (UK) op cit n69. 
"Dr Peter Baskett, the acknowledged UK expert on resuscitation ethics suggests review should be conducted on an individual basis and could 
be `weekly, daily or hourly'. Ethics in Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation. Resuscitation 1995; 25: 1-8. 
75Davies JM & Reynolds BM. The ethics of cardiopulmonary resuscitation Background to decision making. Arch. Dis. Child. 1992; 67: 1498-150 1. 
"Hall K. Intensive Care Ethics in Evolution. Bioethics 1997; 11,3&4: 241-5 at p241. Hall calls this the `scientific ethic' and points out that 
intensive care medicine is `a very recent branch of medicine, having its origins in the polio epidemic of the late 1950s'. 
77 Hall K. Intensive Care Ethics in Evolution. Bioethics 1997; 11, (3&4): 241-5 at p245. 
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Different cultures may adopt different stances. 78 The family of a terminally-ill Japanese patient may not 
sanction the withholding of treatment because this would constitute `abandonment'. 79 Shortages of intensive 
care beds means some patients are denied access despite the appropriateness of care. Sometimes, inappropriate 
patients fill these beds as happens during influenza outbreaks. 8° Hall asserts that there is no ethical model 
which `adequately addresses the role of technology, technical expertise and technical achievement' so the 
scientific ethic continues to be the model used. Hall argues that the distinction made in Asclepian medicine 
between the `hopelessly ill' to whom no treatment should be given and the `seriously ill where treatment \N, 'as 
at the physician's discretion's' should replace the present `ethos of aggressively subordinating Nature to human 
will'. 82 Patients with disabling conditions like motor neurone disease are frequently concerned that they will 
be subjected to ventilation and tube feeding against their will. 83 Devettere, likewise, is concerned at aggressive 
over-treatment, particularly of apparently competent elderly patients who have tried to refuse aggressive 
treatment. 84 
3.2 Outcome of Eventual Death 
In some cases, death could be averted if treatment is given. Without treatment the patient will die within a 
matter of weeks. 
3.2.1 The patient needing transplantation 
Organ transplantations are increasingly successful but the number of available organs is limited. 85 Whilst 
dialysis is possible for the patient with renal failure, alternatives to transplantation are in their infancy with 
regards to heart and liver failure. There is currently no artificial alternative to lung transplantation. Kidney 
transplant patients report a better health related quality of life than dialysis patients. 86 Only certain patients 
are referred to transplantation units; few go onto the waiting list; many die waiting. The criteria identified by 
Collins to withhold the transplantation option include: co-morbid disease, malignancy, diabetes, infection, 
substance abuse, psychiatric illness and a lack of `social support systems' with refusal usually dressed up as 
`futility' even though `rationing' is a more accurate descriptor. " He suggests `rationing' is such an 
"For instance, in Japan, clinicians tend to treat even terminally ill patients aggressively (i. e. they adopt the curative model of care) even when 
the patient has indicated otherwise. Japanese physicians may disregard DNAR orders and may ventilate patients whose cancer is so advanced 
that they are comatose, because anything less is `patient abandonment'. Asai A et al. Medical decisions concerning the end of life: a discussion 
with Japanese physicians. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 323-7. 
79Asai A, op cit n79 at p325. Asai explains that the decision falls to the family because Japanese doctors will not usually tell a patient if s/he 
has a terminal illness and they consider it more appropriate to discuss treatment options with the family even where the patient is competent. 
80For instance, during the winter of 1999-2000. 
81Hall K. Intensive Care Ethics in Evolution. Bioethics 1997; 11, (3&4): 241-5 at p243. 
821bid, at p245. 
"one such patient was Annie Lindsell who campaigned in favour of euthanasia. Her advance directive was recognised as determinative %vhen 
her condition deteriorated to the point of considering ventilation. 
"4Devettere op cit n41. See, in particular, his account of the case of William Bartling at pp177-181. 
"Collins EG et al. Decisions not to transplant: Futility or rationing. J. Cardiovascular Nursing 1995; 9,3: 23-9. Increased success rates and 
improved anti-rejection drugs mean that conditions where previously the patient would not have been considered for an organ transplant are now 
being treated. For instance, Collins et al report (at p23) that heart transplantation is now considered `acceptable treatment therapy for patients 
with end-stage congestive heart failure' -a condition normally considered terminal. Survival rates quoted by Collins et al are 80% at one year 
and 40% at 12 years whereas survival without transplantation is under 50% at one year. Most organs come from dead donors so, with increased 
success in treating trauma injuries; low numbers carrying donor cards, and medical reluctance to request organ donation, usable organs are a 
scarce resource. 
8"Gudex CM. Health related quality of life in end-stage renal failure. Quality of Life Research 1995.4: 359-366 at p365. 
"Collins EG et al, n85 at p24. `Co-morbid disease ' refers to existence of some other physiological disease in addition to the congestive heart 
failure. 
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unacceptable word in the U. S. A., policy makers cannot openly use it. 88 In Britain, the unavailability of organs 
is acknowledged and accepted as beyond government control. 89 This difference could explain the variation 
regarding heart transplantation for Down's patients. 90 In 1996, a patient with a relatively minimal impairment 
of intellectual ability was refused heart transplantation by Harefield Hospital because of her `other problems' 
which included a suppressed immune system. This is actually the clinical situation required for successful 
transplantation. The BMA has now expressed its opposition to such discriminatory practices: `incapacitated 
patients and those with learning difficulties should have the same opportunity to access scarce resources'. 9' 
However, a nine year old girl with Down's syndrome was recently refused a heart transplant allegedly because 
her `quality of life is not good enough'. 92 Such discrimination on the part of doctors seems far worse than that 
shown by families who wish to attach racist conditions to donor organs. 93 
Particular difficulties arise with children. In the case of Laura Davies, 94, parental preferences and medical 
opinion concurred although the initially-applauded decision became increasingly subjected to criticism. 95 In 
Re 7 6, parental preferences clashed with medical opinion, the courts eventually favouring the parents. 97 In a 
third case, a 15 year old girl was given a heart transplant against her wishes. 98 `Best interests', child autonomy, 
family values and medical determination have varying degrees of influence in such situations. 
3.2.2 The chronically ill and the withholding of dialysis 
Kidney failure is sometimes reversible but often is a terminal event in the aging (dying) process. 99 In which 
case, providing dialysis1°° merely extends the dying process and is medically futile since eventually the patient 
will undergo complete failure of other organs. However, if the patient is considered simply in terms of the 
immediate problem, kidney failure, dialysis is actually very effective. 1 ' The costs form a substantial amount 
of any health budget. 1°2 Dialysis cannot readily be seen as too burdensome or invasive so some purchasers limit 
"Ibid. 
"However, the BMA has ended its opposition to an `opting out' system: Anon. BMA starts debate on presumed organ donation. BMJ 
1999; 318: 131. 
90CuttingEdge: A heartforJo. Channel 4 Television September 1996. In contrast, the programme showed an American woman, with the same 
condition but less able to express herself, who had had a successful heart transplant. 
91BMA Medical Ethics Committee. Withdrenving and Withholding Treatment 1998 BMA, London at p12. 
92Rogers L. Hospital refuses new heart to Down's child. The Sunday Times 25 July 1999. 
"Wilkinson P, McGrory D. Union officials leaked racist donor request. The Times 8 July 1999 (reporting a `whites' only request). McGrory 
D. Surgeons ignored racist conditions. The Times 9 July 1999 (reporting an `Asian only' request). 
94An infant who had been born with a congenital condition incompatible with life and who underwent multiple organ transplantation in the U. S. A. 
'Weekly World News Digest December 23 1993. Article reporting her death on 11 November 1993 following a stroke eight weeks after a second 
multiple organ transplant operation which had involved the transplantation of seven organs. 
96Re T (a minor)(medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242. His parents refused the option of liver transplantation knowing that a successful 
treatment could lead to life expectancy being measured in years rather than months without transplantation. 
97A more detailed analysis of these two cases will be undertaken later. It is worth noting the stress placed by the court upon the fact that the 
parents were `health professionals' indicating that they had greater authority to challenge the medical model than other parents would have had 
in the same situation. 
98Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097. This case will be discussed later. 
991n other words, due to ageing, the patient is entering into multiple organ failure and the heart will also be weak, the liver function poor etc. 
Alternatively, the patient has developed kidney failure as a result ofwidespread terminal cancer which would come under the same categorisation 
as being part of the dying process. 
"Dialysis is a technological process by which the toxins, normally eliminated by the kidneys, are removed from the blood stream. Ifthese toxins 
are not removed, death will occur within a few days. Sometimes it is carried out in hospital taking several hours two or three times a week. 
Other 
types of dialysis are now available for use outside hospital. One is Continuous Ambulatory Peritoneal Dialysis (CAPD) where the patient is 
dialysed by means of a special apparatus attached to the waist during the day and can carry on a normal life whilst dialysis being performed. 
There are greater risks of infection attached to CAPD and it is not suitable for all patients. Personal Communication. 
""Medical audit will assist in the appropriate classification of patients. However, it may be that at the time the patient develops renal failure. 
there is no knowledge available to the clinician as to why it has developed or whether the patient has other co-morbid conditions so dialysis often 
will be implemented and withdrawn 
later. The discussion regarding withdrawal is found in the next chapter. 
""Devettere, op cit n41 at p187, reports that in the USA costs will have risen to $10 billion by the year 2000 (to treat 300,000 patients). 
- Chapter 3 page 45 - 
access to dialysis by introducing age-limits on funding. 1' Such arbitrary rationing ignores individual prognosis 
and seems discriminatory. "' Attempts have been made to establish the `cost-utility' of different treatments for 
patients in end-stage renal failure. 105 Gudex suggests these are unsuccessful because of `national differences 
in experience of illness.. . age differences,... 
different guidelines regarding acceptance into treatment programmes 
and the variability of the quality of data employed. 106 
Rationing by providers is more secretive - the public assumes only inappropriate treatment is withheld. 1°7 Most 
doctors withhold dialysis from permanently unconscious patients. 1°8 Others suggest that fear of litigation would 
make them provide treatment they felt inappropriate. "' A recent Canadian paper evaluated refusal of dialysis 
decisions at one centre - most were elderly patients with `poor functional capacity and multiple 
complications"" and female. "' A quarter of referrals were rejected despite adequate resources, most dying 
within six months. 12 Lowance suggests that chronologically or physiologically old patients with a predicted 
life expectancy of under 2 years should be advised not to have dialysis. "' Hirsch's `guidelines' which he 
advocates should be applied flexibly, indicate `advising' 14 non-acceptance of dialysis if the patient is demented, 
has metastatic cancer, end-stage disease of other organ(s) or the need to sedate/restrain the patient during 
dialysis. "' The underlying philosophy is that treatment is inappropriate if it will only have short-term 
effectiveness. His approach is inconsistent however. He comments, `(w)e have always discussed our reasoning 
with the patient and family, and have always assured ourselves that any decision not to offer dialytic support 
is understood"" suggesting his patients are not offered choices after all. The debate about withholding 
treatment is ill-served if fellow professionals and the public are misled. 
3.2.3 The patient with cancer 
Public outcry has followed the withholding of treatment/drugs for cancer patients. "' Research focuses on 
1°3For instance, Wiltshire HA announced in 1997 that it would not purchase dialysis treatment for patients over 65 years - see Chapter 3. Block 
contracts impliedly acknowledge that rationing is necessary. 
"'One of the aims of the NHS reforms under the Labour administration is to create a `national' healthcare system which eliminates such regional 
variations: A First Class Service: Quality in the NHS 1 July 1998 (HSC1998/113 NHS Executive, Leeds) at para 1.8. 
"5Gudex CM. Health related quality of life in end-stage renal failure. Quality of Life Research 1995; 4: 359-366. Gudex examined the health 
related quality of life (HRQOL) of 705 patients and found that estimates of HRQOL and cost per QALY `should not be used out of context or 
without a careful study of the life domains they are based on and the way in which data were collected and processed'. 
106 Ibid, at p365. 
"'There is no central agency in the UK compiling data on refusal of dialysis to serve as a means of informing future decisions about whether to 
treat an individual patient or not. This could be something the NICE includes as part of its remit when it examines dialysis. 
"'in such patients, the decision to withhold could be seen as recognising the fact that, following the irreversible brain damage, the patient was 
now moving from a stable, otherwise healthy condition, to the dying process. Moss reports a survey in the U. S. A. which revealed that 83% of 
centres would withhold dialysis although one doctor said that, if requested, he would provide dialysis to such a patient. Moss AH et al. Variation 
in the Attitudes of Dialysis Unit Medical Directors Toward Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw Dialysis. J. Am. Soc. Nephrology 1993: 4.2: 229- 
234 at p322. 
'°9Moss AH, op cit n 109, at p233. This raises the same concerns as artificially ventilating anencephalic babies. The legal issues will be 
considered in a later chapter. 
''Hirsch DJ et al. Experience with not offering dialysis to patients with a poor prognosis. Am. J. Kid. Disease 1994; 23,3: 463-6 at p463. 
"'Ibid, at p464. There was insufficient information to assert bias. It may simply be that the patients referred were elderly and women have a 
longer life expectancy. 
"ZIbid. 
"3Lowance DC. Factors and guidelines to be considered in offering treatment to patients with end-stage renal disease. 1993 Am. J Kid Disease 
21: 679-683. 
114 Hirsch DJ, op cit nl 11, at p465. 
I "Ibid, at p466. 
"6Ibid, at p465. My emphasis. 
"'Perhaps one of the better known cases being that of `Child B': Rv Cambridge District HA. ex pane B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
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`cures' and better predictors of treatment outcomes. "' Chemotherapy drugs are extremely expensive. 19 The 
NHS saves money by relying upon free provision of trial drugs and the willingness of patients to gamble that 
they are in the group receiving the new generation treatment. 12° Some patients opt for non-treatment. ''' 
However, the patient's right to exercise autonomy may be challenged by doctors. 122 How quickly someone is 
treated depends on how their need `as perceived by the doctor' is rated. 12' This may depend on `age, general 
health and usefulness to the community'. 124 Treatment may be withheld because of the doctor's subjective 
opinion rather than an objective assessment of the clinical benefits of treatment. 125 Rationing by age'26 or 
refusal to fund occurs. 127 Some countries allegedly over-treat to avoid litigation on grounds of negligent 
' practice. Z8 Cochrane was one of the early exponents of audit and research into effectiveness of treatment. ', " 
However, a rapid political shift towards evidence-based medicine could mean that, in order to comply with 
deadlines, mistakes or fabrications of results occur. 
3.2.4 The patient requiring artificial nutrition and hydration 
Following Bland13', artificial nutrition has now been classed as medical treatment. However, Re R "'suggests 
it differs from other treatments and withholding it is not viewed as favourably as withholding antibiotics. "' 
Most doctors seem to consider it appropriate to withhold treatment if the patient is dying and evidencing no 
' "The University of Hull has developed a computer program which can predict how long a cancer patient will live with 90% accuracy: Dobson 
R. Program predicts cancer deaths. Sunday Times Medicine 28 September 1997. Such information can be invaluable in helping the medical 
team and the patient to decide which treatment model to adopt. 
"9McNeil B. Implementing advances in medical technology: the American view. J. Roy. Soc. Med. 1995; 88 (Supp26): 26-7. She reports that in 
one Boston hospital, the new `biotech' drug, Ondansetron, used to combat nausea associated with chemotherapy thereby improving quality of 
life, now accounts for 6% ofthe total drug budget. Cancer drugs are generally expensive as the drug companies seek to recoup development costs 
in the short time available as sole licensees. 
"'The number of patients in such trials is set to double: Secretary of State for Health. The NHS Plan: A plan for investment a plan for reform. 
(Cm 4818-1) 2000 The Stationery Office, London at para 14.7. 
"'Or less radical treatment than the consultant recommends. For instance, a patient with breast cancer may prefer a `lumpectomy' to a radical 
mastectomy, or chemotherapy alone, or opt for alternative medicine rather than conventional. Surgery may be the option which is most likely 
to produce the greatest quantity of life overall but alternatives such as radiotherapy for cancer of the larynx might be more acceptable to some 
patients rather than losing the ability to speak. McNeil BJ et al. Speech and survival: trade-offs between quality and quantity of life in laryngeal 
cancer. NEJM 1981; 305: 982-7. 
'22 Morrison RS et al. When too much is too little. NEJM 1996; Dec 5: 1755-9 at p 1757. Morrison discusses an American case where the patient 
opted for non-treatment of lung cancer with an associated brain tumour yet, following epileptic seizures caused by the increased brain tumour, 
the patient spent his last 47 days in an acute hospital undergoing a lung biopsy, 3 brain scans, insertion of a naso-gastric tube and a gastronomy 
tube (a feeding tube that goes directly into the stomach through the abdomen) and was tied to his bed for 29 days to prevent him pulling out the 
tubes. 
"'Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care 1989 MacMillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p17. His emphasis. 
124Ibid. 
`Criteria used include `whether they were breadwinners, whether they could cope with the financial and social after-effects of their treatment, 
their home circumstances and the number of years of active life the procedure would give them'. Stoll op cit n 124, at p 18. 
126S toll also reports that in Stockholm, a proposal was made to withhold radiotherapy from patients over 70 years with certain cancers in order 
to expedite treatment for younger patients but had to be abandoned following public outcry. Stoll op cit n124. at p19. 
127CIinically-effective cancer drugs are being withheld from patients because of the costs. Laurence J. Timid doctors fail to give heart patients 
the best drugs. The Times 27 August 1996. 
"'In the U. S. A. in the 1980's, `adjuvant' cytotoxic chemotherapy was routinely given after first line surgical treatment for breast cancer yet this 
was not standard practice in the UK. The reason for its popularity in the States is suggested as because of the greater tendency to practice 
`defensive medicine' there. It is possible that the dismissal of the use of adjuvant chemotherapy is an example of jingoism since, if a practice 
has been widely adopted by a particular country, this might indicate a belief that some benefit was accruing to the patient. 
129Cochrane AL. Effectiveness and efficiency. 1972 Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, London. The Cochrane database has been doing this 
for several years now with regard to cancer treatments. 
130,4 iredale NHS Trust i' Bland [ 1993] AC 789. 
"'Re R (4dult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99. 
32See the conclusions on this point in the BMA document, Jvithdratiring and Withholding Treatment: A consultation paper from the B. 1IA s 
Medical Ethics Committee 1998 BMA, London at p22 (discussed more fully later). 
'JW SIiY 
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signs of hunger or thirst. 133 However, inappropriate withholding seems tantamount to inhumanity. ''' The 
media calls it `backdoor euthanasia' when maintaining fluid balance through nasogastric tubes is withheld in 
the case of stroke patients over a certain age. ' 35 These concerns led to attempts to legislate against such 
practices but politicians seem wary of tangling with the BMA. 136 
3.3 Outcome of Reduced Quality of Life 
3.3.1 Reproductive Issues 
Reproductive issues regularly tax medical ethicists and lawyers alike. "' The right to do what one wishes with 
one's own body is constrained by Parliament, the judiciary, doctors and healthcare purchasers. How and where 
a woman gives birth is constrained by resources, the medical profession and the courts. 138 A woman's desire 
to control her fertility is constrained by doctors/resources and her freedom to choose permanent sterility or 
abortion is limited. 
Infertility, a problem of both sexes, is potentially treatable but NHS provision is patchy and inequitable. The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 restricts the availability of assisted reproductive services. 139 
Accessing treatment is governed more by wealth than most other medical interventions. Most provision is 
through the private sector which can introduce inappropriate financial motives. 14' The Glover report identified 
as the `standard' case, the infertile married couple but recognised that others may seek assistance: unmarried 
couples; single persons and homosexual couples. 14' The report queried whether IVF was `medical treatment' 
since it merely circumvented the problem not cured it. 142 Whilst not wanting to make `the morality or 
availability of in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) depend on a definitional point' it recognised a difference between 
"'Lennard-Jones has recently made several recommendations regarding artificial nutrition and hydration. Number 5 states if the plan is to 
provide compassionate care for reliefof symptoms during the terminal phase of illness.. . 
fluid through a tube should be given only if it is to relieve 
thirst'. Lennard-Jones JE. Giving or withholding fluid or nutrients: ethical and legal aspects. JRoy. Coll. Phys. 1999; 33: 39-45. 
"4A doctor was recently disciplined by the GMC for ordering food supplements to be stopped. Horsnall M. GP Guilty of letting elderly patient 
starve. The Times 26 March 1999. The referral to the GMC was reported two years before: Anon. Woman dies two months after food 
withdrawal. BMJ 1997; 314: 1503. This topic has been the subject of media interest and relatives have expressed concern and distress over the 
decision to withhold what some consider to be basic care. Horsnall M. Police check hospitals over `backdoor euthanasia'. The Times 6 January 
1999; Hornsnall M, Foster P. Euthanasia claims sow doubt in families' minds. The Times 6 January 1999 and Hornsnall M. Euthanasia opponents 
want oath restored. The Times 7 January 1999. 
". Death will occur very rapidly if adequate hydration is not maintained when the brain has received a major assault as in a traumatic head injury 
or stroke. 
"'Ann Winterton introduced a private members bill, Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) during the parliamentary session from 1999 - 
2000 but aggressive lobbying of MPs by the BMA resulted in its failure. 
"'There have been several cases involving the sterilisation by hysterectomy of women with learning disabilities and recently, one request for a 
man with Down's syndrome to have a vasectomy: Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
"'Whilst the competent woman's right to refuse Caesarian section has been upheld (R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust ex parse S[ 1998] 
2 FLR 728), the woman deemed incompetent `due to the throes of labour' (Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust vC July 3,1996 Unreported) 
is vulnerable to coercion. See the discussion in a later chapter. 
'"Again, different countries have different approaches. For instance, Canada's Royal Commission, reporting in 1993, has recommended that 
only women who have blocked Fallopian tubes should be able to have in-vitro fertilisation. Devettere, op cit n41 at p277. 
"'The recent case of the sixty year old woman, Elizabeth Buttle, who is said to have `lied about her age' to the private clinic N., hich treated her 
`infertility' by administering drugs to reverse her menopause and IVF treatment leading to the birth of a live child which she initially claimed 
to be a `natural birth' has outraged many who question why this woman was able to obtain treatment which is not available to many `ordinary' 
couple: BBC News 21 January 1998. (In a similar case, an American widow aged 63 also lied about her age and received embryo(s) from donated 
eggs and sperm also leading to a live birth: Internet source: http: //itssrvl. ucsf. edu). An Italian infertility expert has stated that he intends to create 
the world's first human clone. Farrar S. Maverick fertility expert plans first human clone. Sunday Times 25 October 1998. 
'"'Glover J and others. Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European Commission. 1989 Northern Illinois 
University Press, DeKalb, Illinois at p24. 
142lbid, at p45. In this sense it does not differ from the way that spectacles and hearing aids act. 
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wanting IVF for `social' reasons143 and to prevent genetic disorders. " It approved assessing candidates for 
parental suitability since those `whose help is sought may have some responsibility for the consequences of 
their assistance'. "' The underlying philosophy aims to protect future children from abuse but it is questionable 
whether such propensities can detected in advance or whether assisted parenthood should be treated differently 
from natural. 14' It gives doctors powers without training in their use, over issues not obviously their 
responsibility. It can lead to bias regarding class, education, family set-up, previous criminal convictions etc. '4' 
If future potential antisocial behaviour is a reason to withhold treatment, doctors should withhold methadone 
from drug addicts. If society is prepared to protect the interests of a person who has not yet been born, '48 or 
may not be born, by denying him/her the possibility of life because IVF is withheld, why does it tolerate the 
abuse of future victims of the criminal drug addict, who are real and present persons? It is surely only 
appropriate to withhold IVF on the same grounds as other treatments. 14' If procreational ability is classed as 
a `fundamental interest' to be protected, just as `the services of the police should not depend on the citizen's 
ability to pay', "' IVF would become a `basic good' available to all. "' Then the state could arguably be in 
breach of an obligation to assist the infertile which could mean the NHS should be making IVF freely available. 
Giving birth is not always straight-forward. Not all maternity units can offer Caesarean sections in the event 
of an emergency. 15' Such units try to predict `high risk' pregnancies and refer them elsewhere but unexpected 
complications may occur at a stage in labour when it is impossible to transfer the mother. 153 Maternity care 
is generally purchased in `blocks' so `trade-offs' between public demand for local maternity care and the need 
to prevent harm are evident. 'sa 
Other women wish to control their fertility but some religions consider contraception immoral and laws 
reflecting such views place a huge burden upon women. 15' Hospitals sponsored by religious organisations, may 
prevent `a woman in poor health (who) requests in good faith a tubal ligation during a Caesarean section' from 
'a3For instance, so a couple can have a child that is biologically theirs or a professional woman, without a partner, can have a `designer' baby. 
Recently, two homosexuals became the parents of twins through the use of donor eggs and a surrogate mother. O'Connell A. Gay parents of 
twins make legal history. The Times 13 December 1999. 
114 Glover, op cit n 142, at pp45-6. For instance, some inherited conditions, like muscular dystophy, produce their disabiling effects only in male 
children and the use of IVF to enable only female embryos to be implanted can avoid this although the females will still possibly carry the 
recessive gene and so be carriers. 
145Glover, op cit n142, at pp49-51 at p49. 
146 One case where the potential for harm to the child both in-vitro (foetal alcohol syndrome) and afterwards (possible neglect or abuse) was 
detected by the use of tests following comments with the patient which lead the doctor to suspect alcohol addiction was Rv Ethical Committee 
of St Mary's Hospital (Manchester), exparte H [1988] 1 FLR 512. The patient also had convictions for prostitution and running a brothel and 
had been deemed unsuitable to adopt. The doctor did not disclose to the patient the true reason for withholding IVF which could be interpreted 
as preventing the patient from accessing help and modifying her behaviour. The patient's application for judicial review was rejected. 
"'Glover also questions whether society `has an interest in preserving the traditional family' and, if so, if this is `in conflict with the desire not 
to discriminate against potential parents who are single or homosexual'. Glover J and others. Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The 
Glover Report to the European Commission. 1989 Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, Illinois at p52. 
148For a discussion of some of the issues relating to whether society owes any responsibility to those who may or may not live in the future, for 
instance, in terms of saving world resources, see, Fotion N, Heller JC (Eds): Contingent Future Persons - on the ethics of deciding who will 
live, or not, in the future. 1997 Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
"'Very little is actually known about the causes of infertility since those working in the field have concentrated on ways to circumvent the 
problem not cure it. The `take home' baby rate is very low and little is known as to why some couples are more likely to succeed than others. 
Medical audit could provide useful information. 
150Glover J and others. Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European Commission. 1989 Northern Illinois 
University Press, DeKalb, Illinois at p87. 
15'Loc cit. 
' Foetal distress is a condition where, for various reasons, the oxygen supply to the baby becomes impaired and the baby is at high risk of brain 
damage as a result. 
153The outcome for babies born in such circumstances is often poor as a result. One example is that of Bull v Devon AHA [ 1993] 4 Med LR 117. 
154This situation is liable to continue with the introduction ofPCG Commissioning even though logic would suggest all births should take place 
in hospitals with all the necessary facilities to cope with emergencies. 
'55For instance, E ire, a predominantly Catholic country, where various legal actions have challenged the restrictions on the freedom of information 
about contraception and abortion. Most Moslem countries also consider abortion and contraception to be criminal acts or punishable under their 
religious code. Lack of access to contraceptive information and treatment has been blamed for Britain's teenage pregnancy rate even though 
this has not been due to religious prohibitions. 
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having that procedure carried out so she has to undergo sterilisation later at another hospital. 15' Recently the 
right to reproduce of mentally-handicapped vulnerable women has been protected by using contraception rather 
than sterilisation157 although withholding sterilisation could expose them to side-effects they cannot appreciate 
and whether they would be allowed to continue an accidental pregnancy is doubtful. 158 Occasionally, pregnant 
women are rendered permanently incompetent during pregnancy and some doctors may advise aborting the 
foetus whereas others will use the woman as an incubator. 15' Such recommendations seem based more on the 
doctor's personal beliefs than clinical data. 
3.3.2 Other conditions 
Many patients have early symptoms enabling detection of cardiac problems before cardiac arrest. "' Friedman 
examined the `vexing problem' of whether to fit patients with 'pacemakers"" rather than treating with 
drugs. 162 He concluded that costs would be so high only a `carefully selected subgroup of survivors of 
myocardial infarction who are at highest risk for sudden death' should be treated. 163 Other treatments may be 
restricted. 164 Often the decision is supported by clinical evidence as to the effectiveness of treatment but 
national variations exist. 16' Mentally-ill patients may have treatment withheld because experts disagree over 
fundamental issues such as what constitutes mental illness; ` diagnosis and treatability. '67 Patients may have 
concurrent physical and mental illness affecting the approach taken by both patient and doctor. `Severe' 
mental illness is prioritised168 but this means different things to different referral agencies. '69 If not `severely' 
ill places for treatment are limited. Consequently, some patients await treatment so long their condition 
deteriorates with tragic consequences for themselves or others. 1° 
Occasionally, patients request medical treatment which is seldom or never used in this country. "' Chemical 
castration has been requested by prisoners but the BMA has concerns about unknown long-term side-effects 
and the potential to affect the genetic material of the sperm which could produce congenital abnormalities in 
15`Devettere, op cit n41, at p271. 
157Recent case law has recognised the invasive nature of sterilisation procedures: see discussion later in this thesis. 
"'Complications such infertility may follow as a result of having a termination and `strokes' caused by blood clots have recently been recognised 
as a potential side-effect of the `pill'. 
"'See, for example, the case of Re AC 533 A2d 611 (DC App. 1987). See also: English R. This is the little girl born to a woman in a coma. 
Behind her smile is a story of feuding and heartache. Daily Mail 8 April 2000. 
161 Waiting lists mean that some patients die awaiting diagnostic procedures such as angioplasty which in other countries would be carried out 
within hours or days of symptoms first occurring. One such patient, died the day before his angiogram appointment after a six month wait: Rogers 
L, Prescott M. The Human Cost of Waiting Lists. The Sunday Times 4 June 2000. 
16 Properly called implantable cardioverter-defibrillators. 
'62Friedman PL, Stevenson WG. Unsustained ventricular tachycardia - to treat or not to treat. NEJM 1985; 335,26: 1984-5 at p1985. 
161Ibid. In 1985, the cost would be over $1 billion annually excluding aftercare. 
164For instance, hip replacement and cataract operations are not available to everyone since costs and patient age or other pathologies may be 
considered. Not all hospitals treat childhood deafness caused by middle ear infection with antibiotics or surgical insertion of grommets. 
161 See Wennberg's call for action to address the `phenomenon of geographic variation in the use of medical services and its connection to 
differences in practice style between physicians or `medical opinion". Wennberg JE. The Agenda for Outcomes Research. In: Appropriate 
investigations and treatment in clinical practice. Ed: Anthony Hopkins. 1989 Royal College of Physicians, London pp77-90 at p77. The 
government is intending to address such inequalities as already discussed: The New NHS(Cm 3807) December 1997, para 8.5 ii: `Fair access. 
To recognise that the NHS contribution must begin by offering fair access to health services in relation to people's needs, 
irrespective of 
geography, class, ethnicity, age or sex'. Also, para 8.5 iii: `Effective delivery of appropriate healthcare. To recognise that 
fair access must be 
to care that is effective, appropriate and timely, and complies with agreed standards. For example, increasing provision of treatments proven to 
bring benefit such as hip replacements... ' 
166For instance, the debate over whether anorexia really exists or whether it is merely evidence of `obliging' behaviour by certain young women. 
167Adding to this is the problem that there is no clear agreement as to whether patients should be cared for by the specialist mental health services. 
primary care services, social services, prison service or merely just a housing agency: Muijen M. Mad, bad and 
dangerous to know. Health 
Service J. 18 July 1996 p25. 
'68NHS Executive. Priorities and Planning Guidance for the NHS 1997/98 (prioritisation for specialist services) Dept of Health, Leeds. Also, 
The Review of Purchasing of Mental Health Services by Health Authorities in England 1996 Dept. of Health. 
169Muijen M, n167, loc cit. The different referral agencies include hospital consultants, GPs, social workers, etc. 
10For instance the murder of Jonathon Zito by Christopher Clunis. See: Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority[ 1998] 2 WLR 902. 
"'There is no recorded instance of surgical castration being carried out in this country although it has been performed abroad. 
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any children born later. 1' Treatments such as female circumcision are considered in Western society to be 
mutilation and abusive of children. 1' Society's interest in preventing abuse outweighs parental wishes or 
cultural requirements. Another controversial treatment is the use of plastic surgery to correct the characteristic 
facial features of Down's Syndrome children. 1' The discomfort and risks of treatment are offset against the 
benefits of better integration into society. The BMA points out that such treatments are `procedures which 
might reflect the priorities of other people rather than the patient' and suggest, probably correctly, that such 
treatments should require prior judicial approval. 1' With this, the BMA seems prepared, for once, to question 
the extent of medical power. A retired Consultant Paediatrician has called for such `corrective' plastic surgery 
on children too young to consent for themselves to be `outlawed' like female circumcision. "' 
A different example is of the suicidal patient requiring treatment following an overdose or the injured drunken 
driver. S/he may still be conscious and resisting attempts to help. It seems apparent in such a situation that 
treatment cannot ethically be withdrawn just because of resistance but the underlying basis for this conclusion 
is less apparent. "' Is it because the patient is considered incompetent to refuse treatment or is it an emergency 
`life or death' situation and consent is deemed unnecessary? Is it because paternalism"' is acceptable in such 
circumstances or is there an overriding duty to attempt to save life? Is self-harm/suicide so morally wrong that 
overriding personal autonomy is permissible? This latter view, grounded in `concern ... 
for their moral 
character"" could explain the resistance to euthanasia. 18' Or is it that respect for persons means recognising 
that the reasons influencing the behaviour of the person may be beyond autonomous control and when this is 
so, there is an obligation to provide treatment, by force if necessary, until these temporary factors are no longer 
influential? Harris suggests that respect for autonomy means recognising that each individual is `valuable"" 
whether they are depressed, drunk or drugged therefore concern for their welfare and respect for their wishes 
will be shown by those caring for them. However, trying to provide treatment may place healthcare 
professionals at risk of violence. `SZ 
"'BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at p112. This indicates a reliance upon 
the scientific (outcomes) model of decision-making. The government has accepted, in such situations, that this is more appropriate than the 
patient-preference model. However, it may be better to withhold treatment as a matter of principle since such patients may refuse to continue 
treatment after early release and so pose a greater public threat than if they remained imprisoned which introduces the possibility of a social 
welfare model. 
"'It is proscribed by the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985. A critique of the Western world's refusal to carry out female 
`circumcision' has pointed out that the West does impose its notion of what is `normal' when partial clitorectomies are performed on female 
children with enlarged `penile-like' genitalia. Harvey K. A Mother's Dilemma Pioneer Planet 4 March 1999, www. pfc. org. uk. The author of 
this thesis has had personal communication from several midwives caring for Somali women that having cut the woman to allow the baby to be 
delivered, they are intimidated by the partners, who insist on being present, into stitching her up as tightly as before. 
174 This issue is explored in a television documentary, Changing Faces 24 November 1998, ITV, London and HinsliffG. The Down's Dilemma 
Daily Mail 5 June 1997. 
"'BMA. op cit n 173, at p76. If the parents wished their child to look more `exotic', it is doubtful a doctor would rely, as presently, solely on 
parental consent. There are no recorded instances of the court's approval being sought prior to such surgery and since such surgery is being 
carried out in this country, those performing it are relying upon parental consent being sufficient. Whilst this may be acceptable for surgical 
correction of `bat ears' it is questionable. 
"Jones RB. Parental consent to cosmetic facial surgery in Down's syndrome. J. Med. Ethics 2000; 26: 101-102. 
771n fact, the accepted stance in Accident and Emergency departments in this country seems to be that the patient's competence must be assessed 
and if the patient appears competent, the staff are powerless to render assistance until the patient agrees. Sometimes, a psychiatrist will be called 
into provide an `expert' opinion. This constitutes a positivist interpretation ofthe law regarding consent to treatment as found in Rv St Georges 
NHS Trust, ex parte S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728. Legal issues regarding treatment refusal will be addressed in a later chapter. 
178Which can be defined as a belief that the will of others can be overridden, regardless of their wishes, if the person with authority considers it 
right to do so. 
179Harris J. Professional responsibility and consent to treatment. In: Hirsch SR, Harris J (Eds). Consent and the Incompetent Patient: Ethics, 
Law and Medicine. 1988 Gaskell, London pp37-53 at p40. 
""The question of euthanasia is so complex and troubled that it cannot be addressed in any depth in this thesis although an awareness of the 
various views pertaining to it %N ill be assumed and reflected in the few comments specifically mentioning the subject. 
''Harris J, op cit n180, at p 39. 
"'The government has recently announced a `Zero Tolerance' campaign to reduce violent attacks upon NHS staff. Department of Health. We 
don't have to take this: Resource Pack. L20/002 November 1999 DoH, Wetherby. 
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3.3.3 Treatments for the Benefit of Others 
Sometimes treatment is given which carries no physiological benefit for the patient. Siblings or parents may 
donate kidneys, liver/lung lobes or bone marrow to their relatives. 18' Their quality of life will be impaired, at 
least short-term, but society currently considers such sacrifices noble. 184 It may even be a social duty. '85 
Another situation where treatment carries risks for one but benefits for another is where the use of Caesarian 
section to deliver a baby with spina bifida reduces disability. "' The question arises, is there any difference 
between carrying out a Caesarian section, with its risks to the mother, in order to prevent a `normal' baby being 
brain-damaged or to reduce the level of handicap in an `abnormal' baby? Would the woman's refusal be 
considered more culpable in one case than the other? "' Certainly, a negligent failure to offer a Caesarian in 
such a case could be actionable. 
3.4 Empirical Research Analysis 
This section analyses the responses given by the eighty-five consultants interviewed to the following 
questions 18.: 
Regarding the individual patient, when deciding to withhold or withdraw certain treatments, what sort 
of criteria do you use and which criteria should not be used? 
Who should be involved in the decision to treat/not to treat a particular patient? 
Do you think relatives should have a say? 
Caution has to be exercised regarding the interpretation of the responses. There is a danger that what happens 
in practice differs from what is said to happen. In interpreting this data I have attempted to identify 
discrepancies within individual consultant's accounts as well as between consultants. 
3.4.1 Criteria used in deciding to withhold certain treatments 
Evaluating the responses enabled a number of criteria, utilised either singly or jointly, to be identified. 
Sometimes these were implied in what was said rather than used as classifications of approach by the 
183The reasons being the shortage of dead donors and also because genetically related donated tissue is less likely to be rejected by the recipient 
even when an equally good match with an unrelated donor exists for reasons the medical profession as yet do not fully understand. In several 
instances these proposed transplants have been the subject of court decisions and will be discussed in more detail later. 
'840f course, it may be that societal views could change and if the living donor later develops problems that are attributable to his/her `fault' in 
being `stupid' (for instance, if having donated a kidney, the donor later develops renal failure) this may be considered a reason to withhold 
treatment from him/her. Little is actually known about the long-term effects of being a living donor. A critique of how such decisions are made, 
particularly when incompetent patients are the potential donors, is in a later chapter. 
115 For an interesting discussion of this point see Mason JK, McCall Smith, Laurie GT. Lcnv and Medical Ethics 5th Edn. 1999 Butterworths, 
London at pp345-6. 
'"`See: Davis A. `All babies should be kept alive as far as possible'. In Gillon R (Ed). Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, 
Chichester pp629-641 at p638. The study she quotes from found that children delivered by caesarian section were less likely to have severe 
paralysis (Luthy DA et al. Cesarean section before the onset of labor and subsequent motor function in infants with meningomyelocele diagnosed 
antenatally. NEJM 1991; 324: 662-6). 
'. 'Unless the competence of the woman is to be called into doubt, the law, as it currently stands, will support even `irrational' refusals of 
treatment. There will be a fuller discussion of the issue of enforced treatment in a later chapter. 
188A list of the consultants, maintaining confidentiality, can be found in Appendix A. The consultants were based at four different hospitals (A - 
D), and were from a variety of specialties. A descriptor of the hospitals, maintaining confidentiality, can be found in Appendix B. 
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consultants themselves. Some consultants considered certain criteria appropriate to use which others rejected 
as inappropriate resulting in overlapping responses to the first question. The data will be analysed utilising 
themes based on the following criteria: "' 
Criteria which were considered appropriate to use included: 
a) treatment clinically ineffective 
b) the patient's quality of life 
c) balance of burden greater than benefit 
d) wishes of patient (including those expressed in advance directives) 
e) the patient's social circumstance 
f) financial costs 
g) timing costs 
h) burden on the family 
i) burden on healthcare staff 
j) the patient's age 
Criteria which some consultants rejected as inappropriate to use included: 
a) financial costs 
b) wishes of relatives 
c) merit of the patient 
d) patient's responsibility for illness 
e) the patient's age 
3.4.1.1 Effectiveness of Treatment 
The clinical effectiveness of treatment was cited by most of the consultants as the starting point for deciding 
whether to treat or not though gaining patient acceptance of this could be difficult. Typical comments included: 
I never withhold appropriate medical treatment. D 10 
My two criteria for giving treatment are: will it cure or will it relieve suffering. A24 
One looks at the disease process. Not necessarily... age, I've just finished operating on an 87 year 
old. D2 
We do not attempt to resuscitate someone who is partially or totally decapitated; is decomposing or 
who has rigor mortis. C 16 
If someone is manic-depressive or schizophrenic and they ask for psychotherapy I say no because it 
"'Some criteria could fit into more than one theme but the themes selected are: Effectiveness of treatment (which could have included patient 
age and/or present quality of life); Quality of life (which could have included the Balancing of Benefits and Burdens); Balance of Benefits and 
Burden; Patient Wishes; Social Circumstances (which was taken to include the burden on carers); Resource Implications (which was taken to 
include financial costs, timing costs and burden on healthcare staff but could also have included age as a restricting factor on resource allocation) 
and finally, Age. 
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could lead to a recurrence of their psychosis. A28 
The predicted outcomes of treating were important in deciding whether to withhold treatment but a difficulty 
many faced was insufficiency of accurate data. Consequently, several indicated that although they believed, 
as a result of previous experience, a certain patient or condition would not be helped by a particular 
intervention, they felt compelled to offer the chance of treatment: 
The more holistic physicianary approach is to say, this is the pre-terminal event in someone at the 
end of their life and it should be treated as such. D9 
If they've got a greater than 50% chance of not surviving 30 days from surgery, I would view that as 
grounds for not offering that treatment. A 17 
One of the criteria... laid down to us recently was that people had to have a prognosis of about a year, 
at least a year. Nobody can tell who has a prognosis of a year. A 10 
I would not rule out anything for anybody... (but) there is a temptation to present the available 
options as the recommended ones. C1 
Sometimes, experimental treatment would be used as a `last-ditch' attempt to save life190 posing risks which 
may not be fully understood at the time. The few who mentioned this did not clarify whether they consider the 
decision was theirs alone or whether the patient, if competent, should be involved. 
In certain instances one decides to use either experimental drug therapy or drugs that have not been 
of strictly proven value. B2 
One consultant mentioned gender reassignment indicating that a reason for not treating could be because 
patients are dissatisfied with even the best achievable results. This indicates a conflict between patient 
expectations and surgical reality and whether a professional should perform surgery which they consider is 
currently unsatisfactory. 
We don't do them here. I've been involved in the past but they are never happy people, I've never 
known one that actually feels that that was brilliant. They always want something more, very 
dissatisfied, and I personally feel as a surgeon I don't like that. B 10 
Smoking was mentioned by a few consultants as a reason to withhold treatment, not to punish, but because the 
evidence is that outcomes are poor: 
You're not denying treatment, you're perhaps offering them a management strategy that is different 
19OProposed revisions to the Helsinki Declaration included (Draft paragraph 7): `In the treatment of a sick person with a progressive, disabling 
or potentially fatal disease for whom existing therapy is either not effective or not available, the physician should be free to recommend use of 
a new diagnostic and therapeutic measure, 
if in his or her judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating suffering. 
Employment of such interventions, commonly called `compassionate use' and formerly called `clinical research' is not properly regarded as 
research. ' Bull. Med. Ethics 1999; 146: 
3. 
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from their perception of what they're going to have... I have a couple... whom I've said I'm not going 
operate on them as I think they are too overweight and they smoke. A 18 
If they smoke they don't have treatment, and there's no question about that. A25 
Some consultants seemed more comfortable with the concept of withholding treatment than others. Sometimes 
it seemed appropriate to start treatment and review later when more evidence was available 1..: 
If I think it (dialysis) is not going to make any improvement, and it's very difficult to predict that so 
I usually tell them - that I'm not certain it is going to make any difference; these are the difficulties 
you will face, (so) my recommendation is to have a trial of three months. A2 
There are some very difficult (patients) who are wide awake and alert on the ventilator but have no 
lung function left on their own... very often you try and not put them on a ventilator in the first 
place... you've got no other treatment except a new pair of lungs and so we do sometimes put patients 
on a ventilator for days, weeks, months and then allow them to die... The decision is helped by having 
clinical evidence and weighing it up beforehand. D6 
A baby could be born at 400 grams which elsewhere would not be allowed to live. When it comes out 
it's alive, kicking and breathing. Am I just going to let him die, of course not, that child comes down 
here and gets the full treatment to start with. This buys time. A12 
Clinical experience was regularly cited as one of the most important factors and the indication was that 
`experience' was as important as any concrete evidence: 
The decision is made on an individual basis using experience, maybe second opinions, parental 
wishes, the baby's condition, the nurses' experience. A7 
My young team wanted to drain his kidneys and then review his management and I was outvoted 
there. All the other consultants agreed with me and the man died a week after starting terminal care. 
My junior staff were very concerned by this... We are going to meet more of this... they haven't got 
access to people with great experience. A26 
Today I made decisions on three people with head injuries that they won't be treated. My criteria is 
experience - there are no hard and fast rules. Some people will pull out all the stops 
because they 
are unwilling to make moral decisions about not treating. It's easier to treat all and uphold the 
sanctity of life. B7 
Doctors tend not to publicise their failures, their mis-diagnoses. Until this becomes professionally acceptable, 
"Time-limited trials are also `highly recommended' regarding artificial nutrition and hydration when the effectiveness of a procedure and what 
the benefit-burden balance will be: See: Smith DH, Veatch RM (Eds). Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the 
Care of the Dying. .4 
Report by the Hastings Center. 1987 The Hastings Center, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indiapolis at p61. 
The question must be whether it is for the patient's benefit or for the doctor's psychological benefit and to provide protection against litigation. 
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the quality of evidence available for directing treatment decisions will remain poor. 192 An important point, was 
made by one consultant: 
How many persons were treatable that I didn't treat I don't know... we tend to protect ourselves from 
the stress of knowing. D 13 
Another problem, which no one mentioned, is that scientific knowledge is growing rapidly and future illnesses 
predictable. If it is possible to identify that a critically injured person will develop dementia in the near future. 
or carries a gene predisposing him or her towards violence, would this be included with the evidence on which 
to base treatment decisions? "' To withhold treatment on such grounds seems immoral. Even if there was 
absolute certainty that the future illness/event would become actuality, society may prefer to respect the privacy 
of its members from unwarranted intrusion. 194 The growth in clinical evidence, whilst making some decisions 
easier, will create new dilemmas for the clinician and society. 
3.4.1.2 Quality of Life 
This was of great importance although QALYs were not used indicating that the QALY model is purely of 
academic interest and unworkable `at the bedside'. The assessment of quality of life seemed to be a purely 
subjective assessment made by the clinician often with little patient input regarding what an acceptable quality 
of life would be or what his/her life goals were. Typical comments included: 
QALYs aren't used as such. We obviously think about the quality of life of the patient before any 
treatment, we don't actually quantify that. D6 
If I think the patient is not going to tolerate it, their quality of life is not going to be enhanced... 1 tell 
them that's my opinion (not to have treatment) but they should have a go if they are in any doubt. 
A2 
Someone who is unlikely to have an independent existence out of hospital for less than six months I 
would not dialyse. I would not dialyse dementia and very elderly patients over 80 years who were 
unconscious at the time of referral. A2 
The most important thing is quality of life... If there is no prospect of recovery and complete change 
of personality, what quality of life are you enhancing by treating? D 13 
Quality of life is probably the crucial one as far as children are concerned. B8 
"A recent editorial indicated that the error rate in medicine is equivalent to at least 20 aircraft landings at Heathrow being potential disasters 
and called for `greater willingness to discuss error openly at all levels of medical training rather than trying to hide from it'. Nicholson RH. 
Editorial Bull. Med. Ethics 1999; 146: 1. 
193For a discussion of similar issues see: Hargrave S. Row over brain scan that spots `killer' babies. Sunday Times 28 September 1997. 
"'Even where future risks can be minimised, the right of the individual to reject preventative healthcare such as vaccination is upheld in this 
country even though some medical professionals might consider this an irrational rejection of scientific evidence. For 
instance, Schoen suggests 
that routine circumcision of new born males is being rejected despite the future benefits he alleges will acrue to the individual: Schoen EJ. Benefits 
of newborn circumcision: is Europe 
ignoring medical evidence? Arch. Dis. Child. 1997,77: 258-260. His argument is rejected by Rowena 
Hitchcock (Comment. 4rch. Dis. Child. 1997; 77: p260) on the grounds that circumcision is an assault. The Human Rights Act 1998 may help 
to protect individuals against such interventions in the future even if scientific evidence becomes overwhelmingly in support of the procedure 
in question. 
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Some consultants took a paternalistic approach and alone would decide not to treat, often based on a dubious 
`ethical' approach of considering whether the predicted quality of life would be what they would want for their 
relatives: 195 
I'm a bit old fashioned. I tend to take somewhat of a paternalistic view of this ... I weigh up the 
judgement on quality of life in terms of the individual patient... and one decides not to start 
(treatment) if the quality of life is such that there's nothing to be gained I am perhaps guilty of not 
discussing it in a wider sense with patients and colleagues. I'm a great believer in the quality of life. 
B2 
If it were my dad, my mum, my sister, my child... what treatment would I consider optimal. B 15 
What would I want if I was her or she was my mother. A29. 
There was an indication that the options offered to the patient (or relatives who often were used as proxy 
decision-makers) would be tempered by these considerations. This approach is very questionable, legally and 
ethically. The doctor is not expected to act as patient surrogate since s/he usually knows too little about the 
patient to be able to speak for the patient. To withhold treatment on the basis that, if s/he were acting as a 
proxy decision-maker for his/her own mother or child, this is the decision s/he would make, is unacceptable. 
The patient is not the doctor's relative. If the patient is competent, s/he should be involved. 19' If incompetent, 
the decision must be in his/her best interests. The doctor is under an obligation to discover, as best possible, 
what constitutes the particular patient's best interests. This requires communication with others, not a 
transference of one's own family values and personal beliefs onto another. 
3.4.1.3 Balance of burdens and benefits 
Several doctors spoke of balancing burdens and benefits (in other words, invoking the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence. There seemed a consensus that, for the elderly patient, particularly one with dementia 
and/or multiple pathologies, treatment for the presenting problem would be unduly burdensome. Typical 
comments included: 
We look at the pros and cons and if the risk of the procedure is high and outweighs the benefit, I 
advise them against. B3 
First and foremost, what is going to benefit the patient and what the trade-off is in terms of side 
effects, so I have no difficulty in not offering treatment to a patient where I think the side effects are 
likely to outweigh the benefits. C5 
When you can see that someone is pretty well going to die, or if by chance they survive and they're 
115 All the consultants who took this approach NN ere male but that is probably irrelevant since the number of female consultants interviewed was 
very small because fewer women reach consultant status 
in this country. 
"The doctrine of therapeutic privelege is sometimes invoked when it is felt a patient could not cope with the news about their condition. 
However, it may be that the difficulty is more the doctor's than patient's and some doctors are less able to guage the ability of the patient to cope, 
or some doctors are less comfortable with communicating 
bad news. 
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going to have a major problem or a weakness down one side or mental problems, usually we are very 
reluctant to push hard, just maintain life provision. D5 
The decision has to be based on whether this is going to improve quality of life or is this going to 
make things worse, for instance, if the patient had a stroke whilst under anaesthetic. D 11 
Only one interviewee spoke specifically of applying the Beauchamp and Childress principles: 
I use the principles because at least it proves you've thought about it by using this framework, which 
is almost certainly inadequate, but it's got international respectability. A6 
One consultant orthopaedic surgeon with a large paediatric caseload spoke of the difficulties faced in balancing 
present benefits for cerebral palsy sufferers against future problems: 
Treatment of cerebral palsy hip dislocations and... spinal curvature in cerebral palsy and spina bifIda. 
The problem is... the neuromuscular abnormalities that are causing the deformity... are going to be 
there right through. If you get their hips right in middle childhood there is a tendency for them to 
hit other problems in teenage and adult life"' that may negate the value of what you are doing... The 
difficulty is that it's not easy to randomise a treatment that is very intrusive against nothing because 
the logic to the patient is, `why do a very intrusive treatment if you are not sure it's going to be 
substantially better for them? ' C2 
At times treatment may be given which would, with hindsight, have more appropriately been withheld. To 
balance benefits and burdens means assessing present and future quality of life. The lack of clinical certainty 
renders difficult this process. Heim and Steinbach question whether too little attention is focused on the quality 
of life and whether `medical servitude is morally correct in prolonging the patient's hell'. 19' Particular 
difficulty occurs when the patient is a child. "' Michalowski welcomes the fact that `medical opinion of what 
is in the best interests of the child (is) not seen as determinative'. "' 
3.4.1.4 Patient wishes 
Most consultants recognised the importance of patient autonomy and would not lightly ignore it: 
One has to recognise individual choice and preference. D9 
1 have just seen someone this morning who has motor neurone disease... He is now in the situation 
where he is chairfast but he retains his intellect completely and we've already made one rational 
"'Explained as due to the fact that they gain weight and the muscles don't keep pace with the bone growth. 
""Heim M, Steinbach T. For whom the bells knell. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 140-141 at p14 1. They describe a particular patient's situation. The 
reply, by Bryan Jennett (loc cit, pp142-3) reveals that inappropriate surgery is probably more common than realised. 
199See, for instance, Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FLR 502. Was the mother of T correct in asserting that it was better for him 
to have a short life than one with major surgery and anti-rejection drugs for the rest of his life? This case will be discussed more fully in later 
but it is important to note that the court, unlike other cases where the parental refusal has been due to religious grounds, was prepared to hold 
that medical treatment to prolong life in a child whose current life was not `intolerable' should not be given. 
z(X'Michalowski S. Is it in the best interests of a child to have a life-saving liver transplantation? Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
Child. Fam. Lau Q. 1997; 9,2: 179-189 at p181. 
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decision which says that if he loses his ability to swallow he will not be artificially fed. That's his 
decision. He has reasonably said, well I know you can do it but what benefit does it bring me?... He 
is prepared to entertain a tracheostomy because it will help him to cope with distressing symptoms 
whereas an intervention such as putting in a feeding line would be seen as a malicious intervention. 
D9 
When you become physically or mentally very ill - how much is retrievable? (I ask. ) can we give you 
back some control over your life? If we can it might be worth having treatment. D 13 
Sometimes, the consultant would seek to discover the goals and aspirations of the patient. `Normality' was 
considered important. 20' One consultant psychiatrist described how his patients lacked what would appear to 
be `normal' aspirations: 
We put down unmet needs (on our care planning forms) but we found patients never put down work; 
they've given up all hope of getting it so they don't see it as an unmet need anymore even though they 
would actually like it. A4 
Three (male) consultants indicated that women were manipulating the health service. Probably male patients 
can be just as manipulative and this may indicate prejudicial rejection of female assertiveness or 
communication barriers. 202 No one admitted practising `protective medicine' yet the rising number of 
Caesarean sections suggests this and this could be interpreted as manipulating women. ZO3 
A lot of women are now asking for Caesarean section where there isn't a medical indication... they 
want it for convenience of timing so it is convenient for the husband to have time off work that 
particular day. A1 
Some women just don't want to go through labour - it is just too much like hard work and I just say 
yes. Al 
A lot (of hysterectomies) happen because a patient says their periods are awful. Realistically we have 
no way of saying no they're not. We then say OK, we're not going to withhold treatment. 204 B 19 
"'One consultant described how certain operations are tightly restricted by the purchasers and he is required to make a special case for certain 
`cosmetic' procedures such as breast reduction. He gave me a copy of an article which he considered highlighted the social difficulties some 
patients face which have a major impact on their lives. Being able to lead a `normal' life was one of the most important considerations in his 
opinion. (B 10) 
202No consultant made any similar comments about male patients even though, with regard to screening for prostate cancer, the consultants 
interviewed indicated that there was little or no point and no doctor ever has it done because the surgery is worse than the need to pass urine 
during the night. So, scope for similarly disparaging remarks about men existed but none was made. Gilligan questions whether `physicians' 
disregard for their patient's wishes' could be influenced by the fact that the patient and/or the relative was a women and suggests that `courts 
consistently portrayed female patients as less capable of rational decision-making than male patients'. 
Gilligan C, Raffin TA. Whose Death Is 
It, Anyway? Ann. Int. Med. 1996; 125,2: 137-141 at p139. 
203This has been a problem in America for several years. It is also an increasing problem in France and other European countries (France-Soir 
25 Sept. 1997 30% de cesariennes). Wendy Savage considers that 'CS is being used too freely by inexperienced, poorly supervised staff in the 
labour ward misinterpreting electronic foetal heart traces, who don't know how to deliver babies presenting by the breech' (NHS Magazine 
Summer 1997) The Audit Commission has reported that a caesarian section costs about £ 1,100 compared with £360 for a normal delivery. A 
particular issue is whether women should 
be forced to have Caesarean sections in the interests of the unborn child - this will be discussed later 
since there are several important court cases which 
have considered the problem. Audit Commission for Local Authorities and NHS in England 
and Wales. Accounts for the 7 month period ended 
31 October 1997. HC 6681997-98.1997 The Stationery Office Ltd., London. 
2.. Exactly the same tends to be said about women with learning disabilities when requests are made for sterilisation by hysterectom\ . 
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Very few consultants would actively discuss issues such as whether a patient wanted to be resuscitated with 
him/her: 
I think we could do more than we do. Where it could be done is before big elective operations that 
are vascular, abdominal surgery. Now they always have associated ischaemic heart disease and 
something could go wrong with them. A31 
I have anxieties about talking to patients about doctors willingness to resuscitate them or not, I feel 
it can upset the doctor patient relationship. A35 
However, the guidelines from hospital B state that `if at any time patients or their relatives request an attempt 
at resuscitation contrary to medical opinion, this should be carried out'. This is highly significant because it 
acknowledges patient autonomy and goes beyond the general principle that a doctor cannot be forced to provide 
treatment s/he thinks is inappropriate. 205 It also accords a `right' to the patient's relatives not recognised in 
law to override the doctor's medical judgment. There is an inherent disagreement apparent over the general 
support for clinical evidence as being the prime factor in deciding what treatment to give or not and this 
willingness to accede to patient/relative wishes even where evidence suggests resuscitation would be futile. "' 
If I think it is against the patient's medical interest to be prescribed a treatment, for instance, keeping 
somebody alive that would in fact be prolonging their dying rather than actually improving their 
quality of life, I would still be very strongly guided by the patient and their family and would not wish 
to overrule that without having spent a lot of time discussing it with them. B1 
The consultants were not specifically asked about attitudes to euthanasia. 20' One geriatrician indicated his 
opposition to euthanasia or physician-assisted death: 
I have to obey the law and I believe I should obey the law. So I will not do things that will rapidly 
cause patients' deaths even if they are suffering a lot because it's rare not to be able to get on top 
of physical suffering. A22 
Only three of the eighty-five consultants mentioned advance directives which seemed surprising given the 
topicality of the subject. It possibly indicated that clinicians actually come across them so rarely that they seem 
irrelevant to routine decision-making. If the patient's actual situation was unanticipated, or the directive not 
`properly' drafted, they indicated it could be appropriate to ignore the advance directive. This raises huge 
ethical and legal questions regarding who interprets whether the circumstances match the directive 
205However, patient autonomy is not given as much weight in this country as it is, perhaps, in the States. Thus, Mello and Jenkinson believe that 
`physicians retain a larger degree of decision-making authority and clinical freedom' so this `has kept the use of CPR from becoming as routine 
as in the U. S. ' Mello M, Jenkinson C. Comparison of Medical and Nursing Attitudes to Resuscitation and Patient Autonomy between a British 
and an American Teaching Hospital. Soc. Sci. Med. 1998; 44,3: 415-424 at p416. 
206Mello and Jenkinson, supra at p419, found that senior doctors would be more likely to withhold CPR they felt was futile but junior doctors 
would attempt resuscitation. The doctors interviewed for this thesis were all of consultant status. Whether the difference is due to greater clinical 
experience influencing the decision, or greater personal belief in themselves and their power of making correct decisions is impossible to tell. 
207One of the reasons patients may request euthanasia is because of inadequate pain control. See, for instance. Ruddick W. Do doctors undertreat 
pain? Bioethics 1997; 11,3&4: 246-255; Somerville MA. Pain and Suffering at the Interfaces of Medicine and Law. Univ. Toronto LJ 1986; 286- 
317; Wilson WC et al. Ordering and Administration of Sedative and Analgesics during the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from 
Critically Ill Patients. JAM4 1992; 267,7: 949-953and Vangen S et al. Ethnicity and use of Obstetrical Analgesia: do Pakistani women receive 
inadequate pain relief during labour? Ethnicityand Health 1996; 1,2: 161-7. Palliative care is still a new science. The University of Bristol was 
the first to set up an MSc in Palliative Medicine (October 1997). 
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sufficiently. 20' If the responsibility is the clinician's, patients need reassurance that protective medicine will 
not put their interests last. 
I take into consideration any properly drawn up advanced directive. A3 
When the patient is not in a fit state to make their wishes clear it's difficult unless you know the 
patient's wishes from previous either written or oral statements. A15 
I accept the principle of a living will... but also recognise that the patient's attitude to life and death 
and expectation of life and quality of life does change with time and the passage of the illness. Often 
a view expressed three years before the terminal illness gets to grips is different from the opinion and 
the expectation of the time of the terminal illness. You can't anticipate which way the patient's going 
to change their mind or may wish to hang on as long as possible in the hope that something will be 
done to their advantage. Other patients' view that enough is enough. So giving patients a view on 
this is ofparamount importance. A35 
The reason (some) doctors won't let patients die with dignity is firstly that they practice defensive 
medicine increasingly which is appalling... (and)... dealing with someone in their 30s and having to 
say that they have a fatal condition, there is an awful lot of baggage around them that makes them 
much more difficult and much more time-consuming and more challenging. D9 
Much emphasis has been placed on patient autonomy in recent years which can only flourish in a climate of 
trust between patient and doctor. If the doctor distrusts/resents the patient's motive for requesting treatment 
trust is lost. For patient wishes to count in guiding treatment decisions, the patient needs enough information 
to contribute as an equal partner in the process yet it seems rare for patients to be involved in discussions about 
whether they should be for resuscitation or not. 2o9 
3.4.1.5 Social circumstances 
The circumstances of the patient was taken into account by many of those interviewed. Whether they had 
support at home, whether they were, or would be, a burden to others all seemed relevant to deciding whether 
to operate on a patient or not: 
The history that the patient gives, the past history that they give of the problem, the social history, 
circumstances under which they live. Every single factor is important: inability to cut toe nails, 
nobody to help, inability to get up the stairs, nobody to help go to the toilet. D4 
An 18 year old boy with very severe cerebral palsy who could not be weaned from the ventilator. 
"Several consultants separated situations created by illness or accident from those created by the doctor or surgeon. Hence, every operation 
under anaesthetic involves a form of resuscitation and a DNAR order, or Advance Directive saying, 
do not resuscitate, would be ignored. 
Similarly, if the patient suffered a heart attack as a result of a reaction to a drug given by the doctor. This contrasts with the finding of Mello 
and Jenkinson, op cit n205 at p419, who 
found all British doctors and nurses would always follow DNAR orders. 
-'"`'The concept of informed consent and the extent to which 
English law requires consent to be fully informed will be examined in a later chapter. 
It will suffice to state here that consent need not 
be fully informed in order to have been validly given. The extrapolation from this will be that 
refusal of treatment need not 
be fully informed either but this is a possibly more contentious point. 
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Home ventilation would have involved huge cost but would not have extended life indefinitely. 
Principles guiding us were the quality of life for the patient who would be in distress and... the 
immense burden to the family. D1 
It might have considerable implications for the whole family unit if their condition is treated. B9 
It is a grave indictment of society and the inability of the welfare state to deliver what was promised if the lack 
of support at home is a reason to deny a patient an operation. Yet it seems accepted that treatment should be 
restricted due to social circumstances thus validating an `aristocracy of the fortunate'. 21° 
Even when the decision should be made in a child's best interests, the parental burden could be decisive: 
One has to take into account the needs of the family and society but the primary issue should always 
be the best interest of the child. C 14 
This baby is only two kilos or so. But if the parents decide that the commitment that it means for 
them... that is what they want to do, then... we would go with what they want. A34 
Short bowel disease is a good example. `' I've had almost identical patients within months of each 
other where one child was a desperately wanted child of older parents who would not have another 
child and they were desperate for everything to be done. The other was a child of very young parents 
who could not face the prospect of going through all that is involved. In these cases the decision was 
fairly easy even thought the underlying situation was virtually identical as regards these two babies. 
C9 
Several questions are raised by these examples. Do parents have a right to deny a child potentially life-saving 
surgery? If clinical evidence suggests surgery will merely prolong dying and add considerably to the discomfort 
of the child what justification is there for operating? Should society deny the opportunity of treatment on cost- 
benefit grounds? Are surgeons guilty of seeking to advance their knowledge at the expense of the voiceless? 
Should such decisions be taken out of the hands of parents and doctors and given to the courts since neither 
is always committed to placing the best interests of the child first? 
Two consultants indicated that the burden on carers can lead to patient abuse and/or requests from the patient 
to stop treatment. They appreciated that the vulnerable should be protected: 
A lot of old people would do what their relatives wanted. Because even if the relationship is bad, a 
lot of them feel the last thing they want is to end their lives with the relationship with their children 
broken. Even old people who are frankly physically abused by the younger people will usually not 
disclose this because they say my life's nearly over, I'm not going to muck up my kid's life... You need 
someone to stand up for them and not let them be walked over. A22 
2"Harris J. Unprincipled QALYs: a response to Cubbon. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 185-188 at p186. 
2"This is a condition found in some new born babies. It is inevitably incompatible with life. Transplantation has been attempted with limited 
success as in the well-known case of 
Laura Davies. According to the consultant, none has }et survived beyond early childhood and those that 
have undergone active treatment have spent most of their lives in hospital. 
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We had a patient who was saying she wanted to withdraw... but it became clear that she had wanted 
to stop because she felt she was a nuisance and a burden to everyone and you can understand that 
there can be pressure to stop treatment on a busy ward and having stopped treatment we reintroduced 
it. A2 
Regarding infertility treatment, doctors have legal powers to reject patients. The welfare of the future child 
has to be considered but sometimes personal prejudices could lead to imposition of conditions which could be 
considered ultra vires if challenged. Robinson objects to such discrimination since `objections... are based on 
prejudice not reason' . 
212 
We use social circumstances as well. I think fertility is a different area than other conditions because 
of the implications of bringing a child into the world and looking after a child in the future so you 
are looking at suitability to be a parent... if we're going to spend resources on them then I think it's 
right to look at their suitability to be a parent. A25 
The consultant who runs the fertility services here has... very strict views on that particular aspect. 
One of them being, if you're using donor sperm or eggs, the couple must be married because the rate 
of separation after using donor eggs or sperm is greater because there is always some resentment that 
the child is not really theirs. So on that basis he insists the couple is married and therefore by 
implication we don't treat gay couples here because they can't be married legally. A25 
3.4.1.6 Resource implications 
Allocation of resources within society has been considered earlier213 so the effects of resources on individual 
decisions will now be made as a reflection of the principle of justice. Most consultants considered it proper 
to allocate limited resources as wisely as possible though a few refused to consider finances: 
Cost should not be the sole criterion but it may have to influence the decision as there are limited 
resources in the country and it is not fair to gamble very large sums of money when there is very 
limited chance of success. DI 
A lot of the decisions we make about the use of our resources... are to a certain extent driven by 
financial considerations as well as the patient's best interests. C6 
You have to temper clinical decision-making with resources. A20 
We don't make decisions on individual patients because of resources but... (healthcare) is rationed 
because of the time it takes to see us. D7 
"'Robinson BES. Birds do it. Bees do it. So why not single women and lesbians? Bioethics 1997; 11,3&4: 217-227 at p220. The Warnock 
Committee did not go so far as to insist that couples receiving infertility treatment should be married (Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Cmnd 9314) 1984 HMSO, London at para 2.5). The Glover Report felt there were `strong grounds 
for 
unease about reproductive help where the 
family circumstances may impose a serious handicap on the child' (Fertility and the Family. The 
Glover Report on Reproductive Technologies to the European Commission, 1989 Fourth Estate, London) but felt the interests of society were 
better served by not restricting the concept of `family'. 
The English legislation requires that the `need of the child for a father' is one of the factors 
to be taken into account: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 s11(5). 
2'3See discussion in Chapter Two. 
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I never use resources as a criterion. A 14 
Constraints on clinic time (what one consultant termed `timing costs'), once the patient has actually, reached 
the top of the waiting list and has been seen by the consultant, could dictate what treatment was offered with 
little attention seemingly paid to patient preference or clinical effectiveness: 2'4 
When you do a hysterectomy, you may have to consider removing a woman's ovaries, and this has 
an hormonal impact. One way round is to put in a hormonal implant at the time of the hysterectomy 
but I don't do that. I put them on tablets or patches of oestrogen. The tablets are cheaper and that 
way I don't have them come back to my outpatients on a six monthly basis to have the implant 
changed. So the considerations are partly not clogging up my outpatient clinics and partly it's a 
decision to use a cheaper method. Al 
We're overspent so we are looking at ways of rationalising the use of tests. D3 
Several consultants were concerned at the risk of being held professionally liable for providing inferior 
treatment. Typical comments included: 
You do a second best op and take higher risks because of the lack of resources. B7 
I've had conversations with GP's about growth hormones. They can't afford it, their budget is..., if 
they give this child the hormone they may not be able to give the next coronary bypass. C 12 
We're often offering a sub-optimal therapy. A4 
The way treatment interventions were presented to patients could influence whether the patient opted for 
treatment or palliation: "' 
We never say you could have a big expensive operation but we are short of cash this week... What we 
do say is there is a big expensive operation that may suit you but you are 85 and you do live in a 
nursing home and the chances of your survival are 50: 50 and no one loves you and you want to die 
so maybe we shouldn't be quite so enthusiastic about doing this sort of routine. D8216 
The burden on healthcare staff, particularly in adult and neonatal ITU, was also mentioned at times because 
this could lead to staff shortages and restricted resources although few openly admitted to considering the 
burden on themselves: 
My role is to produce the best possible outcome for each patient and my personal opinion should not 
214One consultant interviewed described how the knowledge that there are no more available `slots' for haemodialysis influences decisions 
whether to recommend CAPD instead. At least he is aware that his decision-making (or the choice that 
he offers to the patient) is being influenced 
by what many would consider inappropriate criteria. 
21 Lindgren J. Death by Default. Law and Contemporary Problems 1993,56,3: 185-259. Lindgren points out (at p207) that `the responses people 
give are highly dependent on how questions are asked'. This statement 
is also applicable to the questionning of the consultants for this thesis. 
2"'In fact, although this consultant did not qualify his comments, others indicated that they would similarly present active treatment eg. surgery, 
in a way that reduced the likelihood of the patient wanting to proceed but that they would use tact in how they represented the patient's own 
situation to them. It is probable that this consultant also would not 
be so brutal face to face with the patient. 
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come into the matter. D 1021 
I've been here (intensive care) for fifteen years and that's a long time. A lot of the staff get, well burn 
out isn't the right term, but a lot of the staff, particularly nursing staff leave ITU after that time. A3 1 
Patient wishes sometimes conflicted with treatment rationing but it was felt justifiable to spend limited 
resources on satisfying them if society has not been specific about how it wants its money spent: 
In obstetrics... women are being offered choices... In terms of resources, it involves huge expenditure, 
a Caesarean section costs much more than a vaginal delivery and we are going to have to address 
that eventually. 218.. 1'll keep doing it... until the public purse says that this particular procedure, in line 
with other procedures like tattoo removal, that are not clinically indicated, will not be available on 
the NHS. Al 
Public ignorance is not a reason to allow these practices to continue. This promotion of patient autonomy over 
justice for other users of the healthcare service is out of step with the increasing acceptance that clinical need 
should be the starting point for decision-making. 
3.4.1.7 The patient's age 
There were differences of opinion expressed as to whether age alone, apart from clinical effectiveness, should 
play a part in the decision-making process. Unless some scarce resource like donor organs or great expense 
was involved it seemed inappropriate as a single criterion. Those predominantly involved in treating elderly 
patients were vociferous in their defence of the rights of these patients to equal access to healthcare possibly 
due to self-protection: 
My gut feeling is that age per se should not come into it... If you actually ask... (the elderly)... the same 
question... they might say, give the chance to the younger patients. D 13 
We seem to start up with the assumption that it won't benefit the older ones whereas it should be the 
other way around. You're innocent until proven guilty. D13 
Others accepted the `fair innings' approach. It seemed evident that patients' opinions could be influenced by 
social debate so as to be more altruistic: 
The old tend to be fairly rational about the fact that the young are treated first. A34 
I think the fair innings idea does have merit. I think it's probably somewhere around the mid 70's. 
It does seem to be the age that people can readily live to and provided they are not having chronic 
117 This consultant described how he would sometimes have a patient admitted to ITU, who would probably eventually 
do just as well without 
specialist care after surgery but whose recovery rate would 
be hastened, simply because it was good for the morale of the staff to have a patient 
to look after who would recover and be appreciative of their work particularly 
if they had had a bad run with lots of patients dying. 
218He indicated that hospital A performed 50-100 caesarian sections a year without clinical indications and this number is rising. He also reported 
a study had indicated that 60% of 
female obstetricians would opt for caesarian sections themselves. 
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illnesses they're really not bad. Beyond then people really do start to develop an awful lot of chronic 
illnesses that limit their mobility and all the rest of it. Certainly from the elderly patients I've talked 
to... that's the sort of time that they begin to feel that they have had their innings. A5 
There is an age limit of 70 years beyond which it is unusual to consider transplantation. A30 
The surgeons tell us they won't transplant anyone over 70... 1 leave them on the list if they are still 
waiting but a few patients will take themselves off the waiting list when they get to 70 saying `I'm "0 
now and it's not fair that 1'm on. A2 
Surprisingly, extreme youth seemed to represent an opportunity to withhold treatment in a way that would be 
impossible once the child was older: 
It is the young babies... one knows the effect it has on family lifestyle together with how difficult it can 
be for some of these babies. They are probably the only ones in whom, in paediatrics, we seriously 
consider not treating. Most other children we would treat. So they're ones in a way, where the 
outcome is sufficiently debatable, that one could think that you could justifiably consider an option 
of not treating. (Interviewer: So, for the older ones, the sanctity of life principle comes into play? ) 
Yes. A34 
This provides a worrying insight into how `personhood', and possibly any proven ability of the carers to cope, 
can tip the balance from non-treatment to treatment. The very young child is as vulnerable as the very old or 
demented and rarely are decisions to deny treatment reviewed by independent arbitrators. 
3.4.2 The parties involved in the decision 
These included: 
a) the patient 
b) the relatives 
c) the healthcare team 
d) the consultant 
3.4.2.1 The patient 
Most of the consultants asserted that competent patients should make their own decisions based on information 
provided by the doctor however, qualifications often crept in and their commitedness to patient autonomy seems 
less than initially stated when comparison is made with earlier discussions, particularly regarding advance 
directives. 21' Typical comments included: 
If the patient is competent it is up to them. Al 
If the patient is with it, it is up to them. D7 
"'See- para 6.5.1.4. 
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If the patient is (competent) they have an input into the decision-making process but the decision is 
actually a team decision. BI 
It's a joint decision between the doctor and the patient. B15. 
Little mention was made of how much information the doctor should impart and an atypical comment was: 
The final clinical decision should be made after full informed consent from the patient. D 10 
No one mentioned how they actually assessed competence. Regarding children there was less agreement about 
the extent of their involvement. 220 The Gillick test seemed applied in an ad hoc fashion, with age/physical 
development possibly being more persuasive than understanding. This might indicate defensive practice since 
understanding is harder to prove evidentially if challenged than concrete facts or maybe doctors prefer scientific 
evidence. 
I'd say any child who is an adolescent or more has sufficient insight to contribute and would have 
a major say in what they feel. C 13 
Even quite young children can be involved. (but) parents can feel guilty and push for treatments that 
are just not sensible. A36 
Children can have a very valid and appropriate say in what they do or don't want to be put through. 
But for preschool children that input is very limited because of their intellectual inability to think 
ahead. For infants clearly even that communication is impossible, so in those situations the parents 
area key part of the decision making process. C14 
3.4.2.2 The relatives 
Parents have legal rights to make treatment decisions for minor children but may be too partial or subjective. 
Sometimes, parental demands for treatment were felt to place too high a burden on the child. Several 
consultants spoke of `Child B' in this context and felt they should not `debase their role in medical leadership 
and their advocacy of their patient's interests by passive acquiescence to parental demands'. "' One consultant 
with particular interest in ethics expressed this well: 
There are two aspects that influence people's attitudes as to why the patient shouldn't be treated. 
One is a subjective approach where they feel that even if the child survived, they would be so severely 
disfigured and deformed they would have a terrible sort of life and it would be far kinder, far more 
humane not to save the child. They're putting themselves into, what they imagine is, the mind set of 
a severely deformed crippled person and imagining that it would be terrible because they see the big 
picture and wouldn't want that for themselves. The other is a more objective approach where 
22"Not all the consultants treated children. 
2='Campbell AGM et al. Treatment dilemmas in Neonatal Care: Who Should Survive and Who Should Decide? Annals of the New York 
Academy of Science 1988; 530: 92-103 at p97. 
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professionals feel that looking through the results from our past experience somebody with this type 
of injury does not survive. It's a tremendous undertaking to attempt treatment and perhaps on 
balance it's best in this resource-limited environment that the child would be better not treated. B9222 
Regarding other incompetent patients the general approach favoured involving the relatives. Typical comments 
included: 
If they (the patient) are not competent, then the relatives. A1 
If the patient is not with it, then their closest relatives should be involved. D7 
Some consultants would talk with relatives but considered the decision their responsibility not the relatives. 
Gilligan supports this approach: `(i)f the patient's loved ones must make life-and-death decisions on the 
patient's behalf, they will probably have feelings of grief, guilt and confusion'. 223 
If they (the unconscious elderly patient) are not going to live very long ... 
I would discuss it with the 
relatives and tell them what I think is the right thing to do because I don't think relatives should be 
asked to make these decisions - that is quite wrong - they have come for an opinion and I give them 
an opinion but give them the option to disagree with me. A2 
Relatives wishes in law have no force. But in fact we do actually go and talk to them quite a lot. 
Largely not because we want to give decisions over to the families because I think that's wrong, I 
think that's an abdication of my responsibility... but I do want to listen and I also want to not do things 
that upset or hurt them if I possibly can. A22 
Others took a team approach with family input: 
If the person is not capable of making their own decision, the same principles apply (a team decision) 
but the family take a much more prominent role but the patient is still important because, although 
they may not be able make a verbal contribution, sometimes people can communicate all sorts of 
things non verbally. You may or may not pick that up. CI 
When... there is no hope you have a discussion with the family and friends by which time you will have 
ascertained their advocacy status whether they were close, whether they were remote, whether they 
have vested interests, all these factors are real, and you will have a fairly pragmatic discussion and 
if the people you are dealing with appear legitimate in their concerns, and you can do no more than 
get a feel for their legitimacy, and they agree that on their knowledge of the person concerned that 
they would not want their life sustained at any cost, then you can make very reasonable decisions. 
=2 This consultant described how he had recently been involved with a three year old child who had suffered extensive (90%) burns in a house 
fire. At the same time, the hospital was treating a child of similar age who had suffered a major head injury with massive brain damage. He 
spoke of the difficulties even experienced staff 
had coping with the idea of treating the burnt child and contrasted the fact that the brain-damaged 
child, who looked normal was, in 
fact, not the child it had been: it had lost everything that had made it that child, yet staff were in favour of 
continuing treatment, but the burnt child, under the 
burns, had no brain damage and was still the little boy he had been. Both children later died. 
"'Gilligan, Raff in TA. Whose Death Is It, Anrxvav? Ann. Int. Med. 1996; 125,2: 137-141 at p138. 
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D9 
Often, the feeling expressed was that relatives, less than patients even, did not have the requisite level of 
understanding to be able to contribute to the decision-making process and for that reason should be excluded. 
This view, possibly evidential of feelings of professional superiority, was challenged by a minority who 
recognised that improved communication skills and less stereotyping could enhance relatives and patients 
understanding: 
(If you) go into in depth knowledge most of it tends to go over their heads - they don't have what's 
actually required for a deeper understanding. If somebody is very qualified and very intelligent then 
fair enough if they're able to take it, but generally speaking I hope the relatives should have enough 
trust in the doctors to be acting on their behalf, but that trust has to be earned... With the political 
scenario and the media as it is, that trust has been dented. D 13 
Our role is not to denigrate them because of their limited understanding but to try and make sure we 
provide them with the appropriate understanding in terms they can understand and can accept so that 
they can be involved in that decision making process. C14 224 
Families often expect to be involved even if the patient is competent. Sometimes patients want this but 
assumptions in favour of family involvement can lead to difficulties which some prevented by only including 
relatives with the patient's agreement. 
I don't think it's anything to do with the relatives... it's a contract between the consultant and the 
patient. A24 
I would rather leave it to the patients who they wanted involved. C1 
It is difficult when you have someone on the ward who really does not want their relatives to be 
involved but the relatives want to be involved, if you say, well, I'm not discussing it with you, it's 
always very difficult. A4 
Relatives may disagree over what is best. Kipnis and Gerhard note that the principle of non-maleficence is 
`most likely to be violated when relatives and other decision-makers are given too free a hand in medical 
decision-making' . 
225 
I was looking after a patient for a colleague over the weekend and I was told that care was being 
withdrawn on the Friday and this was all sorted out and it became clear on the Saturday that the sons 
were extremely unhappy by the father's decision and it hadn't been sorted out and we reintroduced 
dialysis. A2.226 
22'This was a very senior consultant with many years experience. 
-=`Kipnis K, Gerhard A. Some 
Ethical Principles for Adult Critical Care. Hawaii Med. J. I995,54: 482-5 at p484. 
"'An analysis of reported conflict situations will be made later where it will be possible to make a 
legal analysis as well as an ethical analysis. 
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Nevertheless, some consultants would use relatives in order to support their paternalistic opinion of patient best 
interests. In the first of two contrasting comments, the consultant admits to using duress to weaken the 
patient's decision not to have treatment although, if consent is not freely given, the doctor may lack a legal 
`flakjacket'. ZZ' The second recognises that patient consent may be given under duress and tried to protect 
patients: 
There are situations where the consent is withheld by a patient who is competent and we then talk to 
the relatives to apply pressure to comply with our advice. Al 
I think too much power is given to relatives.. .1 think relatives can exert a lot of influence and 
emotional blackmail is often used and I think women may feel they should have treatment for their 
partner or their children rather than for themselves. C 10 
Sometimes relatives would ask that the patient is not told the truth about their diagnosis as it is recognised that 
patients and/or relatives may `give up before the situation is truly hopeless' because of their lack of medical 
knowledge. 228 Those consultants who raised this issue would not collude in deception: 
The only times we have a little bit of trouble is when the relatives will come and say don't treat 
somebody, don't tell them they've got cancer. We can't not do that, it's total patient involvement. 
If one has to tell someone they're terminally ill, I will not tell the relatives first. I will talk to the 
relatives with the patient but we'll sit around together. But a lot of people do treat the elderly like 
children. Don't tell them they can't cope with it. It's wrong. They can cope with it if they're told 
in the right way. D2 
If somebody came into me and said well I really don't want my father treated yet I felt that the patient 
could have a decent quality of life after the treatment I would ask the patient what he wanted. I think 
it's the patient's decision with information from us. D2. 
It is clear that there is no real consensus even at consultant level as to what the proper role of relatives in 
decision-making is. Patient and family opinions regarding this could conflict sharply with medical opinions. 
Some doctors were not above manipulating relatives in order to promote what they obviously considered 
superior views to the competent patient's own. This derogation is probably more responsible for the erosion 
of trust than the media or politicians. 
3.4.2.3 The healthcare team 
Many of the consultants felt the decision should involve the healthcare team. 229 Occasionally, this approach 
excluded the patient and/or family extending the concept of therapeutic privilege which holds that if the doctor 
considers the patient will be harmed by the revelation of their diagnosis and involvement in their care, the 
... Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64. A doctor who treats under such circumstances maybe held liable for battery or held 
to have acted negligently by failing to act as a responsible doctor in his or her position would have done (the Bo/am test). Legal issues are 
discussed in a later chapter. 
228Bayles M, High DM (Eds) Medical Treatment of the Dying: Moral Issues. 1978 GK Hall & Co., Shenkman Publishers, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts at p81. 
229This could be construed quite extensively to include not only junior and senior doctors, nurses but also occupational therapists and others. 
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doctor can lawfully exclude the patient. 
We tend to involve the family as part of the team.., nurses and doctors have to meet up and talk 
regularly and that way you don't get a funny decision being made at tam which is contrary to what 
everyone else wanted. B 18. 
I think it (dialysis) is a team issue. I always discuss it with nurses because it is interesting how 
different healthcare people have different attitudes - if you are the person turning the patient every 
two hours and seeing them moaning and groaning then you probably have a lower threshold for 
wanting to pull out than if you breeze in a couple of times a week. A2 
Much emphasis exists, currently, upon taking a multi-disciplinary approach to the non-treatment debate. 
However, these comments need to be considered cautiously in light of some of the following comments made 
in favour of the prime decision-maker being the consultant. 23o 
3.4.2.4 The consultant 
A minority of consultants considered the decision was theirs alone but many indicated that the final 
responsibility of taking the decision was theirs. 23' This seems starkly in contrast with public and professional 
opinion. Whilst legally, the consultant may be held accountable for errors and omissions made by his team, 
it is hard to tell whether this was a reflection of what they considered to be a caring attitude towards their team, 
or whether they believed the power to make these decisions was earned by them and belonged solely to them. 
If the latter, this would indicate, as some of the earlier comments show, that paternalism is still present within 
the medical profession. Typical comments included: 
As a consultant one takes the final responsibility, that's what we're there for. D2 
A consultant has a duty to advise as accurately as possible using his knowledge and depending on 
the strength of his conviction he alters the strength of his argument. C3 
1 fegl very strongly that the most important person to be considered is someone who has expertise or 
knowledge of the particular disease and also the treatment options that are available. 1 think it's very 
difficult, if not impossible, for others to make a primary decision as to what treatment is given. B2 
The professionals should be leading the relatives... in a structured logical argument of the pros and 
cons of treatment, rather than expecting them to make the decision. A36 
... Wilson Barnett likewise noted that `Doctors usually say they value the nurses' opinion and need their input' but, citing Busby's study, during 
ward rounds `the researcher witnessed a traditional picture where the doctor dominated the conversation, rarely asking 
for the patient's or the 
nurse's views... directing his conversation 
between the medical staff. Wilson Barnett J. Inequality among health care professionals: ethical 
dimensions of their relationships. In Grubb A (Ed) Challenges in Medical Care 1992 John Wiley & Sons, Chichester pp 155-169 at p 158, citing 
Busby A, The Nurse's Role in the Medical Ward Round. BSc Research Dissertation 1990 Nursing Studies. King's College Hospital, London. 
21 'In contrast, McLean found that decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment were made by doctors who `always 
involved other medical staff 
and the patient's family as well as nursing staff 
(at p 172). It is submitted that her conclusion lacks authority due to the poor response to her 
questionnaire survey (only 4%), the methodology 
(giving questionnaires to delegates at an international conference) and the fact that if treatment 
was withheld or withdrawn this would 
lead to the patient's death and doctors are more likely to be cautious in how they approach such decisions. 
Her explanation that a possible reason 
for the poor response rate was because `there is a lack of interest amongst those charged with making these 
important life or death decision' (at p 180) seems inconsisted with the fact that attendance at a conference dealing with such issues suggests there 
is an interest. McLean SAM. Report: 
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Treatment. Med. Law International 1998; 3: 169-182. 
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An overall impression was gained that, the more experienced the consultant, the less likely they were to 
consider the decision-making process a matter of a `whole team' vote. The opinions of the team were a 
valuable resource as were the views of the patient (or relatives) but, ultimately, the consultant should take the 
decision as to what treatment to provide. Some authors consider that the responsibility of the doctor has 'taken 
a back seat to patient autonomy in contemporary bioethics'232 but `team voting' can distort the decision-making 
process just as much as if the decision were made in an autocratic fashion by the consultant. 
3.5 Discussion 
Several factors, falling into broad, overlapping themes, are considered when deciding to withhold treatment. 
Before any other factors, consultants seem to consider the clinical picture (diagnosis, prognosis, disease 
management options) which could also encompass patient age/quality of life. The quality of life (which could 
encompass the patient's age/social circumstances) was important. The ability of the patient to express his/her 
wishes, the balance of benefits and burdens associated with treatment and resource implications were also 
relevant. 233 The social circumstances of the patient and burden on carers are also part of the burden to be 
evaluated so patients who are better situated and supported are more likely to receive treatment. This is a clear 
case of `to those who have shall be given' since the principle of non-maleficence confers no obligation to 
positively benefit another. 234 Some consultants believed it fair to use age as a tool for the allocation of resources 
whereas others believed it was not the doctor's role to consider whether resources could be better used by 
another patient. 
It can be deduced that apparently objective decision-making is actually very subjective. This is possibly why 
effectiveness of treatment was accorded such importance since it appears more objective than many of other 
factors and consequently `trumps' other considerations such as patient autonomy, beneficence etc. Externally- 
imposed resource restrictions are also more objective although the injustice these produced was more readily 
recognised. However, this could owe more to how these restrictions interfered with the clinician's `right' to 
recommend the most effective treatment. Patients rejecting treatment were also seen as interfering with this 
`right' by some consultants who indicated their preparedness to question competence or use duress. 235 Gillon 
believes that `the withholding of life-prolonging medical treatment when the competent patient refuses it is not 
only morally permissible but morally required'. 236 Thus, any doctor exerting duress, either personally or 
through others, must be acting immorally. Just as the doctor is under no obligation to provide treatment 
demanded by the patient if s/he disagrees with it, 237 the patient is under no obligation to accept treatment 
... Paris JJ et al. Beyond autonomy: Physicians' refusal to use life-prolonging extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. NEJM 1993; 329,5: 354-7 
at p356. See also: Tomlinson T, Brody H. Futility and the ethics of resuscitation. JAMA 1990; 264: 1276-80. 
z"Lindgren, op cit n217 at pp228-9, lists the conditions which people surveyed in national polls consider are ones for which no treatment should 
be given. Many fall into the `clinical prognosis/futility of treatment' category. Others relate to social circumstances such as dependency on 
family, living in a nursing home (regardless of mental state). The rest fall into quality of life categories which may include social circumstances. 
There seems to be agreement with the findings of this thesis except none of Lindgren's categories included availability of resources. 
'"Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics 4th Edn 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford at p190. 
23 'Pijnenborg Let al. Withdrawal or Withholding of Treatment at the End of Life. Arch. lnt. Med. 1995; 155: 286-292. They found (at p291) that 
the reasons given for non-treatment varied according to whether the patient was involved or not. In 59% of the cases observed, the patient was 
not involved `mostly because of incompetence' (in over half of those cases the relatives were involved) and the decision was usually based on 
anticipated effectiveness of treatment. Pijnenborg et al conclude (at p292) that `The considerations are seldom purely medical. Most often a 
physician has to weigh medical and non-medical burdens and benefits'. 
236 Gillon R. Euthanasia, withholding life-prolonging treatment, and moral differences between killing and letting die. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 115- 
7atp116 
237 See, for instance: Luce JM. Physicians do not have a responsibility to provide futile or unreasonable care ifa patient or family insists. Crit. Care 
A1ed. 1995,23,4: 760-766. 
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offered by the doctor. 
The most concerning issue was that many consultants considered an appropriate decision-making model was 
to decide what they would want for themselves, or their relative and apply that to the patient before them -a 
form of substituted judgment. 238 The treatments doctors select for themselves and those they recommend in 
standard textbooks vary considerably. "' As Wall has pointed out, if a deontological approach is taken to 
healthcare decision making, this suggests `doing as you would be done by' but, if a teleological approach is 
adopted, the decision-maker can only discover whether the right decision has been made once the consequences 
of the action or inaction have been established. 24' Different people have different values. Projecting one's own 
values and beliefs onto another is unethical, more so when one is in a position of control over the other. 
There was no overall consensus as to whom to involve in the decision-making process. No one approach or 
consultant seemed obviously better at reaching the `right' decision than another. Academic enquiry has mostly 
moved to developing `a model that designates who should choose'. 24' Lindgren suggests, `individuals prefer 
family involvement in the decision to withhold treatment'. 242 He might cite the evidence of polls to support 
his conclusion, but this would constitute a grievous breach of trust for the individual who does not want family 
involvement; who prefers to trust the doctor to deal with him/her faithfully without having to voice family 
disunity. Ethical healthcare needs to have an individual face. Not only should the most appropriate treatment 
plan for the individual patient be sought but also the appropriate means of determining this plan. This means 
communicating with the patient and the healthcare team. Revealing information to the adult patient's relatives 
without prior consent breaches confidentiality. To then rely upon their input to the exclusion of the patient's 
violates the rule of fidelity. 243 This rule seems violated also when treatment is withheld because the health 
authority or other healthcare purchaser will not fund it yet the patient is not given this information. 
A surprising number of consultants believed the decision was for doctors only. Whilst objective reasons such 
as legal responsibility and greater experience were cited, it seemed clear that several deemed this one of the 
powers, like those of deciding patient competence and therapeutic privilege which demonstrated their hierarchy 
within the organisation. Withholding medical treatment was considered proper practice by all the consultants. 
It was never undertaken lightly and a strong preference for having the support both of clinical evidence and 
the family was evidenced. Both provide doctors with `flakjackets' against litigation. A principled approach 
was rarely taken consciously. Whether this indicates that doctors are more comfortable with concrete facts than 
esoteric considerations is impossible to conclude. Facts are easier to demonstrate in a court of law than what 
is `reasonable'. Sometimes treatment would be initiated which it would have been better to withhold. Reasons 
given were that there was insufficient clinical data available to adequately support the decision to withhold or 
23SThis is in accordance with the BMA's 1998 consultation document Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment op cit n 133, at para 2.9.2 where 
it suggests that one way for the clinician to decide what benefits a treatment holds is `for an assessment to be made by the clinician placing 
themselves in the patient's position'. The use of `substituted judgment' as opposed to `best interests' will be discussed later in this thesis. It will 
suffice to note that the English courts have rejected the concept of `substituted judgment' in favour of a 
determination of the patient's `best 
interests'. 
239Mackillop WJ et al. Non-small cell lung cancer: how oncologists want to be treated. Int. J. Radial. Oncol. Biol. Phys., 1987; 13: 929-934. 
Reported in Kearsley JH: Compromising Between Quantity and Quality of Life. In: Stoll BA; Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care op cit n 124 
at p44. They report that only 9% of oncologists making 
decisions about their own treatment (in a hypothetical scenario) would opt for 
chemotherapy as well as surgery because of the side-effects of chemotherapy. 
Similarly, one of the consultants interviewed stated that doctors 
with prostate cancer will never have surgery 
because they know that the prognosis is not particularly improved but the quality of life is usually 
impaired by resultant incontinence and impotence. Yet `ordinary' patients are encouraged to have surgery. 
140Wall A. Best Behaviour. Health Service Journal Health Management Guide No5 May 1995 pp3-5. 
24 'Lindgren op cit n217, at p225. 
'42Ibid. 
24'Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics 3rd Edn 1989 Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p39. 
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that there had been too little time for the patient and/or the family to come to terms with the diagnosis., ' 
3.6 Conclusion 
The major difficulty is that, often, insufficient information is available to guide the decision-making process. 245 
This lack relates to clinical diagnosis and prognosis and also the particular characteristics of the individual 
patient. Decision are based on imperfect knowledge with subjective, value-laden judgments filling the gaps. 
At times, quality of life seemed treated as if it were a concrete fact like blood test results. Reasons to withhold 
requested treatment were given, such as unlikelihood of conferring benefit, likelihood of causing more harm 
than good, or the fact that the intervention requested, though not harmful, represented a waste of scarce 
resources. 14' All these approaches, and more, were reflected in the responses to the interview questions. 
The starting point for decision-making seems to be an assessment of available clinical evidence. Patient 
autonomy seemed important and some consultants indicated that they placed it above everything bar clinical 
evidence. However, patients can only exercise full autonomy when provided with accurate information. It was 
evident that competent patients were sometimes denied the opportunity to participate fully in the decision to 
withhold treatment. Some consultants tailored what they told patients in order to optimise the probability of 
compliance and some would use psychological duress. Refusals of treatment for religious or other `irrational' 
reasons could lead to a querying of patient competence although most consultants who described such incidents 
said they were prepared to accept them unless the patient was a child. Treatment requests could be refused if 
clinically inappropriate or contrary to the doctor's beliefs although an obligation to refer the patient to another 
consultant may exist. Doctors know their peers and the courts will provide support when they exercise medical 
autonomy and refuse to provide treatment they consider inappropriate or wrong, yet they may fail to respect 
patient autonomy when competent patients refuse proffered treatment. Decision-making will be improved by 
greater acceptance of patients' rights to act autonomously. In order to do this, patients need to be treated as 
equal partners and informed about treatment options. Decisions on behalf of the incompetent patient are made 
`in the patient's best interests' but, it is clear, from the literature and from the consultants that there is 
disagreement over what constitutes `best interests'. No one expressed any difficulty in holding that death could 
be in a patient's best interests. It was interesting to note that one consultant could accept both treating and not 
treating two, virtually identical babies. In that case, and in others where the decision was based, to some 
extent, on the burden on carers, the decision seems to be made not in the patient's best interests but in the best 
interests of the parents/carers. In order to improve medical decision-making, it will be necessary to consider 
to what extent family and societal interests are, or should be, persuasive. 
Z4' It is seems more appropriate that 
the patient's `social circumstances and family urgings one way or another should be lesser considerations' than 
the patient's own decision for or against treatment. 
248 Several consultants expressed concern over regional 
... See, for instance: Balfour-Lynn IM, Tasker RC. Futility and death in paediatric medical intensive care. JMed. Ethics 1996; 22: 279-281. 
215 See, for instance the discussion of futility in Luce, op cit n238, and the debate over whether giving `Child B' another bone marrow transplant 
constituted futile treatment: Entwistle 
V et al. Media coverage of the Child B case. BMJ 1996; 312: 1587-1591. Entwistle reveals that opinions 
ranged from a 20% chance of survival 
being considered futile to less than 2% chance being construed as futile. 
24 Luce, op cit n23 8, at p764. See also: BrettAS, McCullough LB. Defining the 
limits ofthe physician's obligation. NEJM 1986: 315: 1347-1351. 
247Long TA. Infanticide for handicapped infants: sometimes it's a metaphysical dispute. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 79-81 at p80. He is 
commmenting on the Kuhse-Singer attack on 
Ramsey but reaches no conclusion as to the merits of either position. See also: Kuhse H, Singer 
P. Should the baby live: the problem of handicapped infants. 1985 Oxford University Press, Oxford and 
Ramsey P. Ethics at the edges of life. 
1978 Yale Univ. Press, New Haven. 
2"Rosin AJ, Sonnenblick M. Autonomy and paternalism in geriatric medicine: The Jewish ethical approach to issues of feeding terminally ill 
patients, and to cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 
J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 44-8, at p47. 
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variations and providing a `sub-optimal' service. However, few were prepared to be open with patients 
regarding the effect service constraints had upon treatment options. Any proposals to improve medical 
decision-making must address this issue. Any recommendations must help address the injustice inherent in 
the consideration of social circumstances, age and support of patient. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WITHDRAWING MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Most decisions to withhold treatment are based on clinical opinion that it will neither cure nor prevent 
deterioration. Once started, it can be difficult to ascertain that treatment is not achieving anything beneficial. 
Decisions to withdraw treatment are often made even though treatment is maintaining the status quo. ' 
Sometimes treatment withdrawal is triggered by patient request2or his/her relatives" but some doctors feel 
uncomfortable with such requests and may attempt to use the courts to override decisions. ' Other withdrawal 
of treatment decisions may be made by physicians against the wishes of the patient or his/her family. ' This 
chapter describes how medical treatment is withdrawn from patients. As with the withholding of treatment 
outcomes can vary. Analysis of how treatment withdrawal is carried out in general will be made using the 
categories of whether discontinuing treatment results in imminent and certain death or eventual death over a 
period of a few weeks or whether it results in reduced quality of life. Then the way the consultants said they 
made decisions in individual cases is considered. 
4.1 Outcome of Certain Imminent Death 
4.1.1 Babies 
Treatment withdrawal often involves babies with extremely low birthweight or congenital abnormality. ' Often 
a period of intensive care treatment is initiated to see how the neonate reacts and to provide time for the 
parent(s) to come to terms with events. ' This matches the individualized prognostic strategy (start treating in 
all cases but review regularly for indications of certain death or severe brain damage) identified by Rhoden8 
and adopted by McHaffie and Fowlie9. Common humanity obviously demands that non-medical care is not 
withdrawn. The BMA suggests this is a `right"' of the infant and that `withdrawing treatment is not 
withdrawing love and care'. " However, the child has few other `rights', certainly not to life. Decisions are 
made in his/her `best interests'. 12 Whilst the BMA considers the `initiation or the withholding of treatment' 
'Examples would include the provision of artificial nutrition for a patient in Persistent Vegetative State or Motor Neurone Disease, or the 
provision of ventilation for a baby with lung damage due to prematurity. 
'This would constitute Weir's category of personal treatment abatement. Withdrawal of treatment at the request of a competent patient does not 
present a problem in law, since to continue treatment in such a case would be unlawful. Weir RF. Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients: 
Ethical and Legal Limits to the Medical Prolongation of Life. 1989 Oxford University Press, New York at pp39-40. See Chapter Six 
for a 
discussion of the legal issues. 
'Weir, ibid, suggests that this can be oftwo sorts: imposed treatment abatement and cooperative treatment abatement depending on whether the 
family and the doctor agree that the decision to withdraw treatment is in the patient's best interests. 
4Only some relatives will have decision-making powers eg. parents of minor children. 
'Sometimes the decision is fought in the courts as in the case of Child B: Rv Cambridge District HA, ex Parte B[ 1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
6A European study is examining the attitudes of staff to withdrawing treatment from neonates according to McHaffie (the EURONIC study). 
McHaffie HE, Fowlie PW. Life, Death and Decisions: a reflection on neonatal practice. 1996 Hochland and Hochland, Cheshire at p19. 
'McHaffie et al, ibid, at p17, report that one study found that Britain uses the last strategy, America the first, and 
Sweden the middle one. For 
the study itself see: Young EWD, Stevenson DF. Limiting treatment 
for extremely premature, low-birthweight infants (500-750g) 
. 4m. 
J. Dis. Childhood, 1990; 144: 549-552. 
'Rhoden NK. In: Treating Baby Doe: the ethics of uncertainty. Hastings Centre Report, 1986; 16: 34-42. 
9McHaffie & Fowlie, op cit n6 at p17. 
`°BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at p82. 
"Ibid, at p83. 
'2See discussion later in this thesis regarding the interpretation of `best interests' by the courts and the possible impact of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
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the doctor's responsibility, withdrawing treatment can no longer be seen as a matter of clinical prerogative. 
By the time the decision to withdraw treatment comes to be made, the parents will have more understanding 
of their child's condition and the way `things work' in hospitals and will be better able to participate than if 
they had suddenly been presented with a seriously-ill newborn baby. It seems agreed that parents should be 
involved in decisions to withdraw treatment. 13 
Particularly difficult are cases where the baby is able to leave hospital only to return later with severe lung 
damage due to prematurity which is currently untreatable. Eventually, it becomes necessary to decide whether 
to withdraw further ventilator support or antibiotics. Some argue that such babies have been `over-treated' and 
treatment should be withheld initially. " Stinson describes such an infant whose iatrogenic problems included 
retrolental fibroplasia, infections, broken bones, pulmonary artery hypertension and brain seizures, none of 
which would have occurred had he not been `saved' by the use of the ventilator. " The tragedy is that the family 
will have built up a relationship with the child, who is old enough to have a distinct personality, so proposing 
to withdraw treatment is more traumatic. The decision has to be made in the child's `best interests' but 
emotional, and possibly financial, interests may influence it. 16 Duff and Campbell argue for `latitude' in the 
decision-making process since the families are the ones who `must live with and are most affected by the 
decisions' so legal and medical guidance should only be generalistic. " Merrick notes that it has been openly 
acknowledged that `treatment for babies with identical "selection criteria" could be quite different depending 
on the contribution from home and society'. 18 The question must be, is such variation acceptable? Possibly 
this represents a compromise that must be accepted, but only reluctantly, since no one can force parents to 
expend emotional and financial resources they feel unable to provide. Meyers suggests that parents, who may 
have `different levels of tolerance and capacity to love and nurture such children', are 'responsible ... for the 
financial and emotional burdens of nurturing and raising that child to take his or her place in society'. '9 
Natural justice demands that each, within a given society, should have equal opportunity to benefit from 
treatment. However, inequality occurs naturally. No baby has a right to be born into a rich family or, even, 
a caring one; it is merely a matter of luck. 
Moreno questions whether `an infant's condition (is) ever so hopeless that all care, including feeding, should 
be withdrawn"' particularly since there is `an offensive aspect of quality of life judgments that surfaces in the 
form of comparisons with `normal' infants'. 2' He considers the `notion of parental rights' untenable but 
support for the sanctity of life principle in the `Baby Doe Rules' is only weak, because there are exceptions 
regarding the `irreversibly comatose' and those for whom treatment is `futile and inhumane'. 22 Unfortunately, 
"Caplan A, Blank R (Eds) Compelled Compassion 1992 Humana Press, Clifton, New Jersey at p255. Nothing has been found in researching 
this thesis that indicates a contrary view although it will be suggested that the input of others besides parents and doctors may be needed. 
'Buchanan AE, Brock DW. Decidingfor others: the ethics of surrogate decision-making. 1990 CUP, Cambridge at pp254-5. 
"Stinson R. On the death of a baby. J. Med. Ethics 1981; 7,5: 5-18. 
"'It is worth noting that the British welfare system which pays out benefits to those who are disabled, such as mobility allowance, or attendance 
allowance for the carers, tends to discriminate against the under-five year olds by considering that nothing in terms of extra care 
is required than 
is required by a non-handicapped child of the same age. This can place an enormous burden on the parents of such a child: 
Mencap. Response 
to the Consultation Paper "Supporting Families". 1999 Mencap, London, www. mencap. co. uk accessed 27 January 2001. 
"Duff R, Campbell AGM. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery. NEJM 1973; 289: 890- 895 at p894. 
"Merrick JC. Critically Ill Newborns and the Law: The American Experience. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 189-209 at p195. 
'9Meyers D. The family and life and death decisions. In: Sutherland E, McCall Smith A (Eds); Family Rights: Family Law and Medical 
Advance. 1990 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh at pp59-77 at p71. 
20Moreno JD. Ethical and Legal Issues in the Care of the Impaired Newborn. Clinics in Perinatology 1987; 14,2: 345-359 at p346. He cites 
several cases where. with the parents approval, a non-feeding policy was set 
in place by the physicians but later overturned by the courts. He 
describes (at pp351-2) how a `telephone hot-line' number was displayed for a time in the 1980's in American neonatal intensive care units for 
anyone concerned that `a handicapped 
infant was being discriminated against by being denied customary medical care or nourishment'. 
21Ibid, at p357. 
22Ibid, at p356. 
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he fails to discuss the fact that medical opinion prevails with differing, value-laden interpretations of `futility'23 
and `inhumanity". To certain religions, sanctity of life is paramount over quality of life and withdrawing care 
to hasten death is `inhumane' abandonment of the patient. 24 Eidelman relates how, in Israel, the rabbi's 
influence is more important than the doctor's in deciding whether to withdraw treatment with the future quality 
of life of the infant being no justification. 25 Alternatively, countries, like India, with widely-held beliefs in 
reincarnation, perceive no difficulties. 26 However, Indian preference for male children means `(d)ecisions to 
withhold or withdraw life support are usually undertaken earlier with regard to a female child than a male 
child'. 27 
Some doctors have prescribing habits which hasten death once a decision to withdraw treatment has been 
made. 28 However, it would be improper to withhold adequate pain relief because of fears of being accused of 
deliberately hastening death. 29 Most countries still believe euthanasia is unethical as well as unlawful. " 
However, there are differing attitudes to whether it is ethical `to allow nature to take its own course'. 31 
Whitelaw and Thorensen have stated that `(a) decision to withdraw life support must be made on a certain 
diagnosis with the most up-to-date information available'. 32 Yet studies in the Netherlands have shown `great 
variety in the criteria for life-shortening treatment"' with treatment withdrawal based on a `diagnosis' of an 
`unlivable life'. 34 Suggestions were made that scoring systems should be developed to decide which infants 
have `unlivable lives' but these were rejected as capable of producing arbitrariness and subjectivity. 35 Whether 
they could be any more subjective than medical opinion currently appears is questionable but it is repugnant 
to think that any life could be reduced simply to a numerical value. The New Zealand report placed the 
interests of the child `paramount' with decision-makers considering `the burden of disability the child will 
carry'. 36 Third-party assessment of `burden' can only be value-laden. Therefore, others suggest, the doctors' 
role should not extend beyond the provision of medical opinion. 37 This seems an appropriate limitation on 
medical prerogative. Establishing the neonate's `best interests' requires clinical information and prognosis. 
Whilst the clinician may consider a certain prognosis carries a life not worth living, his/her views should not 
23See the discussion regarding futility in the previous chapter. 
"For instance, Orthodox Judaism. See discussion of patient abandonment in the previous chapter and the discussion later in Chapter six regarding 
conjoined twins. 
ZSEidelman Al. Care of Critically III Newborns: The Israeli Experience. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 247-261 at p255. 
26Subramanian KN, Paul VK. Care of Critically III Newborns in India. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 263-275 at p268. 
27Ibid, at p274. 
28The secrecy surrounding such habits means figures are impossible to obtain. In the Netherlands, one survey suggested that in 57% of neonatal 
deaths, treatment had been withheld or withdrawn earlier and in 23% of all cases, drugs were administered `in doses that may have shortened 
life'. van der Heide A et al. Medical end-of-life decisions made for neonates and infants in the Netherlands. The Lancet 1997; 350: 251-5 at 
p252. This may over-state the situation since Huibers reports that only in 0.5% of cases was the life of the newborn intentionally ended and 
treatment had been withdrawn before death due to no hope of survival (31% of cases) and due to negative prognosis (19% of cases). Huibers 
AK. Beyond the Threshold of Life: Treating and Non-Treating of Critically Ill Newborns in the Netherlands. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 227-245 
at p 230. 
29It would also probably be held negligent behaviour on the part of the doctor as well and compensation could be sought under the civil law for 
failure to meet the standard of a reasonable doctor. 
"'The New Zealand Medical Association, for instance, holds that `deliberately ending the life ofthe patient.. . even at the request of close relatives 
is unethical'. Blank RH. Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns in Australasia. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 211-226 at p215. 
"For example, the Australian Medical Association considers that failing to operate on a Down's syndrome baby for a `correctable defect' is 
merely allowing nature to take its own course: Blank, op cit n30 at p215. 
32Whitelaw A, Thorensen M. `Ethical Dilemmas around the Time of Birth'. In Gillon R (Ed). Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John 
Wiley & Sons. Chichester pp617-627 at p623. 
"Huibers, op cit n28 at p234. 
34Ibid, at pp238-240. 
'SIbid, at p239. 
36National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services. Consensus Development Conference Report to the National 
Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services 1993 NACCHDSS, New Zealand. at p14. See also: Blank, op cit n30 
at p217- 
37 Huibers, op cit n28 at p239. 
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take precedence over a real inquiry into what constitutes `best interests'. 38 
4.1.2 The Critically III on Life Support39 
Weir states that there are three categories of patient for whom intensive care may be indicated: (1) those whose 
probability of survival without.. . 
is low but whose survival with such support is highly likely; 40 (2) those who 
have a low probability of survival without intensive care support but who may have a higher chance of survival 
with it, 4' and (3) those who are at risk of becoming critically i1142 and the monitoring facilities of the intensive 
care unit will ensure rapid assistance in the event of a sudden decline in condition. 43 However, the question 
of withdrawing treatment will eventually be raised. A pertinent factor is the effect the intensive care situation 
has upon patients, relatives and staff. Nurses are particularly under psychological pressure because of `constant 
exposure to crises and death'. 44 Consequently, decisions are liable to be flawed. 45 Walton and Donen suggest 
categorising decisions to withdraw treatment in ICU46 patients according to decision-maker: patients; families; 
doctors and lastly, the `brain death cases'. 47 However, even with competent patients, conflict may arise if the 
physician disagrees. Walton and Donen suggest that conflicts can be resolved by discussion so `one party or 
the other (or both, or neither) may modify his position and relax his resistance to the other's pressure'. 48 This 
fails to recognise the imbalance that exists between the different parties. Some physicians may be more willing 
to withdraw certain treatments than others and this can distort the decision-making process. 49 Different 
doctors, faced with the same patient, may make vastly different decisions about whether to withdraw treatment 
or institute a DNAR order. 5° The BMA recognises that resuscitating patients to preserve organs for donation, 
in the knowledge that this will provide no benefit to the patient, could compromise the principle of respect for 
autonomy but suggests only `symbolic harm' is done. 51 The BMA relies upon gaining `consent' from the 
relatives whilst acknowledging that such consent has no legal validity. This version of `consent' is merely a 
convenient fiction enabling doctors to maximise treatment opportunities for others in the belief that this is 
ethically acceptable. This is very utilitarian. Surely, it can only be ethically acceptable to employ clinically 
38In support, see the discussion of the responses to the interview questions in the previous chapter and later in this one where several consultants 
indicated that ethical decision-making meant considering what they would want doing if the patient was `their mother, sister, child... '. 
"Adult critical care medicine includes coronary care units (where the patients are monitored, supported and resuscitated, if necessary, following 
a heart attack); medical intensive care units (which treat those with medical emergencies such as following heart attacks, drug overdoses and 
infective diseases); surgical intensive care units (where the patient is monitored and given ventilatory support etc. following major surgery); 
neurological intensive care units (which treat patients who have sustained brain damage) and bums units (treating patients who have sustained 
severe burn injuries). For the purposes of general discussion, these will not be separated. 
""For instance, patients whose cardiac problems can be resolved by a pacemaker -a device that regulates the heartbeat which is often used in 
patients who have sustained cardiac damage to prevent future heart attacks (cardiac arrests). 
41For instance, patients in septic or cardiogenic shock. Both are conditions that are potentially reversible with antibiotic or other therapy but left 
untreated are life-threatening and, because of the nature of such conditions, irreversible damage may have already occurred. For instance, the 
antibiotics may not be able to work fast enough to prevent the death of the patient but, if the patient can be sustained for long enough to enable 
the antibiotics to work, complete recovery may be possible. 
42For instance, those who have undergone major surgery and may develop post-surgical complications such as a blood clot or pneumonia. 
4'Weir, op cit n2 at pp39-40. A variety of systems have been developed to choose who receives treatment in such units. For instance, the 
APACHE II system (Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation) uses a scoring system to categorise patients by severity of illness and 
the technological support indicated as necessary to sustain life. 
44Weir RF, op cit n2 at p42. The unfamiliar surroundings and medicalisation and invasive technological support of their condition can also cause 
depression in the patients and their relatives and patients may develop infections and complications. 
45For a discussion of how the behaviour of doctors can affect the way decisions are made see: Tilden RP., Tolle SW et al: Decisions About Life- 
Sustaining Treatment - The Impact of Physicians' Behaviors on the Family. Arch. Intern. Med. 1995; 155: 633-8. 
"Intensive Care Unit. 
47Walton DN., Donen N. Ethical Decision Making and the Critical Care Team. Critical Care Clinics 1986; 2,1: 101-9 at p101. In the last 
category, withdrawal of treatment presents no difficulty in countries that accept this concept such as Canada and the UK. 
4BIbid, at p 102. 
49According to Christakis and Aasch, doctors are more willing to withdraw blood products and haemodialysis than antibiotics, feeding tubes or 
intravenous fluids: Christakis NA, Aasch DA. Biases in how physicians choose to withdraw life support. The Lancet, 1993; 342: 642-5 at p643. 
"'Cook DJ et al. Determinants in Canadian Health Care Workers of the Decision to Withdraw Life Support From the Critically 111, JA. t1.4, 
1995; 273,9: 703-8 at p707. DNAR means Do Not Attempt Resuscitation. 
5'BMA. A1edical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at pp27-28. 
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futile measures if the patient has given prior authority. 52 Otherwise, continuing treatment in a clinically dead 
patient53 must be to subject that person to what would constitute battery in a living patient unless the underlying 
principle of state-provided healthcare is, as Raz suggests, one allowing public welfare to trump the interests 
of the individual. 54 `Instead of essentially competing with the well-being of the individual, the common good 
(of society) is presupposed by it'. 55 Hence, the `range and nature of common goods determine the options 
available to individuals in their lives'. 56 Whilst the interests of the state have not been expressly recognised 
as being relevant in this country, they have been used to support arguments in favour of continuing treatment 
in the U. S. A.. 57 
Once intensive care treatment has been withdrawn, the patient is often transferred to a general ward58 but the 
patient may stabilise leaving him/her in the condition which treatment withdrawal had hoped to avoid. 59 Three 
levels of care may be provided: minimally invasive; moderately invasive and maximally invasive. 60 The level 
selected depends on `patient variables... ; 61 physician variables... 62 and variables related to the technology 
itself... '. 63 Sometimes treatment is continued unenthusiastically. 64 Less effective treatment may be dressed up 
as `doing everything possible' playing on patient/family ignorance. Such pretences are totally unethical and 
have helped to erode trust between patient and doctor leading to further difficulties in decision-making. 
4.2 Outcome of Eventual or Probable Death 
According to the BMA, doctors have a `duty not to provide or continue treatment which they feel is not in the 
patient's best interests'. 65 This validates subjective, apparently unilateral, third-party assessments. Doctors 
are not always competent to decide patient best interests since these extend beyond the medical condition. The 
BMA suggests that the `way in which the professional and society resolve the dilemmas posed by life or death 
cases reflects our most deeply held moral beliefs about the value of life and the qualities which make it 
valuable; the scope and limits of individual autonomy and the balancing of benefit for one patient with the 
possibility of causing harm to other patients'. 66 It suggests that `society is prepared... to overrule the desires of 
some individuals in pursuit of a perceived wider public good'. 67 The BMA is, in effect, stating that doctors are 
the ones to decide whether to withdraw medical treatment; this decision should reflect their opinion of what 
is the patient's best interest; they can consider the interests of society or other patients and doctors have some 
"For instance, in the form of a signed organ donor card. 
5'Ie. brain dead. 
54Raz J. Ethics in the Public Domain. 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford, Chapter 1, `Duties of Well-Being' at pp3-44. 
55Ibid, p43. 
56Ibid, at pp42-3. 
57Weir, op cit n2 at p116 referring to Custody ofa Minor, 375 Mass. 733,379 N. E. 2d 1053 (1978) which held that the state had an interest 
in `preserving the welfare of children, preserving life and protecting the integrity of the medical profession'. 
58Lee DKP et al. Withdrawing Care: Experience in a Medical Intensive Care Unit. JAMA 1994; 271,17: 1358-1361 at p1360. 
59lbid. 
60Weir, op cit n2 at p98. 
"Listed as prognosis apart from intervention, patient preferences, effects of pre-existing concurrent conditions and availability of an ITU bed. 
It is submitted that the availability of an ITU bed does not constitute a factor relating to the individual patient in the same way the other factors 
listed do and it would seem more appropriate for it to be listed as a separate factor relating to hospital protocol or as an external resource 
allocation factor. Weir, op cit n2 at p41. 
12 Prior experience, prejudices, hospital protocol. Weir, ibid. 
"Relative ease of intervention, cost, possible side-effects. Weir, ibid. 
"For instance, dialysis may be introduced or continued but at a less effective interval than would be appropriate. 
65BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at p 149. 
`']bid, at pp150-151. 
"Ibid, at p 151. This can be linked to the earlier discussion regarding organ donation and the BMA approval of clinically futile measures being 
employed in order to preserve organs 
for donation. 
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sort of mandate from `society' to put society's interests above the individual patient's when they consider it 
correct to do so. However, they refute any suggestion that societal interest could force physicians to assist 
patients to die since this would be to allow patient autonomy to impose upon medical autonomy and would 
predictably lead to a change in society's attitude towards the elderly, sick and disabled. " The BMA counsels 
doctors to practice medicine so `life implies "benefit"' and `death implies "harm" 169 but there is a tension 
between this statement, designed to prevent doctors being forced into providing euthanasia, 7° and holding that 
death is `in the best interests' of some patients. 
4.2.1 Patients Reliant on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
Patients may lose the ability, temporarily or permanently, to eat normally or sufficiently so artificial nutrition 
may be provided. " Some are mentally aware, others are totally unaware. 72 For the vegetative patient, court 
approval is necessary to withdraw treatment with decisions based on the patient's `best interests'. 73 Regarding 
these patients, concerns have been expressed about the accuracy of the diagnosis. 'a Some have been 
misdiagnosed. 75 However, misdiagnosis occurs, sometimes through fault, often through lack of accurate data, 
with other patients so perhaps the vegetative patient should receive no special consideration on this ground. 76 
For non-vegetative patients the decision to withdraw artificial feeding is rarely scrutinised by the courts. " 
Moreno considers continuing to feed a patient can cause `protracted suffering' if other medical treatment has 
been discontinued and is tantamount to active euthanasia, for instance, if the patient has kidney failure since 
feeding leads to build up of toxins. 78 However, if a patient is being allowed to die from untreated kidney failure, 
is there really any ethical problem if that death is hastened by a few days as a result of toxaemia? Most patients 
in untreated end-stage kidney failure are comatose, so their ability to feel pain is minimal. A major concern 
GBIbid, at pp151-2. 
69Ibid, at p154. 
"Although some doctors consider it proper for doctors to assist patients to die if terminally ill or severely chronically sick. For instance, see the 
campaign of Jack Kevorkian in the U. S. A. where he was convicted of murder in March 1999 (he is appealing against his conviction) and also, 
in the U. K., the trial (R v Moor (1999) unreported) ofa doctor accused of killing a patient with diamorphine who admits having `helped' possibly 
300 other patients die. Rose P. GP `admitted he helped 300 patients to die'. Daily Mail 17 April 1999. 
"Either by means of a feeding tube through the patient's nose into their stomach (nasogastric feeding) or by a tube directly into the patient's 
stomach (endogastric feeding) or by `lines' (special tubes designed to go into veins) into veins in the patient's arm (peripheral intravenous lines - 
generally a temporary means) or by a `line' into a large chest vein (total parenteral nutrition). The number of patients receiving some or all their 
nutrition this way in the States was estimated at about 1,404,500 in 1987: Mackay RD. Terminating life-sustaining treatments - recent US 
developments. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 135-9 at p138. Artificial nutrition is very different from normal eating and has been classed as medical 
treatment by the British courts despite resistance from those who would argue that only the provision of medication should be considered medical 
treatment: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789. This is probably correct in that these are not methods of feeding a person that could 
be undertaken by the general public. 
72For instance, in a persistent vegetative state like Tony Bland. This thesis intended to exclude patients with irreversible coma or vegetative state 
since the focus has been primarily upon situations where treatment could offer some benefit to the patient. However, the issue of withdrawal of 
nutrition raises similar concerns in both the vegetative patient and the stroke victim so it is appropriate to consider the best interests/quality of 
life/sanctity of life arguments in relation to the full spectrum of patients for whom this may be considered. 
"Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
74See: Andrews K, et al. Misdiagnosis of the vegetative state: retrospective study in a rehabilitation unit. BMJ 1996; 313: 13-16. His study found 
43% of the patients referred to his unit had been misdiagnosed. See also, Smith S. The outer edge of consciousness. Nursing Times 
1997; 93,39: 28-32 and The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS. Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state. NEJM 1994; 330: 1499-1508. 
"For two fascinating examples see: Goodwin C. Coma wife wakes after 16 years to find husband twice remarried. The Sunday Times 9 January 
2000 and Hardy F. The boy who came back from the dead (the Geoff Wildsmith story). Daily Mail Weekend 17 November 1996. In some cases, 
the patient has been found to have conscious control over one muscle, for example, the ability to control blinking of one eye remains, and by 
utilising this to sound a buzzer to signify yes or no to questions, the patient can, labouriously, communicate with others: Smith S. The outer edge 
of consciousness. Nursing Times 1997; 93,39: 28-32 at p30. 
76A diagnosis of PVS should not be made following traumatic injury until the patient has remained in a vegetative state for at least one year: The 
Permanent Vegetative State: Review by a Working Group Convened by the Royal College of Physicians and Endorsed by the Conference of 
Medical Royal Colleges and their Faculties of the United Kingdom. J. Roy. Coll. Phys. 1996; 30: 119. The courts will accept a diagnosis of PVS 
that has been made in accordance with these guidelines: Practice Note (persistent vegetative state: withdrawal of treatment) [ 1996] 4 All ER 
766. 
"Unless a challenge to the doctors' decision is made by an interested party or the decision to withdraw nutrition seems out of step with acceptable 
medical practice in which case criminal prosecutions or professional misconduct hearings might be contemplated. See, for instance: Horsnell 
M. Police check hospitals over `backdoor euthanasia'. The Times 6 January 1999. 
"Moreno JD, op cit n20 at p358. 
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of families is whether the patient will suffer as a result of starvation. 79 If the care the patient receives is 
reviewed holistically it may be possible to conclude that any shortening of life through continuing to maintain 
hydration and nutrition is outweighed by the benefit in not postponing death or the benefit in not suffering 
discomfort from hunger. 8° As Devettere points out, withdrawing artificial feeding does not mean the patient 
dies of the underlying medical condition - s/he dies of malnutrition and dehydration so the classification 
adopted (treatment or food) affects attitudes towards its removal. 8' Even groups who normally speak with one 
voice, such as Catholic bishops, are divided as to when and whether it is acceptable to withdraw artificial 
nutrition. 82 
The views of the family and the health care team may differ with some relatives believing cognisance is 
present. Smith enquires whether, when relatives insist that they can communicate after a fashion with the 
patient, `even if we have not been able to prove it, who are we to say it is not there? '83 
4.2.2 The Patient Reliant on Artificial Ventilation 
Some patients have severe lung damage, possibly because of extreme prematurity of birth, occupational injury 
or smoking-related damage and initially temporary reliance can progress to permanent reliance, even though 
conscious and mentally aware. 84 Infectious disease may also be responsible. 85 The ethical issues can seem 
different from other treatments which, if withdrawn, lead to rapid death since the patient has `personhood' 
potentially or actually present. 86 Others have major brain damage as well as requiring ventilatory support. 87 
Ventilation now seems `quite ordinary' treatment, not extraordinary, in countries like Britain" although the 
distinction was relied upon in Quinlan. 89 Hinging treatment-withdrawal decisions on distinctions between 
`ordinary' and `extraordinary' treatment is problematic since classification seems subjectively determined. 
Devettere argues death would take nothing of value from Quinlan and would cause `no real social harm' so 
allowing death was not undermining society's interest in preserving life. 9o 
Some patients, facing a `locked-in' state, have petitioned the courts for recognition of their advance directives 
79This was a point considered in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. For instance, it has been reported that it took an 85 year old 
woman two months to die after her feeding supplements were withdrawn and at the time of death she weighed only 25kg. `Woman dies two 
months after food withdrawal. ' BMJ 1997; 314: 1503. The GMC considered (regarding Ken Taylor, whom it suspended for six months) that 
a similar situation constituted `serious professional misconduct'. Bull. Med. Ethics 1999; 146: 5. 
"However, different religions and cultures may take a different approach to the question of whether death should be postponed at all costs. See 
the discussion in Chapter 6. 
81Devettere R, Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics: Cases and Concepts 1995 Georgetown University Press, Washington DC 
at pp228-9. Devettere suggests adopting a new category for this procedure called `medical nutrition'. 
82Ibid, at p229. 
"Smith S. The outer edge of consciousness. Nursing Times 1997; 93,39: 28-32 at p31. 
"The number of patients in the States receiving ventilation in 1987 was between 3,775-6,575: Mackay RD. Terminating life-sustaining 
treatments - recent US developments. J. Med. Ethics 
1988;! 4: 135-9 at pl38. Many of these will not be conscious but some are. Mackay reports 
(at pp 135-6) one such case where the patient, having agreed to a trial of ventilation, was unable to persuade the doctors to remove the respirator 
without court approval. She died waiting for that approval. 
"For instance, neurological damage following meningitis or polio may damage the centre of the brain which controls breathing leading to 
permanent reliance on artificial ventilation. The polio epidemic of the 1950's left many people dependent upon the recently 
invented `iron lungs'. 
Some patients have lived forty years or more in such a condition. 
16The ability of some `patients' reliant on ventilation to lead active and worthwhile lives can be quite amazing. For instance, the `Superman' star, 
Christopher Reeves, now ventilator dependent and quadraplegic is actively campaigning to generate funds for research and facilities to help 
paraplegics overcome their injuries: 
Christopher Reeve Paralysis Foundation, website address www. apacure. com. Accessed 27 January 2001. 
8'Like Karen Quinlan: Re Quinlan (1976) 50 N. J. 10. Ventilation was held `an extraordinary means of preserving life' hence not required b} 
the Catholic faith of the family. 
"RDevettere, op cit n8l at p167. There are many cases of people receiving long-term ventilatory support following spinal injuries or motor neurone 
disease. 
"Re Quinlan (1976) 50 N. J. 10. 
90Devettere, op cit n81 at p172. 
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to ensure that the doctors treating them will not implement ventilatory support indicating that they fear doctors 
will insist on preserving `life' irrespective of their wishes. 9' An interpretation of professional ethics which 
leads to such cases must be flawed. Is it because the doctor knows the `person' who is still present so cannot 
handle the guilt/frustration/grief at being unable to prevent loss of function? Is it fear of sanctions? Sometimes 
terminally ill, autonomous patients have been restrained to prevent them removing ventilator tubes. 92 Such 
practices surely represent overtreatment. 
4.2.3 The Patient Reliant on Dialysis 
Patients who would have died from kidney disease as young adults have grown old receiving dialysis. Through 
ageing, other problems develop and withdrawal of dialysis may be considered. 93 When should this be 
considered and should the greater benefit others might gain from using the often scarce resource of a 
haemodialysis machine be regarded? One study found considerable variability amongst dialysis unit medical 
directors regarding whether to continue dialysis. 94 Most would consult with the patient's family and a small 
minority would provide dialysis if that was what the family wished even though they felt it medically 
inappropriate. 95 Dementia seems the most common cause of dialysis withdrawal and `nephrologists are more 
comfortable in making decisions to stop dialysis for patients with Alzheimer's disease than other conditions'. 96 
This suggests that patients should have some awareness of the benefits provided by the medical intervention. 
Clearly, dialysis per se is not medically futile since it achieves its aims, yet ethicists seemingly accept the 
futility argument in such situations. 97 This approach should be challenged since many other medical 
interventions are implemented or continued regardless of patient awareness at the time or future ability to be 
aware of the benefit gained. To accept it is to accept that medical treatment is only appropriately directed 
towards those with `personhood' or potential to develop `personhood'. In the U. S. A., guidelines have been 
called for to exclude or remove from the Medicare Program those with `limited life expectancy and relatively 
poor quality of life' since the `existence of a public entitlement does not obligate physicians to provide dialysis 
to all patients with renal failure'. 98 Quality of life assessments generally emphasise `personhood'. 
4.2.4 The Patient with Cancer 
The search for cancer cures has produced a plethora of alternatives. 99 Often, if the first drug or combination 
therapy fails, an alternative can be tried, sometimes several times before defeat is admitted. Stoll points out 
9'See, for instance, the Annie Lindsell case (withdrawn prior to judgment): Lindsell A. Why I believe I should have the right to die. Daily Mail 
18 September 1996 and The Lords Hansard Text for 6 May 1998 (980506-12) Columns 707-726 www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvnAds98/text/90506-12. htm accessed 8 January 2001. 
92See, for instance, Devettere's description ofthe case of William Bartling, 70 years old, hospitalised 6 times in the previous 12 months with lung 
cancer and severe emphysema (a condition that makes breathing very difficult and requiring the patient to breathe pure oxygen) yet, despite 
writing notes that he did not want ventilation (since he could not talk due to the tube in his throat) he was tied to his bed. Devettere, op cit n8I 
at pp 177-9. 
93For instance, the patient may suffer a `stroke' or develop pre-senile dementia or cancer. 
94Moss AH et al. Variation in the Attitudes of Dialysis Unit Medical Directors Toward Decisions to Withhold and Withdraw Dialysis. 
J. Am. Soc. Nephrology 1993; 4,2: 229-34. The study was conducted by means of a questionnaire circulated to the medical directors of a random 
sample of adult dialysis units throughout the United States and 318 replies were received. 32% were prepared to withdraw dialysis and 68% 
would continue it. Dialysis in such patients in the U. S. A. has normally been privately funded during adult (working) life. 
"Ibid. Moss found six of the 318 medical directors consulted were prepared to give treatment in these circumstances. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that doctors are possibly more likely to practice defensive medicine in the U. S. A. because of fear of litigation. 
96Ibid, at p232. 
97Schneiderman LJ et al. Medical futility: its meaning and ethical implications. Annals. Int. Med. 1990; 112: 949-954. 
98Moss AH, op cit n94 at p233. 
"Certain types of cancer are recognised in themselves as terminal events and consequently incurable. Metastases which develop as a secondary 
or late form of cancer fall into this category on the whole although some are unusual in being sensitive to chemotherapy. 
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that doctors are under pressure to `examine their management decisions' and are forced by rationing and 
queuing to `choose between patients on both medical and social grounds'. 10° He believes curable cancers are 
relatively uniformly treated throughout the developed world, but patients with advanced cancers `may be 
offered vastly different treatments' due to `differences in value judgements as to what is appropriate'. 1 ' Such 
variation based solely upon a doctor's subjective opinion seems unjustifiable. The same patient could be offered 
further `curative' treatment by one doctor whereas another doctor would recommend withdrawing from 
treatment and adopting the palliative model of care. The doctor's workload, departmental resources and stress 
levels may all be influential. Regional variations in curing cancer are of major public concern in Britain. 102 
Moving from the curative model of treatment to the palliative one is always difficult. It is particularly emotive 
when the patient is a child. `Child B' received much media attention yet other children might indicate that 
they are ready to have chemotherapy/radiotherapy withdrawn. The BMA considers it is `ethically justifiable' 
to continue treatment against a child's wishes if there is a good chance that it will save life or prevent `serious 
deterioration in health"" but they also recognise that it may be appropriate to defer to his/her wishes where 
s/he has the requisite understanding. 1°4 However, the child, though of reasonable maturity, may not be enabled 
by those caring for him/her to express his/her viewpoint105 and even if s/he can, the treatment refusal may be 
overridden. 106 Relatives, and sometimes patients, desperately `clutch at straws' in the hopes of a miracle so 
some doctors continue with aggressive therapy that is no longer appropriate. 107 Stoll suggests the doctor's 
options regarding continuing curative treatment should be limited by guidelines reflecting society's interests 
in containing costs. 108 The Commission for Health Improvement and NICE will have increasing importance 
in the area of cancer treatment. New drugs are being screened for clinical and cost effectiveness and guidelines 
on their use are being developed. 
4.3 Outcome of Reduced Quality of Life 
For many patients, death is distant yet their quality of life is markedly reduced even though medical science 
could produce improvement by reducing pain, immobility or mental disintegration. Several reasons for the 
withdrawing of treatment options from various patient groups can be postulated. It may be because they are 
unequal partners in the healthcare relationship, or because of resource allocation decisions by purchasers. 
Certain groups may simply be less-valued by society. 
10"Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p3. 
1°1Ibid, at p20. 
"'Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation. (Cm 4386) July 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
103BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at p77. 
1°4lbid, at p78. The legal position of minors will be considered in Chapter 6. The common law position 
is that, in general, minors who are 
`Gillick' competent may consent to treatment, but are unable to refuse medical treatment (Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 
112). Any such decision to withdraw potentially life-saving treatment at the request of the minor should require the approval of the courts. 
'°5Ackerman and Strong describe such a situation involving a terminally-ill adolescent girl whose mother was pushing 
for continuing aggressive 
treatment. The options open to the physician are described as (1) to continue aggressive treatment; (2) to continue aggressive treatment 
but 
continue to try to change the mother's mind; 
(3) to taper off treatment without telling the mother or the child; (4) to open discussions with the 
patient without her mother's knowledge and expressly confront the child with the 
knowledge of her impending death; (5) to talk to the child 
without her mother's knowledge and attempt to 
find out if the child wished to discuss her illness or (6) wait until all the family was gathered in 
the child's room and introduce the subject. 
Ackerman TF, Strong C. A Casebook of Medical Ethics 1989 Oxford University Press, NeNN York 
at p52. 
`See, for instance, the cases of Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Far n64; Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] 
Fam 1I and Re E (4 Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 which are 
discussed more fully in Chapter Six. 
107Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p20. 
108Ibid, at pp24-6. 
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4.3.1 The Patient with Dementia or Mental Illness 
Dementia is a condition where the rational balance of the mind has been lost, permanently or temporarily. 109 
Originally a condition of the elderly, premature dementia is now seen in young patients. '10 Some patients suffer 
from a combination of mental handicap, mental illness and/or dementia in addition to their physical 
ailments. "' The younger the patient, the more difficult it is for the permanence of mental incapacity to be 
accepted by family/carers. Conversely, it is submitted, the older the patient the more commonly s/he is 
assumed to be incompetent. "' The government has recently agreed that there should be a rebuttable 
presumption of competence. 1' Callahan believes curative or acute care is only appropriate for those with 
`personhood' so when the patient loses this, the primary goal of healthcare should be palliative rather than 
attempting to cure whatever physical health problems they have. 14 He fails to address the difficulties in 
assessing `personhood' in the demented patient unlike the patient in persistent vegetative state or the 
anencephalic baby. 15 Likewise, age differences between the elderly patient and the physician1' as well as the 
environment of care cause problems. "' Thomasma, similarly favouring `personhood', believes it preferable 
to rely upon informally expressed values of the patient when deciding to withhold and withdraw treatment 
rather than having to rely upon advance directives. "$ It seems to be the role of the family to supply the doctor 
with accounts of these `values'. This reflects how treatment plans are currently devised. Accounts of the 
patient's values may not only include views about whether the patient would want to live as long as possible 
or would wish to die if his or her faculties went but may contain a sub-text regarding financial values. Patients 
may be afraid of their children's inheritance being destroyed by residential home costs. The relatives advising 
the doctor may have the same concerns. 1' Benefits payable under insurance policies may be affected. 12° 
"'Senile dementia of the Alzheimer type affects 4-5% of those over 60 years old: Anon. Donezepil in the treatment of mild to moderate senile 
dementia of the Alzheimer type. Evidence-Based Purchasing Report No 69 The Wessex Institute for Health Research and Development. June 
1997. 
"'In some of these cases, the dementia is attributed to `new variant' Creutzfeld Jacob Disease which, it is believed, is linked to the cattle 
condition, Bovine Spongeform Encephalitis. In other cases, the dementia or mental illness may arise in young to middle aged adults as a result 
of unusual infections of the brain tissue as a result of the weakening of the auto-immune system, for instance, as a result of AIDS (Auto-Immune 
Disease Syndrome) or as a result of chemotherapy or drug abuse. 
"'Each of these conditions will have its own effect upon the ability ofthe patient to participate in the decision-making process. One person whom 
the author knows was born with a learning disability, was diagnosed as schizophrenic in her 20's and has recently, at the age of about 50 years, 
been diagnosed as having early dementia. See also, van Thiel GJMW et al: Retrospective study of doctors' `end of life decisions' in caring for 
mentally handicapped people in institutions in the Netherlands. BMJ 1997; 315: 88-91. 
"2Carmel S. Medical Students Attitudes Regarding the Use of Life-Sustaining Treatments for Themselves and for Elderly Persons. Soc. Sci. Med. 
1998; 46,4-5: 467-474 at p468. Carmel found that medical personnel negative stereotyped the elderly and this caused more problems in the 
decision-making process than their lack of communication skills. 
"'Lord Chancellor's Department Making Decisions. October 1999 The Stationery Office, London. See also: de Wachter, ter Meulen. Dementia 
Research: ethical issues of research with cognitively impaired elderly subjects. Biomedical and Health Research Newsletter 1996; 7,1: 5-6. 
European Commission DGXII Science, Research and Development. 
'"Callahan D. Dementia and appropriate care: allocating scarce resources. In: Binstock RH et al (Eds): Dementia andAgeing: Ethics, Values 
and Policy Choices. 1992 The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore at ppl41-152. Also cited by Campbell A et al, Medical Ethics 2nd 
Edn. 1997 Oxford University Press, Oxford at p149. 
15There is a poem, written by a `demented' patient who had not communicated in months with anyone although she was occasionally seen to 
write on scraps of paper, which seems to sum up the way total incompetence is often assumed: `I'm an old woman now and nature is cruel, 'Tis 
her jest to make old age look like a fool... But inside this old carcase a young girl still dwells... So open your eyes nurses, Open and see, Not a 
crabbit old woman, look closer - see ME'. 
"`For instance, Carmel has reported that medical students consistently rated the desire of elderly patients to live much weaker than their own. 
This she explained as primarily due to differences in attitude towards death and strength of religious belief. Carmel S. Medical Students Attitudes 
Regarding the Use of Life-Sustaining Treatments for Themselves and for Elderly Persons. Soc. Sci. Med. 1998; 46,4-5: 467-474 at p471. 
"'Many elderly patients have been found to be suffering from malnutrition and this has contributed to the loss of mental function which can be 
restored (Smith S op cit n83 at p3 1) Also, it has been found that providing some `demented' patients with the sort of surroundings, 
food, music 
etc that they were familiar with in their young to middle years can be useful in re-orientating them to their surroundings and 
day centres often 
carry out this approach. 
"8Thomasma DC. `Mercy killing of elderly people with dementia: a counterproposal'. In: Binstock et al, op cit n114 at pp101-7. 
19A number of the cases of `bed-blockers' are due to patients who are too dependent to be sent home but whose 
family will not arrange for them 
to go into care. Tony Blair recently told Alice 
Miles who was conducting an investigation into the NHS that his government will replace the 
convalescent home beds scrapped twenty-five years ago: 
Miles A. Can the NHS be Saved? Last Chance. The Times 26 May 2000. 
With term insurance, death has to occur within the term of the insurance period. Most policies refuse to pay out if the patient has committed 
suicide. It is possible that some 
insurers may consider an Advance Directive which, when complied with led to the death of the patient, is 
equivalent to suicide. 
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4.3.2 The Elderly Patient 
Certain conditions are seen particularly as conditions affecting the elderly, for instance, `strokes"21 which may 
leave the patient with varying degrees of paralysis and/or aphasia. 'ZZ Provision of effective and aggressive 
treatment, particularly speech and physiotherapy which can reduce disabilities considerably, is patchily 
provided throughout the U. K. and, if provided, is frequently withdrawn after a short period thus preventing 
the fullest possible recovery. 123 Also, elderly people are more likely to have age-related chronic conditions such 
as arthritis, coronary artery disease and dementia. Because of these multiple pathologies, "' decisions to 
withdraw active treatment may be made earlier than with younger patients or one with only one clinical 
problem. Patients may be designated, Not For Resuscitation, even though there is no evidence that attempting 
resuscitation would be futile or unwanted. 12' Buchanan and Brock consider that age itself should not be 
`equated with loss of competence and, where the patient is competent, s/he should be involved in the process 
of deciding whether to withdraw treatment or not. "26 Concerns have been expressed that treatment is 
withdrawn (or withheld) because of age rather than ability to benefit. 12' An example of this is when a decision 
is made not to treat an iatrogenic pneumonia in a demented patient. Such a decision is properly seen as 
withdrawal of treatment even though it is a new course of antibiotics which is needed because it is part of a 
continuum of care. The less confident a physician is over such a decision the more likely he or she is to 
consider the wish of the family or nursing staff to treat the patient curatively. 128 However, there is some 
evidence of a move away from considering the role of the family legitimate. "' 
4.3.3 Other Conditions 
Sometimes the duration of treatment may be restricted due to the costs involved. Few healthcare purchasers 
fund in-vitro fertilisation treatment at all and those who do often limit the number of `cycles of treatment' after 
which treatment is withdrawn. 13' This is an area of inequality and injustice which desperately needs 
resolution. "' 
12' The correct medical terminology for a `stroke' is cerebrovascular accident. The damaging effects occur when a portion of the brain is damaged 
by bleeding into the tissues or occlusion of the blood supply. In fact, despite the presentation of `strokes' as a problem of the elderly, the most 
common age to suffer from one is between 40 and 55 years. For a general discussion of the pathology of ageing and the implications for medical 
ethics see Campbell A. Medical Ethics 2ndEdn. Oxford University Press, Oxford at ppl36-152. 
"'Aphasia is an inability to speak or to talk in a coherent manner. Understanding is present but the ability to communicate so others understand 
is absent. 
123 This is an area where the voluntary sector has begun to provide therapy and support to try to fill the gaps in provision nationwide or the limited 
amount of provision given. Stroke is one such charity dedicated to helping victims of strokes with volunteers providing speech therapy and 
exercise classes. 
'24This is the term used when a patient has more than one illness or medical condition for instance, where a diabetic patient has gangrene and 
also has suffered a stroke. 
'25For instance, in one case heard by the Ombudsman, an elderly woman admitted to hospital with bronchopneumonia was designated Not for 
Resuscitation and the DNAR order remained in her notes for five days during which she made a good recovery before her son found out what 
it meant. She recovered fully from her illness. Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Minutes of Evidence 
13 November 1991 HMSO, London at pp23-28. 
126 Buchanan & Brock, op cit n 14 at pp268. Also, it should be remembered that incompetence can be temporary, for instance, due to medication. 
Z'Ann Winterton's Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) private member's bill presented to Parliament in January 2000 attempted to 
address these fears through legislation but failed for a lack of support and parliamentary time. 
28van der Steen JT et al. Decisions to treat or not to treat pneumonia in demented psychogeriatric nursing home patients: development of a 
guideline. J. Med. Ethics 2000; 26: 114-120 at p117. 
'29See: Craig VJ. Patient decision-making: medical ethics and mediation. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 164-7, in particular, at p165. 
1°Anon. Who should pay for test tube babies? Woman's Weekly 11 June 1996. For instance, it was reported that Morecombe Bay HA would 
only fund one cycle (attempt) per patient which 
dramatically reduces the chances of succeeding in producing a live baby. It should be 
remembered that the number of pregnancies achieved 
by IVF is far greater than the number of `take home' babies. 
"'The present government pledged, in 1998, to eliminate regional inequalities in treatment opportunities over a ten year period. A First Class 
Service paras 1.6,1.9. July 1998 The Stationery Office, London. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently started 
evaluating infertility treatments: 
NICE. Press Release: Response to announcement regarding Infertility Guidance. 30 November 2000, 
ývww nice Y. uk/article. asv? a+12826 accessed 
5 January 2001. 
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Occasionally, a situation may arise when withdrawing treatment is considered because of failure to co-operate 
and/or abusive, aggressive or inappropriate behaviour during treatment. Ackerman and Strong describe a 
situation where a young adult male with low I. Q. and criminal convictions refused to co-operate with leukaemia 
treatment. Initial agreement would be followed by refusal once treatment commenced. He was abusive and 
aggressive towards nursing staff. He could give no reason for his behaviour and understood his need for 
treatment. 132 The question arises whether treatment which is necessary to prolong life or save life can be 
withdrawn in such circumstances. If the patient is viewed as fully autonomous, his behaviour could be 
construed as non-verbal refusal of treatment overriding his prior verbal or written consent. It may seem 
appropriate to hold that the patient is not acting autonomously since no reasonable person would behave like 
this having balanced the risks and benefits of treatment against the outcome of non-treatment. Irrationality 
of decision or behaviour is insufficient evidence of a lack of competence. 133 The difficulty of enforcing 
treatment which necessarily continues over a number of weeks or months means healthcare staff would be at 
risk of patient violence. "' This raises the issue of respecting the autonomy of the care provider who could be 
forced, into providing care in a situation exposing him or her to risk. To enforce an obligation to provide care 
in such a situation would be to oblige healthcare staff to accept risks beyond the call of duty. 13' Mental health 
staff, particularly nurses, face similar violence. Just because people are being treated for mental illness does 
not mean that they lack autonomous control over their actions. 13' However, duties of care towards patients 
make it difficult to withdraw further treatment. 
In other situations, such as long-term rehabilitation following traumatic injury, the patient may feel that he or 
she is being `bullied' by healthcare staff to produce the little bit more each day that is necessary to maximise 
recovery. Such patients will argue that they wish to be left alone, they can't take any more. This may be 
founded upon an irrational belief as to their own capabilities which Savulescu would suggest is evidence of 
incompetence overridable by the professional. "' 
4.4 Empirical Research Analysis 
This section will analyse the responses given by the eighty-five consultants interviewed to the following 
questions138: 
Regarding the individual patient, when deciding to withhold or withdraw certain treatments, what sort 
of criteria do you use and which criteria should not be used? 
12Ackerman & Strong, op cit n105 at pp9-12. 
33St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S. [1998] 2 FLR 728. This case, and others which raise issues of irrationality, is discussed later in this 
thesis. 
14A situation which could certainly be envisaged in this country would 
be where a minor, under the age of eighteen years was compelled to accept 
medical treatment against his or her own will. 
Many teenagers are of sufficient size and aggressive nature to cause a lot of damage to persons 
and property were they to be subjected to medical treatment contrary to their wishes albeit 
in accordance with the law. 
115 When the courts place an obligation to treat a reluctant patient upon a hospital or medical team, 
it might be possible for the hospital as employer 
to refuse to allow its employees to 
be exposed to risks of injury since it has statutory duties to avoid harm befalling its employees, for instance, 
under the Health and Safety at 
Work etc Act 1974 as well as obligations under the common law. 
136 The government has launched a Zero Tolerance campaign to stamp out violence against 
healthcare staff. Department of Health. We don't 
have to take this. Resource Pack. L20/002 November 1999. DoH, Wetherby. 
"'Savulescu J, Momeyer RW. Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs? J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 282-8 at p282. 
"'A list of the consultants, maintaining confidentiality, can 
be found in Appendix A. The consultants were based at four different hospitals (A - 
D), and were from a variety of specialties. 
A descriptor of the hospitals, maintaining confidentiality, can be found in Appendix B. 
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Who should be involved in the decision to treat/not to treat a particular patient? 
Do you think relatives should have a say? 
4.4.1 Criteria used in deciding to withdraw certain treatments 
As discussed in the previous chapter a variety of factors were identified. 13' The data will be analysed utilising 
the same themes as before. 14° Fear of legal sanction was a new criterion identified regarding treatment 
withdrawal which was not raised regarding withholding treatment. All those who mentioned patient merit 
rejected it as unethical. However, regarding financial costs and patient age, there was disagreement over 
whether they could legitimately be included as part of the decision-making process. There was also an 
identifiable difference in approach to `the wishes of the family' as a criterion. Although it had been rejected 
with regard to withholding treatment, several consultants felt it was an appropriate criterion in regard to 
withdrawing treatment. "' Surgical consultants were rarely involved in withdrawal of treatment decisions. 
Their involvement in such cases was generally more peripheral, such as when a patient was not for active 
treatment but a surgical intervention such as re-siting a feeding tube was proposed. 
4.4.1.1 Effectiveness of treatment 
This seems the most important criterion and typical comments included: 
The thing that is major for me is turning off ventilators. We decide to do that when treatment is no 
longer effective. D6 
Difficulties arose when it was impossible to accurately gauge the effectiveness of treatment or it was less 
successful than predicted: 
There was a lady on ITU. She was about 80... on holiday and fell ill. She just got worse and worse 
and her kidneys stopped working so I took the relatives to one side and said, look, we've really 
reached the end. We can't dialyse someone who's in this condition. The relatives were very 
accepting... and we turned everything off and she got better... You have to accept that if you make 
decisions they could be wrong. A5 
We've had some patients who have had heart surgery and for some reason have had a cerebral event 
so we have had to withdraw medication and gradually wean them off the ventilator. B3 
Infrequent contact with the patient probably makes predicting outcomes and assessing quality of life difficult 
"'The criteria included: a) treatment clinically ineffective; b) the patient's quality of life; c) balance of burden greater than benefit; 
d) wishes 
of patient (including those expressed in advance 
directives); e) wishes of the family; f) the patient's social circumstance; g) financial costs; h) 
burden on the family; h) burden on healthcare staff; i) the patient's age; j) merit of the patient; i) fear of legal sanction. 
"'The themes selected are: Effectiveness of treatment (which could have included quality of life and patient age); Quality of life (which could 
have included the Balancing of Benefits and Burdens); Balance of Benefits and Burden; Patient Wishes; Family Wishes; Burden on the 
Family/Carers; The Burden on Healthcare Staff and Resource Implications. 
''Except in regard to new-born babies with congenital short bowel syndrome or similar conditions where, despite the best efforts of science, the 
baby would still die within months. In those cases, where a `best interests' approach did not make the decision to treat or not to treat fall one 
way or another, the parental ww 
ishes were seen as an acceptable way of making the decision. 
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but none of the consultants questioned their own practice over this: 
The problem is, old people with multiple diagnosis can be unpredictable... we go round the patients 
twice a week and on those occasions review the CPR decisions as we go. '42 We rarely change them 
but sometimes we do. A22 
Despite recent legal cases supporting the fact that artificial nutrition and hydration is medical treatment and 
can be withdrawn to allow the patient to die, 143 not all consultants seem happy to do this: 
When it becomes someone whose treatment is futile, you're not obliged to give futile treatment. You 
give basic medical care which I see as food and drink but you don't give anything else. " A31 
4.4.1.2 Quality of Life 
For many, this was the deciding factor as to whether treatment should be continued particularly once it was 
apparent that things were not progressing well. Some consultants take a more subjective approach to patient 
quality of life than others: 
I may have a view that life isn't very good for the patient but if their view is that it is pretty darn 
good, they go on having treatment. A21 
Life can still be sweet even if all of a sudden you're suddenly disabled.... In terms of futility, I think 
we're probably the best judges of futility. I think you should still go and discuss that with the patient, 
even if they say, `If you do something which will put me through a lot of discomfort, I might live an 
extra three or four months... (but) actually my son's wedding is coming up and I want to go there. ' 
Now that to me means a lot. A22 
It was clear some consultants were less comfortable discussing `end of life' decisions with patients than others 
and this could lead to a more objective, less patient-centred approach being taken. Constraints on beds and 
other resources could influence how the patient's quality of life was assessed: 
I use clinical criteria for patients, usually their best interests (but). you have to temper clinical 
decision-making with resources. A20 
4.4.1.3 Balance of Benefits and Burdens. 
Several doctors mentioned that the impetus for withdrawing treatment often came from the nursing staff. The 
general impression was that this was because they were closer to the patient and more involved with the 
relatives. The burden of the treatment was often seen as greater when an old person was concerned since the 
potential benefits of living longer were reduced. A typical comment was: 
"He was referring to the decisions to withhold resuscitation. 
143See: Airedale ARS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
144Discussing a case of severe brain damage, amounting almost, but not quite. to brain-stem death. It was clear from other parts of this interview 
that `food and drink' included tube-feeding. 
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That would be my experience, that nurses often want to withdraw treatment sooner than doctors and 
the issue will often be raised by them - are we doing the right thing? - so I think it comes from the 
team and you always discuss it with the family, you would never do it unilaterally, the family have 
to agree. A2 
The interviews with consultants who cared for children showed that withdrawing treatment from a child was 
always hard. They all used the language of withdrawing treatment `in the best interests' of the child when the 
benefits of continuing treatment were outweighed by the burdens. 
I think every child is individual so that's hard... In terms of withdrawing intensive care... providing you 
have got the principles right, we are clear, we can do this, not often, but when we do it's because we 
perceive it as being in the child's best interest. B 11 
In contrast, it seemed that concluding that treatment was too burdensome to continue in the case of elderly 
adults was easier. Other typical comments were like the following which seems, with hindsight, to confirm 
fears that the lives of old people are being deliberately ended by the withdrawing of artificial nutrition: 
Cases like the Bland case, I think they have bought the debate into the open, but when you are 
dealing with old, frail people who are at the end of their life anyway these things are happening much 
more commonly and it is impossible to consider that you are going to get judicial review on every 
case. It just won't happen. D9 
4.4.1.4 Patient Wishes 
It was recognised that inherent factors, individual to each patient, would influence whether the patient wished 
to withdraw from treatment. `Fighters' would opt to continue, and would cope with the difficulties of 
treatment. This fighting spirit as an influence on the decision-making process was even extended to babies: 
One of our staff has given birth to a 400 gram baby... there are many other babies who come out at 
400 grammes who are black and blue in the face and have no hope of surviving. I think the baby 
makes the decision. A 12 
Withholding and withdrawing are quite different issues... to take withdrawing treatment, the major 
thing is what the patient actually wants. You can't withdraw a patient from treatment without 
discussing it with them. A21 
There are occasions when it's terribly important that somebody lives an extra few months. A26 
Difficulties could arise when the treatment withdrawal was requested by the patient but the clinician believed 
it could still be effective. Failing to accede to the wishes of a competent patient to discontinue treatment is to 
act paternalistically, representing a failure to acknowledge the paramountcy of patient autonomy and the 
validity of the patient's own values: 
I would feel very uncomfortable withdrawing treatment even if the patient wished to do so unless I 
felt that was right because the prognosis was bleak... You can see this as tantamount to suicide, the 
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act of withdrawing dialysis treatment kills the patient, or allows the patient to die, but you can see 
it as stopping artificial prolongation of life. 145 A30 
It was sometimes necessary to balance patient expectations against financial reality. Several consultants 
mentioned the drug, Taxol, which was being hyped by the media as a wonder drug for end-stage breast 
cancer. 14' The local health authority would not fund it. The comments seem to indicate that not only were the 
public being misled about it being a financial decision only (and their information would come from the media 
who receive it from the drug companies), but they were being misled as to whether it was always the best drug 
for the individual to receive. Of course, it is possible that what was related was simply a comforting storyline 
for both the patient and the consultant: 
I know I'm not able to offer Taxol for patients with ovarian cancer or breast cancer but I offer an 
alternative drug which I personally believe isn't that much worse. It may not be quite as good but the 
difference in my view is not a major issue. The drug I'm using is much easier for the patient to 
tolerate than Taxol so I think there is a trade-off there. C5 
4.4.1.5 Family Wishes 
The wishes of the family came across as important in withdrawal of medical treatment because, usually, there 
has been time for the patient and/or family to build up a relationship with the healthcare team. The consultants 
seemed to feel responsible for the welfare of the family as well as the patient. Sometimes clinical evidence 
indicated curative treatment should be discontinued on grounds of futility and palliation started but treatment 
would continue because the patient or the relatives were not prepared to accept death. 
I treat for the psychological benefit as opposed to the physical one. I hate doing that. C4 
There are two important aspects, one is the medical side, the medical decision, the medical prognosis. 
The second is the family. What the family thinks. I try to carry out my practice in such a way that 
there's good communication channels open. But obviously when a family want us to carry on in the 
face of hopelessness one tries to explain to them. B4 
There was one occasion where a mother was just not going to accept that her son was dying until he 
was actually dead. What we did on ITU was just prolonging his life. The rest of the family were 
aware of it but we were doing this futile treatment for her to help her come to terms with it. All 
It was obvious that continuing treatment in such circumstances was felt to be wrong. Since clinical 
effectiveness seemed the paramount factor in most of the consultants' decision-making process, ignoring this 
was seen as unscientific and burdensome on hospital resources and staff. This indicated that there could 
''Similar difficulties have been faced by doctors when patients have refused Caesarean sections to save their or their baby's life. None ofthe 
consultants interviewed indicated ever 
having been in that sort of situation. The refusal of Caesarean section cases will be discussed in Chapter 
8. 
"`At the time of conducting the interviews there was a national media campaign advocating the cause of a young woman who was 
dying from 
breast cancer and who `wished to have Christmas with 
her infant children'. Taxol was said to cost £10,000 per patient per annum. NICE has 
now agreed it should be used 
in the case of ovarian cancer: NICE. Guidance on Taxones for Ovarian Cancer. NICE 2000/013. Issued 5 May 
2000 The Stationer), Office, London. However, the consultant's remarks regarding patient tolerance of it are 
important to note. The media can 
be manipulated by drug companies 
into marketing their products for them when possibly it is not the most suitable drug for all patients. 
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possibly be a balancing process between the needs of the family and the burden on the healthcare staff/financial 
resources. 
In other cases, treatment was not clinically futile, but the probability would be that, although the patient's life 
would be saved, s/he would be left severely handicapped. Several consultants spoke of continuing treatment 
as a result of family wishes even though the clinical evidence was that the patient (often a child) would be 
severely handicapped if they did survive: 
There have been some situations, and I can recall 2 or 3, where we have said to parents look, we 
think he's not going to survive, but if he does survive he will be severely handicapped and we feel we 
should stop treatment. They have said no, and we've continued treatment and the child has survived 
and has been severely handicapped. Now it sounds horrible to say it, but that is a bit of a comfort to 
me because it shows that my criteria for saying a child is going to be severely handicapped are 
probably correct. One always worries about that. A12 
4.4.1.6 Burden on the Family 
The anticipated burden on the family could have an effect on whether the recommendation would be to 
continue treatment or not: 
The relatives (should be involved) if it's going to have implications for them. B9 
In the next extract, the consultant unwittingly acted in a paternalistic manner towards both the patient and the 
son. His motives were clearly good and accorded with the advice of Bayles, in 1978, that `a patient should be 
frankly told about the financial and emotional burden being shouldered by his family or friends'. 117 However, 
by his actions, the doctor imposed his values on the patient (it was the patient's duty to die) and denied the son 
the chance to explore whether he could have coped with caring for his father by having unpaid leave or 
employing carers: 
I said to a widower deliberately (not to have treatment), he was... living... with an unmarried son who 
was forty or so... 1 think the son would have actually taken 6 months off to look after his father and 
probably lost his job had we tried to do something to prolong his life. Since he had a very good job 
I think that could have been affecting his own health in the future. A26 
However, it is not possible for all relatives to fully appreciate what it will mean to have a severely handicapped 
child or parent. The quality of the patient's life and the burden s/he represented to their family were linked 
but it appeared that the consultants felt it more appropriate to base recommendations on the quality of life of 
the patient (ie. the patient's best interests) than associated problems for the carers. This possibly represents 
a shift in position from earlier findings which conclude that physicians `often allow parents to consider the 
impact of a handicapped child on the family when making decisions concerning withholding treatment'. 148 
"'Bayles MD. `Euthanasia and the Quality of Life'. In Bayles MD, High DM (Eds). Medical Treatment of the Dying: Moral Issues 1978 GK 
Hall & Co, Shenkman Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts ppl28-184 at p147. 
'48Strong C. Defective infants and their impact on families: ethical and legal considerations. Lcnv, Medicine and Health Care 1983,11,4: 168-181 
at p169. 
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Withdrawing treatment immediately is not always possible. Sometimes, a minimum period of time must elapse 
before it is possible to apply to the courts to withdraw feeding/treatment. 14' This can place a huge burden on 
the family in the meantime: 
We had a student recently with a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage. He'd been in another hospital and 
when he was conscious, he was transferred to us. Then he had a second haemorrhage and a large 
clot on his frontal lobes. We had to decide whether to let him die or to treat his aneurism. We treated 
him and it left him vegetative. He was newly married and his wife was screaming at us to kill him. 
She's the one who's got no life. He's going to live for a long time. It's destroyed her, both the 
families. It was the wrong decision but we only know this in hindsight. B7 
Several consultants felt their role was often to prevent such situations arising: 
My job is to make sure patients are treated in such a way that they don't end up vegetative. B20 
4.4.1.7 Burden on Healthcare Staff 
Several consultants spoke of the burdens faced by staff. Most had had `heart-sink' patients whose quality of 
life was perceived to be minimal yet they lived when death would seem in their best interest. These sort of 
patients were perceived as leading to high stress levels in areas such as intensive care and could lead to `burn- 
out' in staff. "' 
One consultant described how he would prefer certain patients to die during surgery: 
Patients with severe aortic stenosis ... very unpleasant terminal illness... all the time in your mind 
is 
`I'd rather the surgeons operated and the patient died on the table than I have to sit and watch this 
patient die'. A33 
It was also felt that patients and relatives were much more willing to complain or to take legal action which 
added to the burden on staff and this could mean that treatment was continued inappropriately at times: 
The complaints, they've gone up from 3 0-40 per year to 700 per year and there's a whole team of 
people now particularly employed to answer complaints, a lot of which are nothing short of 
malicious. So nurses and doctors are much more aware of avoiding litigation at all costs. In the end, 
that leads to bad treatment. A 14 
4.4.1.8 Financial Costs 
Financial considerations seemed to have less influence over the withdrawal of treatment than the withholding 
"'In the case of someone who has been left severely 
brain-damaged, it is required, by medical opinion, and approved by the courts, to wait a 
minimum period of time before making the 
diagnosis of persistent vegetative state: Practice Note (persistent vegetative state). [1996] 2 FLR 
37>. 
150A finding supported by others: Calman KC. `Ethical Implications of Terminal Care'. In: Freeman 
MDA. Medicine, Ethics and the Law. 1988 
Stevens & Sons, London pp103-119 at p114. 
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of treatment. If a purchaser had agreed to fund a particular treatment it was up to the provider to decide how 
to allocate them to individual patients. So there seemed to be no evidence that anyone was being told that a 
patient was costing too much and treatment should be discontinued. 
Although I've had my concerns about the way the health service has been run over the last few years 
so far I don't think I can remember a single incident where I've been forced to do something that I 
didn 't want to do because of a managerial decision, certainly in terms of withdrawal of treatment. 
A15 
On an individual patient basis, where treatment has been established, money isn't an issue. B 11 
We've had a set of four babies here and probably... in their first year they cost close to £700,000. 
That's a lot of money. Are we really prepared to do that when we're squabbling about the care of 
the elderly? A 13 
Some consultants felt it was appropriate for them to think about the other demands on the NHS budget when 
making decisions, others did not: 
The difficulty is with things like long term ventilation is that it costs a lot of money and you know 
... spending 
£1000 a day or whatever on a child is £1000 that doesn 't go somewhere else but obviously 
my responsibility is to that family not to the NHS budget so I think the issue of withdrawal of care is 
about resources but it's very difficult to make out quite how to apportion resources. B8 
You're almost training in rationing in a subliminal way from the time you're a medical student 
because you continually question the value of doing things, which is perfectly right. But also in the 
NHS you accept features which in other healthcare systems would be considered unacceptable.. 
lot of the decisions we make about the use of our resources... to a certain extent are driven by 
financial considerations as well as the patients' best interests. C6 
It's a hell of a lot cheaper if they (vegetative patients) die. Part of my management of acutely ill 
patients is to avoid the outcome of PVS. B 15 
4.4.2 Criteria usually identified as inappropriate were... 
4.4.2.1 Legal sanctions 
Fear of civil or criminal sanctions was felt to be an inappropriate way to make decisions about withdrawing 
treatment but sometimes might prevail. Many of the consultants were acutely aware that there is a growing 
tendency for patients to complain or resort to legal action if things did not turn out as expected. There was 
criticism expressed of the doctors who practised `protective medicine' and none admitted doing so themselves. 
We do not practice medicine which is defensive in terms of medico-legal but one has to be aware of 
the medico-legal implications of what you are doing. You're selling a particular piece of goods which 
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is advice and treatment. It's your obligation to ensure that that piece of advice is good. It's no use 
selling a Rolls Royce to a farmer who lives up a mountain track if what he really wants is a four- 
wheel drive. C 11 
Two doctors reported being in difficult legal situations: 
We had one patient, she'd had a drug overdose and she was in ITU and we were talking of 
withdrawing ventilation and letting her die. Then there was a suggestion that she didn't take the 
overdose herself and the police were involved and we didn't know if we could turn off the ventilator 
or not. But then it turned out it was a malicious phone call to the police. A6 
I have very many legal documents on this saying I would be required to treat this patient's'... and I 
have tried to point out in the most tactful terms to the legal people... that it is all very well them saying 
that but I don't know how I can practically do it without sedating this individual for 24 hours a day. 
A34 
4.4.2.2 Patient merit 
Merit of the patient was deemed irrelevant by those who mentioned it: 
People aren't treated on merit. Whether they are good, bad or indifferent as people, they all have the 
same problem and they are all offered the same treatment. C 13 
However, phrases such as `a lovely lady' were used in describing some patients or relatives which indicated 
doctor preference: 
The foster mum was devoted and besotted and mentally deranged... she was very happy that we 
resuscitated him. A13 152 
Some consultants could be judgmental about their patients and one described two contrasting patients: 
We had a difficult situation where we had a patient - she was grossly overweight and hadn 't been out 
the house for two years. She had chronic emphysema and just lay on the sofa all day smoking and 
watching the telly. We had to decide whether to put her back on ventilation. She'd already been 
ventilated and then gone home... Maybe she would have gone on for a couple of years in the nursing 
home. She would have gone back to her chair smoking more fags and further damaging her lungs, 
you think why are we using our resources for this. D6 
He's got motor neurone disease and he's very intelligent, a solicitor locally who still practices when 
he is well enough, a very nice chap, and we had to talk with him about whether to ventilate him or 
not and we decided we'd give it a go. D6 
15'A seventeen year old boy in the care of the local authority who did not want to continue with dialysis. 
The consultant had just described how he had not been `over-vigorous' in his attempts to resuscitate. 
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Doctors, like others, may be unaware that they are reacting judgmentally or in a biased way towards a patient 
and favouring a `just deserts' approach. Since the doctor-patient relationship is essentially a private one based 
on trust, the lack of respect for the patient shown in this example is extremely disquieting. However, patients 
themselves may fail to respect those who are trying to help them by acting in an unacceptable manner. '53 
4.4.2.3 Rationing 
Restrictions as to treatment options due to when in the financial year the patient presented for treatment were 
felt to be unethical: 
The rationing of care because this particular area has used its quota of that particular treatment I 
find completely unacceptable. C 14 
Cost should not be the sole criterion but it may have to influence the decision as there are limited 
resources in the country and it is not fair to gamble very large sums of money when there is very 
limited chance of success. DI 
Once treatment had begun, the question of withdrawing it because of financial cost did not seem to arise. 
However, where a particular treatment had been unsuccessful, and an alternative was possible, the way the 
consultants answered the interview questions seemed to indicate that the second treatment was considered as 
something new rather than a continuation of the initial decision to treat the patient's disease or illness. If the 
first line of treatment had not worked, any subsequent treatment was more of a `gamble' regarding likelihood 
of its being successful. Therefore, the question would be framed in terms of withholding the subsequent 
treatment regime rather than withdrawing treatment. Whether this reflects a traditional way of viewing patient 
treatment or whether this is an artefact introduced as a result of the changes in the way healthcare has been 
`purchased' since the 1991 reforms is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4.4.3 The parties involved in the decision 
Again, these included the patient, the relatives, the healthcare team and the consultant with different views 
expressed as to how the decision should be made and by whom. 
4.4.3.1 The patient 
Sometimes patients would indicate that they wished to stop treatment but it was possible that this was not a true 
reflection of their wishes. 
We have had a patient who... was saying she wanted to withdraw, she had a lengthy condition which 
was progressive but when you actually went to speak to her about it, it became clear that she wanted 
to stop because she felt she was a nuisance and a burden to everyone and you can understand that 
"'One case that was related to me concerned a patient requiring regular dialysis. He was frequently abusive and threatening to the nurses who 
had to carry out his treatment and often exhibited `inappropriate' behaviour whilst undergoing 
dialysis. The help of the psychiatric team had 
been sought but his behaviour remained unchanged 
despite threats to discontinue treatment. Withdrawing treatment could have represented the 
adoption of a `just deserts' model of 
healthcare but the patient's lack of merit was held not to be sufficient reason to refuse him further treatment. 
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there can be pressure to stop treatment on a busy ward and having stopped treatment we re- 
introduced it and I said I sense you are not ready to stop so we can restart and when you are ready 
to stop again we can stop. I don't think you should be frightened of doing these things. A2 
A few consultants obviously did not feel that the patient could participate as an equal partner in the decision- 
making process. The patient's perception of his/her own abilities or future quality of life could be seen as 
distorted: 
The elderly have unrealistic expectations of their health and abilities, that's quite a common problem. 
A14 
Whether the consultant's role in such situations is one of educating the patient or side-lining the patient was 
not asked. However, it is submitted that respect for persons and patient autonomy demands that the patient 
is treated as an equal partner with effort made to enhance this. 
4.4.3.2 The relatives 
The input of relatives was important for educating the decision-making process: 
When you see a patient in hospital and they are sick they may be quite different from the way they 
are at home and the relations and the GP have a lot to offer there... if the patient has been miserable 
and poorly and generally awful for the last year, it is different from if they have only been like that 
since they came into hospital. D7 
It was recognised that blind reliance on what the relatives told the doctor about the patient and his/her wishes 
was inappropriate: 
Families, of course, have a vested interest in some patients not surviving. It's difficult when that 
happens. B1 
I personally try to avoid letting the family make decisions because there is a risk that they will say 
we don't actually want to look after disabled granddad, thank you very much. We've had enough of 
granddad. A 19 
Relatives can have their own agendas, they can use the patient's illness as a means of controll ing the 
patient. A28 
Most of the consultants felt it appropriate to involve the family if the decision to withdraw would lead to the 
death of the patient. They seemed to believe it was more difficult for relatives to agree to treatment withdrawal 
the younger the patient was: 
In cancer treatment we try to involve the relatives at all stages and try and keep everyone equally, 
involved... There comes a point, in any patient's treatment, where it's no longer sensible to carry on 
treating them actively and that decision has to be made. It is quite difficult for the patient to 
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understand. C6 
I don't turn off ventilators without the parents 'full agreement. A12 
One (patient) who took an overdose... She was making good progress and then on the second or third 
night had a sudden arrest. Although she was resuscitated she went into a vegetative state and 
lingered for a very, very long time. It took a long time for her family to come to terms with the fact 
that she wasn't going to improve but the decisions were. when to stop ventilating and how long to 
keep on feeding and whether there was a chance that she'd improve. B3 
Conflict between relatives was possible even though they have no legal status beyond advising the doctors as 
to the values of the patient and despite the fact that treatment decisions should be made in the `best interests' 
of an incompetent patient: 
I am currently involved in a case here where, I was looking after a patient over the weekend for a 
colleague and I was told that care was being withdrawn on the Friday... It became clear on the 
Saturday that the sons were extremely unhappy by the father's decision and it hadn't been sorted out 
and we re-introduced dialysis. I don't think anyone should ever be frightened of withdrawing 
treatment and reintroducing it. A2 
Someone we put on a ventilator for a while. He had cerebral palsy and terrible respiratory problems 
which were getting worse. He was only 19 and his lungs were not functioning. We put him on a 
ventilator and kept him breathing and eventually, we had to look at his treatment. His parents didn't 
want him turned off and tried to investigate if there was anything that could be done. The decision 
still has to be made at some time and it was time. D6 
Consultants related various strategies to overcome family objections. All said they continue treatment in the 
interim: 
I would probably come to a compromise with the family if they wanted to treat the patient and I felt 
it was inappropriate. All I do is say, look we'll start and see what happens. But I think we should 
review this in a couple of days or whatever and then reassess it. I do that because sometimes my 
perceptions are wrong. I involve them in the decision-making process and continual involvement so 
that if what they want turns out to be incorrect they can actually see that as time goes on. B1 
If we 're going to change to a sort of withdrawal pattern... if there are major objections to that, we try 
to put down some sort of markers so that when one's reached it is clear to everyone that we've 
decided that this is a reasonable marker and... that's reasonable grounds for withdrawal. A17 
Several described a `collegiate' approach which meant that, whilst the second opinion would be presented as 
impartial advice to the family, was corroboration of the first consultant's opinion: 
If the parents have religious beliefs then I will involve a minister or involve the hospital chaplain. 
I would always have a consultant colleague involved. There are two benefits. One, different 
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specialists see it from a different viewpoint and two, they get a different person with different views 
which balances out what you are telling them. I have to say I would select that colleague carefully. 
C9 
4.4.3.3 The healthcare team 
Several consultants indicated that the decision-making process involved their whole team and felt reassured 
by having others supporting their decision: 
So we have to accept the responsibility of decision making and that responsibility works along the 
lines of, as a consultant you get to a point where you are unsatisfied with the clinical situation and 
then within the team, which includes your junior doctors, your nurses and the therapists, you will toss 
a few ideas in and see how they bounce, where the limits of care are going to be. If that supports 
your notional idea that you have got to a situation where there is no hope you then have a discussion 
with the family and friends by which time you will have ascertained their advocacy status whether 
they were close, whether they were remote, whether they have vested interests, all these factors are 
real, and you will have a fairly pragmatic discussion and if the people you are dealing with appear 
legitimate in their concerns, and you can do no more than get a feel for their legitimacy, and they 
agree that on their knowledge of the person concerned that they would not want their life sustained 
at any cost, then you can make very reasonable decisions. Whether they are ultimately legally 
acceptable decisions is a matter that I would prefer not to consider too deeply. D9 
The next morning I went in and said I think it is time to consider withdrawing therapy and someone 
said, 'yes, you're right'. I'd got an ally and I felt so much better about it. A31 
Working as a team could raise problems with conflicting views as to the appropriateness of continuing 
treatment or even whether treatment should have been started initially. 
It's usually the primary providers that take the decision. They will do the operation, they will start 
the treatment, and when it gets to a certain stage they will then ask for my input about 
appropriateness of maintaining treatment and then withdraw the treatment. A6 
It's sometimes very difficult for the members of the healthcare team to face facts when you can't 
actually treat a patient... if you're a clinician that talks about what you are doing and why you are 
doing it rather than making bad decisions with no consultation then you are going to get different 
reactions. B6 
The concept of `teamworking' was presented as the prevalent model but the patient was not always considered 
an equal member of the team which raises the issue of patient autonomy and respect for their views. Several 
consultants had expressed concern about legal sanctions if the decision was disagreed with and the team 
approach was obviously seen as a `flakjacket'. It must be recognised that teams may be ineffective decision- 
makers due to the dominance of one or more members or over-deference to the opinions of one person by the 
rest. There is great scope for a consultant to speak the language of team-decision-making but in reality, be the 
sole decision-maker. 
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4.4.3.4 The consultant as prime decision-maker: 
Several consultants felt that the decision to withdraw treatment, like that of initiating treatment, was theirs 
alone. Whether this was seen as a right, a privilege or a burden imposed by patients who refused to participate 
in the process varied. 
The relatives should have enough trust in the doctors acting on their behalf, but that trust has to be 
earned. As it is, that trust is being destroyed, so the political scenario and the media as it is... and 
I'm not sure whether people totally trust their doctor as they used to. D13 
Some of them will just say `do whatever you think is best'. C 10 
This approach isolates the patient whose life may be at stake. The only person who knows whether their life 
is tolerable or worth saving is the patient. Trust has been lost because it has been abused by doctors acting 
paternalistically without reference to the patient (ie. because it is the `right' of the doctor to make the decision). 
If the (competent) patient considers it too burdensome to be involved in difficult decisions, like whether to be 
resuscitated or not, s/he could be seen as investing the doctor with the power to act as a proxy decision-maker - 
a concept not yet acknowledged by the English legislature or judiciary - which can place the doctor under a 
burden which many prefer to share with the rest of the healthcare team. If it is a `privilege' for the consultant 
to make the decision, it is one that must be made in good faith, in the best interests of the patient. 
A few of the interviews revealed disparity between what the consultant replied when asked who should be 
involved in the decision to treat a patient and what seemed to be done in practice. One example follows from 
consultant A 12: 
It has to be the parents' decision. 
As far as the parents are concerned, I've had occasions when they have wanted to stop and I felt it 
was viable to continue. 
If we have a baby that we think shouldn't survive then the team should discuss it. 
4.5 Discussion 
It can be seen that there is no clear consensus over withdrawing treatment. Therefore, when decisions are 
legally challenged, there is not always agreement amongst the medical experts. The starting point for doctors 
seems to be to ask what clinical gains (benefits) will the patient receive from this medical intervention? It is 
clear that different doctors construe benefit differently reflecting their own value-systems. Some could be very 
dismissive of different lifestyles. 154 Some doctors are prepared to take a holistic approach to health and 
recognise that it goes beyond physiological measurements. To them, the emotional and psychological well- 
being of the patient and his/her family is an important part of the healthcare relationship. It was also evident 
that treatment could be withdrawn, although clinically effective, because the toll was too high on the family. 
"For instance, one consultant would consider attendance at a wedding a life goal which it was appropriate for him to assist the patient in 
achieving. Another considered sitting on the sofa watching television an unworthy 
life compared with that of the solicitor who N%orked vv henever 
able. 
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As McHaffie and Fowlie have likewise recognised, `other concerns inevitably enter the equation: considerations 
of family stability; the impact of impairment and subsequent disability; emotional, social and financial costs'. " ' 
Evidence of all these was present in the interview responses. Campbell and McHaffie suggest that as patient's 
interests become `inextricably interwoven with the interests of the family' it is a `major part' of the doctor's 
exercise of `clinical wisdom' to responsibly weigh these interests and resolve conflicts. 15' This analysis fails 
to question whether these `conflicts' are best resolved by making paramount medical opinion. Admittedly, 
some relatives may have an unrealistic view of the long-term prognosis but so might some doctors. 
The BMA states that treatment decisions should not be made on cost grounds since this would be unethical. 15' 
Yet NHS doctors are subject to government and purchaser restrictions so costs seemed relevant to many of the 
consultants although this could be seen as placing them `on the slippery slope of compromised ethics'. 158 Some 
more readily accept this than others. There is a tension between the doctor's duty to an individual patient and 
to society. Newdick notes that Hippocratic Oath doctors pledged to `follow that system of regimen which... I 
consider to be for the benefit of my patients' and the Declaration of Geneva says `the health of my patient shall 
be my first consideration'. "' Some of those interviewed seem to believe that their `ethical duty goes beyond 
the individual patient to all other patients and to society as a whole'. 16' Similarly, doctors are told by the GMC 
that they should always `seek to give priority... in the basis of clinical need' but at the same time must recognise 
the `effects their decisions may have on the resources and choices available to others'. 16' Identifying `need' 
is not always a science. Psychological need may often be greater than physical need so withdrawing treatment 
may be appropriate on clinical grounds but not necessarily psychological. Is the patient to be labelled a time- 
wasting hypochondriac greedily depleting time and resources belonging to others or should s/he be recognised 
as a patient whose real needs are not being met? 
The effectiveness of treatment seems the primary consideration amongst the consultants interviewed. Then, 
quality of life which, regardless of the competence of the patient, would be balanced in the doctor's mind 
against the predicted benefits and burdens of treatment. The physician's assessment of quality of life may differ 
greatly from the patient's. 162 Some consultants recognise this and will continue treatment to help the patient 
achieve some personal goal. Kearsley argues that the `appropriateness' and usefulness in terms of goals `such 
as comfort, survival prolongation, convenience, cost and various other personal, professional and societal 
values' should be scrutinised. 163 It can be questioned, `whose convenience? ' - patient's, doctor's or society's? 
The burdens on patients and family/professional carers all seemed to be relevant factors but the burden on 
society seems of much lesser importance to the interviewees. "' It was unclear whether the criteria were, or 
should be, of equal weight. 
... McHaffie & Fowlie, op cit n6 at p47. A similar conclusion is reached by Sklansky in Sklansky M. Neonatal euthanasia: moral considerations 
and criminal liability. J. Med. Ethics 2001; 27: 5-11 at p8. 
116Campbell AGM, McHaffie HE. Prolonging life and allowing death: infants. J. Med. Ethics 1995; 21: 339-344 at p341. 
157BMA. Medical Ethics Today: Its practice and philosophy. 1993 BMJ Publishing Group, London at p303. 
158Loewy EL. Letter: Cost should not be a factor in medical care. NEJM 1980; 302: 697. 
159Newdick C. Who should we treat? Law, patients and resources in the NHS. 1995 Oxford University Press, Oxford at pp276-277. 
160BMA, op cit n157 at p308. 
16'Ibid. 
162See, for instance: Sugarbaker PH et al. Quality of life assessment of patients in extremity sarcoma trials. Surgery 1982; 91: 17-23 (extremity 
sarcoma is a type of cancer of the bone generally found in the leg). 
16'Kearsley JH. 'Compromising Between Quantity and Quality of Life'. In: Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke pp39-49 at p40. 
164 There is little written that acknowledges the validity of considering the burden on the family when making decisions to withdraw treatment. 
Hardwig cites a few examples and concludes the paucity of discussion ofthis point in relation to older children and adults whilst it is more openly 
discussed with regard to neonates, suggests that '\\ e may not really consider newborns to be fully fledged persons'. Hardwig J. The Problem of 
Proxies with Interests of Their Own. JClinical Ethics 1993; 4: 20-27 at p23. 
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Sometimes, the consultants indicated that they would be slower to withdraw treatment than the patient or 
family wished. Lee recognises that delays may occur after the family has requested treatment withdrawal 
before the `physicians could accept that further care would not benefit the patient'. 16' Lee suggests it is 
`possible that care withdrawal occurred only when patient or surrogate wishes coincided with physician 
attitudes, not out of respect for a patient's right to self-determination'. 16' Others have similarly found that 
`(p)arental input dominated their (the physicians') therapeutic choices, especially when parents wanted 
additional therapies'. 16' Rubenstein suggests that the reason for such behaviour could be to support parental 
autonomy and because of medicolegal concerns. 16' Likewise, two consultants had faced legal problems over 
treatment withdrawal and several revealed anxieties over possible litigation. Defensive medicine was 
condemned by all who mentioned it. 169 No one admitted to making decisions under threat of litigation but 
several mentioned that the threat was real. The willingness to continue treatment, even when clinically futile, 
was presented as patient/family-centred but a hidden reason could be to avoid conflict. 1' 
Problems over treatment withdrawal can occur because physicians are taught `how to deal with disease, but 
not how to deal with dying' and because `they lack basic communication skills in areas fraught with intense 
personal tragedy'. "' Carmel suggests that, despite evidence to the contrary, `physicians tend to believe that 
elderly people prefer to delegate medical decision-making authority to their doctors'. 1' However, this was not 
obvious from the interview responses although some consultants showed more willingness to talk with patients 
than others. In another article, Carmel recognises that there is significant variation in practice about discussing 
death and life sustaining technology `among different physicians and in the different Western societies'. 1' 
Some specialties were more likely to have consultants who were `happy to natter with anyone about anything' 
and who felt comfortable discussing end-of-life issues with their patients than others. 1' 
4.6 Conclusion 
It was clear that consultants selected from a variety of criteria in order to decide whether to withdraw 
treatment. 1' This is traditionally justified under the umbrella of clinical freedom and experience. However, 
'65Lee DKP et al. Withdrawing Care: Experience in a Medical Intensive Care Unit. JAMA 1994; 271,17: 1358-1361. 
' Ibid, at pp1360-1361. 
'67Rubenstein JS et al. Pediatric Resident Attitudes About Technologic Support of Vegetative Patients and the Effects of Parental Input -A 
Longitudinal Study. Pediatrics 1994; 94,1: 8-12. 
'"Ibid, at p11-12. 
169Rees and Rees define defensive medicine as a term referring to `clinical decisions motivated primarily not by what is believed to be the best 
for the patient, but by a desire to avoid litigation if the outcome should prove to be unsatisfactory'. Rees GJG, Rees AAD. `Defensive Medicine 
or Malpractice Suits? ' In Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke pp5l-62 at p52. 
"'This accords with the findings of Tilden et al. Tilden LP. Decisions about Life-Sustaining Treatment: Impact of physicians' behaviours on 
the family. Arch. Intern. Medicine 1995; 155: 633-9. 
"'Carmel S. Medical Students Attitudes Regarding the Use ofLife-Sustaining Treatments for Themselves and for Elderly Persons. Soc. Sci. Med. 
1998; 46,4-5: 467-474 at p468. 
"'Ibid. 
"'Carmel S. Wishes regarding the use of life-sustaining treatments among elderly persons in Israel: an explanatory model. Soc. Sci.: tled. 
1997,45.11: 1715-1727 at p1716. 
174 This is not surprising. A doctor who finds it difficult talking with patients about difficult issues such as whether to resuscitate or not will 
possibly have opted for a specialty in which s/he feels more comfortable early on which requires less input of this nature. Thus, geriontologists 
believe in the intrinsic worth of their elderly patients and have probably have developed the skills to communicate with them. In contrast, the 
orthopaedic surgeons seemed to be less comfortable in discussing non-surgical issues with patients and seemed to show less understanding of 
ethical issues. Howw ever, this may be an artefact due to the small number of consultants surveyed. 
15Others have suggested that the number of criteria is fewer than I have identified. For instance, Lo and Jonsen identified four criteria only: 
cost of treatment. patient wishes, quality of life and futility of treatment: Lo B, Jonsen AR. Clinical decisions to limit treatment. Annals Int. Med. 
1980; 93: 764-8. I would categorise `futility of treatment' as clinical effectiveness. Saunders adds a fifth criterion, the age of the patient to Lo 
and Jonsen's: Saunders J. Medical 
futility: CPR in Lee R, Morgan D (Eds) Death Rites: Law and ethics at the end of life. 1994 Routledge. 
London pp72-90 at p78. 
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the variability of approach found suggests that, in reality, an intuitive decision is made then justified later by 
judicious selection of supporting reasoning. The desire to keep the medical prerogative and exclusivity of 
decision-making seen in some of the consultants does not mean that all decisions made this way are wrong, 
only that some may be. 
Greater self-awareness amongst doctors as to their own limitations in decision-making processes seems 
necessary. Failing to recognise that a patient's perception of quality of life may differ from the doctor's 
perpetuates discrimination against the aged, ill and disabled. 1' Likewise, those who make decisions according 
to their beliefs about what would be appropriate for their own relatives"' may be acting `virtuously' but the 
artificiality of imagined relatedness to the patient is possibly the most objectionable form of substituted 
judgment. However, brutal impartiality harms patient-physician relationships. A principle-based approach 
may be preferable. 1' Therefore, where the patient's own values can be discovered, as a way of educating the 
decision-making process, they should be. To do otherwise is to ignore the principle of autonomy. 
The way treatment withdrawal decisions are made varies considerably. There is more scope for value 
judgments than with decisions to withhold treatment which are heavily based upon clinical prognosis. 
Withdrawal decisions are primarily based upon clinical prognosis, but the opportunity for a relationship to 
develop between doctor, patient and possibly family allows other considerations to enter the decision-making 
process. Some of these are value-laden and lack consistency yet they may trump clinical. These other 
considerations could vary from helping the patient achieve a life-goal such as living till a family wedding or 
the clinician's own fear of litigation or censure from colleagues. Consequently, scarce resources may be denied 
those in need. Several consultants spoke of difficulties managing expectations particularly in the light of 
media-publicised advances in medicine. 1' 
It is important to note the differences between the factors used when withdrawing treatment rather than 
withholding it. When withholding treatment the doctors felt it inappropriate for `family wishes' to educate the 
decision save in a few, rare cases. When withdrawing treatment the wishes of the family are considered 
relevant by doctors and are used as justification for `futile' treatment to continue. Similarly, the burden on the 
family seems more important in the case of withdrawing treatment, probably because it is more apparent. If 
a patient has had a sudden onset illness or accident, the family has not yet faced any burden beyond the distress 
of seeing a loved one afflicted. 18' It seems that judges may be wrong in concluding that there is no difference 
in withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. '8' Many doctors advocate that the decisions `feel 
different'. 18' They don't just `feel different', it seems that they are made differently. Dickenson suggests that 
"'Branson describes an incident in which two eminent transplant surgeons were stunned to realise that their own practice of allocating organs 
to those patients who did not have other pathologies or disabilities was discriminatory and failed to recognise the full worth of the disabled as 
persons. See: Branson R. Virtues, Obligations and the Prophetic Vision. Kennedy Inst. Ethics J. 1996; 6,4: 361-370. It is interesting to note that 
it seems that it is `easier' to withdraw treatment from a brain-damaged patient than from one with physical injuries. Whether the decisions in 
such cases reflect value judgements about the worth of individual lives or merely a pragmatic approach based on a realistic appraisal of the 
quality of support that can be offered outside the hospital is not possible for this thesis to examine. 
"'This was evident with withdrawing treatment as well as with withholding treatment but specific examples have not been cited in this chapter 
since it seemed unnecessarily repetitive. 
178Branson R. Virtues, Obligations and the Prophetic Vision. Kennedy Inst. Ethics J. 1996; 6,4: 361-370 at p363. 
179For instance, Paris et al describe the case of a five-year old boy with major injuries. Once it was clear that recovery was not possible. the 
parents' goal moved changed to one of keeping their son alive and threatened legal action if treatment was withdrawn. Managing expectations 
and agreeing realistic goals is a major challenge for any health care provider. Paris JJ. et al. Beyond autonomy - physicians refusal to use life- 
prolonging extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation. NEJM 1993; 329,5: 354-7. 
180As one consultant mentioned, (reported earlier), his job was to treat patients in such a way that they did not end up in a persistent vegetative 
state. Thus his treatment was aimed at avoiding 
future, predictable burdens for the family and the hospital (or NHS). 
"'As will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
182 Shaw AB. Acts of commission, omission, and demission or pulling the plug. (Royal Soc. Med. 195; 88: 18-19 at p18. 
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medical ethicists may be wrong to insist on a `no-difference' principle. 183 It cannot be assumed that doctors 
treat withholding and withdrawing differently `out of ignorance"84 therefore, there she argues there can be 'a 
coherent pattern to their attitudes"85 and we should not `condemn practitioner opinion as misguided'. '86 The 
emotional burden decision-making places on doctors should not be underestimated. 18' As Gould et al point out, 
doctors may be `uncomfortable with diagnostic uncertainty' or believe s/he has `failed the dying patient' . 
188 
Social and organisational features of the particular hospital, unit or ward may also exacerbate family-physician 
conflict. 18' It seems probable that the longer a doctor-patient/family relationship lasts, the more likely it is that 
individual values come into play as opposed to professional ones. This difference between the way decisions 
to withdraw treatment as opposed to withholding treatment are made may explain why certain types of conflict 
arise. Any proposal to improve decision-making will need to recognise the difference between withholding 
and withdrawing treatment for those involved; the emotional nature of medical caring and the anxieties 
treatment-withdrawal decisions create. The next chapter examines some of the different decision-making 
models that currently exist. 
"'Dickenson DL. Are medical ethicists out of touch? Practitioner attitudes in the US and UK towards decisions at the end of 
life. I. Med. Ethics 
2000; 26: 254-260. 
184Ibid, at p254. 
"'Ibid. 
196Ibid, at p259. 
187 For an analysis of the emotional 
burden placed on healthcare workers, albeit primarily from a nursing viewpoint, see: Smith P. The Emotional 
Labour ofi'ursing. 1992 Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
in particular chapter 6 `Death and dying in hospital: the ultimate emotional labour' at pp96- 
111. 
"'Door Goold S et al. Conflicts Regarding Decisions to Limit Treatment. JAILA 2000; 283,7.909-914 at p912. 
"'Ibid, at pp912-3. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
This chapter examines non-legal models for making decisions on the withholding or withdrawing of medical 
treatment. At least three `levels' of decision making are identifiable. ' The clinical level is closest to the 
patient. Furthest from the patient is government policy which establishes `a framework of national priorities 
and targets for improvement'. ' Juxtaposed is the purchaser/provider level3 in which the tension between 
government policy and patient best interests is evident in judicial review challenges. ' Decision-making models 
are generally proposed either by economists, doctors or ethicists so the analysis will be conducted using these 
divisions: politico-economic, medical and ethical. It is recognised that all models are underpinned by ethical 
values of one kind or another so there are elements of overlap. The next chapter will examine how the 
judiciary make decisions in individual cases. 
5.1 Economic/Political Models 
5.1.1 QALYs 
The use of Quality Adjusted Life Years is attractive to healthcare purchasers who believe that decision-makers 
should act to maximise the number of QALYs produced by the NHS as the only measurable `health benefit'. ' 
However, used with individual patients it poses difficulties, not least the unavailability of accurate information 
available at the time of making the decision. ' The QALY approach requires deciding what quality of life the 
individual currently has, what it would be if treatment is given and life expectancy. ' By including costs, 
comparison between patients and treatments can be made. ' The increased emphasis on evidence-based 
medicine and audit will address the information deficit to some extent. However, the individual patient may 
have individual (possibly genetic) traits which might mean the treatment was either more or less successful in 
terms of years gained than the average. QALY research tends to be based on individual treatments and 
conditions whereas `real' patients often have multiple pathologies. Value-laden it carries potential for abuse. 
'Academy of Royal Medical Colleges. Priority Setting in the NHS: a discussion document. 1997 Academy of Royal Medical Colleges, London. 
'Department of Health. The NHS: A Service with Ambitions November 1996. The Stationery Office, London p38. See also, Department of 
Health, A First Class Service: Quality in the NHS 1998 The Stationery Office, London p7, para 1.14. 
'The internal market was abolished, as proposed in A First Class Service op cit n2, p6, para 1.9, on 1 July 1999. 
4For instance, Rv Cambridge District HA, exparte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
5Nord E. Towards Cost-Value Analysis in Health Care? Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 167-175. 
'This deficiency looks set to be rectified in part by the current emphasis on clinical audit. 
7The concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years normally used is where a healthy life year counts as 1 QALY and poor health gives a value of less 
than 1. Some conditions might be rated worse than death so could score a minus score. Health gains are measured in terms of fractions of 
QALYs per year. For instance, resetting an arm which has mended badly after being broken could produce a gain in utility of 0.1 QALY per 
year of predicted life expectancy. In a 10 year old child, expected to live until 70 years old, the overall gain could be 7 QALYs, but if the child 
has brittle bone disease, the net gain might only be 0.05 QALYs if the bone is liable to break again in 6 months. If the patient is 80 years old, 
s/he has already exceeded the average lifespan so any calculation of overall utility is necessarily impaired. S/he might come from a family whose 
members have all lived to 100 years so the gain is potentially 2 QALYs. However, the impact of carrying out surgery on such a person at 80 
years old might itself reduce the overall gain significantly but this information is unknowable because it has not been tested. 
'If, for example, a heart transplant costs £ 100,000, for that money the quality of the patient's life might improve from a score of 0.3 to 0.8 and 
the patient would be estimated to live an additional ten years. To work out the cost per QALY, the improvement in quality of life should be 
multiplied by the estimated increase in life span (the first calculation). Then, the cost of the treatment should be divided by the figure gained by 
the first calculation. In the example given, the cost of one QALY for a heart transplant would be £20,000. However, a hip replacement might 
cost £5,000 and improve another patient's quality of life from perhaps 0.6 to 0.8, an improvement of 0.2. If this patient is estimated to live for 
another 20 years, the cost of per QALY 
for hip replacement is £1,250. Therefore, to maximise the amount of health gain in the population for 
every pound spent, it makes more sense to abandon 
heart transplants and do hip replacements for everyone who needs one. 
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The limitations on treatment it produces are unacceptable to advocates of a positive duty to do everything 
possible for each patient. ' It acknowledges that `costs' are health activities (or `opportunities') denied to 
another. 1° Williams suggests doctors must consider other patients and believes QALYs produce justice in the 
allocation of health chances or risks. " He aims to `separate "efficiency" from "equity" with "efficiency" being 
kept free of interpersonal comparisons of welfare'. 'Z This ignores the fact that healthcare is necessarily 
delivered in a personal manner. A humane system needs flexibility to enable `magic' to happen particularly 
as `health' is not just physiological. Withholding treatment just because `opportunity costs' are too high fails 
to recognise that the NHS has an important humanistic role. " Medico-technological advances have raised 
public expectations. Consequently, the principle of justice seems offended when `there are treatments which 
can prolong life but which are simply unaffordable'. 14 
Williams suggests there is consensus that the young should receive priority over the old. 15 Bowling agrees. 16 
Williams rightly questions the validity of unequal treatment but fails to offer a convincing argument in favour 
of vertical equity. The alternative, horizontal equity, suggests that `if one person is denied treatment in a 
particular set of circumstances, everybody must be denied treatment in those circumstances'. " This would be 
fairer than the current postcode `lottery'. 18 Rigid equity leads to failure to take account of patient individuality 
and results in patients receiving insufficient treatment when capacity to benefit is considered. 19 Williams' 
answer is that patients unconsciously perform a QALY analysis when considering whether to have surgery. 
Also, he suggests, a weighting could be given incorporating vertical equity eg. setting a value upon treatment 
for the old less than that set for treatment given to the young removing the `vague arm-waving of fine sounding 
rhetoric'. 20 Williams does not address the problem of what if society, or its elected government, decided that 
not only should the old be given a reduced value, but so should particular ethnic/cultural groups or anyone who 
has `contributed' in some way to his/her illness. " He also fails to address whether, in order to reduce 
inequalities, certain groups should have enhanced opportunity to benefit. 22 Reducing people's lives to numbers 
denies their personhood. Focusing on health status, as the single measure of quality of life, fails to consider 
the individual's own assessment. Healthcare is patient-centred if delivered well. Representing medical 
decision-making as capable of mathematical solution merely obscures the difficult issues involved and 
perpetuates the myth that third party assessment of another's life is possible and valid. It is tantamount to 
applying a `best interests' approach to competent people. Others suggest that, with the patient's cooperation, 
QALYs can be used to decide between two treatment options thus upholding patient autonomy. 23 It is hard to 
'One consultant interviewed reported that this is the approach taken by the Malaysian doctors whom she teaches regarding the care of the elderly 
particularly when `peg' feeding is in question. 
"Williams A. `Economics, Society and Healthcare Ethics. ' In: Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester 
pp829-842 at p830. 
"Ibid. 
12Ibid, at p832. 
13 Greaves D. Changing priorities in residential medical and social services. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 77-81. 
14Chantler C. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions. St Catherine's Conference Report No37 1993 The King George VI and 
Queen Elizabeth Foundation of St Catherine's, Windsor at p7. 
"Williams A. `Priorities - not needs'. In Corden A et al: Meeting needs 1992 Avebury, 
Aldershot at pp57-63. 
"Bowling A. Healthcare rationing: the public's debate. BMJ 1996; 312: 670-4. See, in particular, p670. 
"Williams, op cit n10 at p838. 
"For instance, with regard to provision of in-vitro fertilisation treatment across the country. 
"Williams concedes this point: Williams, op cit n10 at p839. 
20Ibid, at p840. 
2'State oppression of different groups, as practised by the Nazi regime, still exists today worldwide. See also the concerns regarding treatment 
trials in Hutton JL, Ashcroft RE. Some Popular Versions of Uninformed Consent. Health 
Care Analysis 2000; 8: 41-52 at p50. 
22For example, Asian women and refugee women who do not speak English well or who come 
from a male-dominated society find it difficult 
to access healthcare particularly regarding sensitive 
issues: Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation July 1999 The Stationery 
Office, London para. 9.32, figure 9.8. 
"Mason JK, McCall Smith RA. Law and Medical Ethics 5th Edn. 1999 Butterworths, London at p303. 
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see how this can be achieved since knowledge (and power) is unevenly distributed in the doctor-patient 
relationship. Grimley Evans notes the impossibility of weighing one good against another which is what 
QALYs try to do. 24 QALYs discriminate against the elderly and ignore the `proportional loss or gain of quality 
of life'. 25 They are discriminatory and sustain an `aristocracy of the fortunate' because those born healthy 
automatically score higher in QALYs. Respect for persons requires that the state is obliged to `defend its 
citizens' with impartiality. " 
Harris argues convincingly that medical resources should be concentrated on maximising the number of lives 
saved: `it is lives that are valuable and not life-years'. 27 Yet, the present government has fallen into the trap 
of detailing the number of `years of life' lost alongside the number of `lives' it expects to `save' with its 
reforms. 28 Harris thunders: `the injunction "maximise QALYs"... encourages health-care providers to choose, 
not the treatments but the patients, who will generate the most QALYs. 29 This involves not only ageism and 
sexism, but also injustice, unfair discrimination and a positively Thatcherite preference for the fortunate. '3o 
Ultimately, QALYs are `insensitive to distributive fairness' issues. " Rawles likewise points out that `(h)ighest 
priority would be given to patients with disabling or distressing conditions compatible with a normal 
expectation of life that could be treated cheaply, preferably as outpatients'. 32 
The QALY model also fails to answer the question of how long to continue treatment once started. As Goulden 
says, `some therapies such as maintenance haemodialysis or aggressive surgery for certain cancers are a very 
poor buy but would be almost impossible to discontinue'. 33 The QALY approach suggests that octogenarians 
with cancer receive low priority regarding surgical intervention until their condition deteriorated to such an 
extent that terminal care could be offered. 34 Therefore, logically, where death is inevitable, early termination 
of the patient's life should be a viable treatment option. 35 Public policy grounded on QALYs could `undermine 
public confidence in and respect for government and health policy makers'. 36 Harris's prophesy became 
increasing true during the 1990's culminating in the election of a new government pledged to end the internal 
market. 37 However, QALYs have encouraged academic debate about resource allocation. Mooney's suggestion 
`that doctors' opinions should not be the basis of health services policy', lacks credibility. 38 Having a 
healthcare policy shaped by politicians and paid financial managers denying input from clinicians actively 
involved in patient care means that individual patient needs are sacrificed upon the altar of efficiency resulting 
24Grimley Evans J. Rationing Health Care by Age: The Case Against. BMJ 1997; 314: 822-5. For example, hip replacements and cataract 
operations are not equivalent even if they were calculated to produce the same net QALY. 
25Mason & McCall Smith, op cit n23. Their emphasis. 
'`'Harris J. The case against: what the principal objective of the NHS should really be. BMJ 1997; 314: 669-672 at p672. 
27 Harris J. Unprincipled QALYs: a response to Cubbon. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 185-188 at p185. 
"Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation July 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
29As Goulden has pointed out, when a patient's individual quality of life and life expectancy is calculated in QALYs and the various treatment 
options considered, it may mean that a dying patient may qualify for a kidney transplant but not for a heart transplant - an illogical distinction 
to make between two ultimately fatal conditions in the same patient. Goulden P. `Non-treatment orders, including Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)'. 
In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp733-742 at p740. 
"'Harris J. Unprincipled QALYs: a response to Cubbon. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 185-188 at p186. 
"Anand P. QALYS and the Integration of Claims in Health-Care Rationing. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 239-253 at p 213. 
12Rawles J. Castigating QALYs. JMed. Ethics 1989; 15: 143-147 at p147. 
"Goulden P. `Non-treatment orders, including Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley 
& Son, Chichesterat pp733-742 at p740. 
34Rawles, op cit n32 at p147. 
35Rawles, op cit n32, particularly at pp 144-6 where Rawles compares outcomes in terms of QALYs fora patient with severe arthritis of the hip: 
one receiving renal dialysis and an unconscious patient on ventilator support. 
36Harris J. Unprincipled QALYs: a response to Cubbon. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 185-188 at p187. 
"Some of the interviews in connection with this thesis were conducted during the fortnight following the general election and contrasted markedly 
with ones conducted before. There was a palpable sense of excitement among the consultants. They all welcomed the change eagerly as 
something that would be positively beneficial for their patients. 
38Mooney G. QALYs: are they enough? A health economist's perspective. J. Med. Ethics 1989; 15: 148-152 at p148. 
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in a model lacking compassion and condemned as barbaric by the society whose resources are being used. 
Mooney, despite his overall support of QALYs, accepts their failure to recognise that what counts as a benefit 
to the individual may not be included in the current concept of QALYs, a point missed by many other 
supporters. 39 Some health authorities have rejected utilitarianism in favour of humanitarianism although 
dispassionate application of QALY's would not have supported their decisions. 40 
An alternative to QALYs is suggested by Nord. 4' A SAVE is the unit given as the value of a young life saved 
from death and restored to full health. 42 Mason and McCall Smith point out that, like QALYs, it is ageist and 
reduces people to numbers. 43 Nord is sensitive to this issue and advises that ' numerical estimates of value 
should not replace critical thought and responsible discussion"'. Like QALYs, the individual clinician is left 
to assess the individual patient. Therefore, as a treatment decision-making model, it is equally subject to 
variation and many of the criticisms directed at QALYs also apply to SAVEs. It is difficult to see how either 
could inform individual decisions since either they will operate to produce a total ban on treatment45 or the 
clinician would be faced with `guestimating' the QALY/SAVE score or interrupting the consultation to carry 
out an actuarial calculation. 46 
Another variation is the `fair innings model'. 47 Older patients do often receive less aggressive therapy than 
younger patients, 48 but that alone is not proof that age is decisive. Disease is often more advanced49 and more 
difficult to cure in the elderly and there is greater likelihood of other health problems. 5° It would seem 
appropriate that age is a relevant factor when deciding to withhold or withdraw medical treatment but 
biological age may be more important than chronological age. 5' Campbell points out that `there is no fairness 
about disease or death' and it is `misleading to compare life to a game of cricket' by talking of people having 
had a `fair innings'. " He holds that simply because some older people take this approach to their own 
healthcare, this is merely a `voluntary relinquishing of health care opportunities' not `a policy of mandatory 
preference for the young'. 53 Callahan, though, advocates that chronological age alone should be the 
determinant as to whether treatment is provided. 54 Hunt considers his approach discriminatory and 
disrespectful of individual autonomy as it is based upon a view that the elderly are regarded as `the means to 
a greater social good, rather than as ends in their own right'. 55 Others suggest `the rights of the younger 
child... seem straightforward. The younger child will be losing more of his/her life than the older and therefore 
loses more'. 56 But societal/genetic/environmental factors and fate all have a part to play so the calculation is 
39Ibid, at p152. 
40See for instance: Anon. Daily Telegraph 19 July 1996: Doctors defend cost of allowing girl to die at home. 
41Nord E. An alternative to QALYs: the saved young life equivalent (SAVE). BMJ 1992; 305: 875-877. He reports that a mathematical model 
to estimate the values for various outcomes of treatment is being constructed by the National Institute of Public Health in Oslo. 
"Like the acronym NICE, the acronym SAVE seems named to appeal. 
"Mason JK, McCall Smith RA. Latin and Medical Ethics 4th Edn. 1994 Butterworths, London at p262. 
44Nord, op cit n41 at p876. 
4'Hence, a potentially unreasonable fetter on the Health Authority's decision-making powers: Rv North West Lancashire HA, ex Parte A, D 
&G [2000] WLR 977. 
46All alternatives being equally non-conducive towards good clinician-patient relationships. 
"Williams A. Rationing health care by age: the case for. BMJ 1997; 314: 820-2. 
48Particularly in the field of oncology: Samet J et al. Choice of cancer therapy varies with age of patient. JA. M. A. 1986; 225(24): 3385-90. 
49Hunt RW: A critique of using age to ration health care. J. Med. Ethics 1993; 19: 19-23. 
50The medical terminology is `co-morbid conditions'. 
"'Biological' age is the age the patient appears to be based on health/fitness assessment. 
_'2Campbell A et al. Medical Ethics 2nd Edn. 1997 
Oxford University Press, Oxford at ppl39-140. 
53Ibid. 
$4Callagan D. Setting limits: medical goals in an aging society. 1987 Simon & Schuster, New York. 
"Hunt RW: A critique of using age to ration health care. JMed. Ethics 1993; 19: 19-23 at p21. 
5"Lewis PA, Charny M. Which of two individuals do you treat when only their ages are different and you can't treat both? J. Med. Ethics 
1989; 15: 28-31 at p30. 
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more complex than indicated. If age is to be considered, chronological age should take second place to 
biological age and evidence as to expected lifespan of the individual patient. 57 However, it is submitted that 
where there are limited resources available to a publicly-funded healthcare system it may be appropriate for 
society to consider whether the same level of treatment should be provided for an older person as for a younger 
person. It is also appropriate, and necessary, for the clinician to consider the patient as the `sum of his/her 
parts' rather than simply a single condition which is how most QALYs are calculated. 58 Effective decision- 
making takes account of all relevant physiological factors. Age alone should never be decisive unless society 
has democratically decided it should be in some situations. Hunt agrees: `(e)ven if age is considered to be a 
typical medical indicator, it would be extraordinary to base a life and death decision upon any one medical 
indicator. 59 
Ultimately, apart from the withholding of treatment from the old, and identifying cost differences between 
similar treatments, these models do not indicate which treatments should be provided by the state and which 
left to individual responsibility. 
5.1.2 Allocating responsibility between individual and state 
The Netherlands' healthcare system6° is a mixture of public and private funding. The state decides which 
services will be covered and it seems most private insurers follow this. It also has the right to limit high 
technology procedures to only a few hospitals. Certain conclusions have been made: ineffective procedures 
should be stopped; withholding potentially beneficial treatment from a person because of lack of money should 
only be done `after effectiveness studies' have been carried out; personal factors such as sex, age, social value, 
and own responsibility for one's illness should `never be taken into account'; the healthcare system should not 
fund non-healthcare procedures eg. infertility treatment and finally, personal responsibility for some types of 
healthcare should be encouraged eg. dental care. Funding long-term care for those who cannot care for 
themselves is prioritised. 61 The Dunning Report recommended that medical treatment is only provided if the 
patient's need has passed through the four layers of the sieve. 62 The questions asked are: 
1 is it necessary care, from the community point of view? 
2 is it demonstrated to be effective? 
3 is it efficient? 
4 can it be left to individual responsibility? 
There is much to commend in its communitarian approach balancing individual and social responsibilities. 63 
However, there is potential for discrimination. The community could decide treatment for certain groups is 
not necessary. These sieves fail to answer the problem of what to do when treatment is effective but inefficient. 
5'It possibly then becomes a variation of the medical model of decision-making. 
58Harris RA, Nease RF. The importance ofpatient preferences for comorbidities in cost-effectiveness analysis. J. Health Economics 1997; 16: 113- 
119. 
"Hunt, op cit n55 at p22. His emphasis. 
60Described in Choices in Health Care: Dunning AJ (Chair). Report of the Government Committee on Choices in Health Care 1992 The 
Ministry of Welfare and Cultural Affairs, Rijswijk, The Netherlands,. 
6'Borst-Eilers E. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n14 at pp4-5. 
"Choices in Health Care, op cit n60 at p24. 
631 am joined in this conclusion by John Butler. Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: 
Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London 
at p91. 
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Utilitarianism trumps patient best interests in this model unless some way is incorporated to identify levels of 
inefficiency that will be tolerated in the interests of justice. 
5.1.3 Efficiency-based models 
The 1991 reforms aimed to control doctors by giving control over what types of treatments and drugs could be 
prescribed to health authority purchasers. ` Whereas rationing prior to 1991 occurred more through demand 
exceeding the possibility of supply, 65 post-1991 the number of `patient episodes' paid for by the DHA and the 
types of treatment were strictly limited. Britain now places strong emphasis upon healthcare provision being 
`efficient'. 66 Healthcare policy in the 1990s modified the QALY model by linking costs of treatment with 
effectiveness of treatment thereby producing the `cost-benefit' or `cost-effectiveness' model. Essentially a 
utilitarian approach, some believe that greater efficiency can eliminate any need for rationing. 67 Randall 
suggests that not all elderly people want all the treatment they receive; some services could be taken out of the 
NHS remit; advances in disease prevention will reduce expenditure on treatment and the efficiency of providers 
will increase. 68 If the patient, from an informed stance, refuses treatment, the doctor should accept this - the 
money saved can be used elsewhere. 69 Achieving health targets could reduce demand7° but often, as fast as one 
disease is conquered, another replaces it. " Better management reduces wastage. 72 The purchaser-provider split 
meant that instead of the hospitals going on end-of-year spending sprees, the health authorities do. `Waiting 
list initiatives"' are simply end-of-year spending sprees although they sound laudable. Controlling healthcare 
expenditure by `identifying separate pockets of money' for different procedures produces inefficiency. 74 
Similarly, moving services from NHS to Local Authority responsibility does not increase the funds available - 
it only leads to conflict. 75 It is too early to establish whether the pooling of resources without `ring-fencing' 
will achieve a `seamless service'. 76 
Rationing decisions vary according to purchaser philosophy with patients receiving unequal access to often 
inefficient care. Some funded `experimental' treatment, others did not. " As Dworkin recognises, whether the 
state should fund `experimental' treatment is one of the most problematic issues in healthcare resource 
allocation. " The boundaries between `effective' and `experimental' need defining. Effectiveness only applies 
when treatments have been tried and their success rates and `opportunity costs' measured. However, 
Ci4Rivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London at p383. 
"Termed `rationing by deterrence or delay': Parker R. Social administration and scarcity. In Butterworth E, Holman R (Eds) Social welfare 
in Modern Britain. 1975 Fontana, London p204-212. Hospitals would run out of money before the year end so would close wards `for 
decorating' or face penalties for over-spending. 
"NHS Executive. Priorities and Planning Guidance for the NHS: 1997/8. June 1996 NHSE, Leeds. 
67Randall A. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n14 at p2. 
6SRandall, ibid. 
69Randall, ibid. 
70For instance, the targets set in Health of the Nation 1992 HMSO, London. 
"For instance, the rise of new diseases such as AIDS and new variant Creutzfeld-Jacob Disease. Also, as people live longer new illnesses/diseases 
due to the aging process become more evident. 
72For an example of poor management resulting in `chaos' see: `Failures in Admission Procedures' 
W. 255/91-92. Report ofthe Health Service 
Commissioner Select Investigations April - Sept 1992 HMSO, London at p3. 
"For instance as discussed by Deborah Evans, Director of Purchasing for Avon HA. BBC Radio Bristol, The lam News 30 January 1997. 
74James J. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n 14 at p5. 
75See, for example, Rv The Brent and Harrow Health Authority, ex parte The London Borough of Harrow TLR 15 October 1996. 
"Introduced in April 2000 - see Chapter 2. 
"See, for example, Rv Cambridge District HA ex parse B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
"Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Virtue. 2000 Harvard University Press, London at p308. 
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`opportunity cost' requires judging `the relative value of different options'. 79 Comparing different options for 
one condition and also comparing different conditions is highly problematic. `Treatments... shown to be the 
most cost effective... may be favoured over treatments with greater efficacy'. 8° `New measures of 
efficiency... which reflect and encourage more appropriate and effective healthcare' are required. 8' An 
efficiency-based service requires high quality data so the most effective treatments can be selected. This means 
conducting extensive (and expensive) research comparing existing treatments on a scale unknown in the U. K. 
Rationing is unpopular particularly when it appears arbitrary and unreasonable. It is easier to gain public 
approval when scientific justification is possible. Hence the promotion of clinical effectiveness. Even though 
this is not objectively determinable the decision appears so. 82 However efficiency models discriminate against 
certain groups83 and can lack the humanity a healthcare system should possess. 
Cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness is a `good housekeeping' model applied to healthcare. Official approval is seen 
in the introduction of NICE. 84 Cost-benefit calculations take no account of personal costs to the patient such 
as slower recovery. 85 Clinicians are alert to these costs and prefer to have the freedom to prescribe the more 
expensive drug/treatment where appropriate. However, bias towards more expensive products as `better' can 
be present in clinicians as well as patients. 86 Whilst doctors should have awareness of costs, health economists 
should not `attempt to dictate the resolution of clinical problems in financial terms. "' Otherwise, it could be 
considered `wrong to use resources to keep (severely handicapped neonates) alive that could be used to save 
or enhance the lives of others'. 88 There is also a danger, which seems inadequately recognised, that focusing 
on improving the health of the nation means giving lower priority to palliative healthcare than curative. 
Efficiency is defined in terms of achieving a `cure' or improved health status which is the underlying theme 
of the present model of healthcare provision. 89 Palliative care achieves neither cure nor improvement. 
Focusing on providing a mixture of clinically effective and cost-effective healthcare for the population as a 
whole as well as for the individual means concentrating on the youngest in society at the expense of older 
members. The restoration to full health of a neonate, or the prevention of brain damage resulting from a 
poorly-managed delivery, is the best means of `investing in the country's future'. " 
"Black D. Paying for health. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 117-123. 
80Coiera E. The Internet's challenge to healthcare provision. BMJ 1996; 312: 3-4. 
"Dixon J, et al. Financial meltdown for the NHS? BMJ 1996; 312: 1432-3. 
82For instance, in some cases the treatment can be objectively shown as effective - it produces a `cure' eg. the bacteria are eliminated; but in others, 
the effectiveness of the treatment is measured in subjective terms such as the patient reports feeling `better' - an unmeasurable quality. The 
difficulty of measuring `success' is recognised in A First Class Service op cit n2, para. 4.54. 
"There can also be problems with regard to participation in research trials by certain ethnic minority groups. If they do not participate, the 
evidence needed to possibly tailor treatments and services to their particular needs may not be generated. 
84See: A First Class Service, op cit n2, para 1.15: `NICE will... assess new drugs, treatments and devices for their clinical and cost-effectiveness'. 
"To demonstrate how cost-benefit works in practice, consider a patient with a bacterial infection. Antibiotic A might cost £20 for the course 
of treatment, net benefit being the patient is cured. Antibiotic B might cost £ 10 for a course of treatment, patient is cured. Therefore, to achieve 
the same benefit, using Antibiotic B makes more economic sense than Antibiotic A. However, Antibiotic B might take longer to cure the patient 
so the patient loses more time from work, or it might have additional side-effects. A calculation of cost-utility was carried out with regard to 
Donepezil (Arocet) by Wessex Institute for Health Research and Development See: Report 69 Evidence based purchasing. June 1997 NHS 
Directorate South and West, Bristol. The range was between £21,000 to £200,000 per QALY gained. Individual costs ranged from £2,000 
to £ 10,000 over the expected course of treatment plus other probable associated expenditure. The benefit to the patient can be immeasurable. 
However, when a health authority is looking to gain the maximum health benefit from its limited funds it can be seen as an inefficient way to 
spend a lot of money - ultimately it is an ineffective treatment because it does not cure, it merely provides a window of normality lasting about 
six to twelve months. 
"Clinical trials often now analyse the cost-benefit of new treatments. Unless the initial trials are `blinded' not only as to which of the alternative 
therapies each patient is receiving but also cost, conclusions may be open to challenge: Freemantle N, Drummond M. Commentary: Should 
Clinical Trials with Concurrent Economic Analyses be Blinded? JAMA 1997; 277: 63-4. 
"Mason & McCall Smith, op cit n43 at p262. 
"RFairbairn G. Enforced death: enforced life. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 144-9. 
"The change of government has not produced any change in emphasis in this respect. Much weight is being placed on the development of 
primary care as seen in both the Health Act 1999 and the Department of Health's Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation July 1999 The Stationery 
Office, London. 
'Swartz K. Editorial: Babies are coming: Don't cap Medicaid. lAMA 1997; 277: 421. 
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Whilst some decisions are taken out of the hands of the clinicians, other decisions remain such as to which 
patients to prefer'. This avoids too open a challenge to medical autonomy. 91 Eddy argues that this `push(es) 
the difficult choices about costs vs quality to individual decision makers'. 92 Without knowing the 
health/economic outcomes regarding different treatment options, it is impossible for the individual clinician 
to choose without personal (possibly unconscious) bias or with conviction. Little was done between 1991 and 
1997 to determine the effectiveness of treatment or to recognise that `(e)ven where the effectiveness of a 
particular procedure is not in general judged to be high, it might be both effective and appropriate in certain 
circumstances for an individual patient'. 92A Judgments focus on the relative worth of different treatments not 
on individual need. For each patient to receive the best treatment, regarding their particular pathology and 
circumstances, means allowing some clinical freedom. Separating healthcare provision from purchasing may 
have been a `reaction to the excessive income, privilege and autonomy of physicians'93 but expecting doctors 
to make individual patient treatment decisions by balancing costs against benefits without proper information 
is unrealistic. 
It is now recognised that making short-term savings disregarding long-term outcomes is illogical. 94 
Effectiveness continues to be linked to costs although the Blair government is less willing to make cost- 
effectiveness as visible as its predecessor. The 1999 reforms aim to control doctors through greater 
accountability and the introduction of national standards, guidelines and targets. Accountability requires 
visibility of process and persons. However, a tension can be seen between the way the government aims to 
make doctors more accountable and yet is trying to lessen its own accountability by using public consultation 
to spread responsibility. 95 
5.1.4 Public Involvement Models 
The `Oregon' model is perhaps best known. Most states limit eligibility for Medicaid to keep costs within 
budget. Oregon decided to widen access by prioritising certain pairs of conditions and treatments and funding 
the top 71496. One thousand residents were asked to rank condition-treatment pairs which had been based on 
patient benefit, duration of benefit and cost (a cost: utility approach). A final ranking with public `ownership' 
of the list was produced. 97 Some treatments were still withheld but the process seemed fairer although only 
costs and benefits were considered not ethics. 98 However, the priorities set failed to secure political or 
professional acceptance and `ran foul' of anti-discrimination legislation. 99 
"Klein R, Day P& Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting and Rationing in the National Health Service. 1996 Oxford University 
Press, Buckingham at p71. 
92Eddy D. M. Connecting Value and Costs: Whom do we ask, and what do we ask them? JAMA 1990; 254: 1737-9. 
92A Department of Health. The NHS: A Service with Ambitions 1996 The Stationery Office, London at p39. 
"Marmor T. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n14 at p10. 
94Hence their emphasis upon researching into the most appropriate forms of treatment. One of NICE's projects 
is to evaluate which of the 600 
different hip replacements joints is the most effective in terms of cost of joint, operating costs, durability and patient mobility: 
NICE The 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness of different prostheses 
for primary total hip replacement. 4 July 2000 The Stationery Office, London, 
www. nice. org. uk. Accessed 27 January 2001. 
951t is interesting to note that following the debate about Child B, Cambridge and Huntingdon HA began local consultation about what treatments 
should be funded. However, despite the 
justificatory gloss which can now be put upon their decisions, when the parties involved in the 
consultation process are examined, 
it is obvious that there is a bias in the selection process which probably sways towards upholding the status 
quo and the process Evas probably 
little more than political gesturing. Personal communication. 
96The funds ran out at this point. 
97Some modification was carried out as initially provision of dental braces was ranked more 
highly than treatment for curable Hodgkin's 
lymphoma. Dixon J, Welch HG. Priority Setting: lessons from Oregon. The Lancet 1991; 337: 891-894. 
98Relman AS. The trouble with rationing. New Eng. J., MMed. 1990; 323: 911-913. 
'9Blumstein JF. The Oregon Experiment: The role of cost-benefit analysis in the allocation of Medicaid funds. Social Science Medicine 
1997: 45,4: 545-554 at p551. 
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John Major's government rejected this approach stating `(n)o... list of treatments could ever hope to 
accommodate the range and complexity of the different cases which individual clinicians face'. 1°° It believed 
`there would be a real risk of taking decisions out of the hands of the clinicians treating patients' and making 
it the `province of others who possess neither the experience of caring for patients nor the expertise to make 
such decisions'. 10' However, passing resource allocation to unelected purchasers1°2 resulted in the Oregon 
model creeping into this country, with minimal guidance from the NHS Executive on priorities103 and variable 
amounts of public input. 104 It looks an increasingly important model following the introduction of Primary 
Care Groups and the National Survey of Patient and User Experience. 105 
Public input was sought by the New Zealand government to help identify the `core services' of the public 
healthcare system. 1°6 Seven representative groups107 were asked what are the benefits of treatment, is it value 
for money, is it fair and is it consistent with the community's values and priorities? 108 The different groups 
seemed to agree that the `criterion of need' is favoured as the moral basis for distributing healthcare. 1°9 
However, `need' is a very subjective concept and incapable of being defined objectively. The rejection of 
waiting lists and regional inequity earned it widespread approval. "' Although the workshops satisfied a moral 
principle regarding public involvement in decisions directly impinging upon their lives they have not resolved 
the hard questions of how to allocate limited resources. The eventual conclusion was that the core services 
comprised all that were currently being provided in that `there is no obvious or right set.. . whatever set 
is 
decided upon will be contentious'. "' Since then, the New Zealand government has continued to work on 
developing decision-making processes that are `fair in the way conclusions are reached... guided by acceptable 
principles and.. . 
based on reasoning that is defensible'. "Z Consultation has continued, practice guidelines have 
been developed and `a way to reduce hospital waiting lists in a manner that is fair and transparent' have been 
achieved with `a high level of acceptance of the strategy' by professional groups. 113 
In France, the government interfered little with healthcare and priorities for treatment until recently. A right 
to health is guaranteed to all French citizens and residents. "' Any priorities that exist seem to come from 
cultural preference rather than logic and audit. "' However, as in Britain, patients want more say and 
'°°The NHS: A Service with Ambitions, op cit n2 at p39. 
"'Ibid. 
112 Dixon J, Welch HG. Priority Setting: lessons from Oregon The Lancet 1991; 337: 891-894. 
103 The NHS: A Service with Ambitions, op cit n2 at p39. 
104 Ham D. Priority Setting in the NHS: reports from six districts. BMJ 1993; 307: 435-8. 
'05A First Class Service, op cit n2 para 4.59. The first nationwide survey of 150,000 NHS patients and users' views was announced in 1998: 
Department of Health. DOH 98/333,12 August 1998 The Stationery Office, London. See also: Bowling A. Health care rationing: the public's 
debate. BMJ 1996; 312: 670-4. 
116 Campbell AV. Ethics Workshops: Public participation in discussing ethical issues in defining core services. A report to the National 
Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services March 1994 NACCHDSS, Wellington, New Zealand. 
1°7A series of seven workshops was held to obtain input from different perspectives: elderly, disabled, rural, urban - 
low income, Maori, Pacific 
Islands and youth. 
"'Campbell AV. Ethics Workshops, op cit n106 at p 3. 
109Ibid, at p 11. 
1°Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p103. 
"'Campbell AV, Gillett G. Ethical issues in defining core services. Discussion papers prepared for the National Advisory Committee on 
Core Health and Disability Support Services. 1993 NACCHDSS, Wellington, New Zealand at p74. 
112 National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability. Sixth Annual Report to the Minister of Health. `Doing the Right Things Right: 
Allocating Resources using Processes most of us can Support'. 1996 National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability, Wellington, 
New 
Zealand www. nhc. govt. nz/pub/annual6/right. htm accessed 26 January 2001. 
"'National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability. Eighth Annual Report to the Minister ofHealth. 1999 National Advisory Committee 
on Health and Disability, Wellington, 
New Zealand at p4. 
114 Geschwind HJ. Health Care in France: Recent Developments. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 355-362,357. 
"'According to Georges Arbuz this is because of the French love for children: In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n14 
at p5. 
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healthcare costs are rising. "' The government, despite resistance from doctors, is moving healthcare into the 
national and social arena. The Social Security focus is on 'solidarity, justice and human dignity for all'. ` In 
1992, a Central Committee of Public Health, with members from various spheres, was given the job of defining 
healthcare priorities, educating the public and encouraging preventative medicine. 18 To avoid discrimination, 
the elderly have a charter of rights and freedom. 1' 
Public participation is the politician's `flakjacket' - if the decision is politically sensitive or requires a high 
degree of specialist knowledge, gaining public `ownership' keeps voters happy. Calls are made for greater 
public involvement when society feels their elected representatives are becoming too distanced from the 
decision-making process. 12° The 1991 reforms reduced patient ('consumer') input through Community Health 
Councils. Few GP Fundholders devised purchasing plans or involved patients. 12' The NHS Plan will further 
reduce input via Community Health Councils and eventually replace them with in-house `patient advocates 51 22 
even though there is a strong argument in favour of strengthening their role. 123 Society has rights to have its 
views taken account of through Parliament and via input to local decision-makers such as Primary Care 
Groups. 12' The media has a role in stimulating debate, educating the public and, questionably, in challenging 
the government. Healthcare professionals should be involved without one profession being dominant. Nord 
recognises that public responses are often `unreflective and unreliable' but believes focus groups which have 
previously discussed ethical issues provide `high quality' data. 12' This seems doubtful unless the participants 
have received appropriate training beyond merely discussing a few issues. 12' The question of who arbitrates 
when focus groups reach different decisions is also challengeable. 
Public participation models may be more likely to identify individual goals and preferences rather than 
identifying communal goals which maximise welfare. Adopting the Oregon model is impossible and probably 
undesirable"' despite suggestions favouring more local population input to increase democracy, `common- 
sense' and accountability. 12' Primary Care Groups are likely to perpetuate regional inequalities. As discovered 
in Oregon, allowing the public to prioritise medical treatments can lead to gross inequity. The process can be 
manipulated consciously or unconsciously by the selection process of participants. This can be guarded against 
"'Geschwind, op cit n114 at p359. 
"'Ibid, at p361. 
18Arbuz, op cit n 115 at p5. 
"'Geschwind, op cit n114 at p361. 
"'Most recently following the media coverage of the `Child B' case: Rv Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
"'Audit Commission report: Fundholding: the main report. The Stationery Office, London 1996. See also: Stewart-Brown S et al. The 
problems of fundholding. BMJ 1996; 312: 1311-2 at p12. 
'"Department of Health. The NHS Plan -A plan for investment. A plan for reform. (Cm 4818 - 1) July 2000 The Stationery Office, London 
at para 10.19. Available on www. nhs. uk/nhsplan accessed 7 August 2000. 
'Z'The Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales prepared a position paper on the culture of health care for the Bristol 
Inquiry in the deaths of children undergoing heart surgery. This paper argues for the role of the CHC to be enhanced. ACHCEW. Health 
Perspectives Issue 1/2000 The Culture ofHealthcare. March 2000, ACHCEW, London. A full copy of their report is available on www. bristol- 
inquiry. org. uk. 
"'Schwatz L, et al. Rationing Decisions: From Diversity to Consensus. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 195-205. 
"Nord E. Towards Cost-Value Analysis in Health Care? Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 167-175,173. 
"'However, if the training lacks impartiality, as in the Cambridge and Huntingdonshire example given by Price, the decision is likely to be the 
one sought by the training body: Price D. Choices without reasons: citizens' juries and policy evaluation. J. Med. Ethics 2000; 
26: 272-276 at p272. 
1271t is worth noting that were Britain to consult as widely as Oregon did when constructing its priority lists, we would have had to have '240 
public hearings, 940 community meetings and a telephone survey of 20,000'. Dean M. Oregon trail reaches Britain. The Lancet 1991: 
338: 1133- 
4. 
'28Some pilot schemes were initiated to elicit the views of the local population regarding healthcare purchase plans. See: Wall A. The Jury is 
out. Health Service J. 18 February 1999 pp32-33; 
McIver S. Healthy debate? An independent evaluation of citizens juries in health settings. 
1999 Kings Fund, London and Davies S et al. Ordinary wisdom: reflections on an experiment in citizenship and health. 1999 Kings Fund, 
London. 
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by having legislation giving protection against discrimination and abuse of human rights12' or by having 
universal input. The NHS Plan13o followed a bizarre public consultation exercise which purported to discover 
what `the people' want from the NHS yet failed to take any measures to solicit responses from some of the most 
underprivileged groups in society. 13' Some services"' are rated much lower by the public than by professionals 
or government and their funding conflicts with `the political need to respond to the outcry from the press and 
public for more beds... and more intensive care facilities'. "' Sykes favours public education before public 
involvement: `(w)hen they understand the cost and fallibility of many therapies, we should help them to 
understand that they have a role in choosing which therapy should, and which should not, be `freely' available 
in the NHS'. 134 Thus, an educated public could work in a relationship based on trust, not `benign paternalism', 
with decision-makers. 13' Others are less convinced this is workable and argue for limitations to public 
involvement to prevent inequality. "' Yet, if a local community decides healthcare should be provided on an 
equality of access basis rather than equality of need perhaps its views should prevail as a democratically 
legitimate decision. "' Clinical audit may eventually demonstrate flaws in this approach which could then 
influence whether local views should be paramount. Resource allocation should be conducted openly and 
honestly. 
5.1.5 The Increased Funding Model 
The increased funding model is less a suggestion for improving the decision-making process than an avoidance 
measure. It blames `government parsimony'. 138 This has some validity. "' Britain spends about 5.8% of 
national income on healthcare, "' less than comparable European countries. 14' The British system is `grossly 
underfunded and underdeveloped compared to other mature industrial democracies'. 142 Appeals through the 
media and judicial review are made for funds for individual patients. "' Reducing duplication of services and 
buildings could redirect money towards treatment, however, outside London, travelling distances are greater 
"'It is still too early to see whether the more recent Disability Discrimination Act 1995 will have an impact on the access of disabled persons 
to healthcare and the quality of treatment received. For instance, there is some evidence that patients with Down's syndrome are not receiving 
appropriate treatment for associated hearing and sight loss. Major S. Parents of people with Down's syndrome report suboptimal care. BMJ 
1999; 318: 687. 
"'The NHS Plan, op cit n 122. 
"'Department of Health. Creating a 21" century NHS. Internet site: www. nhs. uk/nationalplan accessed 5 June 2000. 
"'For instance, primary care, care in the community and mental health (the Cinderella services). 
133Sykes P. Just what are you doing? Health Service J. July 25 1996 p23. 
"'Ibid. 
15Coote A. `Possibilities for direct public involvement in rationing decisions' In New B (Ed). Rationing. Talk andAction in Health Care. 1997 
Kings Fund & BMJ Publishing Group, London at pp158-164. 
136 Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p 112. 
137 For example, a women's magazine advised its readers that one district, City and Hackney, decided that in-vitro fertilization should be made 
more widely available by limiting the number of treatment cycles per couple to only one. Woman's Weekly 11 June 1996. It might mean that 
the chance per couple is less than if they were able to receive two or three treatment cycles but it would enable those currently denied treatment 
via the waiting list system, to receive treatment. 
"'Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n91 at p97. 
"'The World Health Organisation has recently placed the British healthcare system only 18`h in terms of efficiency compared with other countries. 
World Health Organisation. The World Health Report 2000 Health Systems: Improving Performance 21 June 2000 WHO www. %N'ho. int/whr 
accessed 26 June 2000. 
"'World Health Organisation, supra, Statistical Annex, at p 195. A marginally higher figure of 5.9% GDP was suggested by Smith four years 
earlier: Smith D. Quick nurse, more private cash. The Sunday Times November 10 1996. A significantly higher figure of 7.1 % GDP %N as 
suggested by Rudolf Klein the same year: Klein R, Day P& Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting and Rationing in the National 
Health Service. 1996 Oxford University Press, Buckingham at p98. Various figures may be quoted for the U. S. A. healthcare budget taking its 
total spend up to approximately 16% GDP. According to the World Health Organisation, supra, the figure for the U. S. A. is 13.7% GDP although 
Smith quoted it at about 6.2%. 
"'Germany spends 10.5% GDP; France 9.8 % GDPand the Netherlands 8.8% GDP: World Health Organisation, op cit n 139, Statistical Annex. 
at p195. 
1d2Sieverts SH. Is there a crisis in health care. Pamphlet 574 Health Crisis - What Crisis? Proceedings of the Fabian/Socialist Health 
Association New Year Conference 1996 1996 Fabian Society. London at pp 11-13, 
1"Judicial review is examined in the next chapter. 
- Chapter 5 page 115 - 
and more difficult for those of limited means and mobility. A founding principle of the NHS is equal access 
to healthcare and public consensus seems to favour local centres providing good care with a few specialist 
centres. The increased funding model also places emphasis on clinicians becoming more aware of `opportunity 
costs' since demand is what doctors choose to make it. 144 
Governments have regularly denied that the NHS is significantly underfunded, despite apparent crisis, thus 
straining public confidence. The claim that there is `a gap between resources and demand which shows signs 
of increasing as we move into the next century"45 was rejected. 14' The Healthcare 2000 report suggests that 
an aging population, increasing public expectations and medical advances cannot be coped with by the NHS 
as currently organised. 14' Healthcare 2000 proposes charges for non-standard services such as private rooms 
and appointments within a certain period. This would create three-tier healthcare system with a private sector 
funded by insurance or personal wealth and a two-tier NHS. The private sector calls for recognition that the 
government's `primary duty is to ensure that the population has access to adequate health and social care, not 
necessarily to provide or fund it itself. "' It suggests a mixed provision of private, voluntary and state provision 
and clarity about what the state will fund so `we can get on with planning our lives to take account of that'. 149 
Such views are naive. Today's elderly believed that they knew what the state would fund. The state alters what 
it deems to be national priorities. More funding for the NHS is forthcoming but there will always be a point 
beyond which funds do not exist whoever pays. 15° The NHS is labour intensive. Extra funding will not 
necessarily produce the personnel needed for more treatment episodes15' and probably only postpones 
problems. 15' Even where funds exist, compassion for the individual may require that treatment is withheld or 
stopped. Increasing funding `can never be a complete solution'. '53 
5.1.6 Insurance Based Healthcare 
This model suggests that Britain can no longer afford to rely solely upon the state providing the majority of 
healthcare. Therefore, partial adoption of the American model is proposed (or threatened). Private medical 
insurance was encouraged under the Thatcher reforms and opposed by Labour. However, Tony Blair recently 
made it clear that either the NHS embraces `change' or an American model will have to be introduced whereby 
the NHS only cares for emergency cases and the very old and poor. 154 Such comments fail to recognise that 
healthcare practitioners have been subjected to numerous changes over the last 25 years. '55 The NHS Plan sets 
out the reforms. '56 
"'Klein R. Dimensions of Rationing: Who Should do What? BMJ 1993; 307: 309. See also, Jonsen AR, The New Medicine and The Old Ethics 
1990 Harvard University Press, London at p97. 
"'Healthcare 2000 Group, Chairperson Sir Duncan Nichol. Healthcare 2000.1995 Healthcare 2000, London. 
'46Department of Health. NHS. A Service with Ambition November 1996 The Stationery Office, London. 
'47Healthcare 2000 Group, op cit n145. 
"'Independent Healthcare Association Sunday Times 10 November 1996. 
'49Ibid. 
150The NHSPIan, op cit n 122, Summary. Whether the extra funding will be sufficient is challenged by the BMA and others. See: British Medical 
Association. Healthcare Funding Review February 2001 BMA, London `Resources' (www. bma. org. uk/public/polsreps. nsfaccessed 15 February 
200 1); Towse A, Sussex J. "Getting UK health care expenditure up to the European Union mean" - what does that mean? B; VJ 2000; 320: 640- 
642 and Appleby J, Boyle S. Blair's billions: where will he find the money for the NHS? BMJ 2000; 320: 865-867. 
151Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n91 at pp101-102. 
'52Mason JK, McCall Smith RA. Law and Medical Ethics 5th Edn. 1999 Butterworths, London at p305. 
153British Medical Association, op cit n150, Chapter 3 `Resources' at p3. 
154Miles A. Can the NHS be Saved? Last Chance. The Times 26 May 2000. 
15`The author of this thesis entered the NHS as a trainee medical laboratory scientist 25 years ago. 
156 The ;\ HS Plan, op cit n 
122. 
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The state-administered Medicaid-Medicare system results in regional as well as individual inequality. The 
Oregon experiment attempted to address this. 15' Other healthcare is privately funded, mostly as an employee 
benefit. America is moving towards `managed care'. 158 Managed care organisations (MCOs) are mostly non- 
profit groups which people join by paying fees, or having fees paid by their employer. Most patients now are 
seen under a managed care scheme. 15' Doctors are expected to balance their patients' needs against their 
employers' needs. 16' The doctor must consider his/her population of patients not just the individual. Physicians 
are used as `gatekeepers' to care much as GPs are in Britain. Buchanan argues that the managed care 
`revolution' is based on a `begrudging and belated recognition that adequate care... cannot be maximal care'. 16' 
Only cost-effective services are to be provided and the doctor faces a personal financial penalty either based 
on the cost-implications of the services s/he selects for individual patients or on the managed care 
organisation's success in meeting its target. '"' Guidelines and protocols restrict physician autonomy much as 
is intended by NICE. Consequently, Loewy, like Buchanan, 163 reports that Americans have lost trust in their 
doctors. 164 This mirrors findings in this country. '65 Emanuel blames the growing dominance of managed care 
organisations for raising `both expectation and apprehension about improving the justice of the American 
health care system'. 16' Managed care aims to reduce over-treatment of patients by providing a unified, cost- 
effective service and educating users into reducing unreasonable demands under threat of huge insurance 
premium rises. In Canada, which, like Britain, has a universally accessible state-funded healthcare system, 
Alberta is considering moving to a managed care system which will pay a set fee per patient to physician 
`gatekeepers' (equivalent to British GPs). 167 The primary care focus mirrors that of the U. K. but Reay, like 
Loewy, 168 questions the ethics of expecting doctors to fulfil both a public health and a medical role. 16' The 
BMA cannot see how insurance-based healthcare could be introduced in the UK without `compromising the 
principle of equity'. 1' 
5.2 Medical Models 
The politico-economic models require the clinician to consider interests other than the patient's. Many 
clinicians believe the decision to treat/screen a patient should be based `solely on the needs of the individual 
patient immediately before him [sic], leaving it to others to allocate resources' and, once started, treatment 
should continue for as long as it is doing some good. "' The medical models fall into a variety of groups. 
"'See discussion earlier. 
"'Medicaid for the poor and Medicare for the very old and disabled. Curtin L. The Ethics of Managed Care - Pat 2. Nursing Management 
1996; 27,9: 53-55. 
""Churchill LR. The United States Health Care System under Managed Care. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 393-411 at p395. 
161Ibid. 
"''Buchanan A. Trust in Managed Care Organizations. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2000; 10,3: 189-212 at p196. 
'62Churchill, op cit n 159 at p395. 
163Buchanan, op cit n161 passim. 
'64Loewy EH. Health-Care Systems and Ethics: What Can We Learn? Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 309-320,318. 
165 Rogers A et al. "If a patient is too costly they tend to get rid of you: " The Impact of People's Perceptions of Rationing on the Use of Primary 
Care. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 225-237. 
'66 Emanuel EJ. Justice and Managed Care: Four Principles for the Just Allocation of Health Care Resources. Hastings Center Report 
2000; 30.3: 8-16 at p8. 
'67Reay T. Allocating Scarce Resources in a Publicly Funded Health System: Ethical Considerations of a Canadian Managed Care Proposal. 
Nursing Ethics 1999; 6,3: 240-250. 
'68Loewy, op cit n 164. See also: Loewy EH. Justice, society, physicians and ethics committees: incorporating ideas of justice into patient care 
decisions. Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics 1996; 5: 559-569. 
'wReay, op cit n 167 at p245. 
10British Medical Association, op cit n50 Chapter 5 'Mechanisms' at p7. 
17 'BMJ Legal Correspondent. Rationing of Resources. BMJ 1985.290: 374-5 at p375. 
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5.2.1 The Medical Expertise Model 
Most treatment/non-treatment decisions seem made according to the medical model which concentrates 
primarily on cure. However, Veatch suggests technology may be used inappropriately because to use it is 
unnecessary (it over-treats a patient), unsuccessful (using it is futile), unkind (it prolongs life of little quality), 
unsafe (harms almost certainly outweigh the benefits) or unwise (it is an inappropriate use of resources which 
could be better used for others). "' Therefore, an improvement in clinical data and outcomes is needed13 
Hope et al have revealed that the phrase, `not clinically indicated' which represents a medical model of 
decision-making, really has two meanings with a huge difference in their underlying ethics. 1' The first 
meaning is that treatment is `not in the patient's interests' and secondly, it is `not the right use of resources'. 
The common employment of the term suggests that doctors feel more comfortable implying that the decision 
is based on a medical model of reasoning. Few patients have sufficient knowledge to challenge scientifically. 
The balance of power lies firmly with the doctor. Hope indicates that if the doctor believes a treatment option 
is not in the patient's interests, s/he should `(g)ive relevant information and allow the patient to choose'. 1' 
However, the information the patient receives can only be as good as the doctor has been given, often by those 
with vested interests. 1' Recent studies confirm that there is still a `need to improve the comprehensiveness, 
relevance and intelligibility of the information given to patients'. "' Similarly, even when physicians have 
specifically been given outcomes data little change is visible in the treatment decisions suggesting either that 
they are prepared to gamble on their patient being in the percentage that may benefit even though the evidence 
is to the contrary, or that hard evidence is less important than what the doctor may describe as his/her `own 
clinical experience'. "' Dowie argues that medical decision-making is conducted at the most intuitive levels 
of analysis rather than the scientific level, there being a continuum between intuition (ie. ill-structured) and 
scientifically analytical (ie. well-structured) decision-making. "' Dowie proposes greater use of systems to aid 
judgment such as algorithms, Churchillian lists18' and computers. '$' He encourages the adoption of the 
`decision-tree' approach whereby a problem is broken down into separate uncertainties with probabilities 
allotted to each branch so that a measure of utility can be accorded to each option but fails to explain how 
values are to be allocated to each branch. Dowie, though, is rightly critical of the practice of holding expensive 
inquiries into errors of judgment which fail to produce guidance for future practice. 18' There are concerns that 
guidance from NICE may not automatically alter clinician's practice. However, NICE guidelines are likely 
to be taken into account when allegations of negligence are heard by the courts so pressure will be brought to 
bear upon doctors. 18' Making guidelines compulsory will bring the government into direct conflict with 
"'Veatch RM. A theory of medical ethics. 1981 Basic Books, New York. 
"'It will be the role of NICE to supply this data. 
174Hope T et al. `Not clinically indicated': patients' interests or resource allocation? BMJ 1993; 306: 379-381. 
15Ibid, at p379. 
176 Kee F. Patients' prerogatives and perceptions of benefits. BMJ 1996; 312: 958-960. 
"'Ibid, at p959. 
178Poses R et al. You can lead a horse to water - improving physicians' knowledge of probabilities may not affect their decisions. Medical 
Decision Making 1995; 15: 65-75. 
'79Dowie J. `Decision Analysis: the Ethical Approach to Medical Decision-Making'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John 
Wiley & Son, Chichester at pp421-434. 
180A list is made with two columns, on giving the reasons in favour of a particular action and the other the reasons against the action. Then the 
choice is made according to which column outweighs the other. It is a model supposedly used 
by Sir Winston Churchill in planning the course 
of the Second World War. Such an approach was used 
by Thorpe LJ in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at p560. 
'R'Dowie, op cit n179 at pp421-434. 
'RZlbid, at p431. The Bristol Inquiry differs in this respect and interim reports have been issued regarding consent procedures in general and the 
retaining of human material. 
See: www. bristol-inguiry. org. uk. 
'g'Teff H. `Clinical Guidelines, Negligence and Medical Practice'. In Freeman M, Lewis A (Eds) Law and Medicine: Current Legallssues Vol 
3.2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp67-80. 
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doctors. 
5.2.2 The Medical Need Model 
Medical decision-making can be based on perceived need. Like other models it is value-laden and subject to 
the personal bias of the needs-assessor although portrayed as more neutral. Maxwell considers that the NHS 
has `always been committed to meeting health care needs on the basis of need alone, without regard to the 
ability to pay' but, because resources are limited, it `becomes important to meet needs at the highest level 
generalizable to the whole population' (ie. a utilitarian approach). "' Until the NHS decides whether its goal 
is equity of access or equity of outcome resource allocation will remain problematic. Maxwell considers that 
the existing structure is unfair so justice should trump utilitarianism. Butler questions whether access could 
be reduced in wealthy areas in order to improve access in areas with high morbidity. 185 Williams argues that 
`need' should be defined as `capacity to benefit'. 18' If capacity to benefit is minimal, scarce resources should 
not be wasted. Difficulty lies in what counts as 'benefit"" and separating `needs' from `wants'. '88 
Meeting medical need as a model for decision-making can be seen as based on a duty to rescue. Healthcare 
has a tradition based upon helping the less-fortunate. 18' Whilst there may be an `imperfect' duty to help others 
this is not universally accepted or recognised in law. Requiring rescue attempts to be made could be seen as 
giving one person rights over the liberty of another. Menlowe considers that there are three views regarding 
rescues: (a) they are never morally required, (b) they are sometimes morally required or (c) there is an extensive 
requirement to rescue. "' He concludes that there is an extensive duty to rescue which is obviously a duty of 
beneficence. Harris similarly suggests, with regard to NHS resource allocation, what is really a duty to 
rescue. 19' Harris believes that `there is a good principle that real and present dangers should be met before 
future and speculative ones'. 192 This would mean that the NHS should prioritise treatment for existing 
conditions not preventative medicine such as risk-screening or vaccination. 193 Thus, Harris would justify 
diverting large amounts of resources into lost causes because the immediate need of the premature baby, the 
person in end-stage renal failure, the person in cardiac arrest would be paramount over all other demands or 
needs. 194 No thought as to cost or the difficulties of defining such a duty within the constraints of law is 
apparent. However, the media seemingly agree and run emotive campaigns promoting individual needs for 
treatment as rights to treatment. 195 
'.. Maxwell RJ. `Health care management: are ethics relevant? '. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, 
Chichester pp819-828 at p827. 
"'Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p144. 
"'Williams A. `Economics, Society and Health Care Ethics'. In Gillon R. Principles ofHealth Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester 
at pp829-842. 
187 For example, see: BMA Withholding and Withdraiving Life prolonging Medical Treatment 1999 BMA, London at pp1-2. 
"'Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at pp44-46. 
'x9For instance, the Florence Nightingale story and the long tradition of nursing religious orders. 
'90Menlowe MA. `The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue'. In Menlove MA, McCall Smith A: The 
Duty to Rescue. 1993 Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot at pp4-50. 
19'Harris J. Maximising the health of the whole community: the case against. BMJ 1997; 314: 669-672. See also, 
Letters: BMJ 1997; 314: 1901-2. 
192 Harris J. Maximising the health of the whole community: the case against. BMJ 1997; 314: 669-672 at p672. 
193In other words, preferencing acute care over primary care. 
194 Harris J. Must doctors save their patients? J. Med. Ethics 1983; 9: 211-218. 
''"Canada, which supports the idea of universal rights to healthcare, also suffers regional disparity: Kluge E-HW. The Canadian Health Care 
System. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 377-391 at p388. 
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Culyer has identified six characteristics as necessary in order for `need' to have any legitimacy: (1) overt 
recognition that it is value-laden; (2) derivation from the objectives of the healthcare system; (3) ability to be 
applied in practice to both vertical and horizontal distributions; (4) specificity as to persons and services 
required; (5) directly linkable to resources; (6) not productive of inequitable results. 196 Hope questions how to 
decide which needs should take precedence when the healthcare system cannot meet all needs and, if all needs 
could be met with the existing resources, which benefits should be funded. 197 If need is to be useful more 
information is required regarding treatment outcomes and `futility' to avoid subjective quality of life 
assessments. 198 Outcomes research is still in its infancy and lacks funding. Hope seems to suggest categorising 
treatments as to whether they are `needs' or `benefits', thus enabling resource allocation to be carried out, with 
larger budgets for `needs' and lists guiding doctors as to what medical options to consider. 199 This seems 
appealing but it crudely over-simplifies the position and is little other than `Oregon'-style priority listing 
subject to clinicians lobbying in favour of their own specialty. This model cannot satisfactorily resolve the 
difficulty if the clinician's view differs from the patient's. zoo 
5.2.3 Evidence-based models 
In the 1970s came the realisation that `the welfare state could no longer live off the dividends of the growth 
state'. 20' Consequently, Cochrane's Effectiveness and Efficiency202 and Illyich's treatise on iatrogenic illness"' 
have influenced beliefs that `there would be no need for rationing if only the knowledge generated by science 
were fully utilized'. 204 No one disputes the futility of offering a kidney to a diabetic patient who will die soon 
from an inoperable brain tumour205 or a new liver to a chronic unreformed alcoholic of no fixed abode. "' 
Clinical audit20. and research to identify appropriate care using `expert opinion and literature'208 is increasing2°9 
but is not as neutral as implied. International research and audit may be hampered by the relationship between 
medicine and culture. Research can reveal natural pools of patients for whom certain treatments are 
inappropriate21' and identify those from whom logic dictates treatment should be withheld or withdrawn. "' 
By conducting analyses as to costs, efficiency and effectiveness of procedures it is believed that informed 
'9 Culyer AJ. Need: the idea won't do - but still we need it. Soc. Sci. Medicine 1995; 40,6: 717-730 at 727. 
''Williams, op cit n186 at p380. 
'`''Saunders J. Medical futility: CPR. In Lee R, Morgan D (Eds) Death Rites: Law and ethics at the end oflife. 1994 Routledge, London at pp72- 
90 at p85. See also: Zucker MB, Zucker HD. Medicalfutility and the evaluation oflife-sustaining interventions. 1997 Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
'99Hope T et al. `Not clinically indicated': patients' interests or resource allocation? BMJ 1993; 306: 379-381 at p380. 
20°For instance, Culyer cites the example of a patient with cancer of the larynx. Irradiation may preserve the voice but the success rate is lower. 
Surgery is more efficient, survival rates are better, but the voice is lost. Culyer, op cit n 196 at p728. 
21'Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n91 at p43. 
202Cochrane A. Effectiveness and Efficiency. 1972 Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, London. 
203Illich I. Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis - The expropriation of health. 1976 Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
204Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n91, at p97. 
201Collins EG, Pfeifer B. Decisions not to transplant: futility or rationing. J. Cardiovascular Nursing 1995; 9: 23-29 at p27. 
2061bid, at p28. 
207Defined by the Department of Health as The systematic critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including the procedures used for 
diagnosis and the treatment, the use of resources, and the resulting outcome and quality of life ofthe patient. ' DoH. NHSReview Working Paper 
No 6 (1989) HMSO, London. 
208Dr Nicholas Hicks, Consultant in Public Health Medicine, Oxfordshire HA. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n 14 
at p 12. Klein et al report that only 15% of medical interventions are supported by solid scientific evidence. Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n9 1, 
at p92. 
2'9The Cochrane Database is one such resource now available on-line in this country. A similar project is being conducted by the RAND 
Corporation in America. For a comment on the RAND study see: Sharpe VA, Faden Al. Medical Harm: Historical, Conceptual, and Ethical 
Dimensions oflatrogenic Illness. 1998 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge at pp214-5 and Rivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fiftyyears 
of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London at pp300-301. The National Institute of Clinical Evidence (NICE) will fulfil a similar role. 
"'Braithwaite BD. NATALI -a model for National Computer Databases in the investigation of new therapeutic techniques. J. Royal 
Soc. Med. 1995; 88: 511-515. See also: Rogers L. Doctors admit three in four operations are unnecessary. The Sunday Times 27 November 1994. 
21 However, audit will not always be conclusive. For example, see the debate over digoxin for heart attacks: Our Health Correspondent. Foxglove 
dispute proves incurable. The Times 27 August 1996. 
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choices can be made. 212 However, a solely clinical or economic focus can lead to unfairness for the individual 
by failing to take account of individual need or circumstances. 21' Mapping the human genome214 will lead to 
discriminatory practices within healthcare. 215 Delivering inappropriate healthcare contributes to rising costs. 216 
Chantler advocates that health professionals should `work out (the) choices with families'-'- but everv 
premature baby, every disease or accident victim is potentially a tragedy and a triumph. 218 One person can 
swing the decision-making process in the direction of his/her beliefs and a possibly hidden agenda. For 
example, research has shown that 98 % of PVS patients with corpus callosum lesions in their brain never 
recover. 219 However, of the PVS patients who did recover, 24 % of them had those same lesions. 220 If relatives 
are only told the first fact, they will be more likely to opt for non-treatment. Similarly, if no SCBU221 cot is 
available, the doctor may be less honest about all the treatment alternatives for a premature baby. The level 
of maternity care purchased may influence the decision whether to treat or not. 222 Yet some might argue that, 
`where there is life, there is hope' so `everything that can be done, should be done', regardless of cost. 
Consequently, the use of `futility' when advising non-treatment can be dishonest. By interpreting 'patient 
survival' as `survival to discharge 221 it is easier to designate treatments as `futile' and `clinically 
inappropriate'. 224 Raising the threshold of `futility' means that decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment 
will have already been made since it is inappropriate for hospitals or doctors to `offer treatments for which 
there is no evidence of effectiveness'. 225 If evidence-based medicine is to be practised, doctors must be prepared 
to deliver care in line with the latest data. 226 This may conflict with the patient's best interests by placing 
science above ethics or law. 227 As Frith points out, medical literature discussing evidence-based practice rarely 
identifies the part values can play in decision-making. 228 Evidence-based practice could mean compulsory 
treatment or penalties for those who impose additional burdens on the rest of society because of their rejection 
of recommended treatment or preventative measures such as vaccinations. Yet, currently, if a treatment is 
Z'ZRivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London at p382. 
21 'This seemed to be the root of the public disquiet regarding the Child B case -Rv Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
Dickenson briefly discusses this point in Dickenson D. Can Medical Criteria Settle Priority-Setting Debates? The Need for Ethical Analysis. 
Health Care Analysis 1999: 7: 131-137. 
2"Announced on 27 June 2000: Macintyre B. Opening the book of life. The Times 27 June 2000. 
215Cedar S, Terry L. Genes and Genealogy. Family Law 2000; 30: 744-747. 
216Rivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London at p299. 
217 Chantler C. In Health Care: Resources, Choices and Decisions, op cit n 14 at p7. 
2 "For one such triumph see: Wilkinson P. School at last for the l lb baby who fought for life. The Times 10 January 2000. 
2'9Andrews K. Prediction of recovery from post-traumatic vegetative state. Lancet 1998; 351: 1751. 
220Ibid. 
221Special Care Baby Unit. 
222 In October 2000, the author of this thesis was told of a pregnant woman who alleges that she was turned down for maternity care by several 
London hospitals because the foetus had Edwards Syndrome and she refused to have an abortion because of her religious beliefs. She had to 
travel to the outskirts of London where a hospital agreed to book her in and the child was delivered in May 2000. He was not expected to live 
beyond a year and the mother spent most of her time with him in hospital before his death at five months. The mother seemed deeply suspicious 
ofthe motives of doctors and consequently numerous complaints were lodged against staff members. Personal communication. The mother has 
now taken her complaints to the media: Horsnell M. Parents say hospital chose to let baby die. The Times 27 November 2000. 
"'in one survey, survival post-cardio-pulmonary resuscitation was 78% when measured as successful restoration of heartbeat and breathing but 
only 11% when measured as discharge from hospital for the same group of patients: Editorial. Failure of `Predictors' of Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation Outcomes to Predict Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Outcomes: Implications for Do-Not-Resuscitate Policy and Advance 
Directives. Arch. Intern. Med. 1993; 153: 1293-6,1293, 
22'Harper W. The role of futility judgments in improperly limiting the scope of clinical research. J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 308-313. 
211Ibid at p311. 
226 Stewart-Brown Set al. The problems of fundholding. BMJ 1996; 312: 1311-2. See also the findings of the Audit Commission: Audit 
Commission report: Fundholding: the main report. The Stationery Office, London 1996. Vivienne Harpwood describes how league tables of 
clinical performance and the trial ofthe PRODIGY computer-based system for making available the latest prescribing advice to doctors is likely 
to impact upon clinical practice: Harpwood V. `The Manipulation of Medical Practice. ' In Freeman M, Lewis A (Eds) Law and Medicine: 
Current Legal Issues Vol 3.2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp47-66, in particular at pp56-58. 
227See, for example, the discussion, later in this thesis, regarding the approach taken towards establishing best interests in Re A (Conjoined Thins: 
Medical Treatment) [20011 1 FLR 1. 
2 "Frith L. Priority Setting and Evidence Based Purchasing. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 139-151,141. 
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effective there is no obligation for it to be provided. 229 
Predictions as to the quality of life after treatment may be decisive. If the quality of life is likely to be poor, 
the cost may be considered too high either by the patient, his/her carers or the healthcare team. A crucial 
question under this model is whose opinion is decisive. Most decisions are based upon the possibility of cure 
probably because medical education encourages doctors to see `curing' the patient as the primary goal of 
medicine. 23' Fox suggests this model ignores other valuable goals such as prevention of ill health, pain and 
symptom relief, and palliative care. 231 Ignoring these can lead to over-treatment. There is a danger that linking 
`cure' as the predominant medical model with cost-effectiveness means only treatments offering high 
probabilities of `cure' will be funded. 232 Curative models of care rely heavily upon scientific evidence with 
`objective' laboratory evidence being preferred to `subjective' patient report. 233 The `reverence for hard science 
can lead to patients being treated less as whole persons than as repositories for disease. '23' The model assumes 
that, if a cure is possible (ie. treatment is effective) the patient will accept treatment so patient refusal is 
regarded as mis-guided or obstructive. 235 
In contrast to the curative model of care the `palliative' model acknowledges that not all patients can, or desire 
to, be cured. 23' Patient-centred, it focuses on how providing care or treatment can reduce pain, restore 
functional ability and control the symptoms of disease. The goals are those the patient deems important. It 
does not consider death as physician-failure. Time is needed to construct a relationship with the patient, jointly 
discovering what goals are important so health care systems based upon efficiency preclude holistic decision- 
making becoming more widespread. 
Predicting health state following treatment/non-treatment requires assessing the patient's quality of life and 
is usually conducted by those with the power to give or withhold treatment not the patient. Fairbairn suggests 
`quality of life' is employed differently with handicapped neonates from the elderly or terminally ill. 
Consequently, the enforced death of neonates and handicapped children is allowed but terminally ill adults 
have to `endure enforced life' . 
237 Fairbairn considers decisions look as if they are about the futility of treatment 
for individual babies but `really they are about the quality of life of someone else'. 238 This point is important 
as decisions to opt for aggressive (curative) therapy after birth usually rests with the parents and whether they 
229As NICE (the National Institute of Clinical Excellence) reports on the effectiveness of various treatments, `postcode rationing' may decline, 
particularly if the government is prepared to issue purchasing guidance as it has recently in the cases of Taxol and Tamoxifen: NICE Press 
Release: NICE Issues Guidance on Taxanes for Ovarian Cancer. NICE 2000/013,5 May 2000 www. nice. org. uk/updates/upd ind. htm accessed 
14 June 2000. Outcry followed its failure to recommend the taxanes for breast cancer as well: Marsh B. Ordeal for thousands over breast cancer 
drug. Daily Mail 6 May 2000. 
270Fox E. Editorial: Predominance of the Curative Model of Medical Care. JAMA 1997; 278: 761-3. 
Z"Ibid, at p761. 
232The definition of `cure' given by Pellegrino and Thomasma has been adopted for this thesis: Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC. Helping and 
Healing. 1997 Georgetown University Press, Washington DC at p27. 
Z"Fox, op cit n230 at p761. 
23'Ibid, at p762. 
235Doctors may then ask the courts to compel treatment as in Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728. There is 
also an element of medical possessiveness once treatment has begun and doctors can be reluctant to allow patient's subsequent preferences to 
prevail: Chapman J, Hussell L. Two years ago, this man underwent the first hand transplant. How did he show his gratitude? By refusing to take 
his vital medication and asking for the hand to be removed. Daily Mail 21 October 2000. See also, the possessiveness over the conjoined twins 
evident in Re .4 
(Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR I (discussed in next chapter). 
236According to the World Health Organisation, palliative care is `the active total care... of patients whose disease is not responsive to curative 
treatment'. WHO Cancer Pain Relief and Palliative Care: Report ofa WHO Expert Committee. 1990 WHO Geneva, Switzerland. I would 
extend the definition to include the active total care of patients who choose not to undergo attempts to cure their condition. 
Those whose decision 
is informed should not be denied palliative care simply because they have taken a different view from the medical specialists. 
ziFairbairn G. Enforced life: enforced death. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 144-9 at p144. 
2"Ibid. 
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feel able to cope. 239 Fairbairn suggests that, since it is impossible to obtain a subjective viewpoint from the 
neonate, decision-making could be improved by building up a database of quality of life assessments from 
people with a range of disabilities or by waiting until the neonate was able (if possible) to express a view. The 
difficulty with the former is that it would only be possible to collect data from those with sufficient mental 
capacity to understand the full implications of the question. Those whose lives are closest to the neonates for 
whom such decisions are made would be unable to provide insight. 24' Likewise, waiting could condemn some 
neonates to a life that is intolerable. Fairbairn considers this preferable to the current situation of aborting 
disabled babies or allowing them to die after birth. He seems to suggest abortion is inappropriate because 
`greater certainty about the child's condition is possible after birth than before' and that infanticide is 
preferable to abortion. 241 This argument implies that if enough people with disabilities similar to the foetus's 
considered their lives worth living, the pregnancy must continue regardless of the mother's wishes. This 
unsustainable argument would reduce women to incubators. Most disabled people would predictably favour 
the life they have rather than no life. The resulting model would be distorted by the subjective bias of those 
who, because they have faced certain problems, feel they have an authoritative view upon such dilemmas in 
the lives of others. 242 
Whether predictions of health state after treatment should be used to choose between patients is problematic. 
If, as Harris says, `each life is valuable, '243 the model must be unworkable because it unfairly weights the 
decision in favour of the patient whose health state is closest to the norm. Nord indicates that in Norway there 
is a `strong adherence in general to the principle of equal entitlement to treatment' regardless of health state 
afterwards. 244 Nord criticises the failure to recognise that in most Westernised countries the general public see 
the lives of children as more valuable than other lives. 245 
It seems apparent that there is a difference between decision-making models (such as QALYs) which rely upon 
an estimation of patient health status with/without treatment and those relying upon a prediction of outcome 
but others may consider the two identical. The former seem to look for evidence of improvement in health state 
to something approaching `good health' and discriminate against those who will never enjoy `good health' 
because the underpinning principle is primarily an economic one. Outcomes research, in contrast, focuses 
upon collecting clinical data about various condition-treatment pairs and using this as a model to inform the 
decision. The underpinning principle is primarily scientific. However, more openness about who is included 
in studies of outcomes is needed. For instance, the tendency to withhold resuscitation from elderly patients is 
based on aggregate results of survival to discharge even though there is evidence that survival to discharge and 
survival up to three years post discharge for certain conditions is just as good in elderly patients as younger 
ones. 246 
Treatment decisions based upon scientific evidence are probably more acceptable to doctors. The difficulty is 
... Brahams D, Brahams M. The Arthur Case -a proposal for legislation. J. Med Ethics 1983; 9: 12-16. 
240See, for instance: Davis A. A right to life of handicapped. (letter) J. Med Ethics 1983; 9: 181. 
241Fairbairn G. Enforced life: enforced death. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 144-9 at p145. 
242This criticism can be levelled at Fairbairn himself whose views have obviously been framed by his own experiences concerning the birth of 
a child whose disabilities were incompatible with life and for whom he wishes infanticide had been an option rather than a mere omission to treat 
curatively: Fairbairn, op cit n241, at p146. 
-"Harris J. QALYfying the value of life. J. Med. Ethics 1987; 13: 123. 
244Nord E. The relevance of health state after treatment in prioritising between different patients. J. Med. Ethics 1993; 19: 37-42 at p39. 
245Ibid. This would apply in this country and also in Sweden according to Nord (at p41). 
246Rosin AJ, Sonnenblick M. Autonomy and paternalism in geriatric medicine: The Jewish ethical approach to issues of feeding terminally ill 
patients, and to cardiopulmonary resuscitation. J.. 11ed. Ethics 1998; 24: 44-8. 
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for doctors to realise when their dedication to good science is being consciously or unconsciously affected by 
economic values. In the U. S. A., a federal agency researches medical outcomes following different treatment 
interventions and develops practice guidelines to guide future treatment decisions. 24' It has identified that the 
way physicians determine need for hospitalisation, via a clinical threshold `test', depends upon the supply of 
beds. Thus a lack of resources can produce either cost-effective practice or a lowering of clinical standards, 
for instance, by accepting that the patient may do less well outside hospital. 24' As Wennberg expressed it, `the 
rules governing the use of hospitals... are thus determined more by behavioural accommodation to the available 
supply than by recognised medical theory'. 249 This `behavioural accommodation' can be unconscious and is 
then possibly most dangerous. 25° One aspect of the 1991 reforms was to modify clinical practice so that 
ultimately an acceptance of limited resources would enter doctors' psyche. This is worrying because it means 
patients may not be told all the available options, not because doctors are `playing God' but because they are 
unaware of their behavioural modification. 25' Stoll warns, `the presence of paternalism or prejudice may colour 
the doctor's presentation to the patient of the alternatives to hospitalisation, investigation or treatment. 1252 The 
invoking of therapeutic privilege to justify not involving the patient should be subject to a higher threshold than 
is currently evident. 253 Some of the consultants interviewed recognised this and expressed ethical concern over 
whether to tell patients particular treatments were available but they were not allowed to use them. Others were 
silent on the point which could mean that they saw no ethical need to provide full information about treatment 
options. This risk could be overcome by ensuring complete openness about what the clinical options are 
without considering costs. No one knows what demand there would be `if patients were fully informed of their 
options and if the probabilities of the various outcomes were presented to them comprehensively. '254 
5.2.4 The Responsible Body of Medical Opinion Model 
This model relies upon a peer approach to a particular decision-making problem. It is comforting since the 
English judiciary are reluctant to hold a doctor has made an error of judgment providing his or her actions are 
in accordance with a `responsible body of medical opinion'. Professional rules may receive judicial approval. "' 
Consequently, professional bodies often try to regulate everyday practice through guidelines. 256 Scientific 
knowledge is preferenced over laymanship. The guidelines model is a favourite tool of professionals, since they 
are the possessors and interpreters of their particular realm of learning, making it hard for outsiders to 
challenge. Dressing their expertise in quasi-rules makes it even harder. Rules carry authority. The rise of 
healthcare economics can be seen as a scientific (mathematical) challenge to medical science but it lacks the 
authority of professionalism. 25' Guidelines can be useful in educating practitioners regarding changes in 
.. 'The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. Wennberg J. E. Outcomes research, cost containment, and the fear of health care rationing. 
New Eng. J. Med. 1990; 323(17): 1202-4. It is probable that the new agency, NICE, has been modelled on this. 
248One of the consultants interviewed for this thesis indicated that lack ofhaemodialysis (in-hospital) slots meant patients were offered CAPD 
(continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis) as the `preferable' option. 
249Wennberg, op cit n247 at p1203. 
2'oThis point is recognised by Stoll who points out that `medical decision-making may... be based on subconscious value judgements. ': Stoll BA. 
Choosing between cancer patients. J. Med Ethicsl990; 16: 71-74 at p71. 
"'Stoll BA. Choosing between cancer patients. J. Med Ethics 1990; 16: 71-74. 
2521bid, at p72. 
'53 See: Florin D. `Do not resuscitate' orders: the need for a policy. J. Roy. Coll. Phys. 1993; 27,3: 135-8,135. 
254Wennberg, op cit n247 at p1203. 
'"For instance, Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99 which considered the use of Do Not Attempt Resuscitation orders. 
256The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health recently issued guidelines on withholding and withdrawing life-saving treatment in children. 
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Withholding or Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment in Children: A Framework for Practice. 
September 1997 RCPCH, London. Similarly, the British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing have issued guidelines on 
resuscitation and when it may be appropriate to either withhold any such attempt or when to cease: BMA. Decisions relating to 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation: A statementfrom the BMA and RCN in association with the Resuscitation Council (UK). 1999, BMA, London 
"'There are no Royal Colleges of Healthcare Economists. 
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thinking and practice. They may be ill-constructed or badly applied, for instance, used without thought25. or 
without due consideration to factors differing from the situation for which the guidelines were drafted. 259 The 
proposed healthcare reforms look set to validate the scientific model of decision-making with government 
support for clinical governance and the introduction of NICE to `produce clear guidance for clinicians'. 260 
Later in this thesis, current proposals for improving the decision-making process will be examined. However, 
it is worth examining the views of the Tavistock group which has produced the Appleton International 
Conference guidelines as possibly representative of the approach taken by doctors as a professional body. 26' 
Like most guidelines, it is useful in setting out good practice. However, it advocates that a doctor need not 
provide treatment if it entails `according to the norms of medical practice, loss of function, mutilation or pain 
disproportionate to benefit'. 262 This is unexceptional if the treatment requested were female circumcision. 263 
It is less clear that withholding treatment because of a prediction that the resulting pain will outweigh benefit 
is not simply `unbridled doctor paternalism'. 264 It is also problematic given that doctors' attitudes towards 
death can influence whether they are prepared to try to conquer it when the chances of success are minimal. 
If death is equated with `failure' some doctors prefer not to try rather than fail. 265 Also, despite objections, the 
Appleton guidelines state that `(d)octors have an obligation to try to provide treatment and care that will result 
in a peaceful, dignified and humane death with minimal suffering'. 266 To find a pro-euthanasia stance 
enshrined upon the views of only 62% of delegates seems inappropriate since guidelines are intended to shape 
the practice of those with less experience. 267 It could become a case of guidelines shaping medical ethics, and 
possibly the law, rather than the reverse. It advises that `substituted judgment' should be used with 
incompetent patients and only if this fails should the decision be made using the `best interests' approach. 268 
Given that English law requires decisions to be made in the patient's `best interests'269 the guidelines seem to 
attempt to shape the laws of countries taking differing approaches rather than reflecting the law as it is. This 
was possibly due to the lack of legal input. 270 Guidelines must reflect the law of the country in which they are 
being used otherwise decision-makers may find themselves outside the law even though their practice is in 
accordance with a reasonable body of their fellow professionals. 27 ' The Tavistock group likewise rejects `the 
thinking behind the `Baby Doe Rules' proposed by the US Federal Government'. 272 In contrast, the Hastings 
... See: Smith DH, Veatch RM, (Eds). Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care of the Dying: A Report by The 
Hastings Center. 1987 Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianopolis, U. S. A. at p13. 
... For example, two of the doctors interviewed for this thesis described the situation of a patient on ventilator support who `didn't quite meet the 
criteria for brain stem death' yet they wanted to turn off the ventilator despite this. 
... A First Class Service, op cit n2, para 1.15. What is not yet clear is which will take precedence when there is conflict, the scientific model or 
the cost-effectiveness model. 
"'Stanley J. M. The Appleton International Conference: developing guidelines for decisions to forgo life-prolonging medical treatment. 
J. Med. Ethics 1992; 18 Supplement. The guidelines are divided into four parts. Part I considers the situation of patients who have decision- 
making capacity or who have executed an advance directive (pp6-9). Part II relates to patients who lack decision-making capacity and who have 
not executed an advance directive (pp 10-12). Part III sets out guidelines for decisions where the patient has never had decision-making capacity 
(pp I3-15). Part IV concerns decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment `under conditions of scarcity' (ppl6-21). See also: Smith R. Shared 
ethical principles for everybody in healthcare: a working draft from the Tavistock Group. BMJ 1999; 318: 248-251 for a restatement of the ethical 
underpinning of the Tavistock group's guidelines. 
212Ibid, at p6 Part 1: 3b. 
263 Which is unlawful anyhow in both the U. K. and U. S. A. 
264See note 9 to Part 1 by Brady H. In Stanley J. M. The Appleton International Conference: developing guidelines 
for decisions to forgo life- 
prolonging medical treatment. J. Med. Ethics 1992; 18 Supplement at p8. 
26SHarper W. The role of futility judgments in improperly limiting the scope of clinical research. J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 308-313 at p311. 
266 Stanley, op cit n261 at p6. 
267Ibid, at p7. Caution needs to attend the development of any such guidelines by NICE. 
268 In other words, if it impossible to make a decision based on the exploration of `what would the patient 
decide for him/herself? ' then the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are given paramountcy. 
269The position taken by English courts is discussed in the next chapter. 
270It is worth noting the finding, reported later, that a number of the consultants interviewed for this thesis rejected the concept of 
lawyers or 
ethicists having a legitimate input 
into such debates. 
27 'In other words, they would not be acting `negligently': Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
'72 Stanley. op cit n261 at pp14-15. The `Baby Doe Rules' rejected quality of life judgments as a basis of making decisions. 
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Center guidelines state categorically that they have been `attentive to the state of the law' and continue: 'these 
Guidelines are no substitute for legal advice and users of this document should find out how the law in their 
jurisdiction bears on the recommendations'. 273 Whilst comment is acceptable it seems uncompromisingly 
autocratic for any group to promulgate rules directly conflicting with a democratically-elected legislature. 
Clinicians must accept that society may not agree with them. 
The last section of the Tavistock guidelines recognises that life-sustaining treatment may be withheld by 
government agencies because of a shortage of resources274 or costs outweighing benefits. 27' Although it is 
clearly the intention of the authors to create guidelines in this area it is merely, at present, a reflective 
statement. For any guideline to be compelling, the group devising it must have the authority to ensure 
compliance27' otherwise it is merely a recommendation from one group, whose views may or may not be worth 
considering, to another which has discretion to follow or ignore this advice. 2 ' 
Doctors are unlikely to act contrary to guidelines issued by their professional body. 278 The present government 
is aiming to utilise this by involving doctors in a scientific search to discover which treatments are clinically 
effective. Their main value is as `an indication to everyone concerned that decisions about the use of 
technology should depend on explicit policies, rather than on the intuition or prejudice of individual 
clinicians'. 27' However, even where there is good data supporting a particular treatment approach, there can 
be clinicians who would ignore data that `conflicted with some vague concept of what they considered (or 
believed others might consider) to be good ethical medical practice'. 28° 
5.3 Ethical Models 
Unlike the politico-economic or medical models, the models discussed in this section are patient-centred and 
underpinned by social values and ethical principles such as autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. 28' 
5.3.1 Patient preference 
Patient preference is an important model. If the patient has decision-making capacity their preferences should 
be considered but even if they lack capacity weight can be accorded to what their preferences might be via 
devices such as advance directives, deciding `in the patient's best interests' or `substituted judgment'. 
"'Smith DH, Veatch RM, (Eds). Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care of the Dying: A Report by The 
Hastings Center. 1987 Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianopolis, U. S. A. at p3. 
Z'4 Both financial and material shortages eg. organs for transplantation or hospital beds. 
. '. Stanley, op cit n261 at p16. 
276The professional body can compel its members under threat of sanctions for non-compliance. 
277 Under the 1990 reforms, the power of the healthcare purchasers was derived from the authority vested in the Secretary of State 
for Health by 
Parliament. 
278The BMA recently issued guidance on the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment. BMA Withholding and 
Withdrawing Life- 
prolonging Medical Treatment. 
June 1999 BMA, London. These guidelines are examined in detail in a later chapter. 
279.1ennett B. `Medical Technology, Social and Healthcare Issues'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, 
Chichester pp861-884 at p871. 
'"Ibid. 
28'Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics 4"' Edn. 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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5.3.1.1 Autonomous Patients 
The principle of autonomy upholds the concept that patients should make their own healthcare decisions. It 
can be seen as a `form of personal liberty of action, where the individual determines his [sic] own course of 
action in accordance with a plan based on his own thoughts and decisions'. 282 Spriggs suggests that `(a)s 
autonomous agents we are "essentially purposive" and we seek ways to effect our short and long term goals'. 283 
Such an agent is `independent, rational and possesses personal integrity'. 284 Regarding validity of consent, it 
requires that the patient be informed about treatment options, side effects and risks. 285 Patients should also be 
informed if treatment options are restricted on cost grounds since otherwise their ability to act autonomously 
is compromised. 28' However, Hall's proposed `dignitary tort' that would require express prior consent to 
rationing and treatment-limiting decisions over-emphasises individual rights and encourages litigation. 28' The 
alternative, a presumption that NHS users give implied consent to rationing, is equally unattractive when 
regional variations exist. A balance between individual autonomy and societal interests within a resource like 
the NHS is needed. 
Assessing whether a patient has the requisite capacity to act autonomously is problematic. 288 The doctrine of 
informed consent is based on a recognition that autonomy is vitally important. Those who have capacity should 
be enabled to have their views heard. In today's technological world it seems barbaric that anyone's views 
should be ignored because of surmountable communication barriers. 28' With the Western world facing a huge 
movement of displaced people ways to enhance communication within a healthcare setting need to be actively 
sought. The patient might find it hard to understand why the doctor held back from providing treatment. 290 
Occasionally a patient may request treatment which the doctor opposes but there is no compulsion for the 
doctor to comply. The patient's preference has little weight even when the choice is between curative treatment 
and palliative because often the full range of treatment options is not disclosed to the patient when the doctor 
has decided that evidence, or experience, is against continuing active treatment. The doctrine of `therapeutic 
privilege' may be relied upon by the doctor both to protect the patient and to prevent requests for 
`inappropriate' treatment to be given. 29' However, patient preference may be met if treatment is funded 
privately suggesting evidence-based practice or `practice in accordance with a responsible body of medical 
opinion' may be displaced by the desire to generate income. 292 Geographical divisions in healthcare provision 
282Greaves DA. Can compulsory removal ever be justified for adults who are mentally competent? J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 189-194 at 191. 
283Spriggs M. Autonomy in the face of a devastating diagnosis. J. Med. Ethics 1998: 24: 123-126 at p124. 
284Ibid. 
285However, the amount of information given is not necessarily comprehensive: see, for example, Sidaway v Board of Governors ofthe Bethlem 
Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871. 
216Harris RA, Nease RF. The importance of patient preferences for comorbidities in cost-effectiveness analyses. J. Health Economics 
1997; 16: 113-9. 
287Hall MA. Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions. The Millbank Quarterly 1993; 71,4: 645-668 at p661. 
288The legal approach to capacity is considered in the next chapter. 
289Stephen Hawking's computerised voice is well-known to millions of people. Many other patients with similar disabilities do not have access 
to the same technology. 
29"The author of this thesis was recently told by a midwife of a Kosovan refugee woman who was in labour. The baby's heartbeat started to 
weaken and the team knew they had to perform an emergency Caesarian section to save it. The woman spoke no English. Her husband knew 
a few words but the obstetrician and midwives were unable to explain what was needed so he could translate. The British Telecom translation 
service had been contacted as had the hospital interpreter but after 40 minutes they were still waiting. Eventually the obstetrician went ahead 
without consent but it was too late to save the baby's life. 
"'For example, Wear and Logue describe a patient whose quality of life seemed intolerably poor yet she continued to refuse to allow a Do Not 
Resuscitate order being made. Her `preference' was for the life she had rather than no life at all. Wear S, Logue G. The Problem of Medically 
Futile Treatment: Falling Back on a Preventative Ethics Approach. J. Clinical Ethics 1995; 6,2: 138-148 at p142. 
292See, for example, Devettere R. Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics: Cases and Concepts 1995 Georgetown University Press, 
Washington DC at pp 181-182 and Ham C, McIlver S, ContestedDecisions: Priority Setting in the NHS 2000 King's Fund Publishing, London 
at p13. 
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may mean that patient preference is met in one area but not in another. Who the patient's consultant is can 
also be important. There can be apparently identical patients on the same ward receiving very different 
treatment. Patient preference will be met when it concurs with the doctor's opinion. Weir believes patients 
should proactively seek physicians `willing to adhere to their informed preferences' and be prepared to change 
physicians or... initiate legal action'. 293 If necessary they should `sign a waiver or release form'. 2' However, 
problems could arise when a patient has found a physician `buddy' but their shared views are out of step with 
accepted medical, ethical and legal opinion. 
Patient preference for certain treatment options often depends upon the patient's attitude to risks and benefits. 295 
This indicates that for the right choices to be made, the patient must be actively involved in the decision- 
making process and given the necessary information to weigh up risks and benefits for him/herself. Wennberg 
demands a model of healthcare that `disentangles the preferences of the patient from those of the physician'. 296 
The model should also `disentangle' patient preferences from those of health care managers. 
Some autonomous patients may refuse treatment - their preference differs from the doctor's opinion. Some 
refusals are based on religious beliefs and, even where the treatment is life-saving, will usually be upheld in 
this country. 29' In such situations, the patient preference model is paramount even though it is tantamount to 
suicide. Some would question whether a refusal of life-saving treatment on religious grounds can ever be valid 
due to the allegedly `controlling' nature of some religious groups. 29' It seems clear that society accepts that 
enforcing treatment, when there is no threat to public safety, constitutes excessive use of state power and 
illegitimate interference with the privacy of the individual. Weir favours supporting autonomy by informing 
patients `about the legal right to refuse medical treatment'. 29' However, whilst society (via its courts) may 
accept a competent patient's refusal of treatment, the clinician whose expertise has been rejected may be 
inclined to consider that the patient was, after all, incompetent and so may try to enforce his/her views on the 
patient. "' A sensitive exploration of whether the stated views are really the patient's own may be acceptable. "' 
`Bullying' the patient is paternalistic rejection of patient autonomy. The acceptance that there should be no 
undue interference by the state has a pragmatic element. If the state is paying, it makes economic sense not 
to force treatment on reluctant patients unless refusal offends society in some way. 3oz 
293Weir RF. Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients: Ethical and Legal Limits to the Medical Prolongation of Life. 1989 Oxford 
University Press, Oxford at p100. 
294Ibid. 
295Wennberg J. E. Outcomes research, cost containment, and the fear of health care rationing. New Eng. J. Med. 1990; 323,17: 1202-4 at p 1202. 
296Loc cit. 
297For instance, an adult Jehovah's Witness's refusal of a blood transfusion will not be overturned as a rule by the courts although this principle 
is not always absolute as will be discussed in a later chapter. 
29 Muramoto O. Bioethics of the refusal of blood by Jehovah's Witnesses: part 1. Should bioethical deliberation consider dissidents' views. J. 
Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 223-230 and Muramoto O. Bioethics of the refusal of blood by Jehovah's Witnesses: part 2. A novel approach based on 
rational non-interventional paternalism. J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 295-301. A response is provided by Malyon who argues that `faith transcends 
rationality'. Malyon D. Transfusion-free treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses: respecting the autonomous patient's rights. J. Med. Ethics 
1998; 24: 302-307. 
299Weir, op cit n263, at p100. 
JOCSee, for instance, Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728 and W ilks I. The debate over risk-related standards 
of competence. Bioethics 1997; 11,5: 413-426, in particular at p413. See also, the discussion in Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) 
[2000] 2 FLR 389 at pp403H-404A per Thorpe LJ. 
301The author of the thesis was told of a mother who had just given birth to her fourth child and suffered a post-partum haemorrhage. With 
her 
family present she refused blood and received non-blood products which were not expected to be sufficient to save her life. When alone she 
admitted that she did not want to die because 
her children needed her but if she had the transfusions she would be an outcast and her husband 
and family would not let her see her children. A way to carry out secret transfusions overnight without the 
family or any other patients knowing 
was found and the woman recovered. 
Personal communication. 
302 Examples of refusals which might be held to offend society are the refusal of pregnant women to agree to clinically recommended Caesarean 
sections or the refusal by parents of minor children to allow 
life-saving treatment. What is considered offensive will depend upon the society in 
which the refusal is made. For instance, the refusal ofa young woman to be' circumcised' might offend against 
her culture and she may become 
an outcast. 
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The patient's religious views may affect his or her attitude towards medical treatment in other ways. It is 
important for healthcare providers to be aware of religious, cultural and developmental needs even though it 
may not be possible, for reasons of fairness to other users of state-funded services, to meet all these. 303 
Healthcare professionals also need to be aware of the ways their own beliefs or values may affect the way the} 
approach others. Different religions vary according to the weight given to the four principles of beneficence, 
non-maleficence, justice and autonomy because their underlying ethos is Christian. "' The decision making 
process may vary. The Jewish approach is said to be casuistic, therefore, each case should be considered on 
its own merits without `zealous adherence to general principles'. 305 Islam values the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence so the Moslem doctor's oath incorporates these and the principle of justice. Autonomy 
is a lesser concept... so paternalism is accepted because society requires a `focus on the family rather than the 
individual'. 30' Serour believes the doctor's duty to save lives and pursue medical knowledge means that 
advancement of medical technology can be put before patient welfare. 308 The doctor who tries to enhance 
patient autonomy and exclude the Moslem family may be causing offence. Decisions to withhold or withdraw 
treatment which will result in certain death are said to be particularly difficult for Moslems because the 
`(b)eneficence of God can be expected to save the patient until the last minute'. 309 According to Florida, the 
concept of autonomy is foreign to the Buddhist so decision-making models tend to be paternalistic. 31' However, 
there is a danger that doctors who rely upon selective accounts such as those given above may inadvertently 
offend or act in a discriminatory manner because they expect patient or families to act according to the `label' 
they have given them. " 
How cultural views affect a patient's life goals should be respected by the clinician and healthcare purchaser 
whose own views should be irrelevant, subject only to the proviso that no one should be forced to provide 
treatment s/he disagrees with. 312 Some patients request `inappropriate' treatment on religious grounds. "' 
Classifying certain treatments, or continuation of active therapy, as `inappropriate' introduces bias into the 
decision-making process overly weighting some implied `norm' at the expense of the genuine belief of the 
patient or his/her family. 314 Orr and Genesen consider that religious beliefs are more than personal preferences 
because they represent certain extrinsic values but because they are concerned with the meaning of life they 
are more `intrinsic' than other community values. 31' This suggests that strongly-held personal religious beliefs 
should be given `serious consideration' by clinicians and the possibility that a certain approach to treatment 
3o' Terry L, Campbell A. Hearing Children's Voices. A paper presented at The Third Annual Trevor Clay Memorial Conference, Philosophy 
in Nursing, 15 September 2000, Middlesex University. See also: Terry L, Campbell A. Hearing Children's Voices: Are We Listening? British 
Journal of Nursing (forthcoming - accepted for publication 27 February 2001). 
3o4Raanon Gillon, for his Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester, invited a variety of contributors to explain how 
their particular religion viewed the four principles. 
305Steinberg A. `A Jewish perspective on the Four Principles'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester 
pp65-73 at 66. 
306Serour GI. `Islam and the Four Principles'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp75-91 at 
80-81 & 86. See also, the approval of the casuistic approach given in Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1 at p 117F 
per Walker U. 
307Hasan KZ. `Islam and the Four Principles: a Pakistani View'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, 
Chichester pp 93-103 at p97. 
3o8Serour GI. `Islam and the Four Principles'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp75-91 at 
p87. 
"Hasan, op cit n307, at p100. 
""Florida RE. `Buddhism and the Four Principles'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp 105- 
116atpl11. 
"'Terry & Campbell, op cit n303- 
112 In some cases, English law protects doctors by means of a statutory prohibition on certain types of `religious' treatment such as female 
circumcision: The Prohibition on Female Circumcision Act 1985. 
'Orr RD, Genesen LB. Requests for `inappropriate' treatment based on religious beliefs. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 142-147. 
3Albid. 
"'Ibid. 
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may be appropriate for that individual be accepted. 316 
5.3.1.2 Patients without capacity 
With incompetent patients, decisions may be based upon an assessment of their best interests. Underpinning 
the best interests approach is a balancing of the benefits and burdens of treatment. The principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence are more significant when the patient is unable to exercise autonomy. The 
decision-makers may be the parents/legal guardians of a child, doctors or the judiciary. 3 ' It has been 
recognised that `the decision-maker's impression of that patient's experience... may well be inaccurate'. "' 
Thus, the `best interests' assessment may have no correlation with patient preferences if s/he was able to 
communicate them. Decision-makers may be guided by what they imagine the patient would feel to be his/her 
best interests and inadvertently may reflect their own preferences rather than the patient's. The possibility of 
one person accurately deciding what is in another's best interests when s/he has no knowledge of that 
individual's subjective experience is merely a convenient fiction. The degree of closeness of the two parties 
may affect the quality of the assessment. When a parent makes decisions on behalf of a child, the child's life 
experiences and family goals and preferences are known although the child's subjective interpretation of these 
experiences and reflective criticism of family preferences may be unknown. 31' So, although `best interests' 
focuses on discovering what is `sufficient' for the incompetent patient, it is important to recognise that such 
decisions are not neutral. They necessarily involve making a value-laden judgment about another's life which 
generally means making a quality of life judgment. The decision-maker is rarely unable to avoid projecting 
onto that judgment his/her own views as to what is an acceptable quality of life. 32' Such views might also 
incorporate an assessment of the degree of risk to the doctor in adopting one course of action or another. 
Personal risk assessment may affect whether the doctor concludes a patient is competent. 32' 
An alternative to determining the `best interests' of an individual is to use `substituted judgment'. This model 
relies upon the decision-maker asking what preferences would the patient express if able to do so. It has been 
strongly criticised in light of the conceptual difficulties it raises. 322 Like the `best interests' model, quality of 
life issues are heavily weighted. Actual use of both models indicates that `best interests' and `substituted 
judgment' overlap and both are, at times, unsatisfactory compromises. 323 
Some countries allow the appointment of a proxy decision-maker to act in the event of the (adult) patient 
"'Ibid, at p146. See also: Gillon R. Imposed separation of conjoined twins - moral hubris by the English courts? J. Med. Ethics 2001: 27: 3-4 
3 "See discussion in the next chapter regarding legal issues surrounding decision-making for incompetent patients. 
""Elliott C, Elliott B. From the patient's point of view: medical ethics and the moral imagination. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 173-8 at p176. 
3191t is submitted that even very young children will have made some sort of evaluation as to whether they consider certain family 
goals/preferences acceptable to them and have some awareness of what feels right for them even though the language of identification and 
evaluation is still closed to them: Terry & Campbell, op cit n303. 
320See, for instance: B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), Re [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
12'Wilks I. The debate over risk-related standards of competence. Bioethics 1997; 11,5: 413-426 at ppl9-24. 
''=See. for instance, ElliottC, Elliott B. From the patient's point ofview: medical ethics and the moral imagination. J.. 11ed. Ethics 1991; 17: 173-8. 
Also, Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Laie Text and Materials 3rd Edn 2000 Butterworths, London at pp831-842. 
323See Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [ 1991 ] Fam 33 and Superintendent ofBelchertown State School v Joseph Saikewicz Mass 
370 NE 2d 417 (1977). 
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becoming incompetent, temporarily or permanently. 324 In England, this is currently under review. " Providing 
the proxy is 'faithful.. . to the person's 
intentions and values'326 the concept offers advantages over the often ad 
hoc system whereby clinicians seek to discover what the patient would have wanted by asking the most 
available or most assertive relative. However, neither advance directives nor proxy decision-makers can force 
a doctor to provide illegal, futile or inappropriate treatment since incompetent patients cannot be placed in a 
better position than competent ones. 327 There is a clear distinction between proxy decisions and those made 
in a patient's `best interests' or using `substituted judgment'. The proxy can make the decision as s/he thinks 
fit, not necessarily in the person's best interests328 nor by attempting intellectual gymnastics so as to make the 
decision as the incompetent person would if not incompetent. English law requires decisions to be in the 
patient's best interests whoever makes them. 329 Sometimes parents seem to act as proxies rather than in their 
child's `best interests' particularly where they have the interests of two children to consider. 33' Delaney 
describes bone-marrow donations by siblings of children with leukaemia as `altruism by proxy'. 331 
The use of a proxy offers advantages over advance directives since s/he will be able to accommodate advances 
in medical technology and changes in the patient's views although both are fraught with difficulties. People's 
views change regarding both treatment and proxy, though these difficulties are avoidable by regular up-dating 
of the documentation. The uncertain doctor may have to fall back on the `best interests' model. 
5.3.2 The `Do No Harm' Model 
Non-maleficence has ancient roots but is highly relevant today when patients are quick to blame doctors for 
any outcome differing from the one expected. The `do no harm' model has four significant strands. One 
relates to how incompetent patients are to be cared for which has already been discussed. The next relates to 
iatrogenic illness which is an even greater problem now than when Illich shocked the medical world in 1976.332 
The third relates to the practice of defensive medicine and the last to prohibitions on euthanasia, female 
circumcision and similar treatments. 
Few doctors wish to deliberately harm their patients. 333 Some may negligently harm patients and will be subject 
32. Proxy decision-makers may also be known as `surrogate decision-makers' or `medical attorneys'. The closest English law currently has 
regarding medical treatment are the (limited) powers given to the `nearest relative' under the Mental Health Act 1983. However, see 
discussion 
of reform proposals later in this thesis. 
325At present, continuing powers of attorney can be executed allowing control of financial affairs but not medical. In 1988 a 
Working Party of 
King's College, London reported on `living wills' and enduring powers ofattorney as means to achieve continued patient autonomy: 
The Living 
Will: Consent to Treatment at the End of Life. See also: Law Commission Report No 231: Mental Incapacity Law Commission for England 
and Wales 1995 HMSO, London; Lord Chancellor's Department. Who Decides? Making Decisions on 
Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated 
Adults. (Cm 3803) December 1998. The Stationery Office, London and Lord Chancellor's Department. Making Decisions on BehalfofMentally 
Incapacitated Adults. (Cm 4465) October 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
326May WE, McGivney MJ. Making Healthcare Decisions For Others. Ethics and Medics 1997; 22: 6. 
327 Law Commission for England and Wales. Report No 231: Mental Incapacity 1995 HMSO, London Part V: Advance Statements about 
Healthcare at p67. 
... Although English law, as discussed in the next chapter, requires the decision to be made in the patient's `best interests' a proxy decision-maker 
theoretically should have the freedom to make the decision just as the patient would and not all decisions people make 
for themselves are in their 
best interests. 
329Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112. 
'30Such decisions are particularly hard in the unusual case of conjoined (Siamese) twins: Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) 
[2001 ] 
1 FLR 1. 
"'Delaney L et al. Altruism by proxy: volunteering children for bone marrow donation. BMJ 1996; 312: 240-3. 
"=Illich I. Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis - The Expropriation of Health. 1976 Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
i.. Harold Shipman, convicted of murdering several of his patients, is an exception. Rv Shipman (2000) unreported. See also: Watson R, Ford 
R. Murdered patients toll may climb to 345. The Times 6 January 2001. 
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to legal and professional sanctions . 
334 Most try hard to avoid harming their patients by being aware of 
treatment risks and by considering, often with their patients, how these balance against treatment benefits. 
However, doctors may abuse their powers by excluding patients from discussions about treatment futility. 335 
The desire to protect the patient from harm inherent in the doctrine of therapeutic privilege (or 'therapeutic 
deceit"") may be employed inappropriately. Paternalism may oust autonomy. 337 Confronting the patient with 
the news of his or her impending death may be seen as destroying hope in some cultures so the patient may be 
excluded from talks about how death should occur. 338 The assumption that the patient will be harmed by being 
given unpleasant information is problematic. It requires assessing, often on the basis of limited contact, 
whether an individual is psychologically robust. The inability to settle `secular and spiritual' matters may be 
more harmful. 339 
The problem of iatrogenic illness is beyond the scope of this thesis. It can be seen as evidence not just of dirty 
and under-resourced hospitals but also as evidence of over-treatment of patients. Treating iatrogenic illnesses 
is costly. 3ao 
The practice of defensive medicine is possibly increasing in this country due to fears of litigation. 34' The doctor 
may continue treatment longer than appropriate because of fears of being sued (or even threats of violence from 
the patient's family). 342 The development of guidelines by the Royal Colleges provides reassurance in such 
situations that the doctor has a responsible body of medical opinion supporting him or her. 3a3 The doctor's fear 
of being sued may have positive benefits for the patient. The doctor may take extra trouble to ensure s/he has 
up-to-date information regarding the patient's condition and possible treatment options. 344 S/he may more fully 
inform the patient when obtaining consent. Thus, defensive practice can be improved practice. Patient 
autonomy can gain precedence over a more paternalistic approach to care. 
Finally, the `do no harm' model can be seen as underpinning the prohibitions on euthanasia and other 
controversial treatments. Particularly when the patient is a child, it is important to ensure no harm results. 
When a child with Down's syndrome has `corrective' surgery the benefits are said to be better integration into 
society. 345 However, the child loses his or her own face. This can never be restored and may, in time, be seen 
as a harm that should never have been allowed to occur. Children who received growth hormone rather than 
being encouraged to accept shortness of stature and meet the challenges society presents are now dying as a 
334See, for example, criticisms of the General Medical Council over its failure to take early disciplinary action against Dr Rodney Ledward and 
Mr Richard Neale. Marsh B. GMC in dock over second gynaecologist: Another `butcher' doctor. Daily Mail 10 June 2000. 
335Zucker MB, Zucker HD. Medical futility and the evaluation of life-sustaining interventions. 1997 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
at p13. 
1. Tassano F. The Power of Life or Death: a Critique of Medical Tyranny. 1995 Duckworth, London at p32. 
"'See, for instance, Muramoto O. Bioethics of the refusal of blood by Jehovah's Witnesses: part 2. A novel approach based on rational non- 
interventional paternalism. J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 295-301; Pang M-c. S. Protective truthfulness: the Chinese way of safeguarding patients in 
informed treatment decisions. J. Med. Ethics 1999; 25: 247-253; Rosin AJ, Sonnenblick M. Autonomy and paternalism in geriatric medicine: The 
Jewish ethical approach to issues of feeding terminally ill patients, and to cardiopulmonary resuscitation. J. Med. Ethics 1998; 24: 44-8 and Eiger 
BS and Chevrolet J-C (Commentators). Case Study: Beneficence Today or Autonomy (Maybe) Tomorrow? Hastings Center Report 
2000; 30,1: 18-19. 
"BAsai A et al. Medical decisions concerning the end of life: a discussion with Japanese physicians. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 323-7. 
"'Downie RS, Telfer E. Caring and Curing: A philosophy of medicine and social work. 1980 Methuen & Co., Ltd., London at p62. 
'4OHawkes N. Doctors' errors `cost 40,000 lives a year'. The Times 20 December 1999. 
34 'Outstanding medical negligence claims allegedly total £2.8 billion. National Audit Office. See also: Our Medical Correspondent. Surgeons 
`may drop high-risk patients'. The Times 7 September 1999. 
142Knecht J. `He is too young to die... and you too, doctor'. J. Med. Ethics 1999; 25: 418. 
34'See discussion earlier in this chapter. 
144 The legal issues regarding consent will be discussed in the next chapter. 
345The fact that the child still has the characteristic shape of head which means that even before the face is seen the child (or adult) can be 
recognised as having Down's seems 
irrelevant to the doctors who perform this surgery. 
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result. 14' Regarding abortion, healthcare professionals can opt out of involvement and a number find the 
deliberate taking of life, even though it is in the early stages of a pregnancy, to be against their conscience. 
Euthanasia is seen as murder under English law. 347 However, some argue that to preserve life of intolerable 
pain is inhumane and a greater harm results through not allowing physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. 348 
Certain treatments are very controversial and can be seen as potentially damaging not only the individual but 
also wider society. 
Lord Devlin was firmly convinced that the law should operate at any time when the `reasonable man' feels 
`disgust' - `(t)he vast majority of people in this country still believe that certain practices are morally wrong 
and are content that they should be forbidden by the law as such'_349 However, feeling `disgust' is not proof 
of immorality. It could lead to the preferencing of ill-thought, ill-informed responses over educated views. 
This view would mean that certain procedures should be banned, such as gender reassignment, transgenic 
transplants and amputations of healthy limbs. Freeman suggests that arguments for taking account of the 
disgust factor in legislation, as advocated by the Warnock Committee, have been decisively overturned. 3so The 
law should command public respect but it is difficult for the public to understand why female circumcision is 
prohibited yet the total removal of external reproductive organs is allowable. 
5.3.3 Social Etiquette Models 
Some models seemed based on an interpretation of how society works or should work. Consequently, treatment 
decisions can be made according to general courtesy (respect for others); length of time in the queue ('wait your 
turn'); whether the patient deserves treatment ('you get what you deserve'/'you've only got what was coming 
to you') or the rights of individuals within a democracy. 
5.3.3.1 Respecting Others 
The `respect for persons' model of decision-making is one of the most important in a multi-cultural society 
although Campbell's critique reveals the difficulties in the suggestion that `moral' actions are those which are 
based upon respect for other persons. 35' Each person has value and should be respected regardless of race, 
religion, class, age, disability etc. 352 Other's goals and objectives are as valuable as one's own. Consequently, 
no patient has the right to insist that a doctor carries out treatment s/he opposes. 353 This model also holds that 
no doctor can force a medical intervention on a patient except in certain, restricted circumstances because the 
liberty of one should not be interfered with unless it is to prevent a restriction upon the liberty of others and 
346The growth hormone was taken from the pituitary gland of newly deceased adults some of whom had been suffering from senile dementia. 
These children, twenty years on, have now been found in some cases to have developed an early, fatal senility called Creutzfeld Jacob disease 
(CJD). This is not the variant CJD being found in some young people which is being associated with Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (mad cow 
disease). 
3471n America, Dr Jack Kevorkian has recently been convicted of murder. The charge resulted from a video he made of himself injecting three 
compounds into a patient to cause death. For an interesting documentary which includes this video see: Channel 4 TV Appointment with Dr 
Death. 14 June 1999. 
348The discussion of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
349Devlin P: The Enforcement of Morals. 1965 Oxford University Press, London at p125. 
350The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 to a certain extent reflects this view that whatever causes disgust in the reasonable man 
(or Warnock Committee member) should be legislated against. See: Freeman MDA: Medicine, Ethics and the Law: Current Legal Problems 
1988 Stevens & Sons, London at p17. 
15 'Campbell AV. Moral Dilemmas in Medicine. 3rd Edn. 1984 Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh at pp86-105. 
352Not, for example, treated simply as cannon fodder for an army the lack of which was one of the principal reasons the state started to take an 
interest in healthcare in this country. 
353Although a duty to refer the patient to another doctor may exist. 
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then it should only be restricted so far as is necessary to ensure all have equal liberty. "' Where liberty, in terms 
of freedom to participate fully in society, is restricted through ill-health or disability, the health care system 
should seek to redress the imbalance. In contrast, utilitarianism permits inequality in health and inequality 
of treatment because it seeks merely to maximise overall welfare. 
Although equal respect is a sound model for healthcare delivery, it is not clear that respect for others is the 
`motivating factor behind all doctoring' nor how far respect for others extends. "' The equal respect model may 
suggest that patients whose illness is a consequence of smoking should receive equal care as if their illness were 
not self-induced. The difficulty with this is that the costs of treating avoidable self-induced conditions may 
unfairly impinge upon the liberty of others to receive treatment bearing in mind the limited resources available. 
The self-abuser has failed to treat others within society with respect. Whether this should lead to a reduction 
in care is problematic. 356 
Balanced against the possibility of reducing care is the `central obligation' of non-abandonment. Quill and 
Cassel argue that this is an under-emphasised aspect of being a physician. 35' They suggest that it is 
`particularly mandated' by two aspects of modern medicine. First, the prevalence of chronic illness where 
ethics must move beyond short-term decision-making to `establishing a relationship grounded in continuity, 
realistic expectations and a shared understanding of goals and values'. 35' Second, the changing healthcare 
environment and the new emphasis on `managed care systems' and `approaches to cost containment'. 35' Quill 
and Cassel believe that recognition of an obligation of non-abandonment would `focus attention on the most 
vulnerable individual persons and groups and would encourage health care professionals to struggle on their 
behalf. "' Quill and Cassel believe non-abandonment is most closely related to the principle of beneficence 
but it seems more properly conceptualised as respect for others. 36' However, the obligation cannot be accepted 
as meaning that all that can be done, should be done, which the maxim, `where there's life, there's hope' 
suggests. 362 Respect for persons means working together, as doctor and patient, to discover the right treatment 
decisions. A major difficulty arises with the concept of respect for persons: what is a person/personhood? At 
what point does personhood which must be respected arise and when is it lost? There is no definitive answer. 363 
The principle of autonomy can be seen as a direct derivative of the concept of respect for personhood. 36a 
3 "For instance, in the case of mental illness (a patient sectioned under s3 Mental Health Act 1983 can be treated for their mental illness without 
consent for the first 3 months) or with certain infectious diseases the patient can be hospitalised and treated under the Public Health (Control of 
Disease) Act 1984. In some cases, pregnant women have been forced to undergo Caesarean sections against their wishes: Rv St George's 
Healthcare NHS Trust ex pS [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
... Mason & McCall Smith op cit n43 at p7. 
"'See the discussion below regarding `just deserts' and government strategies outlined by the Secretary of State for Health in Saving Lives: Our 
Healthier Nation (Cm 4386) 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
357Quill TE, Cassel CK. Nonabandonment: A Central Obligation for Physicians. Trends in Health Care, Law and Ethics 1995; 10,1-2: 25-32. 
... Ibid, at p25. 
's9Ibid. 
360Ibid, at p29. 
361 For the same reason I disagree with Pellegrino's suggestion that the only way Quill and Cassel's theory can work is to accept non-abandonment 
as a principle in its own right, which he argues defeats their thesis. See: Pellegrino ED. Nonabandonment: An 
Old Obligation Revisited. Annals 
of Internal Medicine 1995; 122,5: 377-8. 
362'Ita quinquam derelinquatis aegros, semper sperate salutem' (Never give up with a patient, where there's life there's hope): Reilly M: Some 
Plymouth Worthies (Part 2) 0 West of England Medical J. 1990; 105(ii): 48-50 at p50. 
36'These questions arose in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 and also in Re. 4 (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [200111 FLR 
1. 
364 Robertson DW. Ethical theory, ethnography, and differences between doctors and nurses in approaches to patient care. J. Med. Ethics 
1996; 22: 292-299. 
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5.3.3.2 Queuing Time 
Individual GPs and consultants can prioritise the patient on basis of need but there will still be a waiting period. 
Political manipulation of waiting times can lead to problems in service delivery. The admissions system takes 
little account of patient welfare or ability to benefit. Mason and McCall Smith suggest that the public may 
prefer this method of allocation. 365 In reality, it is injustice masquerading as justice since the queuing system 
can be manipulated by knowledgeable patients. The judiciary uphold the lottery model if the alternative means 
making an order requiring that a particular patient received a certain resource, regardless of other demands 
for that resource. 
366 
Because British hospitals mostly operate a `turnstile' system, once a patient has been admitted to hospital, if 
some other aspect of health then deteriorates, treatment is received for that as well as for the admitting cause. 36' 
Thus, there is a lottery favouring certain people over those whose condition is possibly as serious but who are 
still awaiting admission. 36' Langford suggests that two criteria exist for deciding who gets a scarce resource: 
medical prognosis and medical emergency and the latter `takes precedence'. 369 It should be questioned whether 
it is right to always give the emergency precedence. Langford suggests that where patients are partly to blame 
for their condition, under the consideration of medical prognosis, although `a past fault would not be ground 
for discrimination,... a present condition, for example of continuing alcoholism, could be if it rendered medical 
prognosis poor'. 37° The difficulty is that when a medical emergency occurs, the amount of information 
available to guide the decision-making process is often limited and so some patients may receive treatment by 
default. 3 ' 
The queuing system can also be subject to geographical variations. 372 In the U. S. A. the allocation of donor 
organs has been subject to prioritisation on the basis of need within a local area first, then a regional and finally 
a national level. 373 This can be seen as `taking care of one's own'. 374 It is discriminatory, and potentially 
socially divisive, particularly if `one's own' prioritised one racial, cultural or ethnic group to the exclusion of 
others. 37' Geographical preferences can easily become personal preferences which damage society and vice 
versa. 
The NHS Plan introduces maximum waiting time guarantees. 37' Similar guarantees are provided in Norway 
subject to the individual patient meeting certain criteria rather than the blanket approach proposed in the UK. 3 ' 
"'Mason JK, McCall Smith RA. Law and Medical Ethics 4th Edn. 1994 Butterworths, London at p263. 
166Ibid, at p264 (discussion of Re J(a minor)(child in care: medical treatment) [1993] Fam 15. 
"'Given the extent of iatrogenic illness this is perhaps comforting for patients: Illich I. Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis - The expropriation 
of health. 1976 Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
168This can be particularly galling for clinicians who have patients needing admission but another patient has a crisis, particularly if it was partly 
self-induced. For instance, as one consultant interviewed related, older people on coach trips may decide not to take their diuretics before 
travelling in case they need to pass urine before the coach reaches a stopping point. When they develop chest pains as a result and have to be 
admitted to hospital they take priority over local residents. 
369Langford MJ. Who gets the kidney machine? J. Med. Ethics 1992; 18: 12-17 at p12. 
3701bid, at p13 - his emphases. 
"'For instance, there maybe insufficient data concerning a patient who has had a cardiac arrest to support a decision not to attempt resuscitation. 
In such cases the `rule' is to start resuscitation. 
"`For instance, regarding coronary bypass operations. Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (Cm 4386) July 1999 The 
Stationery Office, London para 6.15. 
373 Veatch RM. A New Basis for Allocating Livers for Transplant. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2000; 10: 75-80. 
374Ibid, at p76. 
"SFor example, see the reports of 'racist' conditions being attached to donor organs: McGrory D. Surgeons ignored donor conditions. The Times 
9 July 1999 (Asians only condition) and Wilkinson P, McGrory D. Union officials leaked racist donor request. The Times 8 July 1999 (whites 
only condition). 
376 NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform. (Cm 4818-1) 2000 The Stationery Office, London chapter 12. Available on 
wnrw. nhs. uk/nhsplan accessed 7 August 2000. 
377 Holm S et al. Access to Health Care in Scandinavian Countries: Ethical Aspects. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 321-330 at p325 
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The Norwegian approach seems scientifically more valid and helps reduce GPs and consultants being swamped 
by `worried well'. 
5.3.3.3 Just Deserts 
This model conceptualises healthcare as a reward for acceptable behaviour. This can be based on the behaviour 
of a community or individual behaviour. In some parts of the U. S. A. hospitals which have actively procured 
organs for transplantation receive priority for organs. 378 On an individual basis, treatment decisions could be 
made favouring the `most deserving' individual but this is a highly subjective determination: is it the mother 
with four children who smokes or the person with no family who has adopted as healthy a lifestyle as possible? 
Merit-based protocols have been proposed for Scotland. 379 Social class or talent may be determinative. 380 
Dworkin argues talent is luck, not merit deserving tribute. 381 Treatment decisions may be made, possibly 
unconsciously, by those with the power to withhold resources or influence their allocation, so as to favour 
`deserving' patients. 382 This model is likely to become increasingly important as the NHS moves towards the 
target-based approach to healthcare described in Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation. 383 This details individual 
contributions towards health. 384 The seeds have been sown for future governments to imply that individuals 
who have not taken measures to stay healthy have broken their social contract with the country and should not 
expect to receive treatment. 385 
5.3.3.4 Democratic Rights 
Engelhardt believes that there is no `canonical, content-full secular ethics' discoverable by reflection, therefore, 
healthcare rights can only be determined by democratic processes. 38' Whether `democracy' alone can guide 
medical decision-making is questionable although this may be the ultimate goal of current governmental policy 
with the introduction of NICE and the National Survey of Patient and User Experience3S7 and the increasing 
emphasis on individual responsibility for health as part of the social contract. Democracies, simply by their 
existence, recognise the principle of justice. The democratic process necessitates balancing individual rights 
so no one's rights are paramount. Democratic societies only exist where the members consider it mutually 
beneficial to co-operate but this does not mean autonomy is unimportant. By recognising any sort of 
democratic process as a model for decision-making, Engelhardt impliedly validates the four principles. 
Democratic societies, by their very nature, recognise certain basic rights to healthcare and these rights, rather 
than being dictated by public agreement alone are premised upon ethical principles and doctrines. 
". See Mason & McCall Smith, op cit n43 at p260. First call goes to these hospitals to see if the available organ is suitable for any of their 
patients and if it is not then it becomes available elsewhere. 
"'Leonard S. Penalty points scheme rations heart surgery. The Sunday Times 18 July 1999. 
380See: Weaver JL. National health policy: Ethnic Minorities, Women and the Elderly. 1976 The CV Mosby Company, St Louis at p145 where 
he relates how several commentators in the 1970s placed the blame for the individual's poverty-related ill-health on the individual's social class 
thereby absolving `schools, labor unions, corporate industries, hospitals and similar institutions of responsibility'. 
"'Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 2000 Harvard University Press, London at p325. 
"'Lindbladh E et al. Equity is out of fashion? An essay on autonomy and health policy in the individualized society. Soc. Sci. Med. 
1998; 46,8: 1017-1025. 
383Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation, op cit n372. 
3841bid, Appendix 1. This sets out `National Contracts' and lists what individuals can do; what communities can do and what the government 
can do. 
385Lindbladh et al suggest this is the Swedish approach already. Lindbladh et al, op cit n382 at p1018. 
386Engelhardt HT. `The Four Principles of Healthcare Ethics and Post-Modernity: why a libertarian interpretation is unavoidable'. In Gillon R, 
Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp135-157 at p137. 
387 Department of Health. A First Class Service: Quality in the NHS 1998 The Stationery Office, London. 
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Stoll considers that a democratic rights model would help address the problem that different doctors may rank 
the same patient's need for care dissimilarly. 38' Stoll favours multi-disciplinary national committees to develop 
codes of medical practice so that decisions about whether or how to treat a patient or not could be made in 
accordance with the views of society and based upon sound principles since `(s)ociety should openly 
acknowledge the justification for such rationing decisions and approve guidelines for allocating priorities'. 38' 
However, it is difficult to set aside personal preferences so if a panel member, close friend or relative, has a 
certain condition that member will often want that condition to receive a high priority for treatment. "' This 
is possibly truer of lay or non-professional people although this might be a myth promulgated by the 
professional classes who wish to maintain power by restricting access to `outsiders'. The views delivered may 
reflect the social class and age of members more than the local community. 39' 
Individual rights to healthcare have only had weak support to date in this country. The Patients' Charter gave 
no concrete rights, merely a right to complain. 392 Although the European Social Charter 1961, Article 11, Part 
1 spoke of rights `to enjoy the highest standard of health obtainable' Britain's obligations under Part 2 are 
merely to `remove so far as is possible to remove the causes of ill-health' within a framework which encouraged 
`individual responsibility'. "' The individual responsibility model has been increasingly important since 1990. 
Likewise, the duties of the Secretary of State for Health to `secure improvement in... the physical and mental 
health of the people"" were diluted by the proviso that any services were simply to be provided as he `considers 
necessary'. 395 The freedom of the NHS Trusts to provide treatments they felt patients were entitled to is 
restricted by a duty to `achieve such financial objectives as... set by the Secretary of State'. 396 
Rights are not unproblematic. For instance, a `right to treatment' or a `right to die' may be claimed by patients 
or their relatives. Simply asserting a right does not necessarily mean that there is an obligation on society or 
the individual doctor to meet that demand. 39' MacCormick sees rights as interests which 'ought' to be 
protected even if others refuse to admit that certain rights exist. 398 The difficulty is in deciding which interests 
should be protected. 399 Dworkin considers that there are various rights, some of which `trump' others ie. they 
take precedence over rights they are in conflict with. "' Certain individual rights will even, according to 
Dworkin, trump the general welfare of society and must be protected. 40' However, when the rights of two 
... Stoll BA. Choosing between cancer patients. J. Med Ethics1990; 16: 71-74 at p73. His suggestions include greater use of objective guidelines 
and audit mixed with QALYs. 
3891bid, at p73. The role of NICE will be to produce guidelines and national codes of practice. 
39"Lamb D. Priorities in healthcare. Reply to Lewis and Charny. J. Med. Ethics 1989; 15: 33-4. 
31 'Certainly, with many groups like Community Health Councils, the membership is often drawn from a relatively narrow sector of society. 
The 
government has not made it clear how it will ensure that the contributors to the proposed National 
Survey of Patient and User Experience will 
be representative of society. 
... Department of Health. The Patients' Charter and You: A Charter for England. 1991 (revised 1995) Dept. of 
Health, Wetherby. 
393For a useful summary of these healthcare rights see: McHale J, Fox M and Murphy J. Health 
Care Law 1997 Sweet & Maxwell, London at 
pp7-9. 
"'National Health Service Act 1977 sl. 
"'National Health Service Act 1977 s3. 
"National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 s 10. 
39' The `Tavistock Group' has recently published a code of ethics designed to develop continuity of approach by all healthcare professions which 
enumerates as one of the `govern ing principles' a right to 
healthcare. Smith R. Shared ethical principles for everybody in health care: a working 
draft from the Tavistock Group. BAfJ 1999; 318: 248-251. 
i98MacCormick N. Legal Rights and Social Democracy. 1982 Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
-99For example, see the opposite views regarding whether 
foetuses have rights in Dworkin R. Life's Dominion. 1993 Harper Collins, London 
at p18 and Belshaw C. Abortion, 
Value and the Sanctity of Life. Bioethics 1997; 11,2: 130-150. 
"Dworkin R. Taking Rights Seriously 1977 Duckworth, London. In particular, see Chapter 6 `Justice and Rights' at pp150-183. 
401Ibid, at p367. 
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individuals are in conflict, a balancing exercise may be necessary. a"' 
The concept of `parental rights' is particularly problematic. Society feels disquiet when medical treatment is 
withheld against parental demand. However, parental wishes cannot always be supported at society's expense 
or contrary to the doctor's beliefs and judgement. As Freeman recognises, `often parents misuse the rights 
vested in them by biology' consequently `parental authority is frequently abusive, harmful and detrimental to 
the child'. 403 Excessively burdensome treatment could be tantamount to abuse404 and constitute `a victimising 
abandonment of our responsibility to do no harm to patients'. "' Others believe the ability to develop 
`personhood' is the key. Absent this, although `death is not inevitable (such) infants may.. . lose the right to 
have their lives prolonged'. ao6 However, many severely-handicapped infants have the ability to develop 
`personhood' so the debate circles back to `which lives count? '407 and whose opinion counts? 
Freeman sees `rights' as prioritising the civil liberties of all which he admits could be costly to the general 
welfare of society. 408 He suggests that rights can be viewed three ways. a09 Firstly as something which can be 
trumped by special considerations ('goals of special urgency' eg. war, which trumps the right to strike); 
secondly as something that trumps all else, even utility and when in conflict with other rights the one promoted 
is the one that `maximises the fulfilment of rights' and thirdly, as something that is absolute and can constrain 
others. 41° Adopting the second view, he argues that the patient's rights should be given paramountcy in the 
decision-making process over third-party considerations of patient welfare or `best interests'. Difficulties arise, 
however, when the patient's rights conflict with national interests or with another patient. "' In the UK, 
individual rights seem second to fiscal requirements which suggests that securing a healthy national economy 
is a `goal of special urgency' at least as far as the government is concerned. Neither the state nor the NHS sees 
rights `as trumps'. If they did, `it would mean that no cost could be spared in providing health care to all in 
need of it; it would mean that our rights to education, food, shelter, clothing etc. would have to be compromised 
in cases of conflict'. 41' Uddo's analysis of U. S. federal policy on forgoing treatment or care suggests that, 
where the legislature has attempted to introduce rights to non-discrimination on grounds of disability, judicial 
interpretation weakens or ignores their intent and doctors object to the encroachment on their territory. 413 
English courts also follow medical opinion at the expense of individual rights. 414 If a democratic model for 
medical decision-making is to be adopted, it must be supported by the judiciary and doctors. 
... For instance, if an HIV positive patient does not wish his/her partner to be informed, the doctor may reserve the right to inform the partner: 
Campbell A et al. Medical Ethics 2nd Edn. 1997 Oxford University Press, Oxford at pp115-7. Contra, Ainslie DC. Questioning Bioethics: 
AIDS, Sexual Ethics and the Duty to Warn. Hastings Center Report 1999; 29,5: 26-35. See also, Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) 
[2001 ]1 FLR 1- discussion in next chapter. 
`3 Freedman M: The Best Interests of the Child? Is The Best Interests of the Child in the Best Interests of the Child? J. Law, Policy and the 
Family 1997; 11: 360-388 at p365 
404van der Heide A et al. Medical end-of-life decisions made for neonates and infants in the Netherlands. 1997 The Lancet 350: 251-5. 
... Waisel DB, Troug RD. The cardiopulmonary resuscitation-not-indicated order: Futility revisited. Annals Int. Med. 1995; 12,4: 304-8 at p306. 
40`Doyal L& Wilsher D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawing of life prolonging treatment in neonatal medicine. 
Arch. Dis. Child. 1994; 70: F66-F70 at F70 (their emphasis). 
""Belshaw C. Abortion, Value and the Sanctity of Life. Bioethics 1997; 11,2: 130-150 at p141. 
408Freeman MDA. Sterilising the Mentally Handicapped in Freeman MDA. Medicine, Ethics and the Law: Current Legal Problems 1988 
Stevens & Sons, London at p76. 
401Ibid, at p77. 
"'Ibid. 
41 'See: Re B (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Nationality) [1999] 2 WLR 714 and Re A (Conjoined Tit-ins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 
1. 
412Bell NK. (Ed) Who Decides? Conflicts of Rights in Health Care. 1982 Human Press, Clifton, New Jersey at p16. 
413 Uddo BJ. Federal policy on forgoing treatment or care. Issues in Law and Medicine 1992; 8(3): 293-308. See, in particular, the discussion 
at pp294-300. 
414See the discussion in the next chapter. 
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The problem with `rights' is that this view of ethics sees `persons as social and moral atoms, actually or 
potentially in competition with one another'. 41' The Human Rights Act 1998 will be used as a wav to assert 
individual rights to healthcare. 416 Coote suggests that healthcare should seen as `a right of citizenship, rather 
than a matter of privilege or luck'. 4' However, a strong rights ethos may be objected to on the grounds that 
this places individuals before communities. The 1998 Act may strengthen the rights of the learning disabled 
to receive equal access to treatments such as organ donation. 418 The way delegated power is exercised will be 
challengeable. Challenges will have to be heard expeditiously and impartially41' with an effective remedy 
available. 42' Because human rights can be seen as `rights individuals have in relation to governments 1421 it is 
likely that this model sees healthcare rights being seen as firmly linked to responsibilities. Saving Lives: Our 
Healthier Nation adopts this approach. 4"' 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 The weaknesses of politico-economic models 
The politico-economic decision-making models are essentially utilitarian. As such they are open to the same 
objections as the classical theories of Mill423 and Bentham. 424 Consequently, these models fail to gain societal 
acceptance because they demand acceptance that some may be denied treatment so others can benefit. Once 
the human genome is fully mapped a utilitarian healthcare system might use this to prioritise the genetically 
fortunate. 425 The problem is that welfare is impossible to measure accurately. Models such as QALYs attempt 
this but the fact that doctors generally do not consider QALYs suggests that strict utilitarianism is considered 
immoral. 
Underlying utilitarianism is a central belief in the rationality of decision-making but rational processes can 
result in unethical results. Decision are not only pragmatically or prudentially based, but morally based. 
Utilitarianism does not explain why following a moral course of action, which is possibly contrary to one's 
personal interests, to maximise total welfare is desirable. Ultimately, patients want what is best for them, not 
for society. 426 The politico-economic models seek the good of society and consequently no individual has a 
guaranteed right to all, or any, potentially beneficial treatment. 
"'Morgan D. Technology and the Political Economy of Reproduction. In: Freeman MDA. Medicine, Ethics and the Law: Current Legal 
Problems 1988 Stevens & Sons, London at p46. 
416The courts began considering its influence before it came into force: Rv North and East Devon HA, exparte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622 
and Re W (Wardship: Discharge: Publicity) [1995] 2 FLR 466. 
4 "Coote A. Is there a crisis in health care? In: Fabian Society Pamphlet 574 Health Crisis - What Crisis? Proceedings of the Fabian/Socialist 
Health Association New Year Conference 1996 1996 pp 14-17 at p 16. 
418For an example of discrimination see: Channel 4 TV. Cutting Edge: A New Heart for Jo. September 1996. This discusses the case of a girl 
with Down's syndrome denied the opportunity of a heart transplant. 
4 "Article 6(1) European Convention of Human Rights. For an example where the impartiality of the House of Lords is questionable see: Rv 
Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust ex parse L [1999] 1 AC 458. 
420Article 13 European Convention of Human Rights. 
12'Annas GJ. Human Rights and Health - The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50. NEJM 1998; 339,24: 1778-1781. 
4 "Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation (Cm 4386) 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
423Mill JS. Utilitarianism; On Liberty. 1871 Williams G (Ed). 1993 JM Dent, London. 
124Bentham J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Burns JH, Hart HLA (Eds) 1970 The Althone Press, University 
of London, London. See also: Hart HLA. Essays on Bentham (Nos 7& 8) 1982 Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
4255ee: Cedar S, Terry L. Genes and Genealogy Family Law 2000; 30: 744-747 and McLean SAM, Giesen D: Legal and Ethical Considerations 
of the Human Genome Project. 1994 
Med. Law International 1: 159-175 at 169-170. 
4 oCobbs LS, Clark PA and Brusa M. The Million Dollar Question: Commentaries. Hastings Center Report 2000; 30,5: 24-26. 
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Doctors see their patients as individuals but politico-economic models ignore the distinctness of persons. The 
underlying utilitarian ethos means that past promises hold no sway. 42' Therefore, the promises made at the 
inception of the NHS can be broken in the interests of maximising welfare. This jars against the clinician's 
traditional belief in a duty of fidelity towards his or her patient. The 1991 reforms removed the traditional 
freedom of doctors to refer patients to the most appropriate treatment facility. They felt unable to do the best 
for their patients individually. 
An alternative to adopting one goal as the measure of welfare, is that of seeking to discover which goals and 
objectives are valuable. Then, Simmonds suggests, laws and institutions can maximise the welfare from these 
preferences. 42' The present political approach to health is muddled. Quantity of lives saved seems to be the 
measure of welfare not quality. 429 Yet life can be seen as only of value to the individual. Saving someone's 
life but leaving him/her a `cardiac cripple'a3o or vegetative is contrary to acceptable medical practice and 
probably contrary to public expectations. Therefore, it seems that the proper goal of laws and institutions is 
the maximisation of ability to participate in society. However, the recent consultation exercise carried out by 
the government suggests it has confused maximising public participation in goal and objective setting with 
maximising individual participation by reducing the barriers erected by ill-health and disability. a" 
Rawls' powerful critique of utilitarianism proposes a `social contract' grounded on two principles. 432 The 
difference principle holds that social and economic differences are only allowable providing they work to the 
advantage of those least well-off in society. The RAWP formula was designed to rectify regional underfunding 
but, in order to do so within the finances available, better-funded areas would have had to experience cutbacks. 
Rather than even out matters quickly a gradual phasing-in was used and inequity remains. Thus political 
expediency leads to the prolonged continuation of an unjust situation. However, Dworkin's analysis of Rawls's 
theory suggests that this was inevitable since the difference principle 'attends.. . only to those who 
have fewest 
primary goods... no matter what the consequences for those who will still have more'. a33 Gillon argues that the 
Rawlsian deliberators would `require at least a reasonable chance that any meetable health care need will be 
met' and that `if they were to be seriously ill their doctors and nurses should maintain their care and concern 
and palliation'. "' This argument reflects public opinion. Yet, as Williams asserts `(n)o society can afford to 
offer all its members all the health care that might possibly do them some good. 'a35 Saving Lives builds upon 
the notion of social contracts and the obligations of individuals towards society but the long-term threat 
potentially is that those who break their `contracts' do not deserve care. a36 
Another difficulty Rawls fails to address is that the `social primary goods' revealed may differ from society to 
society. 43' Some may consider that any inequality in distribution at all is unjust even if it is designed to even 
out inequalities. The rhetoric about the National Plan for the NHS suggests that both equality of access and 
427Simmonds NE. Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights. 1986 Sweet & Maxwell, London at p19. Rv North and East 
Devon HA, ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622 is an exception. 
1281bid, at p27. 
429Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation, op cit n372. 
... Someone whose quality of life, following a major cardiac arrest and the consequent damage to heart muscle, is greatly diminished. 
41 'Department of Health. Creating a 21" century NHS. 2000 Internet site: www. nhs. uk/nationalplan accessed 5 June 2000. 
412Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. 1972. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
433 R. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 2000 Harvard University Press, London at p331. 
434Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester pp797-806 at p799. 
435Williams A. `Economics, Society and Health Care Ethics'. In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester 
pp829-842 at p829. 
416Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation July 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
4"These include liberty, self-respect, opportunity and wealth. 
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equality of outcome are the aims and there is a failure to realise that both are not achievable in a resource- 
limited service. Ultimately, politico-economic models rely upon the public accepting theories of distribution 
which they little understand. 
5.4.2 The weaknesses of medical models 
The most obvious failure of medical models of decision-making is that there is great potential for paternalism... 
to creep in which directly conflicts with the concept of autonomy or respect for persons. However, there is a 
fine line between respecting a patient's right to act autonomously by giving him/her the knowledge to make 
his/her own decision, and forcing knowledge upon him/her that harms. 439 To move from `the destructiveness 
of complete lies to the destructiveness of unmediated truth"" is undesirable but the alternative often seems to 
be that patient preferences are ignored on the grounds that the doctor, with his/her expertise `knows' what is 
medically, ethically or socially correct. Tassano points out that paternalistically protecting patients from 
choices the doctor considers wrong can result in great harm. 441 The imbalance in clinical knowledge leads to 
an power imbalance between doctor and patient although patients are becoming more knowledgeable through 
the media and the internet. Although patients may lack the skill to interpret this data accurately they 
increasingly challenge medical expertise and authority. Doctors are afraid of becoming the means by which 
all patient preferences are to be satisfied. 442 Maintaining the power imbalance through devices like guidelines 
helps avoid this. 
5.4.3 The weaknesses of ethical models 
Regarding the right to self-determination, it is unclear, certainly regarding healthcare, whether people can 
accurately assess what will maximise personal happiness. Preferences may alter with knowledge or 
experience. 443 Not all patient preferences can be met by state-funded systems so ways to determine the 
legitimacy of different preferences become necessary. Some people would have their preferences met and 
others would not so the system becomes inherently inequitable. Certain personal preferences are objectionable 
to society and would need controlling to protect the rights of others. 444 There is also a danger that unrealistic 
expectations are raised. The model implies that patients expressing a desire for treatment should receive it 
regardless of predicted outcome. 445 
The `do no harm' models can mistakenly distinguish between causing harm and failing to prevent harm from 
happening. Feinberg believes both are equally blameworthy because people have moral rights based upon them 
having certain interests such as life. 446 However, Feinberg tries to limit the extent of rights, and corresponding 
duties in others. Duties to assist can only be indeterminate when more people need to be assisted than there 
... The paternalistic medical model can be seen as based upon Aristotle's description of `unequal friendship'. Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics 
(Translated by Ross, D. ) 1925 World Classics, Oxford University Press, Oxford at pp203-205 (Ethics VIII 7). 
43"Cassell EJ. The Principles of the Belmont Report Revisited. Hastings Center Report 2000; 30,4: 12-21. 
. 40lbid, at p 17. 
a4'Tassano F. The Power of Life or Death: a Critique of Medical Tyranny. 1995 Duckworth, London at p69. 
442lbid, at p47. 
"'For example, many patients, once they have been given accurate information as to the success rates of resuscitation attempts, or who have had 
one resuscitation attempt made on them, then express a desire to have resuscitation withheld in future: Murphy DJ et al. The influence of the 
probability of survival on patients' preferences regarding resuscitation. NEJM 1994; 330: 545-9. 
444For example, racist restrictions attached to donated organs for transplantation. 
445For example, Rv Cambridge District HA, ex Parte B[ 1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
446 This is known as the `Interest' principle. Feinberg J. Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty. 1980 Princetown University Press, 
Princetown, USA. 
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are resources to aid them. 447 Menlove accepts that, otherwise, the duty would give rise to a correlative right"' 
but is unconvinced by the justifications Feinberg gives for limiting the existence of a duty to rescue. "' The 
Patients' Charter inadvertently developed a `rights' culture in healthcare leading to tension when the 
predominantly utilitarian NHS failed to deliver. 
The most obvious weakness of the ethical models is that to work successfully the underpinning ethical 
principles need to be recognised and an appropriate way found to balance them when they are in conflict with 
each other. 45o Although principles like beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice are valuable, they 
can mean different things to different people. 45' As Gillon asserts, each has relevance and acceptability, 
regardless of the religious (or cultural) viewpoint adopted. 452 However, whether they can serve as a decision- 
making model is debatable. 453 This was never their primary purpose. Their greatest value is that they have 
provided a common language for the critique of decision-making processes and theories of distribution rather 
than providing a new theory of ethics. 454 Some suggest that the additional principles of respect for the sanctity 
of life and honesty are required but Gillon, probably correctly, dismisses these and other proposed principles 
of respect for law, liberty and rights as aspects of respect for persons. 455 
Gillon asserts that the expression of the four principles will produce `a better-reasoned, more critical approach 
to personal and moral decision making, better awareness of opposing moral positions and.. . moral positions 
opposed to one's own, and an awareness that there are some moral values... subscribed to by all, or most'. "' 
However, as shown earlier, doctors rarely take a principled approach to decision-making and prefer to rely 
upon `experience'. They may use the principles afterwards in justification like a flakjacket. Ethics assumes 
`alternative options are often open' in the healthcare arena when in reality they are non-existent. "' 
When choosing between two or more patients, each of whom should receive treatment, but it is only possible 
to treat one, the four principles alone are of little assistance. Similarly, when deciding what treatments should 
be funded by the NHS the four principles fail to produce consensus. The justice principle, in particular, is 
capable of multiple constructions. Justice to a market economist may mean sacrificing the older, economically 
non-productive patient but to a rights campaigner, justice may mean equal opportunity to benefit regardless 
of age. 
5.5 The Reality of Decision-Making 
Klein et al have identified seven forms of rationing. There is rationing by denial; selection; deflection; 
"'Feinberg J. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol 1: Harm to Others. 1984 Oxford University Press, New York at p144, 
448Menlove MA, McCall Smith A, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue. In Menlove MA & McCall Smith A: The Duty to 
Rescue. 1993 Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot at pp4-50 at p19. 
4491bid, at p20. 
450For an example of the difficulty balancing ethical principles and doctrines, see: Re A 
(Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 
1. 
"'See: Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1985 John Wiley & Son, Chichester at p323. 
452Ibid, at p320- 
453 Attempts have been made such as the model described by Malley PB, Reilly EP. Legal and Ethical Dimensions for Mental Health 
Professionals. 1999 Accelerated Development, Philadelphia at pp30-31. 
454Botros S. `Rights and the Four Principles' in Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Son, Chichester at pp231-240. 
455Gillon, op cit n451 at pp328 -9. 
4561bid, at pp326. 
457 Raphael DD. Moral Philosophy 2"d Edn. 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford at p114. 
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deterrence; delay; dilution and by termination. 458 The reality is that all of the models described above are ways 
of rationing the level of treatment given. Politico-economic models are more open about rationing than 
medical or ethical models although all try to avoid the word. 459 All models are subject to manipulation by the 
decision-maker. As shown, all of the models described above are used at different times by doctors. The model 
used depends upon the surrounding circumstances such as whether the consultant feels pressurised by the 
family to continue treatment, or whether the consultant believes the patient's stated preference is one that 
should be met. 
Doctors jealously guard their `clinical freedom... to act in the best interests of the... patient as perceived by both 
the doctor and the patient'. 46' Politicians considered doctors took `insufficient account of opportunity costs and 
the need for society as a whole.. . to determine how the money available should be spent'461 so this freedom was 
curtailed by the 1991 reforms. Care must be `cost-effective'. The question that governments tend to ask is 
`which patients are... selected for treatment? ' not which treatment to give a patient. 462 Yet patients `want to be 
accepted without question or qualification' and to receive `the best treatment for themselves, not the best 
treatment for the providers, nor the patient body as a whole, nor for society'. 463 Harris believes the choices 
offered should not be influenced by costs to others or whether others could benefit more. Equality of access 
and opportunity are paramount then it is `up to the patient herself to choose whether or not to forego her own 
chance of treatment, either in her own interests or in the interests of others or society'. 464 Harris fails to 
recognise society's legitimate interest in the allocation of societal resources. Justice in distribution is 
important, but it may be appropriate to limit treatment options without necessarily creating `an aristocracy of 
the fortunate'. 465 Patients are understandably reluctant to deny themselves potentially beneficial treatment so 
the state must impose some restrictions if it is paying. The decision-making process can be improved by 
debating ways of enabling society to be realistic in its demands on pooled resources and possibly encouraging 
individual altruism. 466 Since decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment are more commonly made by 
patients' relatives, following medical advice, than by the patient, this maybe more achievable than immediately 
apparent. 467 Currently, the medical profession accepts as legitimate the relatives' role, 468 possibly because 
patients are poor at refusing treatment, although `(g)uilt and denial may compel relatives to press for aggressive 
treatment' . 
46' Lindgren recognises family involvement as appropriate, because `the surviving family has the 
biggest stake in the decision over a dying, unconscious patient (so) whatever pain or welfare will be enhanced 
by a particular decision will be borne particularly by the family'. 470 Public opinion polls show greatest support 
for families and doctors making non-treatment decisions together rather than families alone with the courts 
being `little trusted'. 47 1 However, recent exposure of medical malpractice and murder in Britain means that 
many elderly patients are losing trust in their physicians. Their fears could be addressed by ensuring better 
... Klein, Day & Redmayne, op cit n91, at pp11-12. 
4591bid, at p66. 
161Chantler C et al. Translating good ideas into appropriate action. In: Hopkins (Ed). Appropriate investigation and treatment in clinical 
practice 1989 Royal College of Physicians of London, London at p97. 
a"Ibid, at p98. 
162Harris J. What is the good of health care? Bioethics 1996; 10,4: 269-291 at 271. 
4631bid, at p272. 
464Ibid, at p277. 
4651bid, at p279. 
4 Harris recognises that `no one is entitled to have their own needs met whatever the cost'. Harris , op cit n462, at p290. 
4 7Wilson AC et al. Ordering and Administration of Sedatives and Analgesics During the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support From 
Critically Ill Patients. JAMA 1992; 267,7: 949-953. 
468The legal status of relatives will be examined in in the next chapter. 
469Kipnis K& Gerhard A. Some Ethical Principles for Adult Critical Care. Hawaii Med. J. 1995,54: 482-5 at 484. 
4"Lindgren J. Death by Default. Law and Contemporary Problems. 1993; 56,3: 185-259 at 225. 
47lbid, at 225-7. 
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recognition of their rights to treatment 
Since healthcare is about the provision of information and.. . 
decision making"" it seems clear that any 
suggestions for improving the decision-making process will need to support patient autonomy. Doctors have 
the clinical knowledge and the scientific skills to analyse outcomes data so as to present the patient with a 
prognosis. 473 Many patients are `more ignorant about health care than.. . other commodities'474 and some 
`welcome the opportunity to pass difficult decision-making to the doctor' . 
475 However, disagreement exists as 
to whether all treatment decisions should be made by joint consultation between doctor and patient. van 
Delden opposes the Dutch approach whereby, if the physician deems the treatment `futile', the non-treatment 
decision is solely the physician's responsibility. 476 van Delden believes patients should `have the opportunity 
to evaluate' even those conditions which, if treated, necessitate `constant monitoring, ventilatory support and 
intensive care nursing' . 
47 However, Davies points out that patients usually assume there must be some benefit 
so opt for treatment. 47' Bruce-Jones suggests that `direct patient involvement in health decisions is necessary 
if "quality of life" is invoked' even though guidelines imposing a prima facie duty to canvass patient opinion 
are liked less by doctors than patients. 47' There is some evidence that treatments which twenty years ago were 
considered uncommon have now become so `routine' that doctors fail to initiate discussions about whether to 
withhold or withdraw them. 48° If the patient is competent, only s/he should assess her/his quality of life 
otherwise third party assessment of quality of life is legitimated. 48' Any suggestions for improving the decision- 
making process will need to address the reluctance of some doctors to involve patients to the extent that the 
individual patient wishes. 
Giving strong support to patient autonomy is not the same as allowing patient preference to become dominant. 
Most doctors (and courts482) consider that doctors are not obliged to provide treatment failing to offer at least 
4a modicum of clinical benefit'. 483 However, the power imbalance between the doctor and the patient can lead 
to one being able to `exploit' the other without the reverse necessarily being true. For example, treatment may 
be provided `against the professional intuition of the physician', 484 and against the patient's wishes because 
doctors fear litigation or because of gender issues. 485 This offends the adage `above all, do no harm'. Gillon, 
discussing the moral difference between killing and letting die, says, 'a doctor who imposes life-prolonging 
treatment on a patient who competently rejects it is clearly failing to respect the patient's autonomy, (but) a 
doctor who refuses a patient request to be killed does not infringe the patient's autonomy'. 
486 Wreen suggests 
that what he calls the `operative principle' should be employed in cases where there is `a question as to the 
"'Mooney G. QALYs: are they enough? A health economist's perspective. J. Med. Ethics 1989; 15: 148-152 at 151. 
47'However, Gilligan points out that `treatment decisions are influenced not only by outcome probabilities but also 
by the physician's personal 
values and priorities': Gilligan T. Whose death is it anyway? Ann. Int. Med. 1996; 125,2: 137-141 at 
139. 
474Mooney, op cit n472, at p 152. 
47slbid, at p152. 
47 van Delden JJM et al. Deciding not to resuscitate in Dutch hospitals. J. Med. 
Ethics 1993; 19: 200-205 at p204. 
"'Ibid. 
478Davies JM & Reynolds BM. The ethics of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 1 Background to decision making. Arch. Dis. Child. 1992; 67: 1498- 
1501 at 1499. 
479Bruce-Jones PNE. Resuscitation decisions in the elderly: a discussion of current thinking. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 286-291 at p288. 
480Pijnenborg Let al: Withdrawal or Withholding of Treatment at the End of Life. Arch. Int. Med. 1995; 155: 2 86-292 at 290. 
48'McCormick RA. To save or to let die. JAMA 1974; 229: 174. See also the discussion in Bayles M, High DM (Eds). Medical Treatment of the 
Dying: Moral Issues. 1978 GK Hall & Co. Shenkman Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts at p91. 
482As will be shown in the next chapter. 
483Brett AS & McCullagh LB. When patients request specific interventions. NEJM 1986; 315: 1347-1351. 
484Pijnenborg et at, op cit n480, at p291. 
'"Gilligan T. Whose death is it anyway? Ann. Int. Med. 1996; 125,2: 137-141, at p139. 
486 Gillon R. Euthanasia, withholding life-prolonging treatment, and moral differences between killing and letting die. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 115- 
7 at 116. 
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validity of the patient's decision' so that `we ought to err on the side of his best interests'. 48' In reply, who is 
able to decide the patient's `best interests' if not the patient? If the patient is competent, autonomy must be 
protected. Wreen's argument that autonomy should not be protected so far as to let the patient refuse life- 
saving treatment since if autonomy is `isolated from other values, an autonomous patient might refuse 
treatment for utterly trivial ... reasons'488 
is flawed because he ignores the enforced Caesarian section cases. "9 
However, many doctors seem to agree and consider genuinely-held views `trivial' or `bizarre'. 49o Where the 
patient's views are grounded on cultural or religious preferences trivialising them is racist and discriminatory. 
Some non-treatment decisions will result in the death of the patient. Deciding who has a chance to live or not 
is sometimes decided `by balancing the familial and social costs/benefits'. 491 Is it appropriate to withhold 
treatment just because the family costs are too high? This means requiring the most vulnerable to act as 
`sacrificial lambs' and amounts to imposing a duty on them to `rescue' others in preference to themselves. This 
must be untenable although it is generally accepted that if society has limited resources not all can receive 
treatment. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Sound treatment decisions can only be made when it is recognised that medical ethics is not solely about 
doctor-patient relationships. Social policy and political ideology, influenced by lobbyists, affect resource 
allocation. 492 More openness is needed by those involved in the resource allocation process. The NHS is 
manipulated for political gains, but disguising the problems of limited resources and/or reduced commitment 
to the welfare state with measures to increase public `choice' or `say' treats the public as simpletons. It does 
grave disservice to clinicians who try to achieve the best for individual patients. The passing of power to 
unelected managers was `not only harmful to patients, but also massively wasteful'. 493 Limits to what any 
country can spend on healthcare have to be acknowledged but this is a matter for informed public debate not 
political gesturing. Through the Primary Care Groups, the public is being involved in the process of 
determining what treatments and for whom the NHS should provide. However, public contribution has to be 
based on better understanding of healthcare than presently seems evident. Consultation exercises should be 
robust in construction so the opinions gained have value. "' Geographical differences in healthcare provision 
should be as unacceptable as differences based on gender, race, social importance or ability/disability. Doctors 
should not be viewed with suspicion or treated as political scapegoats. a95 Their contribution to the debate is 
vitally important as possessors, and imparters, of medical information. Decisions should not be based solely 
S8. Wreen MJ. Autonomy, religious values and refusal of life-saving medical treatment. J. Med. Ethics 1991; 17: 124-130 at p125. 
... Ibid, at p126. 
489Ibid, at p125. 
490Fortunately, for believers in rational people's freedom to make `irrational' decisions, the Court of Appeal has not agreed with Wreen: Rv St 
George's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
491 Long TA. Infanticide for handicapped infants: sometimes it's a metaphysical dispute. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 79-81,80. See also: Kuhse H, 
Singer P. Should the baby live: the problem of handicapped infants. 1985 Oxford University Press, Oxford and Ramsey P. Ethics at the edges 
of life. 1978 Yale Univ. Press, New Haven. 
492Campbell AV. Nonesuch (University of Bristol Magazine) Autumn 1996 pp 27-29. 
493Black D. Paying for health. J.; M1ed. Ethics 1991; 17: 117-123,123. 
494The recent Department of Health consultation exercise `Have your say on a better NHS' conducted in June 2000 can be criticised for its lack 
of research robustness. There were delays over sending out the printed leaflets which meant the date by which responses were to 
be received (5 
June 2000) had to be changed. The leafl ets only appear to have been produced in English -, wich meant that many users of the NHS (for example, 
ethnic minorities; people with poor 
literacy skills; sight-impaired and learning disabled) were excluded from the consultation exercise. 
Department of Health. Creating a 21" century NHS. 2000 Internet site: www. nhs. uk/nationalplan accessed 5 June 2000. 
495As, for example, by Tony Blair in a recent interview: Miles, A. Can the NHS be Saved?: Last Chance The Times 26 May 2000. 
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on finances. Cost-effectiveness is only part of the debate which needs to address the potential efficacy of 
treatment. 
As Dowie asserts, the goal of medical decision-making is to `make the best decision in an individual case, not 
to be "ethically correct" - or "technically correct"... in some abstract or general sense'. 49' Certainly, absolute 
`correctness' is impossible in a highly subjective and evolving field like medicine but the `best' decisions aim 
to be as ethically and technically `sound' as possible. Decisions command respect when premised upon sound 
reasoning and principles. Historically, the medical model was predominant with little consideration given to 
patient-preferences. As clinicians become more enlightened, and patients less compliant, patient preference 
has gained more importance although support for patient autonomy depends very much upon the individuals 
concerned - doctor, patient and possibly family. 
Moves to control expenditure led to the development of economic models but the criticisms of these have 
produced new combinations which attempt to marry cost and clinical effectiveness. The model currently 
promoted by the government is an evidence-based model which signifies that medical values (good science) 
are important as long as they are coupled with a cost-effectiveness model for more equitable national delivery. 
The previous government made the mistake of challenging doctors head-on by trying to place treatment costs 
before treatment outcomes. The new approach aims to exploit the weaknesses inherent in the medical 
professions avowed dedication to scientific values. Much medical `evidence' is little more than `experience' 
and `clinical intuition'. Hence, the government's emphasis on evidence-based medicine has the sub-text that 
if the `evidence' is not conclusive, treatment should be withheld. That seems to be the role of NICE which flies 
in the face of the BMA's belief that medical audit must be `totally independent of the state'. 49' The present 
government seems to hope for unquestioning acceptance of its resource allocation strategy at national level 
through the adoption of these measures. However, national solutions are not necessarily the most equitable 
way of handling local problems. The marriage of science, economics and politics is unlikely to be happy. The 
medical models were obviously preferred by the consultant interviewees but many decisions seemed to be based 
on the `Blue Peter' model of reasoning whereby, providing there were no complaints or problems with a 
preceding case, the next similar one is handled the same way. 498 A concerted effort needs making to discover 
what constitutes a medically and socially robust healthcare decision. Until then, government controls will 
continue to fret both doctors and patients. Society demands more of government than merely balancing books 
and spinning soundbites. Therefore, the debate about which treatments should be given and which treatments 
withheld or withdrawn must seek to find ways to develop a just and justifiable model for making decisions 
about individual patients not just `the people'. 499 It is clear that the scientific model is important and good 
science relies upon openness about what treatment options are possibly available. Similarly, the democratic 
process requires openness and transparency about resource allocation decisions. It will also be necessary to 
decide who should be involved in the decision-making process and the extent to which patient preferences 
should be met. Respect for autonomy is central to both ethical decision-making and the democratic process 
but individual interests will have to be balanced against societal interests in a proportionate manner. 
... Dowie J. `Decision Analysis: the Ethical Approach to Medical Decision-Making' In Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John 
Wiley & Son, Chichester pp421-434 at p421. His emphasis. 
'9'Rivett G. From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. 1998 Kings Fund, London at p213. 
49RThe `Blue Peter' BBC television programme is familiar to many. As the presenters demonstrated how to make an object, finished versions 
would be produced with the words, `here's one 
I did earlier'. 
"'Department of Health. 4 First Class Service: Quality in the NHS 1998 The Stationery Office, London at para 2.3. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DECISION-MAKING IN NON-TREATMENT CASES BY THE 
JUDICIARY 
The previous chapter examined how political-economists, doctors and ethicists suggest individual patient 
decisions should be made. This chapter examines how the judiciary make such decisions and what guidance 
is provided for future cases. Good medical decision-making is said to reflect a balance of the principles: 
beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice. ' Legal decision-making is bound by rules of 
interpretation and precedent. The courts may be asked to resolve conflict over non-treatment decisions. At 
other times, the courts are involved because previous case law holds it is necessary to seek a declaration 
regarding lawfulness. ' Although Weir states that the `legal right of autonomous patients to refuse medical 
treatment is undeniable'3 this right may be challenged when the welfare of a third party is involved. ' Also, 
society, through law, limits physician power. ' A tension has arisen as a result of medical advances straining 
the boundaries of ethical conduct and the public purse. Whether the courts are the best forum and whether 
their decision-making capacity is better than the medical profession's, or more representative of societal views 
(if these should be considered), is questionable. The case law falls into two categories: (1) the doctor proposes 
actively treating; (2) the doctor proposes not treating. Some challenges are because inadequacy of resources 
bars treatment others are because of patient or family opposition to the doctor's proposal. 
6.1 Doctor is Pro-treatment 
6.1.1. Lack of Societal Resources Bars Treatment 
A House of Lords Select Committee concluded that `treatment limiting decisions should never be influenced 
by resource availability' -a doctor's concern should be for the individual patient immediately before him, not 
what the hospital or society can afford since these decisions should be made `elsewhere than in the hospital 
ward or the doctor's consulting room'. ' In ex parte Fisher, it was held that `when deciding whether to 
prescribe treatment to a patient a clinician has to have regard to many factors, including the resources available 
for that treatment and the needs of and likely benefit to that patient, as compared to other patients'. ' Likewise, 
'See: Gillon R. Principles of Health Care Ethics. 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, and Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics 4th Edn. 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
'As explained in Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728 at pp754-5 an application for declaratory relief is the 
`usual procedure when a health authority has taken the initiative in seeking the court's ruling on lawfulness of treatment' (or 
N%ithholding/withdrawing treatment) whereas an application for an injunction is the `usual procedure when it is the patient who is taking the 
initiative'. 
'Weir RF. Abating Treatment ii'ith Critically Ill Patients: Ethical and Legal Limits to the Medical Prolongation of Life. 1989 Oxford 
University Press, New York at pp39. 
'For example Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728. 
'For instance, not just in legislation controlling issues such as abortion, but also in the changes to the structure of the NHS found in the Acts of 
1990 and 1999 (see Chapter 2). 
`The House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21 (1994) HMSO, 
London at p376. 
7R i' North Derby shire H. 4 ex parse 
Fisher [ 1997] 8 Med LR 327 at p337. For a comment see: Dyer C. Ruling on interferon beta will hit all 
health authorities. B) IJ 1997,315: 146. See also: Rv Secretary ofState for Health, ex parse Pfizer Ltd QBD 26 May 1999, TLR 17 June 1999. 
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`the severity of a condition may have to be matched against the availability of resources'. ' However, the courts 
will be slow to interpret statutory duties as discretions. 9 
In Knight, inadequate care allegedly led to a patient's suicide. 1° Facilities were `grossly and comprehensively 
inadequate', " but the court had to remember that `the allocation of resources is a matter for Parliament' so the 
prison service was not negligent. " However, imprisoned pregnant women are entitled to the same obstetric 
care as if at liberty, suggesting that although the unborn child is not a legal person, its existence secures greater 
protection for the mother. 13 This implies that the `oneness' rejected in St George's, where a pregnant woman's 
refusal of a life-saving Caesarian section was upheld, has validity. " 
People may use judicial review to coerce doctors or health authorities into providing medical treatment thereby 
prioritising the applicant over other patients. " `One day' the courts may address social policy in resource 
allocation but the judiciary generally avoid this. 16 The courts are not `arbiters as to the merits of cases of this 
kind. Were we to express opinions as to the likelihood of the effectiveness of medical treatment, or as to the 
merits of medical judgment, then we should be straying far from the sphere which under our constitution is 
accorded to us. We have one function only, which is to rule upon the lawfulness of decisions'. " However, in 
Bournewoodthe House of Lords regrettably deferred to the government's financial arguments. " This suggests 
that future courts may consider not just ethical arguments but economic ones when deciding the lawfulness of 
non-treatment decisions. Health authority decisions will not be overturned unless they are Wednesbury- 
unreasonable19 which indicates that policy trumps `best interests'. 20 The decision in Fisher was only quashed 
because NHS Executive guidance was interpreted as a directive so the decision not to fund treatment was 
improperly made. 21 Trusts are not allowed to overspend. 22 Fox suggests that lack of resources may be a valid 
reason for a health authority not to give treatment so application for judicial review could be refused. 23 It is 
unnecessary for public bodies exercising discretion to reveal how they reached their decision. 24 However, 
`blanket bans' may be held unlawful. 25 As previously shown, some doctors adopt the role of `agent' in 
balancing hospital or healthcare purchaser needs against patient need. Hincks confirmed that the Secretary 
of State has discretionary powers and is not under a duty to ensure Parliament funds all treatment" although 
8R v Gloucesterchire CC, ex. p. Barry [1997] 2 All ER 1 at pp16-17 per Lord Clyde. Dissenting judgments were delivered by Lords Lloyd 
and Slynn. 
9R v East Sussex CC, ex parte Tandy [1998] AC 714. 
"Knight v Home Office [ 1990] 3 All ER 237. The NHS is not the only state institution which provides medical care although this thesis has 
focused on the NHS and the decision-making processes within it. 
"Ibid, at p241. 
12Ibid, at p243. 
"Brooks v Home Office [1999] 2 FLR 33. 
'4R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
; The number of applications for judicial review in general increased from 491 in 1980 to 3,901 in 1996 but few involve medical treatment 
decisions: Woolf H. Judicial Review. LQR 1998; 114: 579-593,587. 
'6Bull & Another v Devon HA [1993] 4 Med LR 117, at p141 per Mustill U. 
"R v Cambridge District HA, ex parse B [1995] 1 FLR 1055, at p1071 per Bingham MR. 
'gR v Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust ex parte L[ 1999] 1 AC 458. 
`Associated Picture Houses v Wednesbury [1948] 1 KB 123. 
20The limitations of the Wednesbury principles mean that very few challenges are successful. For example, see: Rv Central Birmingham HA 
exparte Walker (1987) 3 BMLR 32 and Rv Central Birmingham HA exparte Collier 
CA 6 January 1988 (unreported). 
2'R v North Derbyshire HA exparte Fisher [1997] 8 Med LR 327, in particular, see p328 where 
it is explained that one of the purposes of the 
NHS Executive in sending out Circular (EL(95)97) was to enable the identification of patients from whom it would be appropriate to withdraw 
treatment. 
22NHS and Community Care Act 1990 s 10(1). 
23R v Ealing District HA, exparte Fox [ 1993] 3 All ER 170. A case where a patient remained 
in Broadmoor Secure Hospital because suitable 
care could not be provided in the community. 
24R v Higher Education Funding Council [1994] 1 All ER 651. 
'5R v North it'est Lancashire HA ex parte A, D&G. 
[2000] WLR 977. 
26R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parse 
Hincks (1980) BMLR 93. 
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his discretion is not unlimited. 27 The Acts of 1990 and 1999 have not extended his obligations. By analog) 
with `the GCHQ' case, it is for the executive, not the courts, to decide whether the requirements of the national 
budget outweighed fairness to the individual. 2' The courts will not usually intervene in the case of bona fide 
exercises of statutory discretion. 29 Ex parte A held that public authorities must `(1) accurately... assess the 
nature and seriousness of each type of illness; (2) ... 
determine the effectiveness of various forms of treatment 
for it; and (3)... give proper effect to that assessment and that determination in the formulation and individual 
application of policy'. 30 However, the courts, anticipating the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force, are 
critical of budgetary constraints causing mentally ill patients to be detained unnecessarily. 3' Mental Health Act 
reform proposals suggest a `principle of reciprocity' so `where society imposes an obligation on an individual 
to comply with a programme of treatment and care it should impose a parallel obligation on the health and 
social care authorities to provide appropriate services'. 32 
Leave is required in order to gain judicial review of a decision" but can be refused on the grounds that the 
decision is not justiciable34 or no arguable case. 35 Judicial review is really `too blunt a tool' for `sensitive' 
healthcare decisions. 36 The court's powers are limited and, although judges maybe tempted out of `sympathy' 
to make the order requested, this would be a `cruel deception'. 37 Individual need has been unsuccessfully 
argued as the `only criterion' to be considered, with the provider's lack of resources being irrelevant. 38 Public 
bodies have a duty to treat fairly all service users39 but clinical diagnosis/prognosis can make similar patients 
seem very dissimilar. 40 The publicity may result in treatment becoming accessible via alternative sources. 41 
Promises, though, may be enforceable. 42 Fights over which public body holds responsibility waste money better 
spent on care. 43 
Actions in negligence similarly fail since `it is settled law that the elements of foreseeability and proximity as 
well as considerations of fairness, justice and reasonableness are relevant to all cases whatever the nature of 
the harm sustained'. 44 Public policy militates against finding public bodies negligent in such cases even where 
"Padfield and Others v Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food and Others [1968] AC 997. 
"Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Ministerfor the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 at p402. See also Woolf H. Judicial Review. 
LQR 1998; 114: 579-593 at p590. 
29Anns v Merton London Borough Council [ 1978] AC 728, at p753 per Lord Wilberforce. See also X (minors) v Bedfordshire CC [ 1995] 2 
AC 633 (particularly per Lord Browne-Wilkinson) and Stovin v Wise and NorfolkCC [ 1996] AC 923. See also: Feldthusen B. Failure to confer 
discretionary public benefits: the case for complete negligence immunity. Tort Law Review March 1997 pp17-32 and Harris M. Powers into 
Duties -A small breach in the East Suffolk Wall? LQR 1997; 113: 398-403. 
30R v North West Lancashire HA ex parte A, D&G. [2000] WLR 977, at p992 per Auld LJ. 
"See, for example, LMv Essex County Council [1999] 1 FLR 988. See also: Rv London Borough of Sutton, exparte Tucker (1998) 40 BMLR 
137 where lack of community resources to put into place a care package meant a patient with learning disabilities was unnecessarily detained 
in hospital. 
32Mental Health Act Review Expert Group Draft Outline Proposals April 1999 The Stationery Office, London at para 19. 
"Order 53, RSC (SI 1977, No 1955); Supreme Court Act 1981, s3 1. The claim for judicial review must be brought within three months of the 
allegedly wrongful decision. This period can be extended in exceptional circumstances if the court considers a grave injustice would otherwise 
occur. 
"For instance R, v Central Birmingham HA, ex parte Walker (1987) 3 BMLR 32. 
35Applications for judicial review of decisions by South Lancashire, East Lancashire, Bury and Rochdale Health Authorities not to fund 
genetically-engineered factor VIII for 4 haemophiliac children were refused on the grounds that the children had not established a right to be 
considered as special cases: British Medical Journal 1997; 314: 695. 
'6Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust exparte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905, at p908 per Lord Woolf MR. 
"R v Cambridge District HA, ex Parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055, at p1074 per Lord Bingham MR. 
38R v Gloucestershire CC, ex parte Mahfood; Rv Islington, ex parte McMillan. The Times, June 21,1995. 
'9R v Bristol Corporation, ex parte Hendy [1974] 1 All ER 1047 and Stovin v Wise and Norfolk CC [1996] AC 
923. 
40See, for example, the medical estimations regarding treatment success in Rv Cambridge District HA, ex Parte B[ 1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
41 See, for instance, Rv Cambridge District HA, exparte B[ 1995] 1 FLR 1055 and Rv North West Thames RHA ex Parte Daniels [ 1994] 109 
BMLR 67. 
'=R v North and East Devon HA, ex parte 
Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622. 
43See, for example, Avon County Council v Hooper and Another [1997] 1 All ER 532. 
44 Marc Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine [1995] 3 All ER 307 at p326 per Lord Steyn. 
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foreseeability and proximity are establishable. 45 However, when targets are set by government, the courts may 
hold that failure to meet them resulting in harm is negligent. 46 
6.1.2 Patient Refuses Treatment 
6.1.2.1 Refusal of Treatment by Competent Patients 
Can the patient's wish to have certain treatments withheld, or to discontinue existing treatment, be overturned? 
The principle of autonomy is reflected in the fact that English law, like others47, holds it `a criminal and 
tortious assault' to treat a patient without consent. 48 Lord Scarman believed it is a `sound and reasonable 
proposition that the doctor should be required to exercise care in respecting the patient's right of decision'. 49 
He approved the four propositions5° that (1) every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what is done with his own body, (2) consent is the informed exercise of a choice entailing a chance 
to evaluate the options and attendant risks, (3) all `material' risks should be disclosed by the doctor bearing 
in mind what the `prudent patient' would want to know and (4) a doctor may exercise `therapeutic privilege' 
and withhold information if disclosure of that information would present a `serious threat of psychological 
detriment to the patient'. 51 
St George's, which held a pregnant woman had the right to refuse a life-saving Caesarian section, indicates 
a strengthening of the view that autonomy should be supported even though treatment was both economically 
and medically indicated. 52 Brazier and Bridge note that there is no clear definition as to what the courts 
consider constitutes autonomous choice. 53 They approves Harris' suggestion that choices are autonomous 
providing they are not defective in reasoning, information, control or stability. 54 It is still uncertain how 
binding advance refusals of medical treatment will be. In Bland, Lord Goff stated that `it is established that 
the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that if 
an adult patient of sound mind, refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his 
life would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes'. 55 Lord 
Mustill spoke of the `(p)aramountcy of the patient's choice'. 56 Providing the competent patient has clearly 
indicated his/her wishes it would be unlawful to continue treatment. 57 If the patient's refusal seems 
involuntary, or no longer reflects his/her wishes58, the court may be asked to overrule it. 59 Some patients may 
USX (minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] AC 633. See also, Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee 
[ 1992] 1 All ER where it was held that rights based on public law could not form the basis of private law actions. 
16Kent v Griffiths [2000] 2 WLR 1158. 
"See, for example, Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321 (Ontario CA). 
48Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, at p432 per Butler-Sloss LJ. 
49Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 at p885 per Lord Scarman. His 
approach is more patient-centred than that of the other four Law Lords whose pro-doctor stance has been strongly criticised: Jones MA. Informed 
Consent and Other Fairy Stories. Medical Lativ Review 1999; 7,2: 103-134; Skegg PDG. English Medical Law and `Informed Consent': An 
Antipodean Assessment and Alternative. Medical Law Review 1999; 7,2: 135-165. 
"Given in Canterbury v Spence(1972) 464 F 2d 772. 
51 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 at p887. 
52R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. See also, 
Bailey-Harris R. Comment: St George's Healthcare NHS 
Trust v S. Fam Law 1998; 28: 527 and Bailey-Harris R. `Patient Autonomy -A Turn 
in the Tide? ' In Freeman M, Lewis A (Eds) Law and 
Medicine: Current Legal Issues Vol 3.2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp 127-140. 
"Brazier M, Bridge C. Coercion or caring: analysing adolescent autonomy. Legal Studies 1996; 16: 84-109 at p91. 
"Ibid, at pp91-93. 
55Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p864C. 
56Ibid, at p891H. 
57 Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001 ]1 FLR 129. 
"Ibid. 
"In Bv Croydon HA. [ 1995] 1 FLR 470 involuntariness seems equated with a lack of capacity. 
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welcome court intervention but this should not be assumed. 60 If the barrier to acting voluntarily is medical, " 
or religious, 62 this may be treated as evidence of incapacity. 63 It is a dangerous message to send to doctors that 
incapacity can be determined according to how freely the patient seems able to act. Patients' decisions may 
be affected by other factors such as perceived obligations to others` or religious obligations to accept 
treatment. 65 Whether the court could then justify overriding these decisions is debatable. Sommerville suggests 
that to be binding, oral refusals of treatment should be subjected to the same test that was applied in Re C16 with 
the modification that the patient believed the future illness/condition might befall him/her. " The revised St 
George's guidance goes further by recommending that `unequivocal assurances... in writing' that the 
consequences of refusal are understood be obtained from the patient. 68 An unacknowledged paradox exists in 
that the courts indicate that advance directives may be acceptable indicators of patients' wishes provided they 
are clear yet, unscrutinised, doctors are daily relying upon unprovable assertions by relatives, who have no legal 
status in the decision-making process regarding adult patients. It may not always be appropriate to recognise 
advance directives but there is a fine line between protecting patients who would wish their advance directive 
to be ignored and allowing paternalism full sway. 69 
Thomas J considered that decisions about withholding or withdrawing medical treatment are `best determined 
by the application of common principles of humanity and commonsense. These principles are not outside the 
law but nor are they the prerogative of the law'. 7° Wear and Brahams suggest that `commonsense morality' 
should inform the decision-making process regarding treatment refusals. " Since it is not `commonsense' for 
patients to refuse, or be allowed to refuse, Caesarian sections, the patient's competence is suspect. The 
rationality of the refusal may be grounds for questioning the patient's competence. The principle of autonomy 
requires acceptance that a competent patient, with full understanding of his/her decision, is entitled to act 
`irrationally'. 72 However, some argue that `being autonomous requires that a person hold rational beliefs' 
despite the `great emphasis on physicians respecting patient autonomy.. . 
(which). 
. . encourages tolerance even 
towards the harmful choices patients make on the basis of their own values'. 73 This `tolerance' is seen as 
mistaken and representing `abandonment' of the patient. This argument, principally directed against Jehovah's 
Witnesses, assumes that anyone whose choice seems irrational to the scientific mind, must either be ignorant 
of `truth', 74 uncaring, or lacking analytical skills so doctors have a `more extensive' duty to educate patients 
than previously thought. 75 `Faith' differs from logic and adherents of any religion may be highly educated and 
"Smith DH, Veatch RM (Eds). Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying. A Report by the 
Hastings Center. 1987 The Hastings Center, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indiapolis at p54. 
6'Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11 and Bv Croydon HA. [1995] 1 FLR 470. 
62Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1993] 1 FLR 386 and Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [ 1998] 2 FLR 810. 
63B v Croydon HA. [1995] 1 FLR 470 at p475 per Hoffman LJ. 
64Hardwig J. Is there a duty to die? Hastings Center Report 1997; 27,2: 34-42. 
65Lord Walton of Detchant. Dilemmas of life and death: Part One. J. Roy. Soc. Med. 1995; 88: 311-5 at p314. 
66Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [ 1994] 1 FLR 31. In other words, the patient comprehended and retained the information given regarding 
his/her illness/condition, believed it and was able to weigh it in the balance. 
67Sommerville A. Rememberance of conversations past: oral advance statements about medical treatment. BMJ 1995; 310: 1663-5 at p1664. 
68R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728 and, see also, Family Law 1998; 28: 642-4. 
69For some of the arguments see: Hope T. Advance Directives. I Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 67-8; Ryan CJ. Betting your life: an argument against 
certain advance directives. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 95-9; Luttrell S, Sommerville A. Limiting risks by curtailing rights: a response to Dr Ryan. 
J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 100-4 and Savalescu J. Rationalism and Medical Decision-Making. Bioethics 1997; 11,2: 115-129. 
70.4uckland Health Board v Attorney General of New Zealand. (1993) 1 NZLR 235 at p247. See also: Stauch M. Rationality and the refusal 
of medical treatment: a critique of the recent approaches of the English courts. J. Med. Ethics 1995: 21: 162-165. 
"Wear AN, Brahams D. At the coalface: to treat or not to treat: the legal, ethical and therapeutic considerations of treatment refusal. J. Med. Ethics 
1991; 17: 131-135 at p132. 
72Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at pp436-7 per Butler-Sloss LJ. 
73 Savulescu J, Momeyer RW. Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs? I Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 282-8 at 282. 
74For instance, of the 'correct interpretation' of the bible regarding blood. 
`Savulescu & Momev er, op cit n73 at p287. 
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scholarly. Physicians who attempted `educating' their patients would undoubtedly lay themselves open to 
charges of arrogance, intolerance, intrusiveness and unbridled paternalism. Respecting patient autonomy 
means respecting genuinely-held beliefs not dismissing them. 76 A tendency to examine whether Catholic 
teachings were being correctly interpreted can be detected in Re A (Conjoined Twins) although the court 
stressed parental opposition was not `prompted by scruple or dogma'. " Doctors should avoid interfering with 
areas of religious belief although judicial intervention maybe appropriate if the patient is not of `sound mind'. 78 
If `commonsense' is to underpin treatment decisions, it needs consistent interpretation and application - 
otherwise, it is mere rhetoric utilised to validate the favouring of medical opinion. 
In Re C, where man with paranoid schizophrenia was refusing a life-saving amputation, Thorpe J held that 
competence requires (1) being capable of comprehending and retaining the information given; (2) believing 
the information and (3) being capable of weighing it in the balance to make a decision. 79 In his case, 
amputation was medically indicated but, economically, his early death was possibly preferable. Although the 
Court of Appeal in Re MB8° approved this test a departure from objective assessment appeared in the guidelines 
issued in St George's. 8' These indicate that the decision regarding capacity is to be made by the patient's 
general practitioner or other responsible doctor but `in serious or complex cases' the issue should be decided 
by an independent psychiatrist. 82 Therefore, it appears the test in Re C may simply be a test for the courts to 
judge whether the decision arrived at was justifiable. In contrast, the U. S. A. has a rebuttable presumption of 
capacity which requires four cognitive conditions: `the ability to comprehend the information relevant to the 
situation at hand, the ability to appreciate the situation and the consequences of alternative approaches, the 
ability to weigh the information rationally in the context of a coherent set of goals or values, and the ability to 
communicate choices regarding care'. 83 Emotional capacity could also be held a requisite for decisional 
competence so the patient who seems 'indifferent"' could be held incompetent. 85 
Patients may be coerced (forced even) into accepting treatment. 86 Anecdotal evidence exists showing that 
pregnant woman who would prefer to refuse Caesarian sections are frightened, `in their best interests' into 
consenting by the threat of legal action. 87 Similar concerns exist regarding the treatment of mentally ill 
76See also the discussion of Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College Inc. 331 F2d 1000 (1964) in Kennedy I, Grubb 
A. Medical Lmv: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London at pp371-372. 
"Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1 at p52D per Ward U. A draft judgment was issued on the internet as Re A 
(Children) Case No: B 1/2000/2969 Court of Appeal 22 September 2000 www. courtservice. gov. uk. 
78Stauch M. Rationality and the refusal of medical treatment: a critique of the recent approach ofthe English courts. J. Med. Ethics 1995,21: 161- 
6. 
79Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [ 1994] 1 FLR 31. Note the similarities to the competencies discussed in Wear AN, Brahams D. 
At the coalface: to treat or not to treat: the legal, ethical and therapeutic considerations of treatment refusal. J. MedEthics 1991; 17: 131-135 at 
134. 
80Re MB (Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 426. 
81R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
"Ibid. See also the Comment by Gillian Douglas: November 1998 Family Law 1998; 28: 662-4. 
"Morrison RS et al. When too much is too little. NEJM 1996; 335,23: 1755-1759 at p1757. The latter category includes patients who have 
complete understanding but are unable to communicate their wishes. 
84R v St George 's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728 at p751. 
SSCharland LC. Appreciation and Emotion: Theoretical Reflections on the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 1998; 8,4: 359-376. For a commentary see: Applebaum PS. Ought We to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence. 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1998; 8,4: 377-387. 
For instance, a patient with mental health illness can be forcibly treated under the Mental Health Act 1983 and certain `notifiable' diseases such 
as cholera and tuberculosis render the patient subject to compulsory treatment under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (See list 
of diseases in Sch. I Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988. See also: Morrison RS et al. When too much is too little. NEJM 
1996; 335,23: 17-55-1759. 
97The Association for Improvements in the Maternity Services is a lobby group which is aiming to change the culture that leads to such abuses: 
Frasier L. Mother sues hospital for `assault' during childbirth. Mail on Sunday 12 April 1998. One law firm which represents 70 NHS Trusts 
setup a 24 hour telephone helpline 
for Trusts `seeking to compel non-compliant women to undergo obstetric intervention' in response to NHS 
`need': Hewson B. A woman's freedom under attack. The Times 8 July 1997. See also, Mueller MJ et al. Thin on the details: letters and 
response. Hastings Center Report 
1997; 27,1: 2-3. 
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patients88 and whether women acting as surrogate mothers or tissue donors for a relative have been coerced by 
family pressure. 89 Such coercion may remain undetected because the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 merely requires the `opportunity to receive suitable counselling'. 90 In St George's, the patient wvas 
sectioned even though doctors did not intend to provide treatment for mental illness because they wished to 
protect her unborn child. 9' The American cases of Saikewicz 92 and Farrell` hold that patient refusal of 
treatment is subject to the state's interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of 
the medical profession and the protection of innocent third parties. American courts may differ according to 
whether treatment is curative or merely delaying death and quality is preferenced over length. 94 If the outcome 
is a good quality of life as opposed to a `wretched' one95 the state's interest in preserving life and preventing 
suicide may prevail over patient refusal. 96 The English case of Robb suggests patient self-determination 
overrides such national interests. " It is lawful for prison authorities not to enforce treatment. 98 Consequently, 
the right to refuse treatment or food usually prevails except in a few cases where, rather than appealing to `state 
interests' the person's competence is questioned. 99 Savalescu suggests utilising a model of Rawlsian 
reasonableness whereby `reasonableness' in rational deliberation requires: use of inductive logic; disposition 
towards finding reasons for, and against, the proposed solution; being open-minded and making a conscientious 
attempt to overcome personal prejudices. 10° Regarding failed suicides, withholding care may be viewed as 
colluding in suicide not as respecting autonomy. 
Sometimes the court's finding of competence seems related to how valuable the person is to society. In Re C 
the delusional Broadmoor patient's refusal of life-saving amputation was upheld. "' The patient in Re JT had 
learning disabilities so, like Re C1°2, was an economic burden on society. 103 She had tried, then refused, dialysis 
for her renal failure. 104 She was found competent so the doctor was `not only entitled to withhold treatment, 
he (was) bound to respect the patient's wishes'. 105 The court's failure to question why she was not prioritised 
88R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust exparte L [1999] 1 AC 458. 
89Brazier M (Chair). `Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation - Report of the Review 
Team' (The Brazier Report) October 1998 The Stationery Office, London. 
"Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 s13(6). 
91R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
92 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728,370 NE 2d 417 (1977). 
93In the Matter of Kathleen Farrell, 529 A 2d 404 (1987) at 410. For a discussion see: MacKay RD. Terminating life-sustaining treatment - 
recent US developments. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 135-139. 
941n Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr 297 (1986) the court held that the quality of her life was more important than extending it for a 
possible 15-20 years by artificial nutrition. 
95Satz v Perm utter 362 So. 2d 160,162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also: Weir, op cit n3 at p94. 
96Some American doctors began moving towards the English position about 10 years ago though this may not be reflected in the judicial 
decisions. For the changing medical approach, see: (1) Principles and Guidelines Concerning the Foregoing of Life-Sustaining Treatment for 
Adult Patients. LACMA Physician 21 Feb. 1986: 21 (publication of the Committee on Biomedical Ethics of the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association and the Los Angeles County Medical Association, (2) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Current Opinion of the Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association 1986 AMA, Chicago, (3) The Hastings Center, Guidelines on the 
Termination ofLife-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying. 1987 Indiana University Pres, Bloomington. For a discussion of the USA 
judiciary's approach, see: Flamme A, Forster H. `Legal Limits: When does Autonomy in Health Care Pevail? ' In Freeman M, Leis A (Eds) 
Law and Medicine: Current Legal Issues Vol 3.2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp141-157. 
97Home Secretary v Robb [ 1995] 1 FLR 412. 
98Ibid. The reasoning in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 was followed, distinguishing Leigh v Gladstone and Others (1909) 26 
TLR 139 which had been decided at a time when suicide was unlawful. However, in Xv Federal Republic of Germany, the European 
Commission on Human Rights held that Article 3 of the European Convention was not contravened by a German law which allowed the force 
feeding of prisoners on hunger strike since Article 2 obliged the German government to `secure to everyone the right to life' (N 10565/83 7 
EHRR 152,153). 
99B lv Croydon HA. [ 1995] 1 FLR 470. 
1°°Savalescu J. Rationalism and Medical Decision-Making. Bioethics 1997; 11,2: 115-129 at pp124-5. 
"'Re C (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [ 1994] 1 FLR 31. 
'°2Ibid. 
"'Re JT (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 48. 
"'Ibid. 
105lbid, at p52 per Wall J. 
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for transplantation, unlike the `normal' girl in Re M, reinforces the idea that some lives have lesser value. 1 ' 
In Rodas, the paranoid and depressed patient had made a `rational and reasonable' decision to have his 
gastronomy tube removed. 107 Candura was an elderly lady of fluctuating mental lucidity refusing further `life- 
saving' amputation. 1°8 In Thor, it was held that the right of self-determination prevailed. '09 As a quadriplegic 
he was particularly problematic for the prison services to care for. Issues of patient merit were raised in Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) where Ward U was regrettably silent regarding concerns that `the parents are Kosovan 
refugees unjustifiably draining our resources'. "' He could have asserted that, in humanitarian cases, 
nationality is irrelevant. Although he later stated that the `indispensible foundation of justice is the basic 
equality in worth of every human being', "' the message the courts send out is that the lives of the criminally 
insane, drug abusers, the disabled, the old and refugees are not worth saving. 
The court's findings regarding competence may seem influenced by external factors such as desire not to allow 
criminals to escape punishment. "' In Myers, following kidney transplantation, the court granted advance 
authorization of continued treatment because of the state interest in `upholding orderly prison administration' 
following concerns that he might use threats to stop his anti-rejection drugs as a way to control his 
environment. 1' In Re Caulk, the healthy prisoner decided to starve himself to death rather than remain in 
prison and it was held that the balance of state interests went against his right of self-determination. 14 Brady 
likewise tried to `control his environment' but the same result was achieved based on his `incompetence' and 
`best interests'. 1' Enforced treatment of notorious criminals may be authorised in order to continue to use them 
as examples for others. A similar rationale possibly underlies the Caesarean section cases. When treatment 
is enforced the male-dominated courts broadcast a message that `virtuous' women do not jeopardise the lives 
of their unborn children. Similarly, some American decisions suggest that good parents do not abandon their 
children1. although refusal may be allowed if the child will not be left destitute. "' Involving the courts 
pressurises patients who may feel that they are `behaving badly' and `will be punished' because that is the 
perceived role of the judicial system. 1' 
Death may soon follow a decision to refuse treatment, for instance non-resuscitation. "' Death is more gradual 
in the case of refusing artificial ventilation, artificial nutrition, dialysis, chemotherapy or antibiotics, giving 
time for reflection and reversal of the decision. Every day that the patient lives without requesting that 
treatment is one day more in which s/he reaffirms refusal. Repeated requests for unwanted treatment to stop 
1°6 The patient in Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097 received a new heart within a week although hearts are scarcer than 
kidneys. JT's family had apparently been screened for compatibility as live donors but none was said to be suitable. Non-suitability is used as 
a way to protect reluctant `volunteers' from having to face the condemnation of their families. 
107 In re Rodas, No 86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa County, January 22 1987). 
1°8Lane v Candura 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377,376 NE 2d 1232 (1976). 
1°9Thor v Superior Court 885 P 2d 375 (1993). 
"°Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) op cit n77, at p8A. 
"'Ibid, at p44C per Ward LJ. 
`R v Collins, exparte Brady [2000] Lloyd's Rep Med 355. 
"'Commissioner of Corrections v Myers 399 NE 2d 452 (1979) at p457. See also, Weir, op cit n3 at pp77-9. 
"'Re Caulk 480 A2d 93 (1984). Discussed in Home Secretary v Robb [ 1995] 1 FLR 412. 
"'Ex parte Brady, op cit n 112. 
"`Application of the President and Directors of Georgetoivn College, Inc., 331 F2d 1000 (1964). See also the Hastings 
Center guidelines 
(Guidelines on the Termination ofLife-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying. 1987 Indiana 
University Pres, Bloomington) at p55. 
"71n re Osborne 294 A 2d 372 (DC App 1972). For a 
discussion of the anomalies, see Weir, op cit n3 at pp75-7. 
"'For instance, the patient in Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 `consented' and did not fight against the anaesthetist once the court 
order had been made: Mason JK, 
McCall Smith RA, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics 5`h Edn. 1999 Butterworths, London at p139. This 
could have been evidence either that she 
had been attention-seeking before or she was petrified as to what the court would do to her if she did 
resist. 
19Hayward M. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: are practitioners being realistic? British J. of Nursing 1999; 8,12: 810-813. 
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can also be seen as affirming patient wishes. 12' However, Szasz believes that if the `collectivist model of 
healthcare rests squarely on social consensus... it is incompatible with a concept of a right to refuse 
treatment ... (since)... (i)f every individual's good health is an asset to the group, and every individual's ill health 
is not only a burden but a danger to it, a right to refuse treatment is tantamount to a right to endanger and 
injure the other members of the community' . 
12 ' Puxton believes that the courts should not consider societal 
interests since Re F`" held it was not for the judiciary to extend the law this way. 123 Weir supports the right 
of privacy (which) includes a right to die with which the State should not interfere where there are no minor 
or unborn children and no "clear and present danger to public health, welfare or morals"'. 12' English law is 
reluctant to recognise a right to privacy 12' although the Human Rights Act 1998 may strengthen such rights. 126 
6.1.3 Patient is Incompetent 
St George's holds that competent patients can refuse treatment. 'Z' The court has jurisdiction regarding 
children, "' but Re F"' confirmed that the parens patriae power of the state regarding incompetent adults no 
longer existed following the revocation of the Royal Warrant in 1960.13° Its absence was regretted in 
Bland13'and Tv T'32 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P is critical of the failure of Parliament to legislate in this 
area. 133 The House of Lords addressed this lacuna by holding that the doctrine of necessity allows doctors can 
carry out treatment which they deem to be in the patient's `best interests'. 134 Bland'35 confirmed the use of the 
`best interests' test. 136 Lord Goff held that doctors should act in accordance with a `responsible and competent 
body of relevant professional opinion on the principles set down in Bolam137 ... (and)... it is good practice for 
doctors to consult relatives'. "' The proposed act or omission can be declared not unlawful. '39 This country 
favours the `best interests' approach for both adults, "' and children, "' whereas American courts favour a 
120See, for instance, Bouvia v Superior Court 225 Cal. Rptr 297 (1986) at p306. 
12'Szasz T. `The right to refuse treatment. ' In: Bell NK (Ed). Who decides? Conflicts of Rights in Healthcare. 1982 Humana Press, Clifton, 
New Jersey. at p 114. 
'22Re F (In Utero)(Wardship) [1988] Fam 122. 
'21Ibid, at p144 per Balcombe LJ and Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p444, per Butler-Sloss LJ. See also: Puxton M. 
Comment on Re MB [ 1997] 8 Med LR 228. 
'24Weir, op cit n3 at p91-3 quoting from In Re Maida Yetter 62 PaD &C 2d 619 (1973). Weir explains this is not a constitutional right but can 
be `traced back' to Union Pacific Railway Co v Botsford 141 US 250,11 S. Ct. 1000 (1891) and is examined in Roe v Wade 410 US 113,93 
S. Ct 705 (1973). 
'25See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at pp848-9 for a discussion of this issue. 
126Article 8. 
' 27R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
"'Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64. However, unborn children are not legal persons: Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory 
Service Trustees [1979] 1 QB 276; CvS [198711 All ER 1230; Kelly v Kelly [1997] 2 FLR 828 and Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, 
exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
129Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
"'Ibid, at p51 E-G per Lord Bridge and pp54H-55B per Lord Brandon. Statutory powers relating to medical treatment exist under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 but being sectioned under the MHA 1983 is not conclusive of incompetence: see Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) 
[1994] 1 FLR 31 and Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p862 per Lord Goff; at p875 per Lord Lowry and at p883 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
"`T vT and another [1988] 1 FLR 400 at p405 per Ward J. 
133Re F (Adult: Court's jurisdiction) [2000] 2 FLR 512 at pp523A-154E. 
134 Re F(mental patient. sterilisation) [ 1990] 2 AC 1. See also, Wilson and Smith's criticism ofthe failure to consider protecting her from sexual 
abuse: Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessity and the Legality of Medical Intervention. Medical Law International 
1995; 1: 3 87-410 at p402. 
"5Airedale NHS Trust i" Bland [1993] AC 789. 
13'Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [ 1990] 2 AC 1. See also: Law Commission. Medical Treatment and Research. Consultation paper No 
129. HMSO, London, para 7.7. 
"'Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789,870 per Lord Goff. A further `gloss' has been added by Bolitho v City & Hackney Health 
Authority [1998] AC 232. 
19.4iredale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. The declaration is an equitable remedy available under R. S. C., Ord. 15, r16. 
140Airedale IVHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
"'S I (1) Children Act 1989. A statutory equivalent for adults has been proposed: Making Decisions (Cm 4465) October 1999, The Stationery 
Office, London (discussed in the next chapter). 
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`substituted judgement' approach. 142 Doctors must consider whether the patient has `a capacity... commensurate 
with the gravity of the decision which he purported to make. The more serious the decision, the greater the 
capacity required. If the patient has the requisite capacity, doctors are bound by his decision. If not, they are 
free to treat him in what they believe to be his best interests'. '43 
The Royal Colleges are encouraged to articulate their professional opinion in guidelines. The courts accept 
these without close examination. 144 Lord Mustill's concerns about the `application of the principle of civil 
liability in negligence... to decisions on "best interests" in a field dominated by the criminal law'145 were realised 
in Re A. 146 This case involved a request from the mother of a man with Down's syndrome for him to have a 
vasectomy. The duty to act in accordance with professional standards and the duty to act in the best interest 
of the patient have not `been conflated into one requirement'. 14' Thus, the Court of Appeal held, `it is the 
judge, not the doctor, who makes the decision that ... 
(treating/not treating)... is in the best interests of the 
patient'. "' Hoffman LJ, in Bland, felt that doctors should not `determine the legal and moral questions... Nor 
do I think that the profession would be grateful to the court for leaving full responsibility for such decisions 
in its hands 
... 
(W)hether in those circumstances it would be lawful to provide or withhold the treatment or care 
is a matter for the law'. 14' This analysis reflects public opinion that doctors are accountable and patients have 
protectable rights. Doctors have dual obligations: to act in accordance with a responsible body of medical 
opinion when identifying treatment options and to act in the best interests of the incompetent patient. 'so 
Patients have a right to expect the legislature and/or the judiciary to protect their interests. Treatment should 
be withheld unless there is `no practicable, less intrusive means of treating the condition'. 15' The Blood case, 
in which semen was surgically collected from a dying man at his wife's request, represented a gross invasion 
of privacy despite the doctors' good intentions. 152 Doctors often believe that decision-making is solely their 
preserve. 153 Consequently, the judiciary have found it necessary to set boundaries so doctors know when to refer 
an issue to the courts. 154 Hoffman LJ's conclusion must be correct: `I would expect medical ethics to be formed 
by the law rather than the reverse'. 15' However, often the judiciary have allowed medical ethics to shape the 
law. "' Consequently, doctors `acting in accordance with their peers' feel unchallengeable. 157 Similarly, 
"'The substituted j udgment approach has critics amongst the American medical profession. See, Letters: Substituted Judgment and the Decision 
to Withhold Life Support. Annals Intern. Med. 1991; 115,9: 743-745. Note also that American courts, and some English commentators use the 
spelling `judgement' - quotations will use the spelling employed by the judge or author. 
"'Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at p112 per Lord Donaldson MR. See also, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 
426, at 437, Sidativay v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital[ 1985] AC 871 at p904 and Gillick v West 
Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 at p169 and p186. 
'4'A National Health Service Trust vD [2000] 2 FLR 677. 
'45Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p898. 
'46Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
147Ibid, at pp555 per Butler-Sloss P. 
14SIbid, at pp555 per Butler-Sloss P. See also, Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
149Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p834. 
150Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
15'Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293 at p294 per Sir Stephen Brown P. See also, Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) 
[2000] 2 FLR 389 at p401 per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P and p405 per Thorpe U. 
12R v Human Fertilisation and EmbryologyAuthority exparte Blood [1997] WLR 806. For a discussion see: Delaney L. Fathers - Who Needs 
Them? - HFEA v Blood. Family Law 1997; 27: 261-4. 
'S3See earlier chapters of this thesis andthe BMA guidance Withholding and Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment. 1999 BMA, 
London which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
ii" Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389 at p405 per Thorpe U. See also: Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) 
[ 1988] AC 199: a decision to carry the sterilisation of a minor should be made by a High Courtjudge not by the doctor in charge of the patient. 
155 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p834. 
'56See: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 and Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
157See, In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421 at p 1423 perTempleman U. Similarly, Dr David Moor's actions 
were approved by many doctors yet the 
Crown Prosecution Service felt there was an arguable case against him regarding attempted murder: Rv 
Moor (unreported) The Times 12 May 2000 and Wilkinson P. Cheers as GP is cleared of murdering patient. The Times 12 May 1999. It is 
questionable, following the 
Harold Shipman case, whether the jury would acquit if a similar case came to the courts now. 
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complimenting the doctors for any errors they made in St George's encourages medical paternalism. '58 
In Re S1595 the court held sterilisation was not in her best interests as the risk of pregancy was speculative. In 
Re X the risk was more real, and if she became pregnant her family would face additional pressures, so the 
court granted the declaration sought. "' Therefore, doctors consider it acceptable to consider the burden on 
others rather than the patient's best interests. 16' As in Re F'62, there is often a failure to address the issue of 
protecting the incompetent person, not just from pregnancy, but also from abuse 
Although the incompetent patient has a right not to be subjected to non-consensual touching, which is waived 
only if inhumane not to, children and incompetent adults have been allowed to donate bone marrow, and 
occasionally organs, to siblings with minimal, or no, interference by the courts. 16' This suggests that the 
physical integrity of `incompetents' is of little value to the judiciary. 164 No English court has authorised non- 
therapeutic treatment to proceed in the absence of consent from a competent adult. 16' The message sent to 
doctors is that only those who can speak up for themselves receive protection. In Bland, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson suggests that the court cannot use the best interests test with adults - all they can do is state that 
invasive treatment is lawful. "' If correct, cases like Re Y'67 are incorrectly decided unless there is an 
unacknowledged difference between decisions made for the medical benefit of others and those made for the 
`benefit' of the patient him/herself. 
6.1.3.1 Refusal by Incompetent Adult Patients 
The competent patient's refusal is usually held to be absolute but, where an unborn child's life is at risk, the 
woman's competence is questioned by the medical profession whose opinion is normally accepted by the 
courts. 168 The issue of undue influence, as well as pain, shock and sedation, affecting her competence was 
raised in Re T 169 Economically, medically and ethically, treatment was indicated. However, the doctors had 
withheld information regarding the consequences of refusal. 1° It cannot be acceptable to withhold relevant 
information and then challenge on grounds of incompetence. 
In Rochdale, "' because the patient was resigned to death, she was not 'able ... to make any valid 
decision about 
"'The doctors were complimented for `any errors' they made in St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 728, at p748. 
The guidelines encourage doctors to question the validity of advance directives: St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S (No 2) [1998] 
2 FLR 758. 
'59Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult Sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944. 
"'Re X (Adult Sterilisation) [1998] 2 FLR 1124. 
"'See the discussion in earlier chapters which demonstrates this point. 
'62Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [199012 AC 1. 
"'There seems to be a presumption in favour of the existence of an emotional bond which is not always necessarily the case. Child B's sister 
was the donor for the failed bone marrow transplant (R v Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055). See also: In Re Y (Mental 
Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] 2 WLR 556. American courts have also upheld such donations: Strunk v Strunk (1969) 35 A. L. R. 
(3d) 683; Hart v Brown (Super 1972) 29 Conn Supp 368, and (unreported) a case where a family deliberately had another child in the hope it 
would be a good match for the child with leukaemia: Month S. Preventing children from donating may not be in their best interests. BMJ 
1996; 312: 241-242. 
161 See, for instance, In Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [ 1997] 2 WLR 556. Two other potential donors existed: Feenan D. A 
good harvest? Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant). Child and Fam. Law Q. 1997; 9,3: 305-312 at p309. 
161 See, for instance, the American case, McFall v Shrimp 10 Pa D&C 3d (Allegheny County Ct 1978). 
'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p884F. 
167In Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [ 1997] 2 WLR 556. 
168However, in Re MB, although the obstetrician found the patient competent, the judge disagreed: Re MB (Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 
426 at p435. 
169Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [ 1993] Fam 95. 
10The case only went to court once she had lapsed into a coma. See: Brazier & Bridge, op cit n53 at p108. 
"'Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust vC (Unreported) 3 July 1996. Referred to in Re MB (Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 426 at p434. 
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anything of even the most trivial kind'. 1' Competence was equated with rationality with the arbiters being the 
judiciary and/or the doctors. 1' Butler-Sloss LJ rightly objected to this unbridled professional paternalism. ' 
She concluded that irrationality should mean `a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived 
at it' and `panic, indecisiveness and irrationality in themselves do not as such amount to incompetence'. 1' It 
is for the doctors to decide whether `temporary factors' are `operating to such a degree that the ability to decide 
is absent'. 1' This gives the medical profession tremendous power. "' Competence is `a value judgment that 
varies from moment to moment and situation to situation'. "' The lacuna in St Georges means patients in pain 
could be deemed incompetent. 1' This `handing-over' of their adjudication powers by the judiciary betrays the 
patients they are supposed to protect from unwarranted intrusion. Also, since `(t)here may be occasions when 
the situation facing the authority is so urgent and the consequences so desperate that it is impracticable to 
attempt to comply with these guidelines.. . 
(so). 
. . 
formulaic compliance with these guidelines would be 
inappropriate' it seems that the court's role is becoming one of protecting the doctor from civil liability in non- 
urgent situations. "' The revised guidelines in St George's give weaker support for patient autonomy than the 
judgment itself which asked, `how can a forced invasion of a competent adult's body against her will ... 
be 
ordered without irremediably damaging the principle of self-determination? "" This suggests that the economic 
burden to society of a disabled woman or infant is not irrelevant. 
Following the ruling in St George's the same judge18' who heard the Rochdale case, 18' later heard Re M 
involving a fifteen year old girl refusing a heart transplant. 18' The finding that she was incompetent because 
she was `overwhelmed' by the suddenness of events has ramifications for future cases. "' It is open to the courts 
to decide that any patient faced with unforeseen need for major surgery will be incompetent to refuse such 
treatment. Despite the Court of Appeal's instructions that doctors should not apply to the courts for support 
in enforcing treatment if the patient is competent, 186 all the doctors will need to do now is raise the suggestion 
that the patient has been `overwhelmed' by the rapid turn of events. '$' In Re A (Conjoined Twins) the parents 
"'Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p435. 
13For an example of the difficulties this poses see Hunter v British Coal Corporation [1998] 3 WLR 685, where feelings of guilt following the 
death of a colleague was `an irrational response' yet guilt is one of the seven stages of grief which everyone needs to pass through following a 
bereavement. Kubler-Ross E. On Death and Dying 1974 NBC, New York. 
14Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p435. It should be remembered that different cultures have differing attitudes towards 
surgical delivery of babies particularly if a woman is prized for her ability to bear children. The Caesarian section is major abdominal surgery; 
future deliveries usually need to be by the same route and there is the possibility that the ability of the woman to conceive and carry to term will 
be affected. 
"'Re MB (Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 426 at p437. 
176 Ibid, at p437. 
"'The exercise ofthe power would, no doubt, be judged using the Bolam test: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 
582 as modified by Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. See also: Joyce v Wandsworth HA [1996] 7 Med. LR 1. 
178Wear AN, Brahams D. At the coalface: To treat or not to treat: the legal, ethical and therapeutic implications of treatment refusal. J. Med. Ethics 
1991; 17: 131-135 at p133. 
19R v St George 's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728. See: Jewell L. Treatment without Consent. Family Law 1998; 28: 774- 
6. However, some patients in such situations will be genuinely incompetent: Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust vW[ 1996] 2 FLR 
613. 
180R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S [1998] 2 FLR 758, Guideline (11). 
"'Where there is less urgency, the court's approval will still need to be sought: Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
112Sir Robert Johnson J. See: Gibb F. Judge has a history of overriding patients. The Times 16 July 1999. 
"'Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust vC (unreported) 3 July 1996. 
184 Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [199912 FLR 1097. 
185Ibid, at p 1100 per Johnson J. See also: Scott R. Girl saved by heart she didn't want. Daily Mail 16 July 1999; Dyer C, Boseley S. A matter 
of life and death. The Guardian 16 July 1999; Dyer C, Boseley S. New heart for dying girl who refused consent. The 
Guardian 16 July 1999; 
Anon. Judge forces girl aged 15 to have heart transplant. The Times 16 July 1999. 
186R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse S (No 2) [1998] 2 FLR 758, para ii. 
187J is worth noting that, as will be discussed in later in this thesis, the BMA is prepared to utilise the courts in the case of pregnant women who 
refuse Caesarian sections although for other patients 
it wishes to exclude the courts from playing any role. See: BMA, Withholding and 
Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment. June 1999 BMA, London at p24, para. 13.7. 
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were held `overwhelmed' by the decision' and lacked 'consistency'. "' Patients will only be able to protect 
themselves from unwanted Caesarian sections if they can demonstrate that they have considered all the 
consequences of a difficult labour well in advance. 
In Re S, a Caesarian section case, 18' Sir Stephen Brown P disregarded any consideration of competence and 
based his decision on the American case of Re AC as he believed that this supported the concept that the life 
of the foetus should be prioritised over the principle of respect for patient autonomy. 190 Re AC is 
distinguishable from the English Caesarian section cases to date because her death from cancer was 
unavoidable. Subsequent decisions have been premised upon finding that the patient is temporarily 
incompetent as in Re MB, where counsel argued that, even if she were competent, the court could `and should 
take into account the interests of the unborn child and balance them against the mother's interests'. ` Such 
patients are described as `mothers' although they have yet to give birth but the `baby' is a `foetus'. The 
language chosen has significance for the final decision. "' Re MB held that, despite Re S'93, the court did not 
have `the jurisdiction to take the interests of the fetus into account'. 194 Paton was relied upon for authority: 
`The fetus195 cannot, in English law... have a right of its own at least until it is born and has a separate existence 
from its mother. That permeates the whole of the civil law of this country ... and... America, Canada, 
Australia'. 196 
Sometimes doctors wait until the patient loses capacity, before requesting court approval for treatment. 19' In 
Re AC, her refusal was overridden after unconsciousness following sedation. 198 The conflict of maternal and 
foetal interests meant that `what was good for one would have been harmful to the other'. 19' Other American 
cases hold that the mother and (viable) unborn child are `one'200, suggesting that the state's interest in 
preserving life and the child's right to life trump the mother's right to `privacy'. This `oneness' was expressly 
rejected in St George's20' although Lord Donaldson MR had previously suggested that the principle of 
autonomy could be qualified in the case where the choice could lead to `the death of a viable foetus'. 202 Rhoden 
considers that the judicial willingness to force pregnant women to undergo surgery is tantamount to holding 
that a duty to rescue their unborn child exists. 203 Rhoden believes the courts are wrong to extrapolate legal 
"'Re A (Conjoined Tivins. Medical Treatment) op cit n77, at p52G per Ward LJ (adopting the language used by Sir Robert Johnson J who had 
heard the initial application). 
189 Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671. 
1901n re AC 533 A2d 611 (DC App. 1987). 
'9'Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p439. 
192For instance, carrying out a termination of pregnancy can result in a `recognisable baby', a `foetus' or `end products of conception' being 
`delivered', `passed', `evacuated' or `extracted'. 
193Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [ 1992] 4 All ER 671. 
194Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, at p440, per Butler-Sloss U. 
'95Note the Americanised spelling. 
'96Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276, per Sir George Baker Pat p279. Rv St George's Healthcare , VHS 
Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728 confirms the lack of protection afforded unborn children. 
197The cases of Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [ 1996] 1 FLR 762 and Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (VHS) Trust vW 
[1996] 2 FLR 613 should be distinguished since the findings of incompetence were not unreasonable. 
'981n re AC 533 A2d 611 (DC App. 1987). 
'99Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Law: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London at p355. 
20°Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v Anderson (1964) 201 A 2d 537 (NJ Sup. Ct. ) and Jefferson v Griffin Spalding County 
Hospital Authority (1981) 274 SE 2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Georgia). 
2011? v St George 's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728 at pp742-6. Authority came from Attorney-General's Reference (No3 
of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421 at p428 per Lord Mustill and at p440 per Lord Hope of 
Craighead and Re F (In Utero)(Wardship) [1988] Fam 
122 at p 143 per Balcombe U. 
202Re T (Adult: Refusal of ;l fedical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at p 102. 
203Rhoden N. The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergency of Court-Ordered Caesareans (1986) 74 Cal. LR 1951. Reprinted in Kennedy 
I, Grubb A. Medical Lmv: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London at pp359-366. 
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duties from moral obligations. Alternatively, a general duty to assist third parties could be developed204 
Typically the judge hears `only the doctor's side and will learn little or nothing of the risks of surgical 
delivery'. 205 If the patient feels threatened she may abscond, placing herself and the unborn child at risk. 2o6 
Trying to enforce unwanted treatment may result in no care being received. 
The revised St Georges guidance shows the power of doctors to influence the judiciary at the expense of patient 
autonomy because it emphasises that, in `urgent' situations, it need not be complied with. 20' Since doctors 
decide `urgency' these guidelines give little protection for the patient. More cases like Re S, where the court 
held that the danger to the woman and unborn child justified the haste of its decision, are liable to occur. 208 
Patients may have uncertain or fluctuating capacity but any ability to exercise autonomy should be encouraged 
and enhanced. 209 Acting paternalistically may be easier but proxy decision-makers regularly fail to make the 
same decision the patient would have made themselves. 210 Difficult behaviour may be interpreted as evidence 
of incompetence as in Re D. "' A distorted view of his `best interests', ignoring the fact that his psychiatric 
problems were controllable, enabled a decision to be made that dialysis was not in his best interests. The 
decision could have been based on protecting staff from violence. 2'2 
6.1.3.2 Refusal by Minor Patients 
Minors over the age of 16 years have the status to consent to medical treatment213. Gillick established that 
those under this age may have capacity to consent if of `sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable 
him/her to understand fully what is proposed"" since, `parental right yields to the child's right to make his 
own decision'. 21' A `full understanding and appreciation of the consequences both of the treatment in terms 
of intended and possible side-effects and equally important, the anticipated consequences of a failure to treat' 
is required. 216 If a child has fluctuating understanding s/he is held Gillick incompetent. "' It is for the doctors 
z°4 See: Draper H. Women, forced Caesarians and antenatal responsibilities. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 327-333. Draper proposes that women should 
be held responsible if the baby suffers harm through their refusal of assistance. 
205Rhoden N, in Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Law: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London at p365. Rhoden points out that 
a court-ordered Caesarian leaves the patient and his/her family without redress if the scenario they fear actually occurs unless there is negligence 
on the part of the doctors in performing the operation. In one case the author of this thesis knows of, a woman afraid of death under anaesthesia 
was pressurised into a Caesarian section in 1998. She never recovered consciousness and her death was attributed to pituitary failure resulting 
from the stressful situation. In Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust ex parte S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728 the solicitor actually lied to the judge and 
was rebuked by the Court of Appeal (at p756). 
20GAs in Re F (In Utero)(Wardship) [1988] Fam 122. 
207St George's Healthcare NHS Trust vS (No 2) [1998] 2 FLR 758. 
208Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 26. 
'"'For instance, diminished competence in an old person may be no more than evidence of a treatable urinary tract infection. See also: Law 
Commission Report No 231 Mental Incapacity 1995 HMSO, London para 3.14 and Lord Chancellor's Department Making Decisions (Cm 
4465) October 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
210Hardwig J. The Problem of Proxies with Interests of Their Own. J. Clinical Ethics 1993; 4: 20-27. See also, Stolman CJ et al. Evaluation 
of patient, physician, nurse and family attitudes towards Do-Not-Resuscitate orders. Arch. Intern. Medicice 1990; 150: 653-658. 
21 'Re D (Medical Treatment: Mentally Disordered Patient) [ 1998] 2 FLR 22. As Cretney points out, the declaratory process was used to protect 
the healthcare providers from being held culpable for the patient's subsequent deterioration and eventual death: Cretney S. Comment: Re D 
(Medical Treatment: Mentally Disordered Patient) Family Law 1998; 28: 324-5. 
"'Hospital staff should not have to be subjected to violent attacks: Zollo MB, Derse A. The Abusive Patient: Where do you draw the line? 
American Journal ofNursing 1997; 97,2: 31-36. See also, the `Zero Tolerance' government stance on this issue taken in: Department of Health. 
We don't have to take this. Resource Pack. L20/002 November 1999 Department of Health, Wetherby. However, it should be noted that this 
was silent regarding the issue of violence from mentally ill patients, many of whom are in control of their actions as was the patient in Re D. 
The author of this thesis wrote to Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health, concerning this point and received written assurances that staff 
caring for the mentally ill are not expected to tolerate violence and that further guidance will be issued from the Department of Health in Autumn 
2000. At the time of writing (February 2001) no further guidance has yet been issued. 
2"Family Law Reform Act 1969 s8. 
214 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] WLR 830 at p858D per Lord Scarman. 
-'Slbid, at p855H, per Lord Scarman. 
216 Re R (A Alinor)(Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11 at p26 per Lord Donaldson MR. 
217 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
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to decide whether the child has the requisite level of understanding and intelligence. This may be affected by 
the doctor's personal bias; the nature of the proposed treatment; prior knowledge of the child and his/her 
circumstances and possibly other factors, so similar children may be rated differently. The majority, in 
Gillick218, felt that to apply the law rigidly, insisting on a fixed age barrier between incompetence and 
competence, fails to recognise the natural development of competence with maturity. 219 The more sheltered 
an upbringing, the less likely a child is to be found competent. 220 In Re L, the patient, possibly due to her 
epilepsy, was badly scalded in a bath. 221 She refused life-saving blood transfusions because of her Jehovah's 
Witness faith. Regarding Re E222, a fifteen year old boy with leukaemia, Brazier and Bridge question whether 
the patient's refusal of blood transfusions was `free choice 22' although Bailey-Harris suggests that `teenagers 
with deeply held convictions' should be regarded as mature and `entitled to their full autonomy rights'. "' The 
Court of Appeal, in Re W, 225 accepted that the anorexic patient was Gillick competent, 226 but held that refusing 
treatment differed from consenting since s8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 only refers to 'consent'. 227 
The more serious the consequences of refusal, the less likely the court will hold the patient competent. 228 Lord 
Donaldson MR, in Re R, 229 seemed to consider Gillick competence to differ from the ordinary competence of 
an adult. He held that the test for competence should be modified `(i)n the case of fluctuating mental disability 
to take account of that misfortune'. 23° This suggests that maturing competency differs from declining 
competency otherwise anyone who is subject to fluctuating capacity should be held incompetent. Elderly 
patients of fluctuating capacity could have treatment decisions made on their `good days' overturned on their 
`bad days'. This would bring the medical profession and/or the courts into disrepute. Douglas argues that in 
Re R supra, the Court of Appeal rejected the right of a competent person to make mistakes and `entrenched 
not welfare, but paternalism, as its guiding principle in wardship'. 23' In contrast, Bridgeman believes that the 
Gillick judgment shows the House of Lords held that the welfare of the child was paramount. 232 In most cases 
involving children it is economically, medically and ethically correct to try to save life. 
The Children Act 1989 gives the court powers to order medical or psychiatric examination and treatment. 233 
It also embodies a right for the competent child to refuse medical examination yet the courts have not extended 
this to the logical conclusion of treatment refusal. 234 If a Gillick competent child refuses medical examination, 
the doctor will be unable to make a diagnosis and recommend treatment. A competent child is unlikely to 
refuse examination because s/he will recognise the need for diagnosis. Consequently, a refusal of examination 
could be evidence of incompetence. Once the examination has revealed the problem, the courts then hold that 
218Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112. 
2 '9See the expert opinion in Re S (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065 at p1072 and Brazier & Bridge, op cit n53 at p106. 
120Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. In contrast, see Re B (Wardship: Abortion) [1991] 2 FLR 426. 
22'Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
222Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1993] 1 FLR 386. See also, Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [ 1998] 2 FLR 
810. 
223Brazier & Bridge, op cit n53 passim. 
224Bailey-Harris R. `Patient Autonomy -A Turn in the Tide? ' In Freeman M, Lewis A (Eds) Law and Medicine: Current Legal Issues Vol 3. 
2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp127-140 at p137. 
225Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64, albeit with reservations expressed by Lord Donaldson MR at pp80-81. 
226Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112. 
"'Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [ 1993] Fam 64. 
"See, for instance, Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 where the leukaemic patient was nearly 16 years old. 
229Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
270Ibid, at p26. 
1"Douglas G. The retreat from Gillick. MLR 1992; 55: 569-576 at p573. 
232Bridgeman J. Old enough to know best? Legal Studies 1993: 69-80 at p71. 
233 These powers exist if the court has made orders under s38 (interim care or supervision); s43 (child assessment); s44 (child protection). 
234If the child is of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision, the child is given the right to refuse medical/psychiatric examination 
(Children Act 1989 s38(6), s43(8), s44(7) and paras 4(4)(a) and 5(5)(a) of Schedule 3). 
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the child lacks the capacity to refuse treatment. 23' The child's welfare is the paramount consideration although 
the court should take into account the factors in s 1(3) Children Act 1989. The child's wishes are only one 
factor to be considered although the court should `not lightly override (the child's) decision on such a personal 
matter as medical treatment, all the more so if that treatment is invasive'. 23' How the child's views are sought 
has a relevance not recognised by the courts. 23' Bridgeman criticises the harsh treatment of W who had already 
been dealt with harshly by fate. 238 Sentiment for the individual should not cloud the decision-making process - 
fate has dealt harshly with many of those for whom the courts have to resolve issues of medical treatment. 
The child's refusal is not determinative. 239 It can be overridden by anyone with parental responsibility giving 
consent24° although Lord Donaldson MR suggested that once a child has the requisite maturity and 
understanding, his/her parents lose the right of determination. 24' Eekelaar argues that if parental rights 
regarding decisions concerning the child are lost once the child has capacity to consent for themselves then 
it cannot be possible for the crown to retain the right to `intervene in the lives of children'. 242 However, 
Douglas holds that the parens patriae power of the state is not lost since, as Re R suggests, `the court's powers 
are wider than those of parents' and it is acting not only custodially but protectively. 243 If the child has mental 
illness, statutory powers exist for enforced treatment although there is marked reluctance to use them. 2'a 
Reluctance to use the Mental Health Act left a child barricaded in her room, manipulating her family and not 
receiving the help she needed. 24' Theoretically, where the child is Gillick competent, the court might uphold 
the child's refusal. 246 Douglas argues that although treatment is allegedly in the child's `best interests', in 
practice, alternative medical views can legitimately be held so refusals of treatment should be approached more 
cautiously than consent with regard to overturning the patient's decision since a greater interference with 
autonomy is involved. 24' This is particularly true in the case of Re M where the court was told `no other 
medical option was available'248 although life-saving alternatives which may have been medically better as well 
as more acceptable to her did, at the time, exist. 249. It is worth noting that in Re M, parental consent had been 
given for the heart transplant, yet the doctors were still unwilling to proceed without the authority of the 
court . 
25° This suggests great anxiety regarding decisions involving physical maim (albeit therapeutic) and the 
`Re L (Medical Treatment Gillick Competence) [ 1998] 2 FLR 810. See also, Comment by Rebecca Bailey-Harris: Family Law 1998; 28: 591- 
2. 
236Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64 at p88 per Balcombe LJ. 
23Terry L, Campbell A. Hearing Children's Voices. Paper presented at the 3`d Annual Trevor Clay Memorial Conference, Philosophy in Nursing 
at Middlesex University 15 September 2000. See also: Terry L, Campbell A. Hearing Children's Voices: Are We Listening? British Journal 
of Nursing (forthcoming - accepted for publication 27 February 2001). 
238 Bridgeman J. Old enough to know best? Legal Studies 1993: 69-80 at p79. See also, Huxtable R. Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) Time 
to remove the `flak jacket'? CFLQ 2000; 12,1: 83-88. 
239Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64 at p81 per Lord Donaldson. 
240Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
24'Ibid, at p24. 
242Eekelaar J. The Emergence of Children's Rights Oxford J. Leg. Studies 1986: 161 at p181 
2"Douglas G. The retreat from Gillick. MLR 1992; 55: 569-576 at p573. See: Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) 
[1992] Fam 
11 at p25. 
2441n Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [ 1992] Fam 11 the alternative solution would have been to section her under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 if she became disturbed and transfer her to a psychiatric hospital. 
245South Glamorgan CC vW and B[ 1993] 1 FLR 574. 
246Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097 could have been such a case. 
247Douglas G. The retreat from Gillick. MLR 1992; 55: 569-576 at p576. 
"'Re H (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 at 1099. 
"'Ibid. One alternative, a piggyback transplant using a donor heart would have carried a slightly reduced long-term survival rate 
but the patient 
would have kept her own heart. The other alternative, used successfully with a patient suffering 
from the same viral endocarditis condition, was 
to piggyback a small mechanical heart. In one case where this was 
done as a temporary measure a year before Re M, when a donor heart became 
available six months later, the surgeons 
found the patient's own heart had fully recovered and there was no need to carry out a transplant. Rogers 
L. Mini heart pump to end transplants. The Times 9 April 2000. Heart transplants in young females carry particular problems with regard to 
contraception and pregnancy. 
2"Re Af (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097 at p 1099. The doctors were possibly concerned that the child might attempt to resist 
surgery. There would be a definite risk, 
in such a situation, that a heart attack could be triggered, and they could be held culpable. Recent BMA 
guidance suggests to doctors how and when restraint or 
force can be used on children: British Medical Association. Consent, Rights and Choices 
in Health Care for Children and Young People. December 2000 BMA, London at pp 113-115. 
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long-term acquiescence of the patient. 25' 
Brazier and Bridge persuasively argue that when the patient is a teenager, the finding of competence rests more 
upon the outcome of the decision than its rationality since `(r)ationality appears to be acquired on a person's 
18th birthday'. 252 Had M been nearly 18 years old, her wishes might have been respected, given that heart 
transplants are more likely to be considered abhorrent than other transplants or blood transfusions. Brazier 
and Bridge suggest that `(a)s long as minority necessarily imposes a degree of dependency on the minor, and 
until.. . the 
hormonal disturbances of adolescents are safely in the past, society might well adopt a more sceptical 
approach to autonomy'. 25' Fortunately, `irrational' decisions are no longer evidence of sectionable insanity2sa 
or many women with `mood swings' would be at risk. 255 `Our society-has as its first principle, the respect for 
the individual, and that society and government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by 
another' , 
256 
The welfare of the child is `the first and paramount consideration'. 25' Although Lord Woolf MR accepts the 
principle of `non-interference by the courts in areas of clinical judgment' where avoidable, "' it is not enough 
to `hope' the patient will `return to full health' as in Re L259 or that the child's life will be normal. 26° Judges, 
and doctors, must recognise that some patients prefer death to `life in the wings' if they are to adequately 
respect patient self-determination. 26' This means it is important to identify treatment alternatives. The seeking 
of independent medical advice in Re A (Conjoined Twins) is new and to be encouraged. 262 The problem judges 
have is in critiquing medical information. 263 Gostin correctly challenges the way some judgments are based 
solely upon the efficacy of the proposed treatment. 264 Differences of opinion will `reflect the individualistic 
values to which medicine has always subscribed, particularly in the case of clinicians who have reached the 
top of the hierarchy and feel they possess sufficient expertise to act on the basis of their own judgement'. "' 
Sometimes, distress for others seems decisive. Re L favoured treatment because non-treatment would be 
'distressing ... for all those who were attending 
her'. 266 The child in Re Mrecognised that her family would be 
Z''Ibid, at pl 100. Reservations were expressed by Vivienne Nathanson, head of ethics at the British Medical Association (Was the judge right? 
Against. The Guardian 16 July 1999)and John Evans, chairman of the British Organ Donor Society. The Sun 16 July 1999. See also: O'Hear 
A. From a child of 15, the meaning of life: commentary. Daily Mail 16 July 1999. 
252 Brazier & Bridge, op cit n53 at p107. 
2531bid, at p109. 
254R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
255j is accepted that the `mood swings' in Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam l lwere manifestations of psychotic 
mental illness. 
256McFall v Shrimp 10 Pa D&C 3d (Allegheny CountyCt 1978) per Flaherty J. Approved in Rv S1 George 's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parse 
S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728 at 743 per Butler-Sloss U. 
257Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] Farn 11 at p32 per Farquharson U. 
258Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905 at p908. 
259Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
26"Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) op cit n77 at p21 A and p21 F per Ward LJ reporting the opinions of two of the medical experts. 
"Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810, at p813 per Sir Stephen Brown P. 
262Re A (Conjoined Twins) [200111 FLR 1. 
'`''For instance, the twins were born with an imperforate anus which means excreta cannot be voided. Normally, an opening is surgically- made 
within a day of birth. It is not clear whether this had been performed for these twins. If performed, the surgery could have had an adverse effect 
upon Mary and perhaps the court could have considered whether it may have been better not to have done this. Similarly, the pictorial evidence 
suggests that Mary has hydrocephalus, and Dandy Walker syndrome is a form of hydrocephalus, but the evidence given the court was that she 
had not yet developed hydrocephaly. Similarly, Mary's heart was described as normal in structure but enlarged and `not squeezing well'(Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) op cit n77, at p13F per Ward U. The judges do not seem to have understood the mechanics of what happens if two non- 
synchronised pumps are placed on the same circuit. 
264Gostin. A Moment in Human Development: Legal Protection, Ethical Standards and Social Policy on the Selective Non-Treatment of 
Handicapped Neonates Am J. Lmv & Medicine 1985; 11: 32-41. 
26SHam C, Pickard S. Tragic Choices in Health Care: The case of Child B. 1998 King's Fund, London at p22. 
26 Re L (Medical Treatment Gillick Competence) [1998] 2 FLR 810 at p811 per Sir Stephen Brown P. 
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sad if she died. 26' However, Butler-Sloss P doubts `whether third party interests should ever be considered'. 268 
An appropriate approach to the evidence of distress caused to third parties was taken in Re ZM where Bennett 
J held that expert opinion is not conclusive, it should be `weighed and judged by the court '. 269 
6.1.4 Family Prefers Non-treatment 
Families may seem more interested in the patient's wealth than his/her best interests. -70 Any advice that non- 
treatment is preferable has to be cautiously interpreted. Decisions have to be made in the best interests of 
incompetent patients so neither the doctors' not the parents'/family's views are decisive. To date, there have 
been no English cases challenging the tendency of doctors to decide the older patient's treatment with family 
members even though the patient is competent. 2 ' However, this is a possibility under the Human Rights Act 
1998. In contrast, protection of the incompetent patient's interests requires that the normal exclusivity of the 
decision-making process is displaced. Since the determination of `best interests' is primarily for doctors, it can 
be difficult for families or carers to secure recognition of their view of the patient's interests. This is 
particularly true where the patient is being treated for `mental illness'. In Bournewood, the patient, incapable 
of exercising self-determination, was lawfully treated although not `voluntary' -a decision which deprives 
those like him of protection from unfettered medical paternalism. 27' Bournewood reflects a retrograde step 
from the pro-patients' rights stance taken in ex Parte W and ex parte L. 273 Lords Steyn and Nolan were 
particularly concerned at the absence of adequate protection for so vulnerable a patient. "' 
Non-treatment may be requested by families in order to prevent the patient burdening them. Some decisions 
are influenced by the patient's secondary characteristics such as dementia or mental retardation even where 
treatment is likely to cure/control the primary problem. 27' When doctors believe treatment is appropriate they 
are likely to refer the decision to the courts as in Re B, where the child had Down's syndrome and needed life- 
saving emergency surgery, but the parents refused consent. 27' In Re B, the Court of Appeal concluded `it is not 
for this court to say that life of that description ought to be extinguished'. 277 Barring treatment on grounds of 
age; incompetence or inability to cope alone does exactly this. 
`Best interests' generally requires predicting the quality of life with and without treatment. Schaffner et al 
suggest treatment must be rational, redeeming (benefits outweigh risks), respectful of patient's wishes and take 
account of `quality of life and cost. '278 It is impossible to determine how often situations involving conflicts 
over whether to treat or not arise. The lack of peer/judicial review contributes to the `haphazard and often 
'`''Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097. 
268Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at p556. 
269Re ZMand OS (Sterilisation: Patient 's Best Interests) [2000] 1 FLR 523 at p533. The medical expert suggested the patient suffered distress 
because she knew she was distressing her family (at p533). 
270Re S (Hospital Patient: Court's Jurisdiction) [1995] 1 FLR 1075. 
27 'There are numerous complaints made to Hospital Complaints Managers concerning this tendency: 
Personal Communication. 
`'ZR v Bourneivood Community and Mental Health Trust, ex parte L [1999] 
1 AC 458. 
Z"R v Hallstrom and another, ex parte W (No 2), Rv Gardner and another, ex parte 
L. [ 1986] 2 All ER 306. See also, for a strong critique 
of the Bournewood decision: Diesfeld K. Neither consenting nor protesting: an ethical analysis of a man with autism. 
J. Med. Ethics 2000; 26: 277- 
281. 
274R v Bourneivood Community and Mental Health Trust, ex parte 
L[ 1999] 1 AC 458 at p492 per Lord Nolan and at p497 per Lord Steen. 
275For instance, see Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] 2 WLR 556 and Re D (Medical Treatment: Mentally 
Disordered Patient) [ 1998] 2 FLR 22. 
276In re B (1 Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 
[1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
27(A Ifinor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)[1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
278Schaffner KF, et al. Philosophical, ethical and legal aspects of resuscitation medicine. Critical Care Medicine 1988; 16: 1069-1076 at p1070. 
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arbitrary nature of the practice'. 27' Caring for the disabled presents `substantial burdens to parents, family, and 
even taxpayers' which not all are prepared to take on. 28° The burdens on others are irrelevant under the 
Children Act 1989,281 despite the recent BMA advice that `the implications for the family of treatment or non- 
treatment' should be considered when establishing a child's best interests. 282 Medical advances are likely to 
result in more cases where `the rights of adults need to be balanced against the consequences on children 211 
Re J held `the correct approach is for the court to judge the quality of life the child would have to endure if 
given the treatment'. 284 Dunn LJ said the court could not `hide behind the decision of the parents or the 
decision of the doctors' . 
284A Later, lack of resources was considered relevant. 28' Twelve years on, the court in 
Bland hid286 but in Re A (Conjoined Twins) the difficulities were confronted by the Court of Appeal more 
openly. 287 Whilst it was medically appropriate to attempt separation, it is unclear that it was either legally or 
ethically appropriate. The economic appropriateness was not addressed but that seems dubious. At times, 
patients' lives have been reduced to lists, with minimal acknowledgement of ethical values, to establish `best 
interests' 
. 
21' Re A (Conjoined Twins) shows how difficult it is to determine `best interests'. Ward LJ held the 
separation was not in Mary's best interests, although it was allowable, 289 but Walker U was `scarily clear (that) 
a short, terribly disabled and possibly painful life was a life not worth living'290 consequently, separation was 
in Mary's best interests. 291 Sanctity of life, quality of life, the parents' views and the lawfulness of the operation 
were all considered. Since Mary was `designated for death' anyhow, the separation was allowed in order to 
save the life of Jodie. 292 Kennedy and Grubb criticise the interpretation of the `best interests' test as a `quality 
of life' test since then it is merely normative not factual. 29' Doctors develop their decision-making models 
using the case law as guidance. Consequently, whilst quality of life is `established as a matter of principle' 
by the courts, `it will ordinarily be applied in particular cases' by doctors thus allowing value judgments to 
influence the decision. 29' Had Jodie shown signs of brain damage it is unlikely that the court would have 
overruled the parents' objection. Quality of life arguments are rejected by American courts since 
failing to treat 
because of disability could constitute child abuse. 295 In Re A (Conjoined Twins), Ward U suggested that 
refusing to give one twin the chance of life could constitute abuse. 
296 
Despite the caution given by Lord Bingham MR: `(i)t is important... that there should not 
be a belief that what 
the doctor says is the patient's best interest is the patient's best interest'297 doctors' opinions are clearly 
2'9 Robertson JA. Legal aspects of Withholding Treatment From Handicapped Newborns: Substantive 
Issues. J. Health Politics, Policy and Law 
1986; 11,2: 215-230 at p215. 
2"Ibid, at p217. 
28'Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n77, at p52G per Ward U. 
282British Medical Association, op cit n250 at p4. 
283Re R (Contact: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) [2001] 1 FLR 247 at p251H per Hedley 
HHJ. 
28'Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at p55 per Taylor U. 
284ARe B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421 per Dunn LJ at p1424G. 
285Re J (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 165 at p176 per Balcombe LJ. 
286Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
287Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
288Re 
.4 (Male 
Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at p560 per Thorpe U. 
289Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n287, at p46G. Brooke LJ, at p62F, concurred with Ward LJ on this point. 
"'Foster C. Rocks and Hard Places. Solicitors Journal 13 October 2000 pp922-923 at p923. 
29'Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n287, at p1 18E. 
2921bid, at p54A per Ward U. 
293Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Law: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London pp1240-1247, 
in particular, at p1240. 
2941bid, at p1240. For an example of this 
in practice, see Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905 and Royal 
Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 953. 
295Child Abuse, Prevention and Treatment Act as amended in 1984. 
"Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n287 at p57B-D per Ward LJ (discussion regarding parental cruelty towards 
Jodie (contrary to sI Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933)). 
297Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust vS[ 1994] 1 FLR 485 at p493. 
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preferenced over parents'. 29' This has extended to conducting screening tests against parental wishes as in Re 
C. 299 In that case, the mother left England rather than submit the baby to testing which, if it revealed the child 
to be HIV300 positive, would have led to doctors requesting permission to give treatment against her wishes. 
Medical paternalism and the early involvement of social services created barriers to good care that could 
possibly have been overcome. Only rarely is the refusal of treatment for minors allowed - if the doctors wish 
to treat, they usually can. The only recent exception has been regarding a child in need of a liver transplant 
whose parents removed him from the U. K.. "' It was not clear that treatment was ethically appropriate and it 
was unlikely that the child would survive into adulthood even if the transplant went ahead. Economically it 
lacked appropriateness. Family privacy was upheld. 30' The emphasis placed on the parents' opinion in Re T303 
because they were healthcare professionals can not be seen as decisive following Re MM. j"' Indeed, in Re T, 
the court was possibly `taken in by their professional knowledge"" which highlights the problems inherent 
in expecting courts of law to make decisions in complex areas of medicine and ethics. However, the court's 
decision in Re MM seems particularly flawed given the lack of a proper diagnosis for the child's condition, the 
temporary nature of residency in this country and the lack of accessibility of immunoglobulins in Russia. 
Whatever treatment was given was `experimental' in nature and the parents seemed more knowledgeable than 
the English doctors. 3o6 To `hope' that arrangements could be made whereby the child could receive continued 
treatment after his return home seems to fail to take into account his long-term best interests. 30' Following Re 
A (Conjoined Twins) lack of parental support for the long-term treatment of the child also no longer seems 
relevant. 30' Presumably, if the parents cannot, or will not, care for the child, the state will assume responsibility 
but, where this is uncertain, perhaps heroic life-saving attempts should not be attempted. 309 
6.2 Doctor is Anti-treatment 
6.2.1 Patient is competent 
6.2.1.1 Patient accepts non-treatment 
Consensual withholding or withdrawing of treatment agreed with the full understanding and agreement of the 
patient presents no problem providing the doctor's advice is not negligent. Where the patient is very elderly, 
very immature or of a compliant or suggestible personality, the voluntariness of the consent may be suspect. 
`Well-behaved' patients may defer to doctors. The healthcare environment can disempower. 310 Doctors may 
... See, for example, Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FLR 502. For examples of parents wanting treatment 
but doctors believing 
it best not to treat see: Re C (Medical Treatment) [ 1998] 1 FLR 384. See also Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals 
NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 
953. 
299Re C (HIV Test) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1004. 
"Human Immunodeficiency Virus which is believed to be the cause of AIDS (Aquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). 
'01Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FLR 502. Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child's Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) 
[2000] 1 FLR 571 can be distinguished on the grounds that the circumcision was not medically indicated. 
""Cedar S, Terry L. Genes and Genealogy. Family Lmv 2000; 30: 744-747 at p746. 
"'Re T (a minor) (medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
304 Re MM (Medical Treatment) [2000] 1 FLR 224. 
7°SFreeman M. 'Can we leave the best interests of very sick children to their parents? ' In Freeman M, Lewis A (Eds) Law and Medicine: Current 
Legal Issues Vol 3.2000 Oxford University Press, Oxford pp257-268 at p258. 
106Ibid, at p231. 
307Ibid, at p233. 
30SRe A (Conjoined Twins) [2001] 1 FLR 1. 
3°9lbid, at p26D-G per Ward LJ. 
°Tassano F. The Power of Life or Death: A Critique of Medical Tyranny. 1995. Duckworth, London at pp39-40. 
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forget that withholding relevant information affects `free choice'. 3 ' Sidaway held that the Bolam 312 principle 
should apply to the nature of the information given to the patient by the doctor. 313 The doctor should `provide 
his patient with the information needed to enable the patient to consider and balance the medical advantages 
and risks alongside other relevant matters, such as, for example, his family, business or social responsibilities 
of which the doctor may be only partially, if at all, informed'. 314 However, even when the patient questions the 
doctor about proposed treatment s/he is not entitled to be given full information: `the amount of 
information... must depend on the circumstances'. 315 The courts have often privileged beneficence over 
autonomy. 316 Decisions to move from a curative to a palliative model of care should be informed, not imposed, 
and subject to the `reasonable doctor' test. 3 ' If a `reasonable person in the patient's situation' would have 
regarded certain information as significant the doctor could be liable. 318 The doctor's duty could extend to 
disclosure that appropriate treatment is being withheld because of a shortage of resources or a bar on treatment. 
Otherwise, the patient's consent to the course of treatment proposed, or `consent' to the withholding of the 
undisclosed alternative, is uninformed and the patient is unable to access treatment privately or lobby purse- 
holders. St George's suggested that if the patient's competence is to be questioned, doctors can no longer 
exercise `therapeutic privilege' to withhold relevant information. 319 The analysis carried out earlier in this 
thesis shows that decisions are manipulated by doctors and the nature and amount of information is controlled. 
However, the St George's guidelines issued later show a retreat: whilst the court should be told of `any 
alternative treatment'32° the patient is only entitled to information regarding `the proposed treatment'. 321 
Therefore, Harrington's scepticism as to whether the `liberal critics of current medical law' espousal of respect 
for autonomy and informed consent can overturn the inherent paternalism of the medical profession is well- 
founded. 322 Particularly regarding adolescents, there is little judicial support for fully informing the patient. 323 
If the judiciary are ambivalent regarding protecting autonomy, it is unsurprising that doctors are also. 
Decisions can be defended as consensual although they may not truly represent patient wishes. For instance, 
someone may, altruistically, prefer to offer treatment opportunities to others. There is a hint of this in Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) with the suggestion that Mary would, if possible, offer the chance of life to Jodie. 324 There 
is no legal difficulty over competent, informed adult patients and their doctors agreeing that treatment should 
be withdrawn or withheld. English law takes a laissez-faire approach reflecting a societal view that healthcare 
is a private matter between patient and doctor. For instance, compulsory vaccinations are not required. Dare's 
proposal in favour of compulsory vaccination would mean accepting that the state has a right to override the 
objections of individuals, even when there is no threat to public safety, so radically altering the relationship 
between law and medicine. 325 The trend is for doctors to practice `partnership' in decision-making with patients 
"'See: Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810 and Commentary: McCafferty C. Won't Consent? Can't Consent! 
Refusal of Medical Treatment. Family Law 1998; 29: 335-6. 
"`Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
"'Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [ 1985] AC 871. 
"4lbid, at p886B per Lord Scarman. See also, p904G per Lord Templeman. 
3 5Blyth v Bloomsbury HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151 at p160 per Neill U. 
"'See discussion in Sidaway, op cit n313, at pp886-7 per Lord Scarman. 
3 "The non-therapeutic nature of palliative care should not reduce the level of information required: 
Gold v Haringey HA [ 1987] 2 All ER 888. 
3"Sidaway, op cit n313, at p889H per Lord Scarman. 
"'St George's Healthcare NHS Trust vS (No 2) [1998] 2 FLR 758 para ii. 
3 :0 St George's Healthcare AIHS Trust vS (No 2) [1998] 2 FLR 758. 
321See: Bailey-Harris R. Comment. Family Lair 1998; 28: 663-4. 
`2 Harrington JA. Privileging the medical norm: liberalism, self-determination and refusal of treatment. Legal Studies 1996; 16: 348-367. 
"'See: Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competence) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
324 Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n308, at p1 12B per Walker U. 
325Dare T. Mass immunisation programmes: some philosophical issues. Bioethics 1998; 12,2: 125-149. 
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rather than paternalism. 326 English law generally avoids enforcing unwanted treatment even if clinically 
appropriate or forcing doctors to provide treatment. 327 An issue not yet considered by English courts is whether 
a child under eighteen can consent to treatment withdrawal if this is what the doctors recommend even though 
his or her parents want treatment to continue. The court could uphold the child's autonomy by interpreting 
the decision as consent to the treatment plan (moving from curative to palliative care) or simply uphold the 
medical profession's `rights'. 
6.2.1.2 Patient wants treatment 
If a doctor is not prepared to offer or continue treatment, this is usually because s/he believes this would be 
inappropriate on clinical or ethical grounds. If the reason is a shortage of resources, the patient may chose to 
challenge using judicial review. 328 In other situations, the easiest option maybe for the patient to find another 
doctor who is prepared to give treatment. 329 In the case of Child B, it was held that further treatment would 
not be in her best interests, and possibly not in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion, yet there 
was no legal opposition to her receiving treatment which was provided privately. 33o Ham and Pickard have 
examined this case and the protagonists' motivations in detail. 33' They conclude that the father's refusal to 
accept non-treatment was a `direct challenge' to the doctors involved in her care. 332 The difficulty facing 
patients is identifying a suitable alternative doctor since access to specialists is governed via GPs who may be 
reluctant to incur the additional costs of referral for second opinion. Tertiary referrals also cost money which 
could be spent elsewhere. Patients are increasingly likely, like Child B's father, to actively seek medical 
information particularly via the internet. 333 The difficulty lies in understanding and interpreting it but patients, 
and families, are no longer silent partners in medicine. 
6.2.2 Patient lacks competence to decide 
Imminent, unavoidable death constitutes well-established grounds for ending treatment. 334 Bland decided that 
the correct question was not whether it was in Tony's best interests to die but whether it was in his best 
interests not to continue treatment. Re Mand Re H holds that Bland is correct both at common law and under 
the European Convention on Human Rights although, since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, 
judges are not bound by the decision in Bland. 335 Neither Bland, nor the patient in Re AC, 336 died with dignity 
yet, every time a non-treatment decision resulting in the patient's death is made, the real conclusion is that 
326Lord Walton of Detchant. Dilemmas of life and death: Part One. J. Roy. Soc. Med. 1995; 88: 311-5 at p314. 
327Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905 at p908. 
328See discussion earlier. 
12'This was what one mother alleges she had to do when doctors allegedly refused to book her in for antenatal care and delivery because they 
felt it better to carry out a late termination rather than deliver expensive care to a non-viable neonate: Personal communication. The mother 
eventually went to the newspapers who reported some of her allegations: Horsnell M. Parents say hospital chose to let baby die. The Times 27 
November 2000. 
'oR v Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. In Consent, Rights and Choices in Health Care for Children and Young 
People, the BMA implies, by the way it has placed the Child B case study in the section entitled `The medical duty to act only within one's sphere 
of competence' that the doctors who treated her initially were correct not to be persuaded into giving her other treatment with which they were 
unfamiliar, but it also possibly implies that the doctor who did give further treatment was exceeding his competence: British Medical Association 
op cit n250 at pp209-211. 
"'Ham C, Pickard S. Tragic Choices in Health Care: The case of Child B. 1998 King's Fund, London. 
"=lbid, at p 35. 
13 'Ibid, at pp2-3. 
334 Re C (A Baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43 (concerning a baby left brain-damaged following meningitis). See also, A National Health Service Trust 
vD [2000] 2 FLR 677 (involving non-resuscitation of a severely brain-damaged child). 
35NHS Trust Av Mrs MandNHS Trust Bv Mrs H [2000] EWHC 29 (25 October 2000) paras 18,28 and 31 per Dame Elizabeth Butler-S loss 
P. Judgment available on www. bailii. org accessed 28 November 2000. Also reported in The Times 29 November 2000. 
336 In re AC 533 A2d 611 (DC App. 1987). 
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death is best. 337 Honesty is preferrable. Lords Goff, Lowry and Brown-Wilkinson adopted the `balance of 
benefits and burdens' model but Lord Goff also used `futility'. 338 It is difficult to comprehend how artificial 
feeding, which is achieving its aim of providing fluids and nutrition, is `futile'. 339 Lord Mustill controversially 
held that permanently insensate patients have `no interests"" -a similar approach to the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in Peter which held that since such patients `could not experience any pain, suffering, joy, 
satisfaction, or well-being any benefits-burdens analysis was equally inapplicable. '341 Therefore, it was 
unnecessary to prove that the burdens of continued existence outweighed the benefits of life. 
Dworkin argues that `(a)lmost everyone shares, explicitly or intuitively, the idea that human life has objective, 
intrinsic value'342 but it is `irrational' to prolong some lives. 343 The difficulty is in drawing the line, inside 
which patients live, outside which they die. In Re C, the court concluded (despite evidence that her condition 
was stable) that she was `dying', therefore it was appropriate to withhold treatment enabling her to 'die 
peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least of pain, suffering and distress'. "' Although a court may order 
the transfer of the patient to another doctor34. judges increasingly defer to clinical opinion even though the 
patient's condition differs from the criteria given by a `body of medical professionals' for withdrawing 
treatment... or in the face of opposition by relatives. 34' In Re H the patient's `best interests' required that 
artificial feeding was discontinued although she was not in a vegetative state. 34' Cretney suggests that, 
although it is hard to hold that the decision was in her best interests, it was made in the best interests of all 
concerned. 3a9 In another case, Bodley J concluded that the breakdown in trust between the parties required that 
the doctors were given permission to not-treat the child if they thought fit, not just because this was in the 
patient's best interests but as `a kindness to the parents'. "' The case law leads doctors to believe that their 
opinion can, and generally should, take precedence and that their decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment 
are virtually impregnable. 
The determination of `best interests' relies on estimations of quality of life in cases where doctors are 
advocating non-treatment. Gostin believes "'quality of life" is employed as a signal by those who believe that 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, and, similarly, the severely handicapped child in Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment)[ 1989] 2 All ER 782. 
3 38Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p868 per Lord Goff since `there was no prospect of any improvement in his condition'. 
"'For a useful examination of how `futility' is misused see: Zucker MB & Zucker HD. Medical futility and the evaluation of life-sustaining 
interventions. 1997 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p897E. See also, the American case In the Matter of Hilda MPeter 529 A 2d 419 (1987). 
See also: Robertson JA. Legal aspects of Withholding Treatment From Handicapped Newborns: Substantive Issues. J. Health Politics, Policy 
and Law 1986; 11,2: 215-230 at p226. Robertson's approach seems mirrored by Lord Mustill. 
34 11n the Matter of Hilda M Peter 529 A 2d 419 (1987) at p424. 
342Dworkin R. Life's Dominion 1993 Harper Collins, London at p67. 
343Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue: The theory and practice of equality. 2000 Harvard University Press, London at p313. 
344Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)[ 1989] 2 All ER 782. In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421 
was distinguished due to the different quality of life (B had Down's syndrome). 
3a5This issue was considered in Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FLR 502. American courts will also transfer cases: Paris JJ et 
al. Physicians' refusal of requested treatment. NEJM 1990; 322,14: 1011-1013 at p 1012. The Court of Appeal did not discuss whether to order 
the transfer ofthe conjoined twins in ReA (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n308, to Great Ormond Street though it seems clear that their interests would 
be better served by the experienced team operating. Great Ormond Street later wrote to the Department of Health asking for the transfer: Rogers 
L. Doctors may not operate on twins. The Sunday Times 1 October 2000. 
346See Re D (adult: medical treatment) [ 1998] 1 FCR 498 (the patient's condition did not meet three of the criteria for diagnosis of persistent 
vegetative state according to the guidelines of the Royal College of Physicians). See also: Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust vS[ 1994] 1 FLR 
485 at p492 where there was evidence that the patient had `volitional behaviour'. 
347See: Re G[ 1995] 2 FLR 528, Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 953, Re C (Medical Treatment) [ 1998] 1 FLR 
384 and Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905. 
34RRe H (A Patient) [ 1998] 2 FLR 36. For information regarding inaccurate diagnosis of PVS and the ability to track objects as the earliest sign 
of recovery see Andrews K. Recovery of patients after four months or more in the persistent vegetative state. BMJ 1993; 306: 1597-1601. For 
a commentary on the lack of dignity associated with withdrawal of nutrition see: McLean S. End of life decisions and the law. J Med. Ethics 
1996; 22: 261-2, in particular, at p262. 
3a9Cretney S. Comment on Re H. Family Law 1998; 28: 460. 
35'Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 953 at p957. 
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selective non-treatment decisions are too delicate and complex to be governed by any coherent legal or ethical 
standard. Accordingly, its advocates seek to maintain the decision-making process within a confidential 
doctor/patient framework'. 35' Quality of life is subjectively assessed with `those in the lower social classes 
clearly showing a higher tolerance over what is an acceptable degree of handicap'. 352 This could indirectly 
affect what the law considers acceptable since `parents (in social classes I and II) are not only likely to be more 
articulate but are also likely to share the class values of those responsible for formulating legislation and for 
implementing it'. 353 Keyserlinck asserts: `For society, medicine and law... quality of life can and does mean 
many very different things... some of the uses to which the concept is put are definitely opposed to and in 
conflict with the sanctity of life principle'. 35a Per Lord Woolf MR in Glass: `The principles of law are clearly 
established but how you apply those principles to particular facts is often very hard to anticipate'. 35' The 
doctors in Glass treated the severely disabled boy with pneumonia with diamorphine, a respiratory depressant. 
The family were outraged and, en masse, invaded the ward and resuscitated him. 356 With `these sensitive and 
difficult'357 decisions Lord Woolf suggests the best course is for the parent to agree to `the course which the 
doctors are proposing to take'. 358 Counsel for the Trust in Bland admitted that `one should not leave the 
definition of what is and what is not a `worthwhile' life to be decided by a doctor'. 359 In deferring to medical 
opinion, the judiciary fail to protect the weak. 
Re J held: `it is settled law that the court's prime and paramount consideration must be the best interests of the 
child'. 360 There was a `strong presumption' in favour of preserving life except in `exceptional circumstances' 
with Taylor U stating `it can not be too strongly emphasised that the court never sanctions steps to terminate 
life'. 36' Although, like Bland, respect for sanctity of life would mean J was resuscitated, the court instead 
evaluated his `best interests' by considering the quality of his life. The doctors stressed the `unpleasant and 
distressing nature of the treatment' and the probable worsening of J's condition so it was held that `to add such 
distress and the risk of further deterioration to an already appalling catalogue of disabilities was clearly 
capable... of producing a quality of life which justified the stance of the doctors'. 362 Similarly, in Re C, 363 the 
court held: `whilst the sanctity of life is vitally important, it is not the paramount consideration. The 
paramount consideration here is the best interests of little C'. 364 The failure of the court to give any place to 
the parents' religious views has been criticised as `paternalistic and... culturally imperialistic'. 365 Whilst each 
life is of equal value, individual quality of life is `matters relevant' to be placed in the decision-making 
scales. 366 A major factor could be whether the patient is in pain as suggested by Templeman U in Re B: `this 
court.. (has).. to decide whether the life of this child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in effect the child 
35'Gostin, op cit n164 at p39. 
... Shepperdson B. Abortion and euthanasia of Down's syndrome children - the parents' view. J. Med. Ethics 1983; 9: 152-7 at p156. 
3"Ibid, at p157. 
354Keyserlinck E. Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life: Report for the Law Commission of Canada. Canadian Law Reform Commission. 1979 
at p50. 
... Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905 at p910 per Lord Woolf MR. 
"'Three of them were later jailed for this: Rv (1) Davies (2) Wild (3) Hodgson (2000) CA 28 July 2000 Unreported. 
'57Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905 at p911 per Lord Woolf MR. 
358Ibid, at p910 per Lord Woolf MR. 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p849. 
"'Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at p53. 
3611bid. 
362Ibid, at p56. 
363Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384. 
"'Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384 at p393. See also, Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 953 at 
pp955-956 per Bodley J. For a discussion of parental opinion 
in such cases see: Loughrey J. Medical Treatment - the Status of Parental Opinion. 
Family Laiv 1998; 28: 146-9. 
365Mason JK, McCall Smith RA and Laurie GT. Lativ and Medical Ethics 5th Edn. 1999 Butterworths, London at p251. 
"'Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR I at p48C per Ward LJ. 
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must be condemned to die'. 36' However, in Bland, Butler-Sloss U felt that `concentration exclusively upon 
pain is... an unacceptable approach'. 36' The verdict in Cox confirms that pain is no defence for ending life 
unlawfully. 369 
Doctors have adopted the `demonstrably so awful model'37° but lack the impartiality of the judiciary. 3 ' Doctors 
use `awful' descriptors to influence the court. 372 Judges adopt them. 373 In Re A (Conjoined Twins) the 
descriptors used regarding Jodie and Mary's separate conditions and future quality of life were based on 
emotion not just science. 374 The parents were held unduly pessimistic regarding Jodie. 37' The obtaining of 
independent medical advice was novel and highly commendable but the judges seemed not to know how to 
interpret all the information appropriately. Brooke U discussed the literature regarding reconstructive surgery 
which indicates that multiple surgeries will be necessary and the outcome unsatisfactory yet did not challenge 
the doctors who said they were `hopeful' minimal surgery would be necessary and the outcomes good. 3'6 
American courts hold that, `at the moment of live birth there does exist a human being entitled to the fullest 
protection of the law' and reject quality of life considerations. 3 ' Brooke U held that the rights to life of Mary 
and Jodie had `equal status' so, in cases of this sort, `it is wholly illegitimate to introduce considerations that 
relate to the quality, or potential quality, of each sister's life'. 378 Ward LJ, in contrast, held that, it is legitimate 
`to bear in mind the actual quality of life each child enjoys and may be able to enjoy'. 37' Hence, `Mary may 
have a right to life, but she has little right to be alive'. 38' Brooke LJ's approach suggests why the `first come, 
first served' allocation is accepted medical practice so the current user of a resource is not evicted when another 
potential user of that resource, with a better prognosis, appears. If Ward U is correct, a quality of life 
assessment should determine whether the resource is taken away from the present user. 38' Perhaps current 
medical practice regarding ITU beds and cots is better explained in terms of the doctor's duty of care than 
sanctity of life. Hence, the ITU doctor only owes a duty of care to the current user because the potential user 
has not yet been admitted under his/her care and is currently under the care of another doctor. It is 
unsatisfactory that access to life-saving treatment depends upon `ownership' of patients. 
Few patients have the `exceptional circumstances' of J although they may suffer some disability. Were these 
the sort of patients that Donaldson MR `left the door open' for when he explained `(w)hat is at issue.. . is not 
a right to impose death but a right to choose a course of action which will fail to avert death. '? 382 In general, 
36. In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421,1424. See also, Doyal and Wilsher's argument in Doyal L, Wilsher 
D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment in neonatal medicine. Arch. Dis. Child. 1994; 70: F66-F70, 
at F66-67. 
"'Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p820. 
369R v Cox [ 1992] 12 BMLR 38. Johnson J had been particularly concerned by the image of twin Mary being in pain and unable to cry out: Re 
A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [200111 FLR 1 at p28F-G per Ward U. 
"°In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421 at p1424. See also the evidence of the neonatologist in Re A 
(Conjoined Tivins) op cit n369, at pp22H-23A per Ward U. 
371 See the discussion earlier in this thesis. 
"ZCramb A. Doctor left my premature baby to die. The Daily Telegraph 10 June 1997. The parents of Rebecca Cassidy sought an inquiry into 
why the doctor refused to treat the baby. 
"'See, for instance, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p813 per Bingham MR. 
374Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n369, pp10E-14C per Ward LJ. 
375lbid, at p104D per Walker U. 
376Ibid, at pp66-67 per Brooke U. The surgeon's views are given in the judgment of Ward LJ at pp20E-21A. 
"'Merrick JC. Critically Ill Newborns and the Law. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 189-209 at p200. See also, Clark KL. Intensive Care Treatment 
Decisions: the Roots of Our Confusion. Pediatrics 1994; 94,1: 98-101. 
378 Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n369, at p7l F per Brooke U. 
791bid, at p53H. 
3"'Ibid, at p54D per Ward U. 
"'This issue was considered in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p 896 by Lord Mustill. 
312Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at p55 and approved by Butler-Sloss LJ in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 
[1993] AC 789 at p820. 
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the American approach appears based on a presumption of `personhood'383 which is refuted by ethicists like 
Doyal and Wilsher who argue that `even healthy infants do not possess these attributes (of personhood)'. 3s4 
Separovic, however, believes that this is `dangerous and dehumanising'. 385 Certainly, a change in approach 
by English courts is evident since 1989.386 In Re J, `the court's high respect for sanctity of human life imposes 
a strong presumption in favour of taking all steps capable of preserving it save in exceptional circumstances'. 387 
Two years on, the court could `conceive of no situation where it would be a proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction.. 
. to order a 
doctor.. 
. to treat a child in a manner contrary to his clinical judgement'388 and even if 
consent were given, it would be subject to the availability of resources and the willingness of the doctors to 
treat. 389 In 1993, it was held that sanctity of life `fundamental though it is, is not absolute'. 39° Keown suggests 
that the courts consistently confuse `sanctity of life' with `vitalism' so adopt a `Quality of life' approach 
instead. 39' Close analysis of Re A (Conjoined Twins) suggests that, despite reference to Keown's article392, and 
Ward LJ's emphasis that each life had equal worth, a vitalist approach was taken towards Jodie in contrast to 
a `Quality of life' approach with Mary when resolving the court's duty towards each child. 393 This opened the 
way to hold that the doctrine of necessity allowed doctors to kill Mary. 
In the U. S. A. substituted judgment tends to be used for adults who have had competence. This focuses on the 
known or probable views of the patient so is based more on a patient-preference model than a medical outcomes 
model. Keyserlinck suggests comparing the qualities the patient currently has with the qualities `deemed by 
this patient (or if incompetent or irreversibly comatose, by the patient's agents) to be normative and 
desirable. '39a In Peter a proxy already existed as well as evidence of the patient's prior wishes thus enabling 
the patient's views to be respected. 395 In Quinlan, it was eventually held that her father could be appointed her 
legal guardian and take medical decision on her behalf... In re Jobes authorised the substituted judgment 
approach to be taken by the patient's family utilising their knowledge of the patient's personality and prior 
reactions to healthcare matters in the absence of any known patient preferences about life-sustaining 
treatment. 39' The declaration in Re R gave his parents a novel power of veto. 398 However, in Glass, no such 
power was given to his mother nor any reason given for this judicial inconsistency. 399 It can be speculated that 
in Re R, the parents were working with the doctors whereas in Glass the relationship had clearly broken down 
with the hospital. 
Recently, English courts have strayed into the language of substituted judgment. In Re J the decision was 
... People v Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621,176 P. 2d 92 (1947). For a discussion of this issue see: Robertson JA. Legal aspects of Withholding 
Treatment From Handicapped Newborns: Substantive Issues. J. Health Politics, Policy and Law 1986; 11,2: 215-230, in particular, at p218. 
... Doyal L, Wilsher D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawal of life prolonging treatment in neonatal medicine. 
Arch. Dis. Child. 1994; 70: F66-F70 at F67. 
185Separovic ZP. Massa carnis or human beings? (On Abortion, Euthanasia and Care of Defective Baby). Jus Mecicum 1984 Centrum Voor 
Medish Recht, Rijkuniveriteit, Gent at pp 169-172 at p169. 
"''Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
... Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Farn 33 at p55 per Taylor LJ. 
388Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [ 1993] Fam 15 at p30 per Leggatt LJ. 
389Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at p28 per Donaldson MR. 
'"Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p864 per Lord Goff. 
391Keown J. Restoring moral and intellectual shape to the law after Bland. (1997) 113 LQR 481. See, in particular, p501. 
392Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n369 at pp41G-43C per Ward LJ. 
3931bid, at pp53E-54F, Section IV Family Law para 10, in particular p54D per Ward LJ. 
394Keyserlinck, op cit n354 at p51. His emphasis. 
3951n the Matter of Hilda M Peter 529 A 2d 419 (1987). 
'96Re Quinlan 70 NJ 10 (1976). See also: Devettere RJ: Practical Decision Making in Healthcare Ethics: Cases and Concepts 1995 
Georgetown University Press, Washington DC at pp168-174; Weir, op cit n3 at ppI08-110 and MacKay RD; Terminating life-sustaining 
treatment - recent US developments. 
J,, Ifed. Ethics 1988; 14: 135-139 at p135. 
3971n the Matter of Nancy Ellen Jobes, 529 A2d 434 (1987). See also, MacKay RD; Terminating life-sustaining treatment - recent US 
developments. J. Med. Ethics 1988; 14: 135-139. 
118 Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [ 1996] 2 FLR 99. 
799R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parse Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905. 
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based on whether continued life would be `intolerable to that child'. a0° Despite rejection of this approach in 
Blanc 1°' and Re Y402, in Re R403 the court considered whether the adult patient's life, following resuscitation, 
would be `so afflicted as to be intolerable'. "' Patients like J, R and G have no knowledge of `normative and 
desirable' conditions so basing decisions on what would be `intolerable' to the patient, is merely `a fiction' 
imposing the views of the doctor or judge. "' Ward LJ doubts that substituted judgment is `good law'. 406 
However, when Walker LJ relates how the climber who survived against all odds told the other `You did right' 
the implication is that, if Twin Mary could speak, she would tell Jodie to cut herself free likewise. 407 
6.2.3 Potential criminal liability of doctor 
6.2.3.1 Causing death 
Concerns exist regarding the question of causation of death in civil and criminal law if treatment is withheld 
or withdrawn. 40' The courts, generally, consider withholding treatment and withdrawing treatment identical. 409 
However, a difference seems to be acknowledged regarding the `ordinary' versus `extraordinary' treatments. 41° 
Murder charges were considered against two doctors in California who removed `life support systems'. 41 
Conspiracy to murder charges were brought against the parents and doctors of conjoined twins in America. 412 
In recent years, the position seemed to be that providing the doctor acts in accordance with recognised medical 
practice, a charge of murder, attempted murder or conspiracy to murder will not be brought. 413 Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) challenges this view. 414 First, the best interests of the patient have to be established and this 
will take into account recognised medical practice, then the lawfulness of the action must be considered. 415 
In Conroy, it was held that the cause of death following withdrawal of nasogastric feeding would be due to her 
`underlying medical condition, which included her inability to swallow'. 416 In Peter, it was held that a patient 
dies not because of the withdrawal of dialysis but because `his underlying disease has destroyed the proper 
functioning of his kidneys'. 4' Weir suggests that by `rejecting any moral or legal difference between 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, the courts may have been communicating to physicians 
400Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930,945 per Taylor LJ. Bodley J took a similar approach in Royal 
Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust vB [2000] 1 FLR 953 at p956. 
401Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p872B per Lord Goff. 
4021n Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] 2 WLR 556 at p560 per Connell J. 
403Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99. See also Comment by Rebecca Bailey-Harris: [1996] Family Law pp535-6. 
... Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99 at p108. 
405Per Lord Mustill in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p895. 
406Re A (Conjoined Tivins) [2001 ]1 FLR 1 at p41 G. 
4171bid, at p112B. 
401Ibid. In particular, see the discussion of the doctrine of double effect in the judgment of Brooke U at p75B-G. 
409House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics Report 1993-4 HL 21-I para 251. See also, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 
[1993] AC 789 
at p879 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Doyal L, Wilsher D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawal of 
life prolonging treatment 
in neonatal medicine. Archives of Disease in Childhood 1994; 70: F66-F70 at F68. 
4t0See 
. Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at pp878-9 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also, Blank RH. Treatment of Critically 
Ill 
Newborns in Australasia. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 211-226 at p222 and Gillon R. Philosophical Medical Ethics 1986 John Wiley & Son, 
London at pp 140-7. 
"'Towers B. Public debate on issues of life and death. J. Med. Ethics 1983; 9: 113-5. 
41 'Moreno JD. Ethical and legal issues in the care of the impaired newborn. Clinics in Perinatology 1987; 14,2: 345-359,349. The case was later 
dropped. 
4"There seems to be another proviso - that of the doctor keeping quiet about his or her actions. Dr David 
Moor, was held to have brought 
prosecution on himself, and so was liable to pay one third of 
his defence costs: Wilkinson P. Cheers as GP is cleared of murdering patient. The 
Times 12 May 1999. 
4"Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
4151bid, Section IV Family Law para 4 at p35E-G per Ward U. 
416Matter of Claire Conroy 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985) at 1226. 
4171n the Matter of Hilda M Peter, 529 A2d 419 (1987) at p428. 
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that neither... is tantamount to homicide - as long as the available treatment is reasonably regarded as futile or 
contrary to the patient's best interests'. "' Weir notes Fletcher's argument that the courts may be wrong and, 
rather than admitting consensual withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is suicide or euthanasia, 
they discourage legal submission on the issue. 41' Fletcher suggests that death in these circumstances is not 
because of illness but `a consequence of the decision to die'. 42' Weir argues that only in cases of neglect or 
deliberate intention to kill should the doctor be held the legal cause of death since, when the courts hold that 
discontinuation of treatment is `in the patient's best interests', this `strongly suggests that the injury or disease 
process already at work will cause the patient's death' so, whilst it may be a causative factor, it is not the main 
cause. 42' Therefore, whilst both a physiological and a decisional cause of death may operate, only one should 
be considered the legal cause. 422 However, whilst the Court in Re A (Conjoined Twins) accepted that Mary, was 
`designated for death', the doctors were held to have `murderous intent'. 423 Weir's analysis could not save the 
doctors from criminal liability for causing death. 424 Only if intentional killing is sometimes lawful could the 
doctors escape liability. Judicial selectiveness regarding the principal cause and the demand for greater 
`blameworthiness' in the case of omissions which Clarkson425, in his analysis of Lowe426, has interpreted as 
evidence of reluctance to convict for omissions was of no avail in Re A (Conjoined Twins) because surgical 
separation is a positive act. 42' 
Parents have a duty to care for their minor child;... doctors for their patients429 and those who care for an 
elderly or disabled person43° or take on responsibility for another43'. Duties can also arise under statute. 432 If 
medical care is considered appropriate, for a person with `custody, charge or care' to withhold it for reasons 
such as religious beliefs433, neglect434 or lack of finances435 or lack of medical facilities in their homeland436 may 
mean they are held culpable. Omissions may not attract blame in the way positive acts do. 437 Re B438 held that 
surgery should proceed, but indicated that it is lawful for parents to make decisions which would allow their 
child to die. 439 In Rv Arthur44o, Farquharson J advised the jury that if the doctor's action amounted merely to 
`a course of management... that represents a holding operation' rather than a positive act `likely to kill the 
4''Weir, op cit n3 at p311. 
a "Ibid, at p312. Citing Fletcher J: The Courts and Euthanasia. Law, Medicine and Healthcare Winter 1987-8; 15: 224-5. Suicide is not unlawful 
now (s I Suicide Act 1961) but aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a suicide is unlawful (s2 Suicide Act 1961). See: Attorney-General 
v Able [1984] 1 All ER 277. 
"'Weir, op cit n3 at p313. 
42'Ibid, at p313. 
42 Ibid. 
423Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n414, at p56B per Ward U. 
4241bid, at p56F per Ward U. 
125Clarkson CMV, Keating HM. Criminal Law, Text and Materials 2nd edn. 1990 Sweet and Maxwell, London at p131. 
426R v Lowe [1973] 1 QB 702. 
42'Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n414, at p56G per Ward U. 
428R v Downes [ 1875] 13 Cox CC 111. 
429Barnett v Chelsea& Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1968] 1 All ER 1068. 
430R v Instan [ 1893] 1 QB 450. 
"'R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354. 
432S 1 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 requires that persons over 16 years old caring for a minor child owe a duty not to neglect, abandon 
or expose that child to anything that will cause `unnecessary suffering or death'. 
433For instance, Rv Senior [ 1899] 1 QB 283 and Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n414. 
434R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450. 
4358 v Proctor, Rv Gamble [1918] 13 Cr App. R. 134. 
436See: Re MM (Medical Treatment) [2000] 1 FLR 224 and Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
437 See, Rv Lowe [1973] QB 702 and doubt cast on its approach in Rv Sheppard [1981] AC 394. 
4381n Re B (4 Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421. 
439However, if the child is a ward of court or the court has to arbitrate between doctors and parents, the welfare of the child becomes paramount. 
See: In Re B (4 Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421 at p1424 per Dunn U and Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n436, 
at p32H per Ward U. 
440R v, Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. For a 
discussion see: de Cruz P. `The Leonard Arthur Case: Legal and Moral Implications' in de Cruz P, 
McNaughton D (Eds) By What Right? Studies in Medicine, Ethics and the Law. 1989 at pp-16. Penrhos Publications, Newcastle. 
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child' accompanied by `intent' the doctor should not be found guilty of attempted murder. Kennedy and Grubb 
particularly criticise these instructions and the failure to acknowledge that `allowing nature to take its course' 
may mean that the doctor is in breach of a duty to act to prevent this'. 44' Others submit that `an omission to 




Robertson considers it possible that once a doctor has begun caring for a patient, the resulting legal duty cannot 
be terminated by third parties such as parents. 443 One reason Robinson suggests is that, in providing 
information regarding prognosis, the doctor imperils the child so then the doctor is under a duty to save the 
child. 444 This lacks plausibility since the doctor has a positive duty to inform the decision-makers. The Court 
of Appeal was divided over whether the doctors, or the hospital, were under a positive obligation to refer the 
Siamese twins case to court. Ward LJ held it would have been `a perfectly acceptable response for the hospital 
to have bowed to the weight of the parental wish however fundamentally the medical team disagreed with it. 
Other medical teams may well have accepted the parents' decision'. 445 However, later, Ward U suggests, like 
Walker LJ, 446 that the parents in Re A (Conjoined Twins) failed `to recognise their conflicting duty to save 
Jodie'. 447 His concentration camp analogy is offensive and inapposite since the situation in which the choice 
arises is created in one scenario by a moral agent choosing to act evilly and in the other by nature (or God 
whom Ward LJ presumably does not suggest is evil). 448 Re A (Conjoined Twins)449 leaves doctors caring for 
conjoined twins or babies with, for example, short bowel disorder, uncertain as to when, or whether, they must 
refer cases to court. 
Perhaps the difference between cases like Re J (1993)450, Re C (1998)451 and Rv Arthur is that physiological 
cause will be the legal cause only when there is a `strong suggestion' that the patient would have died 
anyhow452 ie. is `designated for death'. 453 Perhaps the truth is that judges require life to have some meaning 
for the patient before they will consider the doctor's actions in withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining care 
legally culpable. Non-legal persons are unprotected by the criminal law. 454 Anencephalic, severely brain- 
damaged or vegetative patients may likewise lack protection. This seems evident in the discussion in Re A 
(Conjoined Twins): `is Mary a "reasonable creature"? '455 or just a `parasitic attachment'. 456 
Wilson and Smith suggest that Lord Goff interprets the law on causation as being that, providing the patient's 
best interests guide the doctor's actions, the doctor is not the legal cause of death - death will simply be a 
as ' Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical Law: Text and Materials 2nd Edn 1994 Butterworths, London at p 1249. Such `holding' practices have raised 
concerns over `backdoor euthanasia': Horsnell M. Police check hospitals over `backdoor euthanasia'. The Times 6 January 1999. 
442Smith JC, Hogan B. Criminal Law 7th Edn. 1992 Butterworths, London at p50. 
a"Robertson JA. Legal aspects of Withholding Treatment From Handicapped Newborns: Substantive Issues. I. Health Politics, Policy and Law 
1986; 11,2: 215-230 at p219. 
4441bid. 
445Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1 at p27C per Ward U. 
4461bid, at p 114B-G per Walker U. 
447lbid, at p53B per Ward U. 
441Ibid, at p53C per Ward LJ. 
449lbid, Section II para 14 at p27 `The nature of these proceedings' per Ward U. 
450Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [ 1993] Fam 15. 
451Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384. 
452However, even if treatment is withheld or withdrawn, humane care must not be. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
453Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n445, at p54A per Ward U. 
454See, for example, Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 All ER 10. 
455Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n445, at pp69H-71F per Brooke U. 
456Ibid, at pIOOG per Walker U. 
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natural occurrence. 45' They interpret Malcherek as holding the chain of causation had not been broken because 
the doctors were acting `in pursuit of a duty demanded of them by society', not as voluntary agents. 48 
Hastening death seems acceptable, even now to the extent of 'sacrifice'459 but not all countries take a similar 
approach . 
4'0 Does this mean that if Parliament expects doctors to consider the public purse when deciding who 
and how to treat, the doctor is not the cause of death when treatment is withheld or withdrawn? Presumably 
it does, but it must be questioned whether the government in such a case is acting in accordance with what the 
electorate really desires. Most believe that the doctor's role is to save lives and everyone expects 'their' doctor 
to only act in `their' best interests. Possibly such duties are `decontextualised' so no positive obligation towards 
any individual exists. 461 Where the `best interests' of two or more are in direct conflict doctors who preference 
the life of one over another could be criminally culpable. 462 However, when restrictions are placed by 
healthcare commissioners, the doctor can legitimately claim to be acting as an involuntary agent of the 
rationing process. Were it not for the fact that the criminal law focuses on the actions of individuals, hence 
the difficulty over succeeding with corporate manslaughter charges, health authorities must surely be held to 
have caused the death of all the patients they rejected. The legitimacy of the purchaser's, or commissioner's, 
action could be challenged as to whether it is `in pursuit of a duty demanded of them by society' as most have 
little real public input. Criticism of `postcode rationing' fosters belief that those responsible are blameworthy. 
The failure of judicial review challenges does not mean that resource allocation is fair. 
6.2.3.2 Doctrine of double effect' 
The doctrine of double effect has been adopted as a means of avoiding holding the administration of pain relief 
which shortens the patient's life the legal cause of death. 463 Provided the intention is therapeutic, and in the 
patient's `best interests', death is considered a secondary consequence no different from other undesirable, but 
unavoidable, side-effect of treatment464 so not unlawful. 465 Where there is no therapeutic benefit the doctrine 
of double effect is inapplicable. 466 In Rv Bodkin Adams, the doctor was found `entitled to do all that was proper 
and necessary to relieve pain and suffering even if the measures he took might incidentally shorten life by hours 
or perhaps even longer'. 46' However, Dr Cox was guilty of attempted murder since the potassium chloride had 
no therapeutic value. 46' The patient's refusal to continue steroids exacerbated her pain but no argument 
regarding her responsibility was advanced. 46' The British Humanist Society considers it `morally legitimate 
to give doses of pain-killers which are lethal... only if it is morally legitimate to kill that patient... in those 
... Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessity and the Legality of Medical Intervention. Med. Law International 1995; 1: 387-410 
at p391. 
4581bid, at p392. 
459Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n445, at p99A per Brooke LJ. 
460For instance, Israel: Eidelman Al. Care of Critically Ill Newborns. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 247-261,257. 
461 Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessity and the Legality of Medical Intervention. Med. Law International 1995; 1: 387-410 
at p398. 
462Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1. 
463R v Bodkin Adams [ 1957] Crim. LR 365. Under s23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, it is a criminal offence to `unlawfully administer 
to or cause to be administered to... any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as to thereby endanger the life of such 
a person'. 
464See: Re C (A Minor) [ 1989] 2 All ER 782 and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p868 per Lord Goff. See also: House of Lords 
Select Committee on Medical Ethics Report 1993-4 HL21-1 1994 HMSO, London and Government Response to the Report of the Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics (Cmnd 2553) 1994 HMSO, London. 
465Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p868 per Lord Goff. 
466Re A (Conjoined Tivins) op cit n462 at p56E per Ward LJ and p76A per Brooke LJ. 
467R v Bodkin .. dams 
[1957] Crim. LR 365. 
468R v Cox 1992 12 BMLR 38. 
'69Dyer C. Rheumatologist convicted of attempted murder. BMJ 1993; 305: 371. 
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circumstances'. 47° Price argues that using the doctrine `threatens analytical integrity'. 47 The key is the 
proportionality of the doctor's response. This is an area where further scientific research could clarify matters. 
The opportunity for euthanasia that presently exists would be removed making this a matter for legislators to 
address. 
6.2.3.3 Criminal Intention 
Withdrawing `life support' can satisfy the mens rea of a murder charge. 47' Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated, 
`where the accused was under a duty ... to do the act he omitted to do such an omission can constitute the actus 
reus of homicide, either murder473... or manslaughter474... depending on the mens rea of the accused'. "' By 
focusing upon the fact that the doctors were acting in the best interests of Bland, they could eschew intention 
to kill. 47' As Wilson and Smith point out, `intention' in criminal law is equated with awareness that the 
outcome is `virtually certain'. 4' The definitive statement is now found in Woolin. 478 The legitimacy of the 
doctor's actions is key to exonerating the doctor from blame. This suggests that where the patient is competent 
s/he should be involved in the decision unless treatment is clinically futile. For doctors to decide `in the 
competent patient's best interests' is inappropriate. In such cases, the doctor could be held to have acted either 
negligently47. or recklessly, 48° and be charged with manslaughter. 48' Regarding manslaughter, Lord Mackay 
explains that `(t)he ordinary principles of law on negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant 
has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who died.. . the next question is whether that breach 
caused the death... if so.. . whether that breach should be characterized as gross negligence and therefore a 
crime'. 48' Using a test so protective of doctors as the Bolam4ß3 test to decide criminal liability is highly 
questionable. 484 Designating a patient not for resuscitation could be construed as intention that the patient 
should die. Therefore, the competent patient's agreement should be sought. If the patient is incompetent 
judicial approval seems necessary if treatment is not futile or clearly contrary to the patient's best interests. 
Also, although the issue has not been considered by the courts, where a doctor is treating an identifiable patient, 
if s/he withholds treatment on the grounds that other patients have a better call upon the scarce resources of 
the NHS, s/he is failing to act in the best interests of that patient who is the only one to whom a concrete duty 
of care is owed. Thus, government use of doctors as the primary agents of rationing exposes the medical 
profession to charges of criminal (and civil) liability. 48' To expect a doctor to consider `future and contingent' 
patients, who may or may not materialise, at the time of treating the one to whom there is an immediate 
... In its evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics: Report 1993-4 HL21-I op cit n463 at para 76. 
471 Price D. Euthanasia, pain relief and double effect. Legal Studies 1997; 17: 323-342 at p325. 
472As was argued by the Official Solicitor as guardian ad litern in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at pp835-855. 
47'RvGibbins(1918) 13 CrAppR 134. 
474R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354. 
475Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p881. 
476A similar approach is taken in New Zealand: Auckland Health Board v Attorney General of New Zealand. (1993) 1 NZLR 235, at p253. 
477Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessity and the Legality of Medical Intervention. Med. Law International 1995; 1: 387-410 
at p390. 
478R v Woolin [ 1999] 1 AC 82 at pp96B-H per Lord Steyn. 
479R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr. App. R 8. 
480R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354. 
'R'R v Lawrence [ 1982] AC 510 and Rv Caldivell [ 1982] AC 341 seemed to indicate that there was no longer a distinction to be drawn between 
reckless manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter but Rv Adomako [ 1994] 5 Med. LR 277 has reintroduced two separate types of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
482R v Adomako [1994] 5 Med. LR 277 at p282. 
481 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [ 1957] 1 WLR 582. 
484Puxton M. Commentary [1994] 5 Med. LR 284. 
485The situation described is differs from the practice of triage whereby a group of patients, all of whom are owed a concrete duty of care by the 
doctor or the hospital since they are present and together, are placed into order of priority of treatment. In such a case, the doctor's duty is owed 
equally to each patient and time of waiting 
in the queue is recognised as being secondary to urgency of treatment. 
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obligation is both unrealistic and dangerous for the medical profession. 
The House of Lords, in Bland, rejected a defence of mercy killing. 48' McHale suggests `(i)t is possible that if 
the death appears to be a "mercy killing" by a relative then the prosecution may decide to accept a plea of 
manslaughter rather than prosecute for murder'. 48' If the relative denies causing death, charges of murder or 
attempted murder may be made. The courts show more leniency towards doctors who kill than relatives. 488 
Over-zealousness in bringing criminal charges against over-burdened or compassionate carers should be 
avoided. 
6.2.3.4 The Doctrine of Necessity 
Re F`189 extended necessity to healthcare situations where the patient is incompetent. 490 Wilson and Smith 
suggest that doctors should have this defence available to them provided this is formulated with `an articulated, 
principled, approach to fundamental patient rights of autonomy, and equal concern and respect'. 49' They 
believe that if doctors act in the patient's best clinical interests, they should not be held criminally culpable. 492 
However, `best interests' are not simply clinical interests. 493 The doctor's act/omission should only be 
considered absent criminal intent if the decision were made after due recognition, and balancing, of all the 
patient's interests. If there is doubt as to what constitutes a patient's `best interests' independent arbitration 
seems proper. 
Despite the House of Lords decision in Dudley v Stephens, 49a the Court of Appeal has now held necessity is an 
exceptional defence to murder. a95 As Smith predicted in 1989, `it would not be too difficult'a96 to distinguish 
Dudley v Stephens in a case where `(t)he accident had chosen the unlucky' one. 497 It is subject to a test of 
proportionality. 498 The circumstances in which it is admissible are narrowly prescribed. a99 Sanctity of life and 
bodily integrity must sometimes give way where interests are closely entwined yet the welfare principle clearly 
shows one is to be preferenced. soo However, just because necessity permits certain actions to be lawfully carried 
out that does not make them morally correct. 50' Any apparent similarities between separating conjoined twins 
and climbers cutting the rope between them become less persuasive once it is recognised that a degree of 
... Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p892 per Lord Mustill. 
487McHale J, Fox M, Murphy J. Health Care Law: Text and Materials 1997 Sweet and Maxwell, London at p822. 
488See, for example, the different sentences given to Julie Watts (who, if she removed the tube, did what could lawfully have been done by a 
doctor) and Dr Cox whose actions were clearly unlawful. The Court of Appeal eventually acquitted Julie Watts of the murder of her severely 
disabled 14 month old daughter. Watts v R. (unreported) 18 May 1998: Brooke C. My Agony, by Mother Cleared of Mercy Killing. Daily Mail 
19 May 1998. 
. 89 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [ 1990] 2 AC 1. 
49DAiredale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p892 per Lord Mustill. 
491 Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessityand the Legality of Medical Intervention. Med. Law International 1995; 1: 387-410 
at p406. 
492Ibid. 
493See the `welfare checklist' found in the Children Act 1989 s1(3) regarding decisions on behalf of children. 
494Dudley v Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. See also: Hanson N. The Custom of the Sea. 2000 Corgi Books, London. 
495Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. The `wholly exceptional' nature of the case is emphasised by Walker U at 
p118C. 
496Smith JC. `Necessity: Killing One that Others May Live' In The Hamlyn Lectures: Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law. 1989 
Stevens & Sons, London pp73-79 at p78. 
4971bid, at p79. 
498Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n495, at p59G per Ward LJ; p96C per Brooke U and p113D per Walker U. 
4991bid, at p62B-C per Ward LJ and p99B-D per Brooke LJ. 
500Ibid, at p99E per Brooke U. 
5111 for example, the House of Lords decision in Rv Bourneivood Community and Mental Health Trust ex parse L [1999] 1 AC 458 and the 
concerns of Lord Nolan (at p492) and Lord Steen (at p 497). 
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consent to the climber's action exists. 502 The mountaineers have voluntarily and jointly embarked on a 
hazardous venture. Lord Steyn warns, `(t)he common law of necessity... places effective and unqualified 
control' in the hands of the doctors. 503 It is regrettable that a definitive statement on this defence and the 
impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 will not be forthcoming from the House of Lords. `Advances in medical 
treatment... suggest that the criminal law's protection should be as wide as possible'. 50' Lord Hoffman believes 
that these `fundamental and painful decisions about life and death' do not constitute an `area in which any 
difference can be allowed to exist between what is legal and what is morally right'. 505 
6.3 Potential Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 
In Coughlan, the Court of Appeal, in partial justification, cited Article 8(1) European Convention on Human 
Rights in anticipation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) coming into force on 2 October 1998.506 Claims 
can only be brought by victims against public authorities, bodies exercising duties of a public nature and their 
agents, not against private individuals. 5 ' Doctors are being warned that `health professionals must be able to 
show that their decisions are compatible with the human rights set out in the Articles of the Convention'. ` 
The right of children to make their own healthcare decisions will probably be enhanced. 509 In Re MB, 51 ° Butler- 
Sloss U pointed out that the right to respect for private and family life5 ' is limited by pregnancy. 512 The right 
to life513 does not extend to protecting the unborn child"' because this prioritises the unborn child's over the 
mother's. s's The `repugnance' of the woman's decision in St George's did not alter the absence of foetal 
rights. 51' St George's emphasised the need to protect individuals from the `coups d'etat' and `gradual erosion' 
evident in other countries. 5 ' In America, the state's parens patriae role of protecting innocent third parties 
has been used to overrule refusals of Caesarian sections. 518 It is possible that, in any future case similar to St 
George's, the Human Rights Act 1998 could be interpreted as requiring that the needs of the unborn child are 
balanced against the wishes of the woman. 
In Re A (Conjoined Twins) it was held that allowing the operation did not contravene Mary's right to life. s'9 
Wilson and Smith suggest that the `doctrine of necessity which protects doctors when responsibly furthering 
502Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n495, at p 112 per Walker LJ. 
503R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458 at p497 per Lord Steyn. 
504Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n495, at p71A per Brooke LJ. 
... Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p850. 
506R v North and East Devon HA, ex parse Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622. 
507Moraes FC. Making a Human Rights Claim. NLJ2000: 1485-6. 
50RResuscitation Council (UK). Decisions Relating to Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: AJoint Statementfrom the British MedicalAssocialion, 
the Resuscitation Council (UK) and the Royal College of Nursing. February 2001 Resuscitation Council (UK), London 
(www. resus. org. uk/pages/dnar. htm accessed 28 February 2001) `Legal Issues' at p3. See also: British Medical Association. The impact of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. October 2000 BMA, London. 
"Garwood Gowers A. Time for competent minors to have a legal right to self-determination with regard to medical intervention. Paper presented 
at `Human Rights Act 1998 in Health Care Conference'. Nottingham Trent University, 10 May 2000. 
"'Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p442. 
"'Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
512Bruggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany [1977] 3 EHRR 244. 
'"Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
514Although the Commission has stated, but not elaborated, that, in `certain circumstances', Article 2 might afford a foetus protection (H v 
Norway (1990)(No 17004/90, unreported). See Butler-Sloss LJ in Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at p445. 
5 "Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [ 1978] 2 All ER 987. 
5168 v St George 's Healthcare NHS Trust ex parse S[ 1998] 2 FLR 
728 at p746. For a commentary see Bailey-Harris R. LQR 1998; 114: 550- 
555. 
517 Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728 at p740 per Judge LJ. 
"'See: Norwood Hospital v Munoz (1991) 564 2d 1017 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct). However, Butler-Sloss LJ suggests, in Re MB (Medical 
Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 426 at p444, that the American courts are moving towards the English position. 
519Re .1 
(Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1 at pp 116-117 per Walker LJ. 
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the interests of the patients, is being subverted by a judicial unwillingness to look behind the practices of the 
medical profession to the rights-respecting traditions (respect for the sanctity of life and bodily integrity) which 
justify them'. 52° In Re M and Re H, heard after 2 October, it was held that decisions to withdraw treatment 
made in a patient's best interests and in accordance with a `responsible body of medical opinion' do not 
constitute `intentional deprivation of life' contrary to Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 521 The patients were alive within the meaning of Article 2 but there was no `intention' to bring about 
the patients' deaths. 522 Article 3 did not apply because, even if their position could be described as -degrading' 
or `inhuman', the patients were unaware of it. 523 Withdrawal of treatment was `in accordance with a 
responsible body of medical opinion'. 52' An omission to provide treatment could only be contrary to Article 
2 if the state is under a positive obligation to safeguard life `irrespective of the circumstances or prognosis' . 
525 
It is doubtful that `families have any rights under Article 8 separate from the rights of the patient. 526 It is 
remotely possible that the contractual approach of Saving Lives527 could be construed as containing enforceable 
obligations but it seems that the courts will be reluctant to hold that the HRA alters the existing position 
regarding the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment. Indeed, Re H (1993) suggests that the courts 
should resist hearing cases requesting declarations as to lawfulness of treatment since this `might be an 
unfortunate signal.. . that 
it was appropriate, as a matter of good medical practice, for the implementation of 
such procedures to be delayed pending the outcome of a costly application to court'. 528 
6.4 The Decision-making Process 
6.4.1 Who Decides? 
Parents are accorded the right of decision-making concerning the upbringing and healthcare of their (minor) 
child. 529 The rebuttable presumption is that such decisions are made in the child's `best interests. "' However, 
the assumption that they, by virtue of genetic ties, are best is inherently flawed. 53' This is evident when parents 
want life-saving treatment withheld because they do not wish to parent an `abnormal' child532 or believe the 
child cannot receive appropriate care and societal acceptance. 533 If parents withhold consent the doctor can 
override the refusal without obtaining court approval if the situation is desperate. 534 In other cases the parents' 
desire to save their child results in requests for burdensome treatment. Then the doctors' refusal to treat can 
... Wilson W, Smith KLM, op cit n491, at p402. 
52'NHS TrustA v Mrs MandNHS Trust Bv Mrs H [2000] EWHC 29 (25 October 2000) para 30 per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. Judgment 
available on www. bailii. org accessed 28 November 2000. Also reported in The Times 29 November 2000. 
5221bid, at para 18. 
5231bid, at para 49. 
524Ibid. 
52'Ibid, at para 29. 
526Ibid, at para 41. 
52'Department of Health. Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation July 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
528Re H (Mental Patient: Diagnosis) [1993] 1 FLR 28 at p33 per Mr Nicholas Wilson QC sitting as deputyjudge. 
... Albeit of diminishing potency as explained by Balcombe U in Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64, at p88. 
5i. Hollen PJ, Brickle BB. Quality parental decision making and distress. J. Paediatric Nursing 1998; 13,3: 140-150. 
"'This tie was recognised by Waite U in Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [199711 FLR 502, at p514. It was accepted that the parents, 
at all times, were acting in the child's best interests. However, for a strong critique of the favouring of the parents as decision-makers in Re T 
and other cases, see Freeman, op cit n306 passim. 
5'ZFor instance, see the parental rejection in Re B(A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1981 ]1 WLR 1421. In other cases the parents 
may feel pressurised into taking on the role of carer. It is perhaps easier to explain that your child died rather than it is now the responsibility 
of the social services. 
53Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
534See, for instance, the discussion concerning emergency treatment in Re R (a minor) (blood transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 737, at p760 and the 
use of emergency protection powers in Re 0 (4 Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149. 
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be `based upon the best interests of the child and their own professional ethical integrity'S35 and is usually 
upheld. 536 Occasionally, doctors and families may agree but the decision may be referred to the courts by others 
who disagree. 537 Then, `court must decide it'. 538 Rather than terminating, `parental privileges' become 
`subservient to the... welfare of the child'. 539 
Doctors can be seen as adopting `ownership' of the decision dependent upon the health status of the patient. 
In Re Dinnerstein withholding resuscitation in the event of a cardiac arrest was a matter `for the attending 
physician only'. "' Jonsen suggests that the physician `acquires a right over the disease and the patient by 
double title: he mixes his labor (sic) with the disease and masters it; he contracts with the patient to do his 
work... he almost has an independent right over the disease itself. "' `Ownership' is evident in Re .4 
(Conjoined Twins): the court did not discuss whether Jodie's best interests required that the experienced Great 
Ormond Street team542 did the separation rather than the inexperienced Manchester team. 543 
In Re 0, parental rights were displaced short-term enabling blood transfusions to be given. 544 The judge 
expressed concern that even where the local authority has parental responsibility and can act alone, `the ethics 
of (doctors) acting in reliance on the consent of only one of, say, three persons who hold parental responsibility 
and in opposition to the wishes of the other two' is debatable. 545 He advised that the courts should endeavour 
to hear both sides so genuine parental beliefs are treated respectfully. 546 An American court held that the 
decision `should generally occur in the clinical setting', the role of the court being to 'assist ... when an 
impasse 
is reached'. 54' Re C[ 1996] held that `(t)he courts do not instruct doctors how they should perform their clinical 
and professional duties... (but)... are ready to assist with the taking of responsibility in cases of grave anxiety'. 548 
The courts have yet to consider how far a person of 16 or 17 years who is themselves the parent of a child is 
able to give valid consent or refusal of treatment for that infant. Following Re A (Conjoined Twins) the scope 
for legitimate difference to tip the balance towards the parent as decision-maker as in Re 7"' seems 
substantially restricted. 550 It seems probable that doctors will accept decisions made by parents of any age 
where they agree with the medical team. Where there is scope for legitimate difference doctors, wishing to 
treat, will ask the court to decide. Decisions involving severely-handicapped neonates or terminally-ill children 
are rarely referred to the courts. Without an independent advisor, the child-parent is possibly more susceptible 
... Nelson LJ. Ethics and the provision of futile, harmful, or burdensome treatment to children. Critical Care Medine. 1992; 20(3): 427-433 at 
p229. 
53GSee, for instance, Rv Secretary of State for Social Services, ex parse Walker (1992) 3 BMLR 32; Rv Cambridge District HA, ex parse B 
[ 1995] 1 FLR 1055 and Rv Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust ex parte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905. 
'"See, for instance, In re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1981 1 WLR 1421 and Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical 
Treatment) [1993] Farn 15. 
538Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n533, at p33D per Ward LJ. 
539Re K. D. (A Minor)(Ward: Termination ofAccess) [1988] 1 AC 806,825 per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton. Approved by Ward LJ in Re A 
(Conjoined Twins) op cit n533, at p50A. 
... Re Dinnerstein (1978) 380 NE 2d 134 (App Ct Mass). Since this case was heard, Massachusetts, like most other states, now requires the 
physician to follow a strict protocol before writing a DNR order. 
sa1Jonsen AR, The New Medicine and The Old Ethics 1990 Harvard University Press, London at p93. 
"`Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n533, at p63H per Brooke LJ. 
'"Ibid, at p67C per Brooke LJ. 
544Re 0 (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149. 
saslbid, at p154. 
5461bid, at p155. 
5471n re Joelle Rosebush, 491 N. W. 2d 633 (Mich. App. 1992). Lord Woolf MR takes a similar stance 
in Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust, ex parse 
Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905 at p908. 
548Re C (A Baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43, at p44 per Sir Stephen Brown P. 
549Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 WLR 242. 
"'Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n533, Section IV Family Law para 9.2 at pp51C-52C per Ward LJ. 
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to manipulation by the medical profession whom, as shown in earlier chapters, consider this acceptable 
practice. Consequently, it may be inappropriate to maintain the normal exclusivity of decision-making. 
However, it would be inappropriate for the child-parent to be denied decision-making capacity regarding the 
infant in the absence of evidence that the child-parent cannot decide appropriately. 55' Wilson J. is correct in 
holding that `the law must at the very least be clear before it should be so construed as to permit invasion of 
parental autonomy by public authorities'. 552 Yet, the lack of clarity in the law did not tempt the Court of 
Appeal to leave decision-making to the parents in Re A (Conjoined Twins). 553 
The British legislature is currently reviewing these issues. "' Browne-Wilkinson LJ questioned whether judges 
should `seek to develop new law' or whether it is for society `through the democratic expression of its views 
in Parliament, to reach its decisions on the underlying moral and practical problems and then reflect those 
decisions in legislation? '555 The guardian ad litern in Bland argued that `the question of life as against death 
is one wholly outside the competence of judicial determination... since `the court is unable to evaluate the 
consequence of death'. 556 The Court of Appeal was the decision-maker in Re A (Conjoined Twins) despite the 
fact that it is `a court of law, not of morals'. 557 It is highly questionable whether cases raising such complex 
ethical concerns should be decided in a court of law. Legislative change can restrict the need for judicial 
intervention. 558 Most American states now recognise Advance Directives. 559 English decisions indicate that 
doctors following Advance Directives in good faith will not be liable to prosecution. 56o This suggests both that 
wishes of previously autonomous patients are important and that the courts do not wish to interfere with well- 
balanced patient-doctor relationships. In Re A (Conjoined Twins) the lack of legal precedent regarding 
conjoined twins was attributed to the role of ethics committees as decision-makers in the U. S. A. 56' Since the 
court `is not equipped to choose between... competing philosophies"" perhaps it should not be the arbitrator. 
As already noted, the court is `a court of law' so legal principles are determinative with medical criteria 
seeming more persuasive regarding `best interests' than ethics. 563 Whilst `patients do not know as much 
medicine as their doctors, patients know as much and more about their own values and interests'. 564 Judges 
frequently fail to critique medical evidence so too narrow a view is taken of highly complex issues. 565 Although 
medical advances create these situations the dominant perspective need not be either medical or legal. Such 
cases could be decided in a different forum if the legislature so wished. 
"'For example, given the policy of encouraging childhood immunisation, it would be burdensome to insist the child-parent could not consent 
for her baby to be vaccinated. However, if the child-parent refused immunisation, that could be interpreted as evidence that she lacked capacity. 
Whether this could seen to be sufficiently against the baby's best interests to warrant referral to the courts is debatable. 
... In Re X (Minors)(Care Proceedings: Parental Responsibility) [2000] WLR 1031 at p1035 
553Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1. 
554Lord Chancellor's Department. Who Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults. (Cm 3803) December 1997 
The Stationery Office, London and Making Decisions: the Government 's proposals for making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated 
adults. (Cm 4465) 1999 The Stationery Office, London. These will be examined in the next chapter. 
555Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p878. 
556lbid, at 837. 
557Re A (Conjoined Ttivins) op cit n553, at p6H per Ward LJ. See also, Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389 at 
p401B per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. 
158 As called for by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p878. 
559Annas GJ: The Healthcare Proxy and the Living Will. New Eng. J Med April 25 1991 1210 at p 1210 reporting the effect of the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act 1990 Pub L No 10 1-508 paras 4206 and 4751. 
560Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [ 1994] 1 FLR 31. 
56'Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n553, at p66H per Brooke LJ. A similar (36 hours long) operation to separate conjoined twins was carried 
out the weekend of 30 September -1 October 2000 in the USA 
following approval from the hospital ethics committee, not a court: personal 
communication. 
562lbid, at p98F per Brooke LJ. 
5631bid, at p6H per Ward LJ. 
564Jonsen AR, The New Medicine and The Old Ethics 1990 Harvard University Press, London at pp96-97. 
365Finnis JM. Bland: Crossing the Rubicon? Law Quarterly Review 1993; 109: 329-337 at p334. 
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6.4.2 What values are important? 
Autonomy is given great support. The right of competent patients to refuse treatment and the right of doctors 
not to give treatment contrary to their consciences is upheld. 566 Doctors and judges must use a rational 
process. 56' Yet, in the interests of `autonomy', judges support irrational refusals of treatment thereby failing 
to protect the weakest. 568 However, the principle of `non-abandonment' creates obligations. 56' Perhaps the slow 
death mandated in Bland and other cases is judicial approval of doctor abandonment57' despite the 
manipulation regarding patient autonomy in Bland to justify allowing `dignified' death. " ' 
The judiciary are reluctant to place sanctity of life before quality or the patient's right of self-determination. 
According to Firnis, the judiciary, in Bland, redefined human life. 57' Consequently, even those with 
personhood can now be `abandoned'. 573 The courts distinguish causing death from preventing its natural 
occurrence but the doctrine of necessity now allows positive acts of medical killing to occur albeit in restricted 
circumstances. 574 With patients like J, there seems no reason to preserve life575 but `little C' had 
`personhood'176 like David Glass. s" The decision in Re T may have been based less on `best interests' than a 
belief that societal resources should not be used for rescue attempts that there is no duty to perform . 
17' There 
appears to be tacit support for the notion that `those who sap the strength of the state' can be `sacrificed'. "' 
Lord Goff held the court's role is not to ensure fair access to treatment, merely to decide if non-treatment is 
`in accordance with a respectable body of medical opinion and that it is reasonable'. 580 Keeping certain patients 
alive seems potentially harmful to society, through bringing the use of medical technology into disrepute or 
creating an unjust burden on resources, so decisions allowing death are made. 58' The autonomy of 
incompetents is little respected when their tissue can save others. 582 Such decisions suggest that if people are 
of little value in themselves, their existence is validated by making use of them. Dressing decisions in a `best 
interests' framework hides any contentious belief that society has a legitimate interest in maximising the 
contribution of each individual. 
Keyserlinck, like Keown583, argues that the real issue is not the value of life but the value of treatment. 584 
However, the decision often focuses upon the value of the patient's life because of the emphasis placed upon 
566 See: In re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam. 15 and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p896 per Lord 
Mustill. 
567Re A (Conjoined Twins) op cit n553, at p60C-E per Ward LJ. 
568R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
569Quinn TE, Cassel CK. Non-abandonment: A Central Obligation for Physicians Trends in Healthcare, Law and Ethics 1995; 10,1-2: 25-32. 
See discussion earlier in this thesis. 
570Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789. 
"'See the argument of Anthony Lester QC and Pushpinder Saini as amicus curiae in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at pp848-850 
adopted by Lord Goff at pp864-5. 
572Finnis JM. Bland: Crossing the Rubicon? Law Quarterly Review 1993; 109: 329-337 at p334. 
573 See Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384. 
574Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
575Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [ 1993] Fam 15. 
576Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384. 
577Rv Portsmouth NHS Trust ex parse Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905. 
57SRe T (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 1 FLR 502. 
579Buck v Bell 274 US 200 (1927) per Holmes J. 
... Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p884 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
581As possible, very tragic, examples, see the case of the patient with the skin deformity described by one consultant and the boy with 90% bums 
described by another. 
582See, for instance, Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] 2 WLR 556. 
$83Keown, J. Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland(1997) 113 L. Q. R. 481. 
5R°Keyserlinck, op cit n354 at pp55-6. 
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(predominantly medical) estimations of the patient's present and future quality of life. Lord Goff, in Bland"', 
was unhappy at the emphasis placed on quality of life in Re J. 5S6 Lord Mustill firmly rejected the argument 
that the `interest of the state in preserving life' can be reduced where the `quality of the life is diminished by 
disease or incapacity' since this would lead to active euthanasia. "' The fact that few applications regarding 
patients in a vegetative state have been made suggests that neither society in general nor all doctors believe 
continued treatment is not in the patient's best interests. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Openness of decision-making and procedure is seen as increasingly necessary by the courts. Blanket bans on 
treatment are not deemed acceptable so doctors and healthcare commissioners (purchasers) learn new 
phraseology to cover true intent. In line with emphasis on open government and transparency of decision- 
making by public bodies medical decision-making needs to follow a similar approach. 
The case law tells doctors that patient autonomy is important. However, this message is weakened by the courts 
allowing doctors to not only decide whether a patient is autonomous but then what constitutes the best interests 
of an incompetent patient. The empirical evidence obtained for this thesis indicates that the legal and ethical 
understanding of doctors is limited and their desire to retain control strong. The case law indicates that in 
deciding `best interests' the burden on relatives can be considered, even at the expense of the patient's best 
interests, and that guidelines, albeit produced by a `responsible body of medical opinion', can be ignored. 
Sanctity of life has little importance and the doctor's interpretation of the patient's quality of life is decisive. 
The judicial distortions of `best interests' have become so much a matter of course that even where it would 
be possible to hold that the right of healthcare staff not to be assaulted prevailed over a patient's right to 
treatment, the courts have preferred to misuse the `best interests' principle. Doctors learn that as long as they 
employ certain key words, (necessary, futility, unacceptable quality of life, best interests, guidelines, clinical 
judgment, experience) there is no effective challenge once their decision is made. `Mutual understanding 
between the doctors and the judges' may be the `best way to ensure the evolution of a sensitive and sensible 
legal framework for the treatment and care of patients' but the tendency of the judiciary to defer to the medics 
fails to protect patients. 588 Therefore, the inquisitorial approach taken in Re A (Conjoined Twins) is welcome. 
Law alone `cannot effect a substantial change in the routine behaviour of doctors, but it can have some 
symbolic impact on their perception of what is appropriate in relationships with patients'. 58' `The focus of 
judicial decisions... (is)... to rein in excessive medical enthusiasm'. 59o 
The contention that `the decision to treat or not to treat will be determined only upon clinical grounds; that no 
patient shall be treated as a vehicle for social policy, and that all patients are accorded the same social worth"" 
receives little real support. Patients do not receive equal protection or have equal social worth. Incompetent 
... Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p869. 
5861n re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33 at p55. 
587Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p894. 
5R8Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at p871 per Lord Goff of Chievely. 
589Teff H. Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor-Patient Relationship. 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford at p238. 
59° Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389 at p397G per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. 
59' Wilson W, Smith KLM. The Doctors' Dilemma: Necessity and the Legality of Medical Intervention. Med. Lmv International 1995; 1: 387-410 
at p400. 
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patients need more protection than currently received since there is potential for abuse (intentional or 
otherwise) particularly when non-therapeutic treatment is proposed. 592 The courts are better able to consider 
and balance all the factors relating to a person's welfare than even the most experienced doctors because these 
decisions have to balance public as well as private interests. 593 Theoretically, the court's sole focus is the 
individual patient whereas doctors, with little formal training in decision-making, have to balance individual 
interests against those of other patients. 594 The feasibility of doctors switching from a model of decision- 
making legitimating the interests of others to one concentrating on the `best interests of this individual alone' 
is questionable. Tomlinson argues that if doctors can lawfully restrict the treatments offered patients it can 
only be because they have the `authority to act on judgements of value'. 595 This authority can only exist 
provided society accepts it is proper. Society seems less ready to accept this premise. 
Little has changed since Brazier wrote: `the law as it affects sensitive health care decisions is frequently ill- 
defined... (and) can offer the doctor and his patient little clear guidance as to their rights and obligations to each 
other and to the community'. 596 Quality decision-making needs improved communication between doctors and 
patients, particularly regarding treatment risks, "' and improved understanding of the decision-making 
process. 598 This requires both sides to develop the skills necessary. 599 Promoting Advance Directives could 
assist. It should be possible for doctors, patient groups, lawyers and ethicists to work together to produce a set 
of instructions covering the most-feared conditions. Necessity is increasingly used as `gap-filler' to mend out- 
dated legislation... or cover the void between medical opinion and precedent case law. 60' Law is being shaped 
by medical ethics. `Necessity' becomes the language of the `responsible body of medical opinion'. The lack 
of a more appropriate forum for resolving issues of medical advances straining the boundaries of law and ethics 
has resulted in the intrinsic worth of human lives spiralling downwards like sycamore seeds in the wind: law 
one side, medicine the other, key words flying around, and ethics desperately trying to maintain a grip. 
S92 The Rt Hon Sir John Balcombe. The Child, the Doctor and the Judge J. Roy. Soc. Med. 1996; 89,28: 3-9 at p9. 
593Per Lord Griffiths in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at p70. See also, p4lE and p42B per Butler-SlossLJ. 
59°See, for instance, the burden placed on doctors to consider the welfare of any child who would be born as a result of giving infertility treatment 
before accepting the patient for IVF treatment as shown in Rv Ethical Committee of St Mary's Hospital (Manchester) exparte 
H[ 1988] 1 FLR 
512. 
595Tomlinson T, Brody H. Futility and the ethics of resuscitation. JAMA 1990; 264: 1276-1280 at p1277. 
596Brazier M. Medicine, Patients and the Lmv. 1987 Penguin Books Ltd, Harmonsworth at p325. 
'97Horton R. Commentary: How should doctors respond to the GMC's judgments on Bristol? The Lancet 1998; 351: 1900-1901. 
598Walton DN, Donen N. Ethical Decision Making and the Critical Care Team. Critical Care Clinics 1986; 2,1: 101-109. 
599See: Campbell AGM, McHaffie HE. Prolonging life and allowing death: infants. J. Med. Ethics 1995; 21: 339-344 at pp341-2 and Craig VJ. 
Patient decision-making: medical ethics and mediation. J. Med. Ethics 1996; 22: 164-7. 
600Re F (-dult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2000] 2 FLR 512. 
"Re 
. -1 
(Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS 
This chapter, and the next, explore how the decision-making process can be improved. In this chapter the 
views of the consultants on how to improve decision-making will be examined first, since their support is 
necessary for reforms to work. Then different proposals which have been made since the empirical research 
for this thesis was carried out will be critiqued to see if they resolve the difficulties identified. These difficulties 
include the questions of which inputs to the decision-making process are acceptable and when non-treatment 
decisions require scrutiny outside the medical domain. 
7.1 The Doctors' Views 
The eighty-five consultants were asked: 
How do you feel decision-making regarding allocation of resources could be improved? Do you feel there is 
a place for local population involvement? 
How can the process of making decisions about individual patients be improved? Should there be national 
guidelines? 
7.1.1 Decision-making at the societal level 
7.1.1.1 Government guidelines 
The last government explained that `guidance is stronger than guidelines... if an authority did not take notice 
of guidance, the Secretary of State has the power to make directions... guidance is expected to be followed'. ' 
Government medication `blacklists' mean some treatments are openly withheld but most restrictions on 
treatment are achieved through less direct means. Purchasing bodies are used to deflect criticism from 
governments. Some identify closely with government strategies in the exercise of their discretion. 2 Doctors 
felt the resource allocation process needed to be more open: 
It should be simplified, clarified and made more transparent. C 12 
It could be more explicit. A17 
Most of the consultants would welcome national debate about resource allocation: 
It's a discussion for society. It's too complex for doctors. B 17 
'Jacob JM. Lawyers go to hospital. 1991 Public Law 255-281 at p266. 
2For instance, see the decision of the purchasing body in Rv Cambridge District HA, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
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Someone's got to take the lead and decide what we can and cannot afford. A24 
Some sort of national guideline and consensus is desperately needed. C9 
It's more difficult with these minority services (dialysis) to have a local plan - it needs to be a much 
bigger, global, national planning with national guidance as to what the level of funding should be 
and what resources should be in any one unit and working out if you have the right number of units 
for the population. A36 
Guidelines and policies can be manipulated as a way to reduce healthcare costs by withholding or withdrawing 
treatment sooner rather than later. 3 Views amongst consultants varied as to whether more money was the 
answer: 
Health authorities need more money. B 11 
Just putting more money into the system isn 't going to solve anything... Diseases and treatments will 
have to be looked at in a more effective way, looking at outcomes. A 18 
Exponential growth in medical technology occurred at the same time financial restrictions were being 
introduced. Some specialties have always had to justify expenditure: 
I was chairman of the national working party... a specialty that didn't exist twenty years ago... right 
from the beginning we had to look at cost-effectiveness and have had to deal with those arguments 
in terms of introducing restraint. C 14 
7.1.1.2 Improving the resource allocation process 
Medical decision-making can be formally or informally regulated. ' Apart from contentious issues like abortion 
and surrogacy, the U. K. has taken a laissez-faire approach but increasing litigation, complaints and healthcare 
costs mean ways to restrict clinical freedom are being sought. ' Some doctors see legislation as a way to resolve 
wastage of resources. ' The issue of rationing on the grounds of age was mentioned by only three consultants 
despite recent media and journalistic coverage of the `fair innings' argument: 
I refuse to make choices on age but other people would be happy saying the young and mothers 
should be guaranteed rights to treatments before others. B 18 
We're seeing more elderly people being admitted to hospital with terminal illnesses... the problem is 
'Some American doctors already believe that DNAR policies can be legitimately used to control the cost of health care: Murphy DJ; Finucane 
TE. New Do-Not-Resuscitate Policies. Arch. Intern. Med. 1993; 153: 1641-8. 
'For a comprehensive analysis see: Moran M, Wood B. States, regulation and the medical profession. 1993 Oxford University Press, London, 
in particular, at pp90-111. 
'Occasionally, Parliament has called for national guidelines to be developed by healthcare professions: MPs demand guidelines on life-saving 
bids. Hospital Doctor 21 November 1991 p2. See also: Department of Health. A First Class Service: Quality in the NHS June 1998 The 
Stationery Office, London paras 2.13,2.17 and Lawrence H. `Postcode' prescribing. Healthcare Parliamentary Monitor 22 March 1999, at 
p3. 
6Rogers L. Doctors seek £50 fine for patients who fail to show. Sunday Times 29 June 1997. Call for patients to be charged £5 for visits to GP. 
The Times 20 January 1999. 
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that we can now treat some of those conditions. A26 
The fair innings argument does have merit. A5 
Healthcare is dominated by expensive treatments due to the lack of independent research. ' Relatively 
inexpensive `treatments' such as influenza vaccination might carry hidden costs in preventing the death of non- 
income-generating persons. ' Research might reveal unsuspected side-effects associated with conventional 
treatments and the acceptability of continued use would have to be decided. ' Audit1° can identify patterns and, 
combined with algorithms or flow charts, might help identify treatment options, but acceptable and accurate 
predictors of outcomes are difficult to establish. " Scope exists for computer-assisted diagnosis" which could 
be manipulated to identify only certain, cost-effective treatment options thereby increasing uniformity. 
However, `(i)f medical research is to be at the service of knowledge, it is also to be at the service of society in 
order to help mankind to progress, both economically and socially. "3 As patients become more knowledgeable, 
demands for `the best' will grow: 
The public's opinions tend to be swayed a lot by the media, by emotion. C 10 
Identifying a national level of healthcare provision to provide a baseline could help to eliminate geographical 
variation. However, baselines can be interpreted as equalising distribution of healthcare resources, or 
maximising collective health status, not necessarily prioritising those whose need is greatest. Two of the 
consultants believed it was necessary to remove the barriers between healthcare and social care: 
The social services are split from the NHS and every time (this district) has lost. D 13 
There needs to be improving dialogue. A4 
Many of the consultants felt a national policy was needed across the country to eliminate rationing `by 
postcode14 and increasing regional inequality15: 
You can make a very strong case for a national policy, particularly on these various expensive 
'For instance, see the patenting of human genetic codes as the Human Genome is mapped: Terry L, Cedar S. Nursing and the `New Genetics'. 
Nursing Standard (scheduled for publication 28 March 2001 - accepted for publication 4 December 2000). 
'This is acknowledged as a very cynical argument. 
'For instance, recent research indicates that children born as a result of in-vitro-fertilisation treatment are more likely to suffer from hearing and 
speech difficulties or have retarded mental development than those conceived naturally: to Velde et al; Commentary: Concerns about assisted 
reproduction. The Lancet 1998; 351: 1524-5. See also, Pritchard KI. Commentary: Is tamoxifen effective in prevention of breast cancer? The 
Lancet 1998; 352: 80-81,93,98. 
"Audit is defined as`the systematic critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including the procedures used for diagnosis and the treatment, 
the use of resources, and the resulting outcome and quality of life for the patient': Department of Health. NHS Review Working Paper No 6, 
1989 Department. of Health, London. 
"See: McIntyre KM, Failure of `Predictors' of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Outcomes to Predict Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Outcomes. 
Arch. Intern. Med. 1993: 153: 1293-6 and Stewart K et al. Does audit improve DNR decision making? J. Roy. Coll. Physic. 1994; 28,4: 318-321. 
See also, as evidence of the medical professions' unwillingness to accept audit: Stewart K et al. Does audit improve DNR decision making? 
J. Roy. Coll. Physic. 1994; 28,4: 318-321 at p321; Martin LF et al. The Surgeon's Role in improving Medical Care. American J. Surgery 
1997; 174: 294-296, in particular, pp295-6 and Department of Health Primary Care: Delivering the Future 1996 The Stationery Office, London 
at para 3.4. 
"Fox J. `Formal and knowledge-based methods in decision technology'. In Dowie J, Elstein A (Eds) Professional judgment -a reader in 
clinical decision-making. 1988 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge at pp226-252. 
"Pompidou A. Research in medical ethics and ethics of research in the European Union. Biomedical Health Research 1995; 6,2: 8-9 at p9. 
14They are joined in this call by others. See: Light DW. The real ethics of rationing. BMJ 1997; 315: 112-5 and BMJ Editorial. At last, a public 
health minister. BMJ 1997; 314: 1498-9. 
"Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Death in Britain: How Local Mortality Rates have Changed. 1997 York Publishing Services, York. 
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treatments such as bone marrow transplantations, chemotherapy and some of the new anti-cancer 
drugs. C6 
There aren't a great deal of various specific guidelines for the national budgets... they have to be 
evidence-based now and if the evidence isn't there... you could have a sort of filling-in by an expert 
body. D3 
Some of the consultants felt the NHS was manipulated for political reasons: 
I do not believe local health authorities have the resources or the expertise to make a full range of 
purchasing decisions... it is essentially a political cop-out to pretend you can devolve purchasing 
decisions which affect a national service from the centre to health authorities ... I would 
favour the a- 
political solution of a national health commission which is charged with establishing the basic 
priorities. B 16 
Take health out of the political agenda. B 15 
Eddy argues for patient representatives to replace government bodies in determining available treatments. 16 
Lay input is valued by the present government but the Oregon model was only mentioned by four consultants 
and views varied: 
I'm not impressed. C16 
I think it's based on very sad principles. A15 
Like the Oregon experiments... we need to have three areas of dialogue (with medical experts, 
health authorities and the public). C5 
I thought it was brilliant. It was just that people didn't like the conclusions. Al 
Pessimism and anxiety was expressed by some of the consultants interviewed: 
I don't think you can improve decision-making - there will always be pressure groups. B3 
7.1.1.3 Who should be involved 
Greater local input can help identify specific needs particularly if the process accesses those often excluded 
from formal consultations. However, the majority of consultants rejected local population involvement and 
there was evidence of anxiety regarding pressure groups. The underlying assumption seemed to be that lay 
input would be 'unbalanced': 
The public would be influenced by pressure groups. C8 
"Eddy DM. Connecting Value and Costs: whom do we ask and what do we ask them? JAIN 1990; 264,13: 1737-9. 
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Local population... you will find a small number of activists leading the argument. The majority of 
the population would prefer to leave it to a professional body they trust and on the whole, they trust 
the medical professional. A23 
Local population should have more of a say in what they want from their local hospital. A35 
Likewise, Community Health Councils were not seen as an appropriate way to input local views: 
CHCs are run by people who seem to have personal axes to grind... their fostering complaints and 
encouraging litigation forces staff to take a defensive stance. D1 
There was strong support amongst interviewees for the idea of increased input from General Practitioners: 
You need to talk to chief GPs... I don't think you should ask the patients as they don't have a clue. 
A32 
GPs are more in touch with their patients and actually make more sensible decisions regarding 
priorities than the health authority. B 19 
Decisions... should be more directly involved with the people who are providing that care. B 14 
The approval of local input via medical professionals starkly contrasted with the rejection of lay input. This 
can be interpreted as evidence of the desire of professions to maintain control over their domain although 
several foresaw problems in placing resource allocation solely in the hands of doctors: 
Doctors would order the earth if they could. Doctors and administrators are still the best mechanism. 
C13 
At the moment it is largely done by civil servants... There has to be more public accountability ... more 
involvement of patient groups, family practitioners in particular and hospital specialists. A14 
7.1.2 Decision-making at the individual patient level 
7.1.2.1 Medical Guidelines 
Stoll wants national and international guidelines and standards because there are `marked differences between 
institutions in the use of aggressive or high tech (sic) procedures'. " Haycox warns that `guidelines must start 
from a patient perspective whilst encompassing the needs of the whole community'. 
18 The Clinical Standards 
Advisory Group mirrors the work done in the U. S. A. where the `development, implementation and monitoring 
of guidelines is overseen by custom built organisations'. 
19 However, it is recognised in the U. S. A. that although 
"Stoll BA. Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The MacMillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke at p23. 
"Haycox A, et al. Clinical guidelines - the hidden costs. BMJ 1999; 318: 391-393 at p393. 
19Editorial BMJ. Clinical Guidelines BMJ 1997; 315: 324. 
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guidelines `might be based on rational economic and research-based considerations' they can `lack the crucial 
input of doctors with a day-to-day concern for the welfare of individual patients'. 2° Linked with clinical audit, 
the way ahead is clearly prescriptive. One danger of guidelines is that they can encourage new treatments or 
new decision-making methodologies being adopted when `in practice their results may be poorer than 
expected'. 2' Opinion was divided over their usefulness. The number of consultants supporting national 
guidelines was exactly the same as the number opposing them. However, support was almost always qualified 
whereas opposition was very powerfully expressed without qualification. 
Typical remarks supporting national guidelines were: 
Certainly in the case of cancer. -for other diseases it is more difficult... the best way is to get a multi- 
disciplinary team together. D12 
I've been involved in drawing up national (clinical) guidelines... but when it comes to guidelines for 
ethical issues I think that's a lot harder... they would probably be rather philosophical. A14 
As long as one understands what their limitations are, that you're always going to have people who 
are exceptions... they're helpful. C4 
The absence of guidelines could lead to inappropriate practice being adopted as normal by younger colleagues. 22 
Those supporting them often perceived guidelines as more useful for less-experienced staff than themselves, 
experienced consultants : 
You need to have some sort of policies and guidelines for junior staff and nursing staff. A12 
Guidelines could be seen as a way to control mavericks: 
You can have guidelines that stop politicians withholding treatment; you can have guidelines that 
stop doctors treating - there are some gung-ho surgeons. B9 
Typical reasons for rejecting guidelines for clinical decisions were that patients and circumstances are unique 
and guidelines would ignore this individuality. 
Everyone's an individual... national guidelines - No. B6 
There is a danger in guidelines... we have to look at individual babies... they're not specific... either 
they will be too open-ended so they won't be as much use, or they risk being too closed. A7 
Everyone told her she was too young to have a hysterectomy and she said to me, well, how old do I 
20Prof Ted Marmor in: Health Care Resources, Choices and Decisions. St Catherine's Conference Report No37 1993. The King George 
VI and Queen Elizabeth Foundation of St Catherine's, Windsor, at p10. 
2'Haycox et al, op cit n18 at p91. 
22For instance, see Stuttaford T. Shifting views on Euthanasia. The Times 6 January 1999 p2 in response to front page article: Horsnell M. Police 
check hospitals over `backdoor euthanasia' 
The Times 6 January 1999. 
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have to be?... That's the sort of thing we can't have written down. A2523 
In the few (cases) where decisions are not straightforward, they're so highly specific and individual 
that guidelines are unhelpful. C3 
Our Royal College has guidelines... they ended up being a good small textbook almost entirely 
inapplicable to an individual situation. C7 
Sometimes, the reason for rejecting guidelines was based on the difficulty of who should draft them: 
Guidelines are produced by old men who've usually long since finished practising at the coalface... An 
example is the national guidelines for hip replacement... this report came from the Royal College of 
Physicians - people who break their hip aren't treated by physicians. A23 
Even experts don't agree. C10 
One consultant suggested a collegiate approach to decision-making as an alternative to guidelines: 
Who would be responsible for drawing them up? Would it be managers, ... government 
employees,... patient advocacy groups,... lawyers? ... 
If it's the wish of three consultants in a hospital 
then management should not restrict that patient. B9 
Sometimes the reason given for rejection seemed based on flawed ethical reasoning: 
We must get (emotionally) involved... all my patients have access to the mother, father, brother, sister, 
child role as I try to do for them what I would do for my family member... Guidelines would give the 
objectivity... but... make it impersonal. B4 
Resistance on the grounds that guidelines fail to meet individual needs might be misplaced. Setting out a 
structure for decision-making could help meet the needs of patients, family and other professionals: 
The national guidelines in psychiatry had a lot of resistance initially but it really has sensitised us 
to patient and relatives' needs and made us work more cohesively and improved communication. 
A28 
We are quite used to thinking we need the social worker, the psychologist, the key nurses... (Others) 
don't always remember to involve all those upon whom (the decision) has impact. So guidelines on 
structure might be useful. A36 
Failure to comply with guidelines may be evidence of a breach of the standard of care. 24 Eventually `the time 
may come... when a new recommendation may be so well proved... it should be adopted' thus obliging doctors 
23 Recounting how he was persuaded to carry out a hysterectomy in a `girl' under 25 years old. 
24Harpwood V. NHS Reform, Audit, Protocols and Standards of Care. Med. Lmv. lntern. 1994; 1: 241-259. 
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to modify their practice accordingly. 25 There was much more support for flexible guidance but confusion over 
terminology was evident26: 
There are more factors that can be inherently included in a simple algorithm or simple protocol. D6 
As long as they are guidelines not rigid protocols. A8 
They start off being guidelines then become more and more rigid... you (should) employ intelligent 
people who will make an appropriate decision within a flexible framework. A34 
Some treatments are nationally protocoled and the individual consultants can alter them as the 
situation may dictate. C 12 
The NHS Executive states that guidelines should produce `improvements in health' at `acceptable costs'. '-' The 
`desirable attributes' of guidelines include: validity; cost-effectiveness; reproducibility; reliability; 
representative development; clinical applicability; clinical flexibility; clarity; meticulous documentation; 
scheduled review and utilisation review. 28 Doctors are stigmatised as `spendthrifts' but receive little guidance 
on how to allocate resources. 29 As medicine advances, it becomes harder to develop guidelines which reject 
less viable cases hence healthcare costs can escalate as doctors use guidelines as a way to `prove' treatment is 
appropriate. 30 Several consultants linked guidelines for individual decision-making with resource allocation 
suggesting that treatment decisions and costs are combined in their minds: 
There is a place if you are taking on board the resource implication... helpful assuming it reflects 
public opinion, to give some idea of the value that society puts on different treatments and their costs. 
B1 
I broadly agree with the guidelines"... but they haven't really grasped the issue of economics... they 
have to decide what level of problem it is not economically justifiable to treat because it takes away 
resources from other perfectly treatable children. C9 
The problem with guidelines and recommendations is that they tend to push healthcare costs 
up... there will be more tests, more treatment, more interventions... the NHS is cheap because we 
employ doctors to be ignorant. A 13 
The management still want doctors to make decisions about who to treat and who and when not to 
treat because it gets them out of a sticky corner and they always say the resource is there - it's a 
"Crawford v Board of Governors of Charing Cross Hospital. (Unreported) The Times 8 December 1953 per Denning J. 
"This is a similar finding to Harpwood: Harpwood V. Guidelines in medical practice: the legal issues. Cephalagia 1998 Supp 21: 56-62 at p56. 
27NHSE. Effective Health Care 1995 para 6: 1 "Clinical practice guidelines in a purchasing environment. " NHSE, Leeds. 
28Ibid. 
29See, Martin LF. The Surgeon's Role in Improving Medical Care. American J. Surgery 1997,174: 294-6 and Cook D et al. Determinants in 
Canadian Health Care Workers of the Decision to Withdraw Life Support From the Critically Ill. JAMA 1995; 273,9: 703-708, in particular, 
at p708- 
"For instance, see Roberton's challenge to the government to ensure sufficient funding to treat babies between 500-800 grams: Roberton NRC. 
Should we look after babies less than 800g? Arch. Dis. Childhood 1993; 68: 326-9 at p329. 
"Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Withholding and JI'ithdrawing Life Saving Treatment in Children: a Frameworkfor Practice. 
1997 RCPCH, London. 
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question of the doctors prioritising usage of that resource. A18 
It is unclear when doctors can disregard national guidelines or what sanctions might be applied. 32 Doyal and 
Wilsher advocate using guidelines to exclude the current use of inappropriate and legally unsafe arguments 
to justify withholding treatment although they favour the maintenance of clinical discretion. 33 Several 
consultants reserved the right to ignore guidelines: 
I don't involve patients in resuscitation status, unless they are young patients that I would not 
resuscitate, because it's an unfair burden (on the patient)... there are guidelines on this so I ignore 
them since I don't agree with them. A2 
There are so many exceptions ... if you have rigid, inflexible guidelines... you'd breach them all the 
time... having guidelines oversimplifies the theory - it doesn't allow you to follow your own beliefs. 
D4 
If they say you can't dialyse people over 70 I'll still do it. A10 
What appears to be state-of-the art this year is not so next year... there needs to be recommendations 
with a possibility of case by case consideration. CI 
Guidelines enable decision-makers to believe decisions have been made the `right' way. 34 A danger exists with 
any form of guidance in that it can become dated, or can prevent scientific development. 35 They may lead to 
deteriorating standards of care. 36 Even those who supported them were concerned about their role as evidence 
in malpractice actions: 
I'm writing some national guidelines at the moment... The government's guidance is that if you don't 
adhere to them.. . you can 
be sued. A32 
There should be national guidelines that back decisions not to treat certain conditions... at the 
moment we are under pressure to treat everything which is the only safe thing to do medico-legally. 
C9 
Consequently, doctors call for guidelines to allow `discretionary judgment"' but if too much discretion is 
allowable, guidelines are worthless. 
"See: Payne K et al. Physicians' Attitudes about the Care of Patients in the Persistent Vegetative State: A National Survey. Ann. Intern. Med. 
1996; 125: 104-110, in particular, p109 and Murphy DJ, Finucane TE. New Do-Not-Resuscitate Policies. Arch. Intern. Med. 1993; 153: 1641-8, 
at p1643. 
"Doyal L, Wilsher D. Towards guidelines for withholding and withdrawal of life prolonging treatment in neonatal medicine. Archives of 
Disease in Childhood 1994; 70: F66-F70 at F76 and F68. Like them, this thesis has found evidence of poor quality ethical reasoning by some 
consultants. 
'4Ibid, at pF69. 
'SOne ofthe consultants (a professor with over 35 years experience) related how, because ofthe parents' religious views, he kept a comatose child 
with Reyes Syndrome on life support for much longer than normal. The child began to come out of her coma and is now fully recovered. 
Evidence based, cost-effective healthcare guidelines would probably have prevented him acceding to the parents' wishes and would have cost 
the child her life. See also, Harpwood V. Guidelines in medical practice: the legal issues. Cephalagia 1998; Supp 21: 56-62 at p61. 
36 See, for example, Wickline v State 228 Cal. Rptr at 661. See also, Miller FH. Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in English and 
American Law. American J. Law and Medicine 1992; 18,1-2: 37-71 at pp49-50. 
"Strong C. Defective infants and their impact on families: ethical and legal considerations. Law, Medicine and Health Care 1983; 11,4: 168-181 
at pl7l. 
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7.1.2.2 Improving the decision-making process 
Some guidelines advocate that end-of-life issues should be discussed with patients38 but many doctors invoke 
therapeutic privilege to avoid this. 39 This could be to cover their difficulties in communicating such 
information sensitively or feeling a sense of failure. Conflicts may arise because the physician's goal of 
treatment may have changed whereas the patient's did not'. 4° Veatch proposes patient-physician `buddying' 
with a focus on `deep-value pairing'. 4' Savalescu, in reply, suggests an attractive solution of doctors holding 
rational discussions with patients. 42 However, this presupposes that there is no power imbalance between the 
parties and lacks a solution for when competent patients act `bizarrely'43 or refuse to enter negotiations. 44 The 
current NHS system fails to facilitate spending time discussing patient values and treatment options resulting 
in a form of physician abandonment. Increased consultation time and greater understanding of decision- 
making theory could improve matters. 45 Improving doctors' communication skills is another way to improve 
decision-making since communication problems were perceived as the largest barrier to high-quality decisions: 
Misunderstandings, communication problems: you try and communicate well but we don't always 
succeed. D4 
Some of the problems arise when we haven't actually devoted enough time to discussions and talking 
to other people. B8 
We should learn to talk more clearly... (but)... there are some people who do not understand and do 
not want to understand. A27 
A few consultants identified improved training as necessary: 
Improvement of training (clinicians, psychiatrists, managers)... continuing the progressive 
improvement in attitudes of one to another... Those factors would improve the decision-making 
process but... decisions should be made between the clinicians and the patients, not by some 
centralised body. A4 
We would benefit from more case conferences. A 11 
"For instance, the guidelines relating to resuscitation issued by British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing. RCN & BMAJoint 
Statement on Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation March 1993 BMA, London, updated May 1999: Decisions relating to cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation: A statement from the BMA and RCN in association with the Resuscitation Council (UK). May 1999, 
littp: //web. bma. org. uk/public/ethics. nsf BMA, London. 
39See: Doyal L, Wilsher D. Withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation: proposals for formal guidelines. BMJ 1993; 306: 1593-6, at p1594: 
Padkin A, Robinson R. Letter: DNR policyJ. Roy. Coll. Physic. 1993; 27,3: 335 and Williams R. The `do not resuscitate' decision: guidelines 
for policy in the adult. J. Roy. Coll. Physic. 1993; 27,2: 139-140. 
40Headley J. The DNR Decision - Part II. Ethical Principles and Application. Dimensions in Oncology Nursing 1991; 5,2: 34-7 at p36. 
"Veatch R. Abandoning Informed Consent. Hastings Center Report 1995; 25: 5-12. See also: Veatch RM. Modem Vs. Contemporary Medicine: 
The Patient: Provider Relation in the Twenty-First Century. Kennedy Institute of Ethics J. 1996; 4: 366-370, in particular, p369. 
42Savalescu J. Rationalism and Medical Decision-Making. Bioethics 1997; 11,2: 115-129. 
43 As, for instance, in the case of Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust ex pS [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
44See: Savalescu J, Momeyer R. Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs. J. Medical Ethics 1997; 23: 282-8. 
"See Eraker SA, Politser P. `How decisions are reached: physician and patient'. In Dowie & Elstein, op cit n 12 at pp379-434. Also, Goldstein 
WM, Hogarth RM (Eds) Research on judgment and decision making. 1997 Cambridge Series on Judgment and Decision Making Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
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Improved data may improve decision-making though its presentation and interpretation creates difficulties. 46 
The phenomenon of physician biases affecting this process has been recognised. 47 The General Medical 
Council considers doctors have a responsibility to `self-audit' patient care even thought self-auditing is 
flawed. 48 There were contrasting opinions regarding the value of improved clinical data and clinical audit as 
the basis for improving decision-making: 
Keeping up to date with evidence of trials so that you can have an ever more accurate prediction of 
an individual's outcome based on current research using the current methods of treatment. A7 
Medicine isn't an exact science... a lot of it is just feeling and intuition... there will always be the 
patient who survives against the odds. B3 
Data would be useful to see if our decision-making is correct but I'm not sure we should use the data 
to make decisions. A31 
Although the U. S. A. has statutory exceptions to treatment, 49 similar to those in the guidelines issued by the 
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 5° none of the consultants proposed a statutory process for 
medical-decision-making. Legislation tends to be inflexible. " Currently, only controversial issues are subject 
to government controls. 52 Legislation can lead to costly challenges, alleging inappropriate withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment, and over-treatment hence doctors prefer non-mandatory, non-governmental 
guidelines. " The advantage of legislative examination of medical decision-making is that the views of others 
beside doctors can be sought whereas medical guidelines frequently lack input from `outsiders'. " 
7.1.2.3 Who should be involved? 
Only three of the eighty-five consultants identified greater patient involvement as a way to improve decision- 
making: 
By giving them more information... more responsibility... on the patient, not necessarily to make the 
decision but to have a more informed element on what I'm advising. C5 
We should be making those decisions before (implementing treatment)... you should be saying to the 
patients, if we do this and it goes badly wrong, these are the consequences - what would you want to 
do in that situation? A 17 
"See, for example, Andrews K. Prediction of recovery from post-traumatic vegetative state. Lancet 1998; 351: 1751 and Reich S et al. Clinical 
decision making, risk and occupational therapy. Health and Social Care in the Community 1998; 6,1: 47-54, in particular, p48. 
47Christakis NA, Asch DA. Biases in how physicians choose to withdraw life support. The Lancet 1993; 342: 642-6. 
"Ramsay S. Evidence against `Bristol-case' doctors found proven. The Lancet 1998; 351: 1707. 
49Rehabilitation Act 1973, s504. 
50Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Withholding and Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment in Children: a Frameworkfor Practice. 
1997 RCPCH, London. 
"See: McHaffie and Fowlie in McHaffie HE, Fowlie PW. Life, Death and Decisions: a Reflection on Neonatal Practice. 1996 Hochland and 
Hochland, Cheshire at p50. 
52For instance, see the Abortion Act 1967 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
53See, for example, In the Matter of Babv K, 16F. 3d 590 (4th Cir 1994) and Commentary: Annas G. Asking the courts to set the standard of 
emergency care - the case of Baby K. NEJM 1994; 330: 1542-45. 
"For example, the BMA issued its consultation paper at the start of the universities summer vacation with little publicity and close of consultation 
on 16 October 1998: BMA. Withdrawing and 
Withholding Treatment: a consultation paper from the BMA's Medical Ethics Committee June 
1998 BMA, London. See also, McHaffie and Fowlie, op cit n51 at p19. 
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We don't withdraw from conscious patients without their permission. What always frightens me is 
how much patients want to go on. A21 
Team involvement was seen as useful by most consultants but some identified the difficulty of getting all to 
agree: 
Once you start to involve other folk you get so many decisions to the contrary you can't reach a 
decision. D2 
Things done by committee are never done. A10 
Discussions with relatives are common but a possible bias as to whether involvement by non-medical 
professionals was welcomed was identified. Most consultants rejected involvement by non-medical 
professionals with the strongest objections coming from those at one hospital which possibly had less 
opportunity to work with non-medical professionals: 
Decisions have to be based on a much more personal individual basis with the individual patient - 
I don't get a lot of help from (religious views). B 15 
I don't think lawyers, social scientists and philosophers have any idea about it. D7 
Decisions should be made by the informed, professionally trained clinician and their team and by the 
patient ... 
I don't want lawyers, accountants and administrators involved. D10 
The decision should be clinical but with guidelines drawn up by lawyers and social scientists as 
medical practice must reflect the wishes of the community who in turn will have to face the unpleasant 
decision of how much money they are prepared to pay for the services they demand. DI 
Consultants from another hospital with stronger links with the university found input from non-medical 
professionals useful which possibly indicated that greater interaction with other professions reduces hostility: 
I brought that last decision to a meeting because I wanted people to help discuss it... In hospitals there 
are Ethics Committees that spend hours discussing the ethics ofprojects and we don't spend that time 
very often discussing individual cases. I think that is inappropriate. On the Ethics Committee you 
have a broad selection of intelligent people. A26 
Having the opportunity to have a discussion forum in the unit is often quite useful with either a 
psychologist or someone whose area is just slightly outside... chairing the meeting. A7 
Our Professor of Medical Ethics - he 's a wonderful man... you present a case to him and he discusses 
the issues... The other person I use a lot is our hospital chaplain. A12 
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Procedural guidance may be issued by the courts. 55 It often aims to improve recognition of the patient's 
interests or views. 56 Authoritative guidelines can `avoid the need for unwieldy applications to the 
courts... and... avert a situation whereby the courts encroached upon the medical profession's field of 
competence'. 57 Anxiety over having to justify their actions was shown. 58 Most of the consultants felt that 
decisions should not involve the courts: 
Although the law can provide a measure of protection for the medical profession and in that sense 
can be our allies... it's not the appropriate place to sort out this sort of issue. A15 
The law is all black and white and medicine is all grey. I don't think the law should get 
involved... they should leave it to the parents and the medical profession and trust us. A12 
7.1.3 Discussion 
There was an overwhelming call for more comprehensive guidance regarding resource allocation. The current 
system unfairly treats both doctors and patients by failing to reflect considered societal values (as opposed to 
media-created values). Improvements in scientific data and communication skills were perceived positively. 
However, guidelines and protocols threaten medical prerogative and resistance to inflexible guidance is strong 
because of fears over justifying non-compliance. 59 Some perceived guidelines as hindering ethical decision- 
making. A surprising, and sometimes vehement, distrust of the ability of other professions, and/or the public, 
to assist in the decision-making process in difficult or complex cases was apparent. A similar distrust of their 
fellows was also occasionally evident. This may be due to unfamiliarity with the type of assistance available 
or fear of having to logically (or legally) justify decisions based on 'clinical intuition', `experience' or other 
esoteric concepts. It could be interpreted as a `power complex'. 
None of the consultants suggested encouraging increased use of advance directives to improve decision-making, 
possibly reflecting a desire to retain control or an underlying belief that decisions should be grounded in science 
not patient-preference. This suggests that either clinicians consider advance directives to be of academic 
interest only at present or they fear the legal implications of written documents - informal discussions seeming 
safer - as evidenced by the concern that guidelines should allow `latitude'. 
55For instance: Re MB (Medical Treatment) [ 1997] 2 FLR 426 and Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust ex Parte S[ 1998] 2 FLR 728 
(refusal of medical treatment by competent patients). See also, Practice Note from the Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court on Vegetative State 
[ 1996] 2 FLR 375 and Practice Note from the Official Solicitor on Sterilisation [ 1996] 2 FLR 111. 
"'See, for instance, the advice given in Rv St Georges Healthcare , 'F'HS Trust, exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728, at p759. 
''. -t uckland AHB v Attorney-General 
[1993] 1 NZLR 235 at p241 per Thomas J. 
58The doctor's actions will be judged using the Bolam test: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. The 
`standard textbook' will be treated, like guidelines, as authoritative evidence of the proper practice to be adopted by the professional: Wis: niewski 
v Central Manchester HA [1998] 6 Lloyds Med LR 223 per Thomas J at p258. See also: Hurwitz B. Clinical Guidelines and the Law: 
Diligence, Discretion andJudgment. 1998 Radcliffe Medical Press Ltd., Abingdon, and Hurwitz B. Legal and political considerations of clinical 
practice guidelines. B. t1J 1999; 318: 661-3. 
"Duff R, Campbell AGM. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery. A\ EJ, tf 1973: 289: 890-895. 
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7.2 Recent Proposals from the Medical Profession 
7.2.1 BMA Ethics Committee: Withholding and Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment 
The BMA's guidance, Withholding and Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment, 6° followed its 
consultation exercise in 1998.61 It generated immediate public comment62 and merits detailed examination. 
Numerous doctors apparently oppose it. 63 The most immediate point of concern is the evident desire of the 
medical profession to restore its prerogative over decision-making to the exclusion of other professionals such 
as medical ethicists, judges and lawyers. The role of the `doctor in charge' (the consultant) as being 
responsible, and accountable, for decision-making is repeatedly emphasised. 64 This mirrors Campbell et al's 
argument that doctors `must not debase their role in medical leadership... by passive acquiescence to.. . 
demands' 
although they acknowledge there should be `limits to medical arrogance'. 65 There is no mention of any possible 
place in the decision-making process for medical ethicists who are not practising doctors. Lawyers are 
evidently regarded with strong suspicion hence the determination to exclude judicial scrutinising. The 
guidance fails to justify convincingly why the decision-making process should be so exclusive. It seems to 
advocate a return to the days before Rv Arthur" made it clear that the courts will not allow the medical 
profession unfettered control over life and death. Attempts are even made to blame the judiciary for failing to 
extend their guidance regarding persistent vegetative state to cover other conditions where a decision to 
withdraw artificial nutrition or hydration may be appropriate. 67 The BMA uses this `failure' as justification 
of their stance that Court review should not be needed for any of these cases. It is hard not to come to a 
conclusion that this document was written solely to protect doctors by excluding them from scrutiny particularly 
since it stresses at several points the `anxiety' which decision-making causes doctors. " 
7.2.1.1 The Proposed Shift in Emphasis 
Probably the most contentious section is the BMA's proposed `shift in emphasis'. It states: 
`Debate on this subject has tended to focus on assessing the justification for withdrawing or 
withholding treatment. In the BMA's view the emphasis should shift to considering whether the 
benefits of the treatment justify the intervention. For every proposed or actual medical intervention, 
a judgment should be made about whether that intervention would be worthwhile, in the sense of 
60BMA. Withholding and Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment: Guidance for Decision Making. 23 June, 1999. BMA, London 
(updated October 2000 to take account of the Human Rights Act 1998: www. bmipg. co. uk/withwith/ww. htm accessed 30 October 2000). 
Similarly, the American Medical Association has recently issued guidelines on end of life care. JAMA 1999; 281: 937-941. 
61BMA. Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment: A consultation paper from the BMA's Medical Ethics Committee. 1998 BMA, London. 
Over 2000 responses to the Consultation Paper (Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment) were received, including from the author of this 
thesis. 
62For instance, television and radio news on 23 June, 1999 contained discussion regarding its contents and more than one programme and media 
commentary was dedicated to it: Radio Four, The Moral Maze 23 June, 1999; Murray I. Doctors want final say over patients' 
lives. The Times 
24 June 1999; Hawkes N. Sanctity of life tests mettle of philosophers. The Times 24 June 1999; Hornsnall M. `A doctor decided she should die'. 
The Times 24 June 1999; Boseley S. Doctors to decide on right to die: BMA insists guidelines are not charter for euthanasia. The Guardian 24 
June 1999 and Leslie A. Saturday Essay. Daily Mail, 26 June 1999. 
6'Keown J. Beyond Bland: A critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Legal Studies 2000; 20,1: 66-84. 
at p67. 
64See BMA, op cit n60 at para. 7, p12; para. 11.1 (a); para 13.6, p24; para. 18.2, p45 and Part 5: 21, p68. See also, British Medical Association. 
Consent, Rights and Choices in Health Care for Children and Young People. 2001, BMA, London at p118. 
65Campbell AGM, et al. Treatment Dilemmas in Neonatal Care: Who Should Survive and Who Should Decide? Annals New York Academy 
of Science 1988; 530: 92-103 at p97. 
66R v Arthur (1981) The Times, 6 November 1981. 
67BMA op cit n60, Foreward at p ix. 
68lbid, at pxviii and p57. 
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providing some benefit to the individual patient. '69 
Hidden in these innocuous words is a huge change to the whole way in which medical treatment has been 
provided for centuries. The presumption has always been in favour of giving treatment and hence, reasons not 
to give treatment or to withdraw treatment have been looked for when the patient's condition or prognosis is 
very poor. The BMA now proposes that there should, de facto, be a presumption against giving treatment to 
any patient. Doctors should seek positive reasons why a patient should receive medical treatment. " This point 
is revisited later: `decisions to provide treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, need to be 
justified'. " This change must be challenged at the earliest opportunity. Not least, this is because, later in the 
same paragraph, the BMA makes it clear - despite its cursory recognition that `each patient has his or her own 
values, beliefs, wishes and philosophies' - that `benefit' is to be construed solely as `net health benefit'. 72 
7.2.1.2 The Primary Goal of Medicine 
The BMA holds that the primary goal of medicine is to provide physiological (health) benefit. 73 Therefore, they 
suggest, a duty to provide treatment no longer exists if this is not possible. However, it cannot be for the 
medical profession to dictate the boundaries of their legal duty of care. The BMA focuses on the `level of 
recovery that could reasonably be expected'. 74 Where the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment is 
premised upon a determination of `futility' or `survival prospects' patients need some protection so that there 
is consistency in interpretation of these conditions. The BMA continually emphasises the construing of 
`benefit' as `health benefit' because it suggests this will introduce `greater clarity about the legitimate scope 
and process of decision making by health professionals'. This, the guidance says, will `challenge' the apparent 
difference felt by many concerning withholding as opposed to withdrawing treatment. 75 The BMA fails to 
explain why, as stated in its consultation document, it `can see no ethical difference"' although 
`some 
... 
intuitively feel there is an important distinction'. " The evidence obtained in this thesis suggests that 
most consultants recognise a difference and distinguish between withholding and withdrawing treatment in 
their answers although the questions had been designed not to differentiate. The difference is not just about 
distinguishing acts from omissions nor is it just emotional. The difference goes deeper because benefit is not 
to be construed solely as `health benefit'. 78 Consequently, the interviewee consultants considered different 
factors when deciding whether to withhold or withdraw treatment. However, the BMA suggests that once 
decision-making is firmly back under the control of the medical profession the `doubts' that non-medical 
professionals have raised, in its opinion inappropriately, will be removed. Pretending such differences do not 
exist, or should not exist, does little service to those who are actually making such decisions regularly. This 
over-emphasis on a scientific model of decision-making will only increase the anxiety it seeks to avert since 
the subconscious message given is that doctors who take into account other factors are failing to meet the 
69Ibid, at pp1-2. 
"'Since `life-prolonging' treatment can include almost any medical intervention from antibiotics to vaccinations the change in emphasis places 
everyone at risk if they fail to meet some medical `norm'. 
"BMA op cit n60, para. 13.3 at p23. 
12Ibid, para. 1.1 at p2. 
"Ibid, para. 1.1 at p1. 
74Ibid, para 2.1 at p5. 
75lbid, para. 6.1 at p11. 
"BMA. Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment op cit n61 at para 2.9.1. 
"Ibid, para 1.1 at p1. 
78For discussion on this point in relation to BMA consultation paper see: The Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics. WithdraN%ino and 
Withholding Treatment: A Response to "Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment: A consultation paper from the BMA's Medical Ethics 
Committee" 1998 The Linacre Centre, London. Available on www. Iinacre. org/wwt. html accessed October 1998. 
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standards of their profession 
By contrast, later in the guidance, the BMA, surprisingly, accepts that it may be appropriate to provide even 
`futile' care in the short-term to enable a competent patient `achieve a particular goal or sort out their affairs'. 79 
This is particularly significant since it emphasises the `individual' nature of the decision. The guidance also 
suggests that there are two strands to this decision: what is appropriate for the individual patient and what is 
appropriate once the needs of the rest of society and the limited nature of societal resources have been taken 
into account. 8° Unfortunately, it introduces another, highly variable, condition: whether the 'doctor in charge' 
considers that the patient will be able to achieve the stated goal. " This reintroduces a scientific evaluation 
when it has already been determinative as to whether the patient is a suitable candidate for treatment. 
Scientific data do not recognise the effects of hope and love on people's abilities to meet goals. Only cursory 
recognition is given to the fact that the patient who is refused the opportunity to achieve a life goal may require 
`ongoing support' to help them accept this. 82 The `abandoned' patient is referred to a colleague for palliative 
care or back to his/her GP. 83 The guidance fails to address the issue that inadequate resources means that good 
quality palliative care and/or counselling is not available to all. Doctors `see their dying patients only when 
nursing staff call them to adjust drug treatment'. 84 
7.2.1.3 The Exclusion of the Courts 
The BMA `does not believe' decisions regarding the withholding or withdrawing of treatment from patients 
with Alzheimer's disease or severe stroke should be scrutinised by the courts. 85 By analogy with such cases, 
it suggests that PVS cases should also not require judicial approval. 86 The BMA challenges the authority of 
the courts regarding the declaratory process currently employed. " Only in `rare cases' should legal review be 
necessary. 88 By excluding the courts, the medical profession can dispense with the existing guidance they have 
laid down and, unchecked, alter the `rules'. The BMA seems to do this by suggesting that a diagnosis of PVS 
can be confirmed at six months89 contrary to the opinion of experts such as Keith Andrews and existing judicial 
guidance which requires twelve months to succeed traumatic injury before the diagnosis is fixed. " 
Virtually the only time the BMA accepts that the courts might have a legitimate role to play is regarding 
pregnant women and the refusal of Caesarian sections. 91 Presumably this is because the courts, to date, have 
always supported the medical profession and found ways to enable treatment to proceed. If doctors believe a 
woman has been `overwhelmed'92 by the suddenness of the decision but the court finds her competent to refuse 
"BMA, op cit n60, para. 11.1(a) at p18. 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
"ZIbid, at p19. Also, para. 26.1 at p64, the BMA suggests families may need to be offered counselling. 
83Asai A et al. Medical decisions concerning the end of life: a discussion with Japanese physicians. J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 323-7. 
84Mirando S. Doctors can benefit from spending time with their dying patients. BMJ 1999; 318: 1763-4 at p1763. 
85BMA, op cit n60, para. 3.4 at p8. 
86Ibid, para. 2l. l at p54. 
"Ibid, para 21.1 at p55. 
S"Ibid, para 18.4 at p49. 
R9Ibid, para 21.1 at p54. 
90See: The Permanent Vegetative State: Review by a Working Group Convened by the Royal College of Physicians and Endorsed by the 
Conference of Medical Colleges and their Faculties of the United Kingdom. J. Roy. Coll Physic. 1996; 30: 119 and Practice Note from the Official 
Solicitor to the Supreme Court on Vegetative State [1996] 2 FLR 375. 
9'BMA, op cit n60, para. 13.7 at p24. 
92As in Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097. 
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a Caesarian section, 93 the BMA may then seek to place these decisions within their proposed umbrella of 
decision-making. After all, Re F holds it is for doctors to decide who is competent. 94 The adverse effect this 
would have upon the future of patient autonomy is frightening. 
7.2.1.4 Patient Merits/Quality of Life 
The guidance states that `the doctor's role is not to assess the value or worth of the patient but that of the 
treatment'. 95 Yet this is exactly what doctors do, often unconsciously, as shown in the empirical evidence for 
this thesis. 96 Keown argues that the guidance indicates a preference for quality of life considerations that 
endorses judgments about the worth of the patient. 97 The BMA rejects the concept that life alone is a sufficient 
justification for its prolongation, particularly given that patients compete for resources. The BMA does suggest 
that treatment `may be of benefit' if an individual is `able to interact with others' and/or is `aware of his or her 
own existence and having an ability to take pleasure in the fact of that existence' and/or has the `ability to 
achieve some purposeful or self-directed action or to achieve some goal of importance to him or herself. " The 
preceding consultation document likewise stated that `life (is) a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains 
some potentiality for human relationships'. 99 Yet doctors withdraw life-saving treatment even though the 
relationship potentiality has been realised but the physical potentiality of growing into a healthy child/adult 
has not. Not all such decisions are based on `pain' or 'into lerability'. 10° David Glass seemed `able to interact', 
albeit in a limited manner, yet his doctors considered it `in his best interests' for him to die and the courts 
refused to support his mother's action. 10' Had this guidance been published earlier, would the court have 
interpreted it in his favour? Possibly it might, but if the BMA has its way and excludes independent 
scrutinising of such decisions, the answer will not be known. This case is particularly concerning since it 
seems that the doctors were instructed by the hospital's Chief Executive to give the child diamorphine. 1°2 This 
raises the spectre of hospital managers, possibly with no medical training, suggesting that the time has come 
to withdraw treatment or hasten death with the use of pain-killers as a way to combat bed shortages. Unless 
the doctor is prepared to defend the patient's quality of life to his/her peers, it will be very difficult to oppose. 1°3 
Certainly, the BMA seems anxious to ensure that cases like his and those of people with `advanced dementia 
or very severe stroke' are controlled exclusively by the medical profession. The BMA states it `does not believe 
104 these cases should routinely be subject to Court review'. It fails to mention that the GMC, and the media, 
93As in Rv St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S. [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
94Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
95BMA, op cit n60, para. 1.2 at p3. 
96Doctors have the power to enable patients to `leapfrog' waiting lists for patients they believe should take priority. More conscious ways of 
taking account of patient `merit' have also been proposed: Leonard S. Penalty points scheme rations heart surgery. The Sunday Times 18 July 
1999. 
97Keown J. Beyond Bland: A critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Legal Studies 2000; 20,1: 66-84, 
at pp72-74. 
98BMA, op cit n60, para. 1.2 at p4. 
99BMA, op cit n61 at para 2.9.7. 
1°°See Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384 (the child with spinal muscular atrophy). 
"Horsnell M. Relatives stormed a ward to resuscitate this boy. Doctors say he should be allowed to die. The Times 22 April 1999. Dyer C. 
Mother loses court battle on right to life. The Guardian 23 April 1999. Mrs Glass was one of the participants in the debate regarding the BMA 
guidance on the Moral Maze, op cit n62. 
102Jones T. Mother fails to win `right to life' ruling. The Times 23 April 1999. The Court of Appeal also ruled against her: Rv Portsmouth NHS 
Trust, exparte Glass [ 1999] 2 FLR 905. See also: Dyer C. Mother loses fight over son's treatment. The Guardian 22 July 1999 and 
Gibb F. 
Doctors who wanted to let child die did not act illegally. The Times 22 July 1999. 
103 The only protective measure suggested when competition for resources means that hospital managers begin to suggest that some patients have 
`bed-blocked' long enough is that of the `second medical opinion': BMA, op cit n60, para. 8.1 at p13; para. 17.2 at pp38-9 and para. 22.1(a) 
at pp57-8. 
'°4lbid, para. 3.4 at p8 and para. 21.1 at p54. 
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have criticised some doctors for withdrawing or withholding artificial nutrition from such patients. 1°5 Even 
Williams is concerned at the concept that autonomous patients, who believe their life would continue to be 
worthwhile, could have treatment withheld because a third party judges their future quality of life 
unacceptable. "' The guidance increases anxiety by warning doctors that they could be the first to be 
challenged. 107 
There is a presumption against treating babies and young children: `(treatment) should only proceed where it 
would provide a net benefit to the patient'. 1°8 This rests firmly on a quality of life determination despite the 
avowed rejection of this approach. 1°9 `Standard policies and guidance' have limited effectiveness and the 
profession does not have a good record at policing itself. 1° Stating that treatment should not be withheld 
simply because it might be easier to do this than withdrawing treatment later does not reflect the reality of some 
doctors' current practice. "' Several consider their role is to ensure patients do not survive because they may 
become vegetative. "' Since this is current practice, as the BMA recognises, though it does not approve, how 
will excluding their decisions from the scrutiny of other professionals help ensure that difficult decisions are 
appropriately made and that some patients are not needlessly sacrificed? 
7.2.1.5 Patient Autonomy 
Patient autonomy is given support and it is reassuring to see that the BMA states that patients should not be 
pressured into accepting treatment. 113 Yet, as discussed earlier in this thesis, there is evidence that duress 
occurs particularly regarding Caesarian sections. Some consider it appropriate to `educate' patients whose 
`irrational or bizarre' views prevent them accepting that `doctor knows best'. 1' The guidance is silent 
regarding the fact that doctors will present clinical information in such a way that it is more likely the patient 
will not request active treatment. ' 15 It is also worth noting that patients refusing treatment are still not worthy 
of `full' information about their condition. "' Yet patients who receive full information may then accept 
medical advice. "' However, parents apparently merit `full, clear and accurate information' yet no justification 
for this difference is given. "' This could be a potential source of future challenge by patients like Mrs 
Sidaway. 1' According to the guidance, parents are also entitled, unlike other patients, to information regarding 
the doctor's own success rates regarding the particular treatment or procedure. This is obviously in response 
"5Horsnell M. GP Guilty of letting elderly patient starve. The Times 26 March 1999; Wilson E. GP in mercy killing case escapes being struck 
off. Daily Mail 27 March 1999. 
106Williams A. Health professionals have an ethical duty... J. Med. Ethics 2000; 26: 85-88 at p86. 
"'BMA, op cit n60, para. 21.4 at p56. 
""Ibid. 
1°9Ibid, para. 1.2 at pp2-3. The research for this thesis found that Quality of Life seemed more important to doctors when the patient concerned 
was a child. See also: Rogers L. Having disabled babies will be `sin', says scientist. The Sunday Times 
4 July 1999. 
"'See, for instance, the failure to `police' the heart surgeons effectively at Bristol Royal Infirmary with the result that excessive numbers of babies 
died. Horton R. Commentary: How should doctors respond to the GMC's judgments on Bristol? The Lancet 1998; 351: 1900-1901. Ramsey 
S. Evidence against `Bristol case' doctors found proven. The Lancet 1998; 351: 1707. 
"'BMA, op cit n60, para. 6.2 at ppl 1-12. 
"'It is worth noting that the babies who die as a result of poor obstetric care cost the NHS much 
less in compensation than those that survive with 
major disability. 
"'BMA, op cit n60, para. 9.1 at ppl3-14. 
1ASavalescu J, Momeyer RW. Should informed consent be based on rational beliefs? J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 282-8. 
"'See discussion earlier in this thesis. 
"6BMA, op cit n60, para. 9.3 at p14. 
"'See earlier discussion in this thesis and McCafferty C. Won't consent? Can't consent! 
Refusal of Medical Treatment. Family Law 
1999; 29: 335-336. 
". BMA, op cit n60, Part 3B at p27. 
' 19Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [ 1985] AC 871. 
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to the severe criticism of the doctors involved in the `Bristol babies' case. 12° The advice given regarding 
Advance Directives/Statements seems to accord with accepted ethical and legal opinion. The need to respect 
patient confidentiality is recognised yet, strangely, the BMA considers it appropriate to seek information from 
relatives about the patients `wishes and values', even though the patient has specifically stated that his/her 
condition is not to be discussed with them. 12' This could contravene patient confidentiality rules as well as 
form a future area of challenge under the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The updated guidance also 
recognises a slight possibility that the HRA 1998 could lead to foetal rights such as a right to life, or a right 
not to be discriminated against, overriding maternal autonomy. 122 
7.2.1.6 Incompetent Patients 
Emphasis is made regarding the optimising of conditions for assessment when seeking to discover the 
awareness state of any patient. 123 The guidance says doctors should decide `(what) would be considered 
acceptable to the individual patient if he or she were able to express a view'. 124 This adoption of a substituted 
judgment approach is typical of the muddled reasoning demonstrated by many of the consultants interviewed 
for this thesis. The BMA recognises that many doctors employ the model of `ethical' reasoning which 
questions whether they `would wish to have treatment themselves' in the same situation but does not question 
this practice. 125 
The guidance says that children and incompetent adults should be treated alike12' so `the ethical underpinning 
of paediatric, adult and geriatric medicine are the same'. 127 Yet its statement that `there should be a 
presumption in favour of initiating (treatment)' whenever there is reasonable uncertainty about outcome results 
in different treatment. 12' This is because, as acknowledged a few lines earlier, there is an inadequate evidence 
base concerning treatment of children upon which to rest decisions. 12' The guidance notes that some doctors 
believe that parental consent is all that is needed to withhold life-sustaining treatment from babies. 13° Where 
the parents do not accept the doctor's advice, the BMA suggests bringing in `additional clinical expertise' to 
provide `further medical opinions' and suggests parents `may benefit from the opportunity to speak to other 
parents'. 13' Nowhere in the guidance is it suggested that an ethics specialist, the hospital chaplain or religious 
advisors of the family might usefully be employed. This demonstrates a real hostility to the idea that these 
other professionals might have a useful role to play. In contrast, lawyers should be consulted when parents 
refuse to agree with the healthcare team's advice. 132 This seems extremely heavy-handed and is likely to 
exacerbate the differences of opinion which could have been avoided had the help of other professionals been 
"'Ramsay S. Evidence against `Bristol-case' doctors found proven. The Lancet 1998; 351: 1707. 
"'BMA, op cit n60, para. 18.3 at p47. This could seem to contravene patient confidentiality rules as they currently stand, as well as form a future 
area of challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998, Article 8(1). 
"'BMA. Withholding and Withdrawing Life prolonging Medical Treatment 2"d Edn at para. 19.3 available on 
www. bmipg. co. uk/withwith/ww. htm accessed 30 October 2000. 
123BMA, op cit n60, para. 17.8 at p42. 
'24Ibid, para. 13.5 at p24. In the preceding consultation document, Withdraºving and Withholding Treatment op cit n61, at para. 2.9.2, the BMA 
suggested that one way to decide what benefits a treatment holds is `for an assessment to be made by the clinician placing themselves in the 
patient's position' despite the clear rejection of the `substituted judgment' approach by our higher courts. 
'2SBMA, op cit n60, para. 13.6 at p24. This reflects the findings of this thesis. 
116Ibid, paras. 14.1 & 14.2 at p25. 
Z'Ibid, at p26. 
'Ibid. 
"'Ibid. 
10Ibid, para. 14.2 at p25. 
"'Ibid, para. 15.2 at p30. 
112Ibid, para. 15.2 at p30 and para. 15.3 at pp30-31. 
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utilised. Likewise, the language employed regarding the input of `those close to the patient' is very dogmatic: 
`it is essential that those consulted are absolutely clear that, ultimately, the treatment decision is not their right 
or their responsibility. Rather, the decision will be made by the clinician in charge of the patient's care on the 
basis of what he or she considers will benefit the patient'. "33 
7.2.1.7 The Second Medical Opinion 
In place of the judiciary, the BMA suggests that a Second Medical Opinion agreeing with the `doctor in 
charge' 134, backed up by audit in the case of withdrawal of artificial nutrition/hydration13', would provide 
sufficient protection of patient interests. This would be used where parents reject medical advice. 13' Classing 
this as `independent' raises the same reservations that have been expressed regarding abortion and the use of 
this same restraint. 13' Reality suggests that the decision would be `rubberstamped' since, as this thesis shows, 
doctors who offer a `second medical opinion' as a way to reassure or persuade relatives to accept their views 
ensure that the colleague selected is likely to agree. Even where children are concerned, the BMA believes 
disputes between parents and doctors can mostly be resolved without recourse to the courts by utilisation of the 
second opinion process. 138 Yet, when they feel it is to their advantage, doctors turn to the courts. '39 In Re M, 
the doctors were not willing to simply rely upon parental consent and their own estimation of her best interests, 
as advocated in the guidance which had been issued a few weeks earlier, but wished to have the additional 
security of judicial authority. 14' 
7.2.1.8 Resource Allocation 
In its consultation document, the BMA excluded the issue of resources from the discussion which seemed 
artificial and potentially misleading14' although later, in the same document, it acknowledged that such 
decisions necessitate considering the `effect on the family, staff, the hospital and the community as well as 
resources'. 142 Many of the consultants interviewed suggested that the process was always affected, consciously 
or not, by resource availability and appropriateness of allocation. The finished guidance states that therapeutic 
treatments `are not invariably given.. . 
but are weighed according to a number of factors such as... the resources 
available'. 143 The BMA discusses the withholding/withdrawing of treatment because of cost. 144 The influence 
of the market economy is evident in the acceptance that treatment decisions can be based on costs rather than 
science. 14' The appropriateness of doctors making economic decisions, bearing in mind their closeness to 
individual patients and their apparent tendency to apply poor ethical reasoning and judgmental attitudes at 
times, is questionable. Williams objects to the lack of ethical support given by the BMA for the 
"'Ibid, para. 18.3 at p48. 
134Ibid, para. 8.1 at p13; para. 17.2 at pp38-9 and para. 22.1(a) at pp57-8. 
'35Ibid, para. 22.1(c) at pp58-9. It does not state who should conduct the audit. 
136Ibid, para. 15.2 at p30. 
"'The `rubberstamping' of abortion requests has been blamed by the pro-life lobby for the exponential growth in the number of abortions from 
23,641 in 1968 to 177,275 in 1996 in this country. Respect for Life: www. likeuk. org. 
138BMA, op cit n60, para. 15.1 at p29. 
"'Re A (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
140Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097. 
14 'BMA, op cit n61, para 2.7. 
142Ibid, at para 2.8. 
`BMA, op cit n60, pxvii. 
144Ibid, para. 11.1 (d) at p20. 
'45Ibid. 
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`disqualification of patients who make "inequitable" demands on scarce resources"46 but concludes 'it would 
be a great service to the citizenry of the U. K. ' if the BMA would engage in the resource-allocation debate. '47 
The BMA presumes to challenge the judiciary for holding that `non-treatment decisions... should be based on 
considerations of benefit to the patient and not Cost,. 148 The guidance advocates that the real costs of caring 
for `irreversibly and severely brain-damaged patients' should be recognised. 141 It suggests that `in reality, cost 
factors probably have a disproportionate influence on decision-making for this very vulnerable patient group' . 
150 
This unsupported statement raises some troubling questions. Since most referrals to court for approval of the 
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment are prompted by the medical profession, is the BMA openly admitting 
that doctors allow cost factors to influence their attitudes towards such patients? Certainly, the empirical 
research findings of this thesis suggest this but where is the BMA's justification? Trying to exclude judicial 
scrutiny because the courts fail to consider costs whilst holding that costs are important but `disproportionately' 
influential is evidence of muddled reasoning. Consequently, it is hard to believe that decision-making would 
be improved by allowing the medical profession unscrutinised control. Since justice in resource allocation 
nationally is urgently required society should decide what factors to consider. 
7.2.1.9 The Decision-making process 
The BMA suggests that the starting point for decision-making is clinical evidence15' and favours the use of 
clinical guidelines. "' The guidance states that doctors have an obligation to use `the most reliable and accurate 
data'. 153 However, Roberton worries that the process of interpreting data introduces subjective variables. 'sa 
Bohin fears that improving outcomes data will introduce `a more aggressive policy for the withdrawal of care 
in those babies where a clear indication of severe handicap existed'. 15' Little wonder the medical profession 
is increasingly opposed to openness with regard to the decisions they make. To hide the decision-making 
process from scrutiny by ousting the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be held consistent with the rights newly 
justiciable in British courts under the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, doctors must be required not only 
to continue to accept independent scrutiny and arbitration they need to actively embrace open accountability. 
When they deny someone a life-saving opportunity of treatment, they must be clear that this decision has not 
been made using `blanket' categorisations such as age or disability regardless of whether the decision has been 
made apparently `consensually' with the patient concerned because, as this thesis shows, patients and families 
are manipulated by doctors who have been trained in gaining compliance. In particular, if a decision is made 
that the patient shall not receive, or shall not be offered, treatments such as resuscitation, ventilation, artificial 
hydration/nutrition or chemotherapy the reasons for that decision should be recorded and open for scrutiny. 
If there are several treatment options, this should be carried out for each option. Evidence-based medicine 
requires evidence. Respect for patient autonomy and patient rights requires openness. The factors considered 
should be identified as should the weight given to each factor along with the reason the weighting is as it is. 
This may seem cumbersome to a profession which has 19`h century ideas about the appropriateness of 
'`Williams A. Health professionals have an ethical duty... J. Med. Ethics 2000; 26: 85-88 at p86. 
"'Ibid. 
'48BMA, op cit n60, para. 18.5 at p49. 
149Ibid. 
150Ibid. 
1.. Ibid, para. 17.1 at p38 and para. 17.10 at p43. 
'SZIbid, para. 17.2 at pp38-39. 
153Ibid, para. 18.4 at p48. 
154Roberton NCR: Should we look after babies less than 800g? Arch. Dis. Child. 1993: 68: 326-329 at p328. 
155Bohin S et al. Impact of extremely premature infants on neonatal services. Arch. Dis. Child 1997; 74 F 110-F 113 at F 112-3. 
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independent scrutiny but it is the only way ahead for the 2 1St century. 
Concern regarding legal culpability is evident where it is stressed that doctors withdrawing treatment have a 
responsibility to ensure the patient is not adversely affected by residual drugs, particularly respiratory 
sedation. 15' Doctors following this advice could avoid allegations, like those made in the David Glass case, of 
inappropriately prescribing a respiratory depressant, diamorphine, to a patient with respiratory difficulties. 's' 
The guidance advocates the use of `try-outs' of treatment where the outcome is uncertain. This advice extends 
to stroke patients, who should receive artificial nutrition and hydration where prognosis is unknown. 158 This 
could allay public concerns over `backdoor euthanasia' but, over a year since the guidance was published, little 
seems to have changed. 15' The input of other healthcare professionals is mentioned but it is emphasised that 
the decision is the consultant's. 160 Team agreement is useful in `cases of uncertainty'. '6' Such cases are the 
ones most likely to lead to conflict. Conflict management is held to be the responsibility of hospital managers 
and doctors seem unprepared to accept any responsibility for minimising or handling conflict ethically or 
professionally. '"' Although decision-making should be `transparent and able to withstand close scrutiny"63 a 
danger that decision-making could become `routinised' is recognised. 164 It is possible to see the start of a 
`slippery slope'. 16' Little advice on how to avoid this is provided apart from a non-exhaustive list of factors 
to consider. 16' How to balance these factors is not addressed nor is whether certain factors should have greater 
weight such as, for instance, the views of parents of a minor child. 
7.2.1.10 Burden on Staff 
Finally, the guidance notes the burden that caring for very ill patients places on staff and correctly states that 
employers have responsibilities regarding the well-being of employees. 16' It fails to recognise, however, the 
influence `burn-out' can have on the decision-making process which was evident from the interviews for this 
thesis. If doctors do not recognise all potential sources of influence, their decisions are liable to be flawed, 
often fatally flawed, for the recipients. 
7.2.2 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health: Withholding or Withdrawing Life Saving 
Treatment in Children'68 
The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health adopts the same position as the BMA that withholding and 
116 BMA, op cit n60, para. 17.4 at p40. 
157R v Portsmouth NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905. See also cases like that of Dr David Moor, accused of murder: Jones T. GP 
`murdered elderly patient with injection' The Times 14 April 1999; Wilkinson P. Honesty led to a murder charge. The Times 12 May 1999. 
Horsnell M. Thousands of doctors `reassured by verdict' The Times 12 May 1999. 
'.. BMA, op cit n60, para. 17.7 at p41. 
159Dyer C. Police investigate deaths of terminally ill patients. BMJ 2000; 321: 981. 
"'°BMA, op cit n60, para. 18.2 at p45. 
16'Ibid. 
'62Ibid, para. 18.4 at pp48-49. 
16'Ibid, para. 17.8 at p42. 
164Ibid, para. 25.3 at p63. 
165 See discussion earlier in this thesis and also, van der Heide A et al. Medical end-of-life decisions made for neonates and infants in the 
Netherlands. The Lancet 1997; 350: 251-5 at p252. 
166 BMA, op cit n60, para. 18.1 at pp44-45. See also: Keown J. Beyond Bland: A critique ofthe BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing 
medical treatment. Legal Studies 2000; 20,1: 66-84, at p77. 
167BMA, op cit n60, para. 26.2 at p64. 
'68Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Withholding or Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment in Children: .4 
Framework for Practice. 1997 RCPCH, London. 
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withdrawing treatment are ethically equivalent but acknowledges that `emotionally' they seem different. 16' In 
other respects the guidances are markedly dissimilar. Committed to serving the child's best interests, the 
RCPCH guidance concludes that there are five situations in which the withholding or withdrawing of treatment 
might be appropriate. 1' These are the brain death; vegetative state; `no chance'; `no purpose' and `unbearable' 
situations. "' Guiding principles are teamwork between parents and healthcare professionals, compliance with 
the law and respect for the rights of the child. "' Unlike the BMA guidance, emphasis is placed on enhancing 
`corporate moral responsibility"" through team decision-making rather than individual consultant 
responsibility although later it states that the consultant bears final responsibility. "' Although euthanasia is 
rejected, the guidelines mandate a practice which ensures death will follow withdrawal of artificial 
ventilation. "' It seems quite probable that parents are not told that continuing muscle paralysing agents in a 
child from whom ventilation is to be withdrawn means that death will be certain. Some parents may not realise 
that, in reality, survival is `a lottery' and their child may be able to survive. Similarly, the guidance suggests 
that artificial hydration and nutrition should `rarely be introduced' for a child with rapidly progressing 
cancer. 1' This practice has been much criticised with regard to adult patients. "' 
It is held ethical to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a competent child who refuses it but only providing 
the healthcare team and the parents agree. "' The RCPCH emphases the ethical basis of decision-making by 
seeking `to define best practice"" rather than taking a legalistic approach like the BMA. 18° The RCPCH 
advocates saving lives of `high quality' despite handicap but fails to address who should decide what is `high 
quality'. '8' It is as indefinable as the RCPCH accepts `intolerable' is. 1S2 The RCPCH points out that the legal 
touchstone is intolerability to the child, "' yet, the five situations delineated by the RCPCH do not include this, 
presumably because of fears that intolerability could be based on religious objections. 18' Heart transplants are 
intolerable to many yet the child in Re M was forced to undergo one. 185 There is a lack of coherence in the 
RCPCH stance. Ethically it is hard to justify such an intrusion as a heart transplant on an unwilling patient. 
The legalist stance is adopted by doctors when it suits them and children's views carry little weight. In Child 
B the court accepted the clinical view that further treatment would be too burdensome despite evidence she 
could and would tolerate it. 186 Consequently, only cursory recognition is made of the concept that the views 
of a child-patient can `help adults make more informed decisions'. '$' Doctors are advised to continue treatment 
when they think fit despite `presumption of competence'. `88 
"'Ibid, para 2.1 at p9. 
"'Ibid, para 3.1.3 at pp 19-20. 
"'Ibid, Summary at p7. 
12lbid, para. 2.3.1 at p10. 
"'Ibid, para 3.1.1 at p19. 
"'Ibid, para. 3.3.1 at p22. 
"'Ibid, para 2.4.3 at p14. 
171Ibid, para 3.1.4 at p20. 
"'Horsnell M. Police check hospitals over `backdoor euthanasia'. The Times 6 January 1999. 
"8RCPCH, op cit n168, para. 2.3.2.8 at p12. 
191bid, para 2.4 at p13. 
180See: Keown J. Beyond Bland: A critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Legal Studies 
2000; 20,1: 66-84, at pp81-82. 
"'RUCH, op cit n168, para. 2.7.1 at p17. 
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184For instance, the rejection of blood transfusions by many Jehovah's Witnesses. 
'85Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097. 
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Selectivity in asking colleagues to give second opinions to resolve conflict should be `recognised and guarded 
against' if the dissent is with colleagues. 1S' Presumably the RCPCH considers selectivity is acceptable if dissent 
is with parents since there is silence on this point. Several consultant interviewees for this thesis admitted such 
selectivity. Ethics committees are rejected as `too remote' because they dissociate the decision-making process 
from the medical team19° although the RCPCH admits others consider them `patient-centred' and reflective of 
informed societal views. 19' If introduced, the RCPCH believes ethics committees should be independent ofNHS 
Trusts to prevent financial considerations influencing decisions19' although it recognises that doctors 
themselves consider resource implications. "' The most concrete proposals are for improved training and 
research into children's competence and what levels of disability are `tolerable'. 194 It perpetuates the status quo 
and gives little guidance regarding the sorts of cases where dispute over `best interests' or competence ends 
in the courts. 
7.3 Recent Government Proposals 
7.3.1 Reforming the resource allocation process 
Since the interviews for this thesis were carried out in 1997, changes to the way the NHS allocates resources 
have been implemented or proposed. Will these address the difficulties identified at that time? In 1999, the 
market economy in health was abolished (in theory). 195 Greater lay input via Primary Care Commissions is 
designed to facilitate greater recognition of local needs. However, as recognised with the Oregon Plan, some 
central control needs to be in place hence health targets, treatments and guidelines will be issued via the 
Department of Health, NICE and CHI. There will still be regional inequalities but blame can be deflected from 
government to the public. Identifying what treatments are appropriate for different conditions and which the 
NHS should fund is a long overdue measure. However, NICE lacks the resources to conduct a fully 
comprehensive review. It is becoming clear that the choice of treatments it considers is politically driven not 
scientifically driven. 196 
The government has promised more money, more staff and improved facilities for the NHS. 197 This will 
address some concerns. 19' However, it was clear from the consultants' comments that funding is not always 
the issue, how it is used is. Some devolution of power from central government to local health services is 
planned but health will not be taken out of the political arena. Oakley condemns the `arid and artificial 
division between medical and social models of health' which suggest that the social factors causing babies (and 
1S. lbid, paras 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 at p23. 
190Ibid, para 3.4.4 at p23. 
"'See, for instance, Freeman MDA. `Sterilising the Mentally Handicapped'. In Freeman MDA (Ed) Medicine, Ethics and the Lmv. 1988 Stevens 
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'94Ibid, paras 5.1. and 5.3 at p26. 
195Health Act 1999. 
196 For example, the alteration of stance regarding Relenza: NICE. NICE issues guidance on zanamivir (Relenza) for influenza. 21 November 
2000, www. nice. org. uk. Accessed 5 December2000. Also, the announcement that the provision of infertility treatment will 
be reviewed because 
of regional inequalities: NICE. Response to announcement regarding Infertility 
Guidance. November 2000, w-NNw. nice. org. uk. Accessed 5 
December 2000. 
"'Department of Health. The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform. (Cm 4818-1) The Stationery Office, London. Available on 
www. nhs. uk/nhsplan accessed 7 August 2000. 
"'Dobson R. NHS still rattling tins for funds. BMJ2000; 321: 982. This discusses the forthcoming report from Charities Aid Foundation, 
Philanthropic Funds in London's Health Care (December 2000) www. cafonline. org. 
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presumably, older patients) to die can be considered as beyond government remit or too expensive to address 
and so investment in medical technology is easier. 19' The increased funding of the NHS will fail to produce 
equity of outcome if investment fails to address social factors as well. The pooling of resources between health 
and social services is returning to a model similar to that which existed in the 1970's but will do little to 
investigate or address social influences on health. The pooling of resources is merely designed to prevent 
patients `falling in the cracks between the two services'. 20' The NHS Plan promises that by 2004 `widespread 
bedblocking' will have ended. 20' However, unless there is sufficient funding, sufficient support for people in 
their homes or sufficient acceptable quality residential places, beds will still be occupied inappropriately and 
treatment will be withheld from other patients. 
Waiting times are currently denying many patients appropriate and timely treatment. They are used `to balance 
supply and demand'. 202 The NHS Plan places emphasis upon early diagnosis through initiatives to ensure 
speedy access to GPs or alternative sources of advice such as NHS Direct, pharmacies and clinics. 203 However, 
access to consultants or `specialist GPs' will still be via the GP `gatekeeper'. 204 By 2005, the wait for inpatient 
treatment will be cut from eighteen months to six. 205 The problem will still remain as to how to ensure that 
patients are not treated, at the expense of non-treatment for others who would benefit more, simply because 
they have reached the maximum waiting time. The politics of healthcare means that the scientific model of 
treating the most treatable and the medical model of treating the neediest are displaced in favour of reducing 
waiting lists. 
Measures to address inequality in health and access to services are planned. 20' The difference between equity 
in outcome and equity in access is not recognised. 207 This means that a tension between the two will continue 
with the result that treatment could be withheld from some patients thereby resulting in lower quality of life 
simply because others will gain access before them. One important improvement, which will improve the 
ability of patients to make autonomous choices, is the introduction of a free, nationally available translation 
and interpretation service by 2003.208 The slow introduction of this service is regrettable. It is unclear whether 
it will be available to children to access privately so they do not have to rely upon their parents or carers to act 
as an intermediary between the doctor and themselves. Advocates of children's rights to make autonomous 
choices and to be involved in their medical care will be keen to see it made freely available. 
Improving outcomes20. and tackling regional inequality in the availability of newly licensed drugs for cancer 
patients are major targets. 21° However, there seems to be greater emphasis upon female cancers at the expense 
of tackling inequality with regard to research, diagnosis and treatment for male cancers. "" The emphasis upon 
doubling the number of adult cancer patients entering drug trials is concerning. 212 Whilst this will make the 
"'Oakley A. Essays on Women, Medicine and Health 
"Department of Health, op cit n195, Summary. 
201Ibid, Chapter 12, para 12.9. 
20'`Ibid, Chapter 12, para 12.14. 
"'Ibid, Chapter 12 paras 12.1-12.7. 
2041bid, Chapter 12, para 12.7. 
10`lbid, Chapter 12, para 12.20. 
206 Ibid, Chapter 13. 
207Ibid, Chapter 13, para 1.313. 
2081bid, Chapter 13, para 13.14. 
209Ibid, Chapter 14, pars 14.3. 
210 lbid, Chapter 14 para 14.11. 
2"Ibid, Chapter 14, paras 14.5 and 14.6. 
2121bid, Chapter 14, para 14.7. 
1993 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh at p122. 
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new (third) generation oncology drugs available to more people than is currently the case, it means that many 
patients will continue to receive the less effective (first generation) drugs because they are in the control group. 
Patients will not know which drug they are receiving. This is exploiting the vulnerable who may feel 
pressurised into being `guinea pigs'. Several consultants expressed concern over gambling with patients' lives. 
This `solution' will exacerbate the problem. Instead, funding should be directed towards making freely 
available the many, already proven, second-generation oncology drugs that are currently black-listed. 
With regard to heart disease, waiting times will be reduced which will address some of the problems. However, 
some measures need to be treated cautiously. Training ambulance personnel to deliver thrombolytic drugs to 
`heart attack' patients213 could lead to inappropriate, and potentially fatal, treatment being given. If the patient 
is suffering from a cerebro-vascular attack, such drugs exacerbate the bleed. Cynically, the `trade-off of 
improved recovery for some against early death for others might be politically acceptable as a way to reduce 
NHS costs as long as the public does not realise. 
Failings in mental health service provision will be tackled with more staff. Early intervention for young people 
with mental illness will be improved but compliance with treatment is likely to be poor if it will continue to 
be delivered through the presently adult-centred system. Mentally ill offenders will receive better access to 
treatment214 but there is no mention of improving access to treatment for those with learning disabilities who 
also have mental health problems. There is no mention at all about improving the availability of the new 
generation psychiatric drugs. This means that many patients will continue to suffer unpleasant side-effects 
which impinge upon their willingness to comply with treatment. The financial costs involved for society mean 
that its most vulnerable members will continue to carry physical, social and emotional costs for the benefit of 
others. There is more emphasis on control than cure and very little caring. 
Whilst the NHS Plan seemed to place `service-user preferences' at the heart of its consultation process, only 
the elderly receive clear identification of their needs and wishes. 21' Ageism will not be tolerated particularly 
in regard to non-resuscitation. "' However, there is scope for ageist non-treatment protocols to be developed 
as long as age is not the sole criterion. 2 ' There is no mention of the new Alzheimer's drugs so it seems likely 
that provision of these will continue to be sporadic and unequal. Much of the Plan focuses upon keeping 
patients out of hospital through greater support in the community218 rather than enhancing access to treatment 
for the disabling conditions of old age such as cataracts and hip degeneration. Consequently, the Plan itself 
seems `ageist'. 
Z"Ibid, Chapter 14, para 14.21. 
2"Ibid, Chapter 14, para 14.36. 
""bid, Chapter 15, para 15.3. 
2161bid, Chapter 15, para 15.6. 
217 Ibid. 
21SIbid, Chapter 15, passim. 
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7.3.2 Reforming the Individual Patient Decision-making Process 
Based on earlier proposals from the Law Commission21. and the House of Lords, 22° Who Decidesset out to 
gauge whether legal, medical and lay opinion remained the same. 222 Acknowledgment was made in Who 
Decides? of increased healthcare expenditure due to demographic and technological changes. 223 In October 
1999, Making Decisions was published. 224 It fails to address several significant concerns raised in Who 
Decides? The legislation proposed in Making Decisions is subject to the availability of parliamentary time. 225 
There now seems little enthusiasm to legislate rapidly, although similar legislation, the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000, will soon be in force. 22' The proposals say that children over sixteen years should be 
treated as adults. 22' Legislation regarding independent supervision of medical and research procedures or 
public law protection for people at risk will not be forthcoming. 228 Legalising euthanasia is expressly rejected. 229 
The key principles when deciding for a person without capacity are, according to the government, capacity, 
best interests and a general authority to act reasonably. 23° The reform proposals extend to creating new powers 
of attorney for healthcare decisions; new powers for the courts, a new Court of Protection and ways to recover 
expenditure made on behalf of the incompetent person. The strong presumption in favour of saving healthy 
lives, albeit without using force, that was evident in Who Decides? has gone. 231 Making Decisions concentrates 
on those who probably will not recover capacity and could be seen as an unwelcome burden both on their 
families and the state. 
7.3.2.1 Measures to support patient choice 
Who Decides? emphasised `doctor/patient dialogue'. 232 This could resolve fears that some patients are 
pressurised by relatives into refusing treatment. 233 The `fair innings' argument suggests that the old are under 
a duty to die. Presumably, the Code of Practice that will accompany legislation will address this. 234 In general, 
Making Decisions fails to support patient autonomy as extensively as expected. The government recognises 
that the common law permits advance refusals of treatment235 hence it concludes legislation regarding advance 
directives is unnecessary to protect patient rights. 236 Who Decides? questioned whether previous proposals that 
doctors should incur no liability for failing to comply with advance refusals of treatment struck an `appropriate 
balance' between doctors and patients. 23' Bernat believes that there may be cases where advance refusals 
2"Law Commission. Mental Incapacity. (Consultation Paper 231) 1995 HMSO, London. Law Commission. Mentally Incapacitated Adults 
and Decision-Making. An Overview (Consultation Paper No 119) 1991 HMSO, London and Law Commission. Mentally IncapacitatedAdults 
and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction; Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: Medical Treatment and Research; Mentally 
Incapacitated and Other Vulnerable Adults: Public Law Protection. (Consultation papers No 128,129,130) 1993 HMSO, London. 
22°House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics Report 1993-4 HL21-I HMSO, London. 
22 'Lord Chancellor's Department. Who Decides? Making Decisions onBehalfofMentallyIncapacitated Adults. (Cm 3803) December 1997 
The Stationery Office, London. 
2221bid, paras 1.5 and 2.19 - 2.24. 
223 Who Decides? op cit, n221, paras 2.2 and 2.3. 
224Lord Chancellor's Department. Making Decisions (Cm 4465) October 1999The Stationery Office, London. 
225Ibid, para 7 at p2. 
226Royal Assent was received 9 May 2000. Implementation of the Act begins April 2001. 
227This mirrors the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 sl(6). 
22 Making Decisions op cit, n224, para 12 at p3. 
229Ibid, para 18 at p4. 
2301bid, para 8 at p2. 
Z"Ibid, paras 4.34 and 4.37. 
232 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 4.18. 
23 Ibid, para 4.23. 
234Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 22 at p5. 
235Ibid, paras 16 - 20 at p4. 
23'Ibid, para 20 at pp3-4. 
2-3711 'ho Decides? op cit n221, para 4.30. 
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should not survive supervening incapacity because the incompetent patient's life is painfree and apparently 
happy therefore experiential interests should over-ride the critical interests embodied in self-determination. 238 
Similarly, Degrazia argues that the person who exists after the loss of capacity is a different person from the 
one before therefore decisions made prior to incapacity are not binding. 239 Arguments like this encourage 
doctors to ignore advance directives. There is no mention in Making Decisions of the decision in St 
George 's240, although Who Decides? treated pregnant women differently from other patients by suggesting that 
advance refusals of treatment should only be respected if the risk of death and acknowledgement of pregnancy 
are made. 241 It seems more appropriate for the elected representatives of the public to decide whether prior 
refusals will always be binding rather than doctors. 
7.3.2.2 Incapacity and Best Interests 
Making Decisions advocates a presumption in favour of capacity242 and rejects the concept that capacity 
depends on rationality. 243 A statutory defmition of incapacity is proposed based on the functional ability of the 
decision-maker. 244 Patients who are unable to communicate decisions will be deemed incapable. 24' This leaves 
patients with impaired communication abilities vulnerable to the vagaries of doctors and the resource-strapped 
NHS since the government has merely `noted' the Law Commission's emphasis on taking `all practicable steps' 
to enable patients to communicate their decisions. 246 It is unlikely mechanical communication aids will be 
available to many although the Scottish Act contains a proviso that no one should be deemed incapable because 
of a remediable inability to communicate. 24' The determination of incapacity in the Scottish Act is similar to 
that proposed in Making Decisions. Hence the form English legislation would adopt could be that `incapable 
means incapable of (a) acting; or (b) making decisions; or (c) communicating decisions; or (d) understanding 
decisions; or (e) retaining the memory of decisions... '. 248 The consultation paper on Mental Health legislation 
examined the concept of `best interests' briefly. The Scoping Committee identified a choice regarding what 
constitutes a patient's `best interests' between a model prioritising `the professional opinion of the clinical 
team' and one prioritising `the presumed wishes of the patient as far as they are ascertainable'. 24' The 
government prefers the former which is contrary to the strong emphasis placed upon patient rights by many 
ethicists. 250 
The `best interests' approach is preferred to substituted judgment. 25' As the point is not discussed, it seems that 
the `best interests' approach will be used with vegetative patients although Who Decides? queried whether this 
... Bernat E. The living will: does an advance refusal of treatment made with capacity always survive any supervening incapacity? Medical Law 
International 1999; 4: 1-21 at p9. 
... Degrazia D. Advance Directives, Dementia and the `Someone Else Problem'. Bioethics 1999; 13,5: 373-391. 
24"R v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust, ex parte S. [1998] 2 FLR 728. 
"'Who Decides? op cit n221, paras 4.26-4.29. 
242Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.1 at p7. 
24; Ibid, para 1.9 at p8. 
114Ibid, para 1.6 at p8. 
245Ibid. 
2461bid, paras 1.7 and 1.8 at p8. 
'"The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 sl(6). 
2481bid. 
24'Department of Health and Welsh Office Expert Committee (Richardson G, Chair). Review of the Mental Health Act 1983: Draft Proposals 
for the New Mental Health Act. April 1999 Department of Health and Welsh Office, London at para 174. 
250Secretary of State for Health. Reform ofthe Mental Health Act 1983: Proposals for Consultation. (Cm 4480) November 1999, The Stationery 
Office, London. 
25'Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.10 at p8. 
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criteria should be set aside in such cases. 252 Statutory guidance is proposed which adds to the Law 
Commission's list of factors253 the additional factors of whether the person is likely to recover capacity in the 
foreseeable future and checking whether prior expressed wishes were the product of duress. 254 Who Decides? 
favoured `informal' decision-making whenever possible subject to the `reasonableness' threshold. ''" 
Legislation will introduce a `general authority to act reasonably'256 subject to certain restrictions. 257 Actions 
will not attract civil liability providing they are reasonably believed to be in the person's best interests . 
211 Who 
Decides? suggested that the `general authority' should not include a right to coerce or confine incompetent 
adults. 259 It also upheld patient civil liberties because threats of `going to the courts' were to be outlawed but 
Making Decisions is silent on this point. 260 The Scottish Act does restrict the use of force and detention. 26' No 
guidance is given regarding testing `reasonableness'. It seems as if negligence actions could lie against doctors 
who fail to consult as per accepted guidance. 262 There is no provision for a statutory list of nearest relatives 
who should be consulted such as that found in mental health legislation. 263 
The Scottish Act provides for doctors to certify that a patient lacks capacity. 264 The certificate can last for a 
year and is renewable. 265 It confers authority for the doctor in charge to do `what is reasonable in the 
circumstances.. . to safeguard or promote the physical or mental health of the patient. 
266 Making Decisions is 
likely to be similar. The form of treatment offered remains a clinical matter. 26' It is probable that there will 
be restrictions to prevent abuse of clinical power. 268 Who Decides? proposed a new offence of ill-treating or 
wilfully neglecting a person. 269 This appears in the Scottish Act. 27° Making Decisions states that the 
government was not persuaded that a new offence would tackle abuse. 2 ' Introducing a new offence could 
dilute the checks currently imposed by the criminal law. Dr Arthur was charged with attempted murder. 2'2 
Doctors in future could face a lesser charge of wilful neglect with lesser sanctions attached. 2'3 
7.3.2.3 Proxy decision-makers 
Making Decisions proposes introducing a Continuing Power of Attorney system to enable proxy decision- 
making. 274 Who Decides? suggests that children of sixteen years and above are to be treated as adults. 275 The 
252 Who Decides? op cit n221, pars 5.30. 
151Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.11 at p9. 
2541bid, pars 1.12 at p9. 
... Who Decides? op cit n221, paras 3.26-3.28. 
256Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.16 at p10. 
257Ibid, pars 1.23 at pp 10-11. For example, giving consent to marriage is excluded. 
2581bid, para 1.17 at p 10. 
259 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 3.41. 
2601bid, para 3.24. 
26'Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s47(7). 
262A point considered in Who Decides? op cit n221, para 3.24. 
263See: the Mental Health Act 1983 s26. 
264Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s47. 
265Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s47 ss5-6. 
266Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s47(2). 
267 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 2.5. 
268As in Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s47(8)-(10), and ss48-50. 
269 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 3.48. 
270Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s83. 
27 'Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.37 at p12. 
272R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1. 
27The maximum sentence under the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s83 will be two years imprisonment. 
274Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 2.4 at p14. 
275 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 1.14. 
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Scottish Act adopts this proposal. 27' Yet Making Decisions proposes that only those over eighteen years will 
be able to appoint an attorney. 2' This leaves the estranged or parentless child unable to select his, her own 
proxy even in the event of foreseeable incapacity. As with the Scottish Act, the form for making a CPA will 
be prescribed and will be more arduous than standard will-making. 27' Unless the procedure is well-publicised, 
patients may not realise that they need to be certified competent at the time of creation. The power must be 
registered before use. 27' It will be important to avoid excessive administrative delay, particularly where court- 
appointed managers will be needed. 28° Decisions by the attorney will be treated as if made by the adult. 281 
Making Decisions does not answer the concern raised in Who Decides? that attorneys could veto treatment 
doctors believed appropriate but could not prevent the withholding treatment of treatment. 282 Presumably, 
conflicts would fall to the Court of Protection to resolve283 even though the Law Society believes it is unsuitable 
in its present from. 284 With any advance decision-making, continuing powers of attorney, or appointment of 
proxy a risk exists that the patient's views may have changed. Most proxy decision-makers have less 
understanding of ethical and medical issues than doctors or courts. The courts will be able to revoke a CPA 
if the attorney is unsuitable or is not acting in the patient's best interests. 28' The conservative approach taken 
by the government possibly reflects a view that respect for autonomy requires respect for the human being 
rather than mere respect for a past statement of choice. 286 
In Who Decides? the government questioned how realistic it is to expect proxy decision-makers to place the 
patient's interests before their own or those of others they are close to. 287 This question is unanswered but there 
will be a general authority to `act reasonably'. 288 The burden on others may be a reasonable consideration. 
Religious or cultural factors28. will be `factors the person would consider'. 29o 
7.3.2.4 The Role of the Courts 
Who Decides? questioned the role and powers of the courts. 29' It suggested that certain treatment decisions 
should continue to be subjected to independent scrutiny. 292 The use of `second medical opinion' was suggested 
as a way to make treatment decisions, possibly even for withdrawing artificial nutrition from vegetative patients 
despite the opportunity for misuse. 293 Making Decisions proposes that `certain serious healthcare decisions' 
will remain matters for the courts. 294 The Scottish Act simply provides for Ministers to exclude certain 
295 treatments from the authority to treat. It seems that judicial scrutiny of medical decisions will be the 
. '. Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s1(6). 
Z" Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 2.4 at p14. 
278Ibid, para 2.10 at p15. 
279Ibid, paras 2.14-2.15 at p16. 
28. Provision will be made for emergency situations: Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 2.20 at p17. 
28'Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 2.25 at p 17. 
282 Who Decides? op cit n221, paras 5.6 and 5.7. 
283 Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 3.4 at p 19. 
284The Law Society. Response to `Who Decides? ' www. lawsociety. org. uk/dcs accessed 6 March 1999. 
285Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 2.22 at p17. 
286For this argument, I acknowledge my indebtedness to Luke Gormally: Gormally L. Legislating for Advance Refusals of Treatment: What 
is at issue? 1998 Linacre Centre, London www. linacre. org/advdirec. html. 
287 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 3.24. 
288Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.15 at p9. 
289 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 3.24. 
290Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 1.11 at p9. 
291 Who Decides? op cit n221, paras 7.1- 7.16. 
292Ibid, paras 5.1 - 5.34. 
293 bid, paras 5.16 - 5.22,5.27 and 5.28. 
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exception rather than a necessary rule in order to protect the most vulnerable members of society from 
invasions such as sterilisation by hysterectomy which is not specifically mentioned in Making Decisions. 
Having noted the tension between the preventing of incompetent adults from donating blood on ethical grounds 
and the sanctioning of bone marrow donation from such adults by the courts296 the government's failure to 
demonstrate strongly that the vulnerable should be protected from undue interference suggests that it believes 
all individuals should contribute to the welfare of society in a positive way and certainly should not 
unnecessarily burden it. 29' 
Who Decides? rejected the concept of an administrative tribunal to deal with healthcare matters despite the 
attractiveness of its informality because the courts already have the necessary resources and expertise 2" and 
because, sometimes, issues other than medical treatment may require consideration. 299 A new Court of 
Protection will handle these issues. 300 To many, the involvement of the courts carries stigma and, although the 
Court of Protection already uses an `informal and inquisitorial approach', 301 it does not currently make 
healthcare decisions so the objection that a new forum would have to develop expertise in these matters applies 
just as strongly. 302 Further, the proposal to separate decision-making for children under sixteen from those over 
sixteen and adults will dilute present judicial expertise. 303 The narrow selection of judges who have this 
expertise would be made even narrower if they were divided between adult courts and children's courts. It is 
also worth noting that the ages of the children involved in Re M304 and Re E305 were stressed in the judgments. 
It is regrettable that other alternatives to the courts were not considered such as hospital ethics committees, or 
`prognosis boards' which are sometimes used in the U. S. A. to allow non-compulsory, impartial discussion of 
different issues in individual cases. 30' Relatives can participate in these and a casuistic approach is taken with 
the physician and family representative(s) examining the clinical evidence and determine whether, or how 
aggressively, treatment should continue. 30' Several authors consider them beneficial. 3 ' However, care is 
needed to ensure illegitimate issues are not considered when reviewing individual cases. For instance, 
Thornton and Lilford consider that `particular beneficiaries' of these committees are the `third parties who may 
be affected by a patient's decision'. 309 They suggest that it may be appropriate to act paternalistically since 
some `patients may be pleased in the long run if the committee's experience stops them harming themselves 
or others'. 31° In contrast, Campbell and McHaffie favour `multidisciplinary' groups over ethics committees 
since they can provide `ethical comfort and.. . 
legal protection' and, as good multidisciplinary practice develops, 
the need for formal fora would diminish. "' This is grounded in the `responsible body of medical opinion' 
approach. Such groups can help develop good practice but it seems they may be as short-lived as some of the 
296Who Decides? op cit n221, para 5.13. 
2"See also, Who Decides? op cit n221, paras 5.31 - 5.34. 
29. lbid, para 9.4. 
2991bid, para 9.5. 
"Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 3.4 at p 19. 
301 Who Decides? op cit n221, para 9.4. 
302A point which is weakly acknowledged in para 9.17. 
303Making Decisions, op cit n224, para 4.13 at p30. 
304Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [ 1999] 2 FLR 1097 (15 and a half years old). 
'°5Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 (15 years, 9 months). 
30`Barnett TJ. Are there employment risks to ethical decisions? Nursing Forum 1993; 28,1: 17-21. 
307Ibid, at p 17. 
308Moss AH et al. Variation in the Attitudes of Dialysis Unit Medical Directors Towards Decisions To Withhold and Withdraw Dialysis. 
J. Am. Soc. Nephrology 1993; 4: 229-234. Also; Rosner F. Hospital medical ethics committees: a review of their development. JAM4 
1985; 253: 2693-7. 
"'Thornton JG, Lilford RJ. Clinical ethics committees. BMJ 1995; 311: 667-9. 
3"Ibid, at p669. 
"'Campbell AGM, McHaffie HE. Prolonging life and allowing death: infants. J. Med. Ethics 1995; 21: 339-344 at p342. 
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patients for whom they make decisions. 
3"' 
7.3.2.5 The usefulness of the proposals 
Overall, whilst government intervention has been viewed as long overdue by the courts, there is a danger that 
new legislation may lack cohesiveness with a plethora of decision-makers supplementing and replacing existing 
ones and variability of decision-making criteria depending on the patient. The government's proposed 
legislation shows increasing support for autonomy as a guiding principle in healthcare decision-making. 
However, issues such as openness on the part of doctors are not addressed. Only if doctors are prepared to 
truthfully disclose treatment options and outcomes can the attorney or the court make the best decision for the 
patient. The popularity of `futility' arguments has increased with the rise in cost constraints. 313 Pressure upon 
beds and other resources means `futility' may be mis-used when advising attorneys. Making Decisions fails 
to address the issue of resource constraints and how to allocate scarce resources in a way that balances 
individual interests against societal interests. 
7.4 Recent Ideas from the Legal Profession and Others 
7.4.1 Addressing Issues of Distributive Justice 
In 1996, Dworkin suggested the `prudent insurance principle' as a method to answer the joint questions, how 
much to spend and what healthcare to buy. 314 He has now developed this in more detail. 31' Dworkin argues 
that current expenditure is based on the belief that health differs from other `goods' so equality of access is 
essential. 316 Secondly, the `rescue principle' is constantly evoked so that whatever can be done to avoid death 
is held to be necessary care. 3 ' Dworkin suggests that `no sane society"" would allocate resources to cases like 
ex parte B. 319 However, he accepts that the rescue principle is useful in holding that if rationing is necessary 
it should be carried out on the grounds of need not money. 32° Dworkin rejects the idea that greater efficiency 
avoids rationing because the efficiency model disguises rationing by eliminating `low yield' treatments. 32' 
Dworkin argues that the key is to imagine a world where wealth is evenly distributed, all possible information 
about treatments is available to the public not just doctors, and no one knows `how likely any particular person 
is to contract a particular disease or suffer any... accident'. 322 In this world, even if money was freely available 
to all, Dworkin believes that few would buy health insurance that offered life-saving treatment if they fell into 
a persistent vegetative state. 323 Dworkin believes that whatever his `transformed community' decides to allocate 
to healthcare is non-criticisable since the amount will be `morally appropriate'324 and however the healthcare 
i2Larcher VF, et al. Paediatrics at the cutting edge: do we need clinical ethics committees? J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 245-9. 
"'Carnevale FA. The Utility of Futility: The Construction of Bioethical Problems. Nursing Ethics 1998; 5,6: 509-515 at p512. 
114 Smith R. Being creative about rationing. BMJ 1996; 312: 391-2. 
, "Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 2000 Harvard University Press, London. See, in particular, chapter 
8 `Justice and the High Cost of Health' at pp307-319. 
316Ibid, at p309. 
3"Ibid. 
""Ibid. 
39R v Cambridge District HA, exparte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. Dworkin's reference to the Child B case was reported in Smith R. Being creative 
about rationing. BMJ 1996; 312: 391-2 at p312 but does not specifically appear in Sovereign Virtue. 
320Dworkin, op cit n315, at p3 10. 
32'Ibid, at p308. 
3221bid, at p312. 
323Ibid, at p313. 
324Ibid, at p312. 
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is distributed will be `just for that society'. 325 There would be three levels of provision: care that almost 
everyone agreed was necessary; care that almost everyone agreed was unnecessary and care where people chose 
differently. Dworkin argues that the state could fund the first level but not the second and people could take 
out private insurance for the third level if wished. His `prudent insurance test' asks what cover individuals 
would pay for, then `insists' that, as a nation, `aggregate expenditure' should meet this level so that all have 
that level of cover. 326 Dworkin suggests that the guidelines developed by NHS doctors are based partially on 
the concept of prudent insurance. 32' The `what would I want for my mother, my sister... ' style of reasoning may 
reflect this. 328 However, Dworkin has not addressed how to get the agreement on the first two levels other than 
by consulting the public. 329 One criterion is that there is full knowledge (about effectiveness of treatments) yet 
another criterion is that there is no knowledge (about gender, cultural or societal predispositions to disease). 330 
Yet the former level of knowledge necessitates having the knowledge he denies anyone should have. Gender, 
societal and cultural qualities have implications for disease prognosis and management. This model does not 
address the social problems that would arise if many people felt they needed the third level of care but could 
not afford it. If such division of funding meant that state-run hospitals only provided state-funded treatments 
and private hospitals were the only place for the privately-insured treatments, medical expertise may end up 
concentrated in the private sector with state-funded treatments becoming the new `Cinderella' services . 
33 , 
Finally, Dworkin's model pays inadequate regard to whether there is an ethical requirement to treat, or not to 
treat, certain conditions or whether certain treatments are less ethically acceptable than others. 
7.4.2 Improving the Individual Patient Decision-making Process 
Jonsen has described a casuistic model of decision-making. 332 Some judges also have recently adopted this 
approach to decision-making. For instance, the Churchillian list employed in Re A has casuist origins. 333 In 
the conjoined twins case, Walker LJ said, `The term `casuistry' has come to have bad connotations but the truth 
is that in law as in ethics it is often necessary to consider the facts of the particular case, including relevant 
intentions, in order to form a sound judgment. '334 Beauchamp and Childress suggest its disrepute rivalled that 
of astrology. 335 In medical decision-making it is increasingly necessary to ascertain the facts of particular cases 
and ascertain why people appear to be making certain decisions. Under the scientific model of decision- 
making, facts are more relevant than experience and intuition. The doctor's motive or intention is as relevant 
as the patient's or the family's. Certain intentions are clearly wrong, sometimes unlawful, but in other cases, 
only when there has been openness on the part of those involved with making the decision can its soundness 
be confirmed. Nelkon rightly notes that `(r)elying upon the parties to bring forward their evidence sets severe 
limits to the nature of legal enquiries'. 336 This is why it was such an important advance for the Court of Appeal 
in the conjoined twins case to seek independent medical advice. As McHale points out, the use of the amicus 
32'Ibid, at p313. 
726Ibid, at p317. 
327Ibid, at pp317-318. 
328See discussion in earlier chapters of this thesis. 
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32Jonsen AR, Siegler M, Winslade WJ. Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine. 4`h Edn. 1998 
McGraw Hill, New York. 
"'Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
"'Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1 at pl 17F. 
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curiae brief is still not as extensive as it could be. 337 Many patients and families are denied independent advice 
even if their case is subjected to judicial scrutiny. 
The empirical evidence obtained for this thesis found that doctors did not utilise the Beauchamp and Childress 
four principles (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice) when making decisions. 338 Although it 
could be argued that they were wrong not to do so, attempts to improve decision-making must acknowledge 
this fact. Jonsen et al's model is designed to give clinicians `a straightforward way to sort out the facts and 
values of the case at hand into an orderly pattern that will facilitate the discussion and resolution of the ethical 
problem'. 339 Whilst recognising the value of the principled approach to decision-making, Jonsen et al point 
out that often there is a `wide range of medical facts, a multitude of circumstances, and a variety of values'. 340 
These may remain hidden and the decision-making process distorted unless a policy of openness is adopted. 
The analysis involves four topics: medical indications; patient preferences; quality of life and contextual 
features. 34' Medical indications include identifying the patient's medical problem, past history, diagnosis, 
whether the problem is acute or chronic, emergent or reversible, what the goals of treatment are, what the 
prognosis is, what can be done if therapy fails, how the patient can be benefited by treatment and how harm 
can be avoided. 342 Different treatment options should be identified not simply the ones that are available to the 
doctor or the ones the doctor is prepared to offer the patient. 343 This does not mean patients should be confused 
with a variety of choices but it means the doctor can offer the most appropriate choice(s) when patient 
preferences, in particular, are in opposition to possibly the most effective clinical option. This avoids situations 
such as Re C where the choice offered the patient was amputation or death. 344 Once the court held that his 
preferences could prevail, alternative therapy was sought and the leg saved. Patient preferences include 
identifying whether the patient has expressed (now or in the past) any preferences about treatment; whether 
the patient has been informed of benefits and risks and given consent; whether the patient is competent or will 
regain competence in the near future; the willingness, or ability, of the patient to co-operate with treatment and 
to what extent legally and ethically possible is the patient's right to choose being respected. 34' Quality of life 
involves examining the prospects, with or without treatment, for a return to the patient's normal life, whether 
there are any biases that might prejudice the healthcare provider's evaluation of the patient's quality of life, 
what physical, mental and social deficits the patient is likely to experience if treatment succeeds, whether the 
patient's present or future condition is such that continued life might be judged undesirable by him/her, 
whether there is any plan or rationale for forgoing treatment and what care and comfort can be given if a non- 
treatment option is chosen. 3a6 Jonsen highlights the distinction between personal evaluation of quality of life 
and observer evaluation. 34' The contextual features involve examining whether there are family issues that 
might influence treatment decisions, whether there are physician or nurse issues that might influence treatment 
decisions, whether there are economic, religious or cultural factors, whether there is any justification to breach 
confidentiality, whether there are resource allocation constraints, what the legal implications of the 
treatment/non-treatment decision are, whether clinical research or teaching is involved and whether there is 
"'Fox M, McHale J. In Whose Best Interests? Mod. Law Rev. 1997 Sept: 700-709 at p709. 
... Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th Edn. 1994 Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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any provider or institutional conflict of interest. 348 Together, the four topics `organise the varying facts of the 
particular case and... call attention to the moral principles appropriate to the case'. 349 
One of the advantages of the model is that the four boxes (one for each topic) can be drawn on a whiteboard 
or piece of paper and completed as fully as possible. It can help identify whether any other information is 
necessary in order to make a sound decision. This mirrors Devettere's `situational awareness'. "' Another 
advantage is that the decision-making process avoids the normative nature of principlism which creates an 
ethics of obligation"" and instead has a greater emphasis on the individual patient `living well'. 352 Ultimately, 
probably each of us wants medical decisions to be centred upon ourselves even though we can recognise that 
society places certain obligations upon its individual members. Many of the conflicts that have to be resolved 
by the courts arise because there is doubt over whether the decision will enable the individual to `live well' or 
because the individual patient (or his or her supporters) believe that what is appropriate is being denied due 
to resource constraints. 
Obviously, the ethical values embedded in the principled approach that is popular in Anglo-American bioethics 
are present in the Jonsen model. One of the problems with the principled approach is that `when they conflict 
we have to balance them against each other to determine which one prevails and becomes our absolute 
obligation in the particular situation'. 353 This balancing approach is becoming more popular in English 
medico-legal cases. 354 Consequently, the principle of autonomy seems to be weighted more highly than other 
principles where the patient is competent and there is no threat to public health or values. However, ethics is 
more than `the safeguarding of mere personal preferences'. 355 At times, different ethical values have to be 
balanced against each other. As the conjoined twins case shows, there is no obvious way to do this: one of the 
three judges held that it was in Mary's best interests to have `bodily integrity' even though this meant death. 356 
There is also little scope within the principled approach to take into consideration other factors. Principle- 
based ethics can be seen as `removed from the real work and content of ethics'. 35' The Jonsen model seeks to 
identify all factors affecting the decision-making process since only by being open and identifying them can 
the legitimacy or otherwise of each of these be determined. Thus it avoids the criticism that `(c)asuists have 
no clear methodological resource to prevent... a neglect of relevant features of cases'. 358 However, over- 
emphasis on the circumstances of individual cases could lead to fragmentation and inconsistency in the model's 
usefulness in guiding `everyday life and social policy'. 359 Hence, to work successfully, the casuist approach 
must be one that attends to `the particulars' as well as be sympathetic to the universal principles. 36o 
The Jonsen model is not without its flaws. The `topics' embrace Beauchamp and Childress principles. 36' 
... Ibid. 
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Hence, patient preferences broadly equates to autonomy. Some of the contextual features are related to the 
principle of justice. There is evidence of beneficence and non-maleficence within both the medical indicator 
topic and the quality of life topic. But the quality of life topic also suggests that questions that may relate to 
autonomous choice are asked. The goals of treatment can only be assessed by the patient in terms of the risks, 
benefits and costs of treatment as Jonsen et al recognise. 362 The cultural and religious factors identified within 
contextual features could be seen as belonging more appropriately to patient preferences. Hence they are 
entwined with patient preference. The provider issues that might influence treatment decisions perhaps belong 
more appropriately with medical indicators. Breach of confidentiality belongs better with patient preferences. 
Consequently, the approach seems somewhat muddled although it is fundamentally correct in promoting 
openness. Jonsen et al fail to advise how what to do when patient preferences clash with medical indications 
or when contextual issues, such as the likely burden on the family once the patient is discharged from hospital, 
mean that, although treatment could be successful in returning the patient to his or her `normal' standard of 
life, it would be better for the family not to treat. In the case of David Glass, the doctors believed they were 
acting in his best interests. 363 As a non-autonomous patient who had never had, or would have, the ability to 
express preferences, treatment decisions are to be made in his best interests. The principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence outweigh autonomy. The Jonsen model may have made them question whether there were 
biases that prejudiced their evaluation of his quality of life. If the decision to give diamorphine and palliative 
care only had been made after following a Jonsen-style analysis the doctors would presumably have felt the 
medical indicators and his quality of life prior to admission outweighed family wishes. The question remains, 
why should one balancing process be better than another. The answer must be that the casuistic model suggests 
greater openness than seems to occur with other approaches. Ultimately, the greatest value of evidence 
gathering, as advocated by Cochrane, 36a is `to estimate the probability for outcomes that matter to patients and 
to elucidate the importance of patient preferences in choosing treatment'. 365 Then it is possible to identify what 
is appropriate and proportionate treatment. 366 This needs to occur within a `stable framework of general norms' 
so as to provide controlled judgment and prevent `prejudiced or poorly formulated social conventions'. 36' Such 
an approach can be seen in the conjoined twins case where it was held that `the rule of proportionality is central 
to the evaluation of a justification premised on two conflicting duties'. 368 In that case, `(t)he actions of the 
doctor viewed objectively constitute(d) a proportionate and necessary response to the competing interests 
viewed as a whole'. 369 The doctors owed `conflicting legal (not merely social or moral) duties' but `the test of 
proportionality' was met. 37° The challenge casuistry must face is that without safeguards in its use, it could 
`degenerate into mere sophistry or become an apology for the status quo'. 371 
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7.4.3 Improving the Decision-making Process Relating to Incompetent Patients 
Listening to Children's Views372 is a report on the extent to which children's voices and opinions are heard 
when parents are undergoing legal, administrative and mediatory processes relating to family breakdown. 
Many of the recommendations are relevant for healthcare, not just regarding children, but also adult patients 
particularly those with learning disabilities. 373 As O'Quigley says, `all children have a right to be listened to 
about matters that affect their lives'. 374 Patients with impaired or fluctuating capacity have the same right. 37' 
Three major themes are identifiable. First, autonomy and enhancing the child's ability to make his or her own 
decisions; second confidentiality and third, the need for cultural and developmental sensitivity. 3'6 
7.4.3.1 Autonomy 
The O'Quigley report makes a number of key recommendations relating to autonomy: 
" Adults should allow children to tell the whole of their story without interrupting or rushing to 
interpretation. 
" Adults should adopt a non-intrusive style of interviewing with the aim of learning from the child. 
" Adults should be open-minded and non judgmental, and allow the child to raise his/her agendas and 
not simply respond to the adult agenda. 
" Good communication is more likely to occur if adults see children's abilities and competencies as 
being different from rather than lesser than adults'. 
" Questions should be simple and direct; indirect questions should be avoided as these are experienced 
by children as `trick' questions. 
" The child needs adequate information in order to express views. 
" The interviewer should be alert for any sign of distress in the child and acknowledge it. 
" Younger children may prefer to speak if they have a friend with them. 
Healthcare professionals need to identify barriers to the child acting autonomously. 3 ' These can include 
barriers due to the child's life experiences which possibly are not known to the healthcare team as well as 
barriers erected by the healthcare team, for instance, through failure to show cultural sensitivity, or isolating 
him or her from peers. 37' One of the biggest barriers is poor communication. 37' Allowing children to relate, 
without interruption or condemnation, what values they hold dear, and what factors they consider important, 
is highly important. Then these values and factors can be explored. For instance, in the case of Re L, a 
strongly motivating factor for refusing treatment could have been fear of scarring and unattractiveness to 
... O'Quigley, A. Listening to Children's Views: The Findings and Recommendations of Recent Research. 2000 The Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, York. 
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boys. 380 She may also, or alternatively, believe she must adhere to the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witness 
faith she has been raised in or that she must obey her parents. Exploring all the reasons why patients are 
opposed to treatment, giving reassurance and answering questions honestly may lead to different decisions 
being made. 
No patient wishes to be patronised. O'Quigley believes it is important to value children's abilities and 
competencies. 38' Whilst children's abilities to comprehend and interpret information and their competency in 
decision-making differs from adults, it is not necessarily of a lesser quality. 382 Just because a child may make 
a decision in an apparently less rational, or less logical manner from an adult, this does not make the decision 
wrong. The decision itself maybe the right one for the child. It may just be that the child lacks the language 
to dress it in the same way adults would. Consequently, children are easily held incompetent when major 
decisions have to be made. O'Quigley notes the findings of others that many adults, including judges and 
presumably doctors, confuse `participation' with decision-making. 383 Adults may also fear upsetting children 
and fear acknowledging their own vulnerabilities so they act `as if adults know children's best interests better 
than they do'. 384 Adults may wish to protect children. 38' Listening to Children's views gives strong support 
to children's rights not just under the United Nations Convention on The Rights of the Child which holds that 
children have rights to information; to express views including views that might influence adult decisions or 
complicate matters and to make decisions but as a matter of good practice. 38' O'Quigley notes that most 
Department of Health information leaflets for children are written for children with reading ages of fourteen 
years yet many cannot read at this level. 38' 
A relevant factor is the computer literacy of children. As O'Quigley found, today's children like the apparent 
neutrality and ease of accessing information that the internet provides. 38' Left to conduct their own searches, 
children may access information of dubious quality and neutrality because they lack the necessary knowledge 
to identify poorly researched and presented information. Helping children to access accurate and appropriate 
information through the internet seems vitally important. The better informed the child is, the more weight 
can be given to his or her views although children should not be abandoned to make decisions alone. 38' 
However, where the child wishes to be involved, s/he has a right to expect that the healthcare professionals 
involved will do all they can to ensure that she or he has the information and assistance necessary to 
participate. 
There needs to be more effective representation for children involved in judicial proceedings. 39o O'Quigley 
recommended that children wishing to have a friend with them should be able to do so. 39' It would be 
interesting to know if the child in Re M had a `friend' present when interviewed by the Official Solicitor's 
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representative. 392 Did she feel `interrogated' 3937 Being interviewed late at night by a stranger is potentially 
frightening. 39a It may be useful to be able to refer the child to a specially trained patient representative or 
advocate whose apparent neutrality makes him/her more acceptable to the child than members of the healthcare 
team. Advocates of this type have played an important role in American hospitals for twenty years. 395 The 
Patient Advocacy and Liason Service (PALS), announced in the NHS Plan is due to start in 2002.396 It is 
unclear whether specially trained PALS will be available for children and this should be clarified. 
7.4.3.2 Confidentiality 
O'Quigley's list of recommendations contains one that specifically relates to issues of patient confidentiality: 
" If possible, children should be assured of confidentiality; if this is not possible then the limits to 
confidentiality should be made clear at the outset. 
Respect for persons requires that confidentiality needs to be maintained as far as possible. In many health care 
situations power is a key concept within the context of confidentiality. 39' Children may have a realistic or 
distorted view of adults' knowledge, abilities or influence. They may disclose information in the hope it will 
be acted on. Alternatively, they may disclose information believing it will not be passed and feel betrayed when 
disclosure occurs. Healthcare professionals should question their practice regarding information handling. 398 
Particularly where the child's (or parent's) opposition to treatment is based on beliefs or values those caring 
for the child disagree with there may be a temptation to discuss the situation with others who lack the necessary 
training or understanding of the issues involved to assist in gaining greater insight and who themselves may 
not be bound by rules of confidentiality. 
7.4.3.3 Cultural and Developmental Sensitivity 
The O'Quigley report addresses the important issues of child development and cultural values and 
recommends: 
0 Adults should be aware of developmental and cultural factors but should beware of making 
assumptions about the individual child based on these. 
0 Some children may not want to participate in decision-making at all. 
Healthcare delivery is built around an adult model rather than a child model. 399 The recent NHS Plan makes 
little reference to children. "' Consequently, children find healthcare provision lacks sensitivity to their cultural 
and developmental needs. Children are institutionally discriminated against as a group regardless of ethnic 
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origin. 401 In a multicultural and multi-faith arena it is important that health care professionals have self- 
awareness about their own attitudes and communication skills when dealing with children or families from 
backgrounds different to their own. Avoidable misunderstandings or unintentional offence may occur, which 
could have been avoided by education, consultation with relevant agencies and, most importantly, listening to 
children and their families as they relate both difficult and positive experiences. 402 
Language barriers present a major issue when caring for the traumatised victims of ethnic cleansing and other 
horrors. Interpreters may have to be employed and whilst confidentiality constraints are easily recognisable 
there may be less recognition that difficulties can occur if the interpreter is of a different sex from the patient. 
Certain apparently inoffensive terms like `family support' may be interpreted differently in different cultural 
groups. "' Familiarity with the customary styles of communication in different cultural groups, particularly 
when a family is experiencing grief, anxiety, fear, concern or disagreement, can enhance decision-making. '" 
Over simplification of cultures (eg. `Asian') may partially deny diversity thus enhancing the potential for 
stereotyping. It is important not to assume that patients will always, or perhaps ever, want to speak to a 
healthcare professional from the same ethnic or religious background. There may be social status, educational 
or value differences. This may be particularly true in sensitive areas like genetic disorders. "' Such `matching' 
may create barriers to the patient being honest about his or her real wishes and views. There may be fear of 
being criticised for holding values different from the ethnic community to which the patient belongs. This can 
be a particular problem for children who feel torn between the values of the society in which they move and 
are educated and more traditional values within the home. Patient's voices cannot be fully and consistently 
heard if healthcare professionals fail to effectively recognise different cultural and developmental requirements. 
Cultural sensitivity requires respecting the patient and his or her family as persons with values and beliefs 
which, whilst possibly different from the doctor's own, are no less important. Likewise, doctors and others 
should avoid assuming that children will have particular beliefs and values, or will be more likely to defer to 
their parents because of their cultural background. To do so would be to fail to see the child as an individual. 
However, some children, because of their cultural background and strong trust and belief in the role of their 
parents as decision-makers, may genuinely have no desire to participate in healthcare decisions. This trust 
should not be destroyed in order to promote `independence' of decision-making 
7.5 Conclusion 
The proposals discussed above demonstrate the value of others besides doctors having an input to the debate 
about withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Distributive justice, in particular, requires public input, 
whether this is through elected government or through other channels. It will be important to find ways to 
achieve this and address the concerns raised by some of the consultants regarding the value of lay input. It is 
for Government to decide what proportion of Gross Domestic Product is put into the NHS. This will reflect 
its overall vision of the sort of society it is trying to create but it was clear from the consultants' responses that 
continuing regional inequality is unacceptable. However, the focus on society must not exclude individual 
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needs. The advice doctors give patients often reflects the availability of resources. As discussed earlier, the 
BMA suggests that this is an acceptable part of the doctor's role but doctors lack the training and the mandate 
from society to do this. If, as the BMA proposes, non-treatment decisions become the sole prerogative of 
doctors distributive injustices will abound. The interests of the patient may be forgotten as the focus shifts to 
what doctors consider to be the interests of society. There is a clear need to find ways to identify when doctors 
can be left to decide alone and when decisions should go to independent arbitration as a final procedural step. 
It is also necessary to identify which inputs to the process are acceptable. The vulnerable need the courts and 
parliament to protect their interests for instance, by setting out procedural rules as the courts have done 
regarding non-therapeutic sterilisations of learning impaired women. At present, incompetent patients only 
receive protection if someone is prepared to challenge a non-treatment decision. 
The lack of funding for palliative care, particularly for children, needs urgently rethinking. If the alternative 
to active treatment is poor quality palliative care, patients, parents, and doctors, may be more inclined not to 
opt for non-treatment. Healthcare professionals may be tempted to misuse pain-relief. Since the way 
healthcare is delivered affects the ability of patients to act autonomously, government, health authorities and 
primary care groups need to recognise that children, ethnic minorities and the learning disabled are significant 
users of health services. To develop services where appropriate treatment decisions can be made means 
listening to the views of these users which the NHS Plan consultation exercise failed to do 
Dworkin's proposals have particular merit. The government should rethink the role of NICE and the way it 
is currently considering treatment availabilities. The funding of the NHS lacks a sound basis since no one has 
identified which treatments should be provided by the state. Consequently, medical advances coupled with 
regional inequalities in funding have produced a healthcare lottery. Flawed public consultation exercises and 
politicised selection of which treatments are to be evaluated by NICE can only produce inadequate solutions 
to the question of whether certain treatments should be available through the NHS or withheld. 
Individual decisions need to be economically, medically, ethically, legally and emotionally as sound as possible 
for all the parties. Many of the consultants interviewed for this thesis held similar views to those in the BMA 
guidance. They believe that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is `primarily a medical 
decision for which the doctor bears ultimate responsibility' although `good practice imposes' a duty to note the 
views of nurses, other members of the team and the family. 406 However, just because this is the view of a 
`responsible body of medical opinion', it is not necessarily acceptable. Many of the consultants interviewed 
have been qualified over twenty years and are possibly strongly influenced by the attitudes which prevailed at 
the time of their training. The BMA is wrong to try to secure exclusivity of the individual decision-making 
process. Without scrutiny and without the input of those who have expertise particularly in the fields of ethics 
and law, but also other fields such as statistics, psychology and training, the individual decision-making process 
would be likely to diminish in quality. I believe it would fail to meet the needs of the parties to the decision 
and gradually fail to reflect appropriate values or protect the more vulnerable members of society. Adopting 
the recommendations given in Listening to Children's voices would improve decision-making not just for 
children but also for adults with reduced ability to act autonomously. It would provide a focus for training to 
improve communication skills which several consultants recognised as poor at present. 
4°6Campbell AGM, McHaffie HE. Prolonging life and allowing death: infants. J. Med. Ethics 1995; 21: 339-344 at p340. Their emphasis. 
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Giving competent patients the power to appoint proxy decision-makers is long overdue. This is likely to be 
a more acceptable way of making decisions when the patient is incompetent to both doctors and patients since 
it could help reduce anxieties on both sides. The government has let down the majority of the electorate by its 
slowness in legislating in this area. National inequality has arisen since residents of Scotland now have the 
power to appoint proxy decision-makers. However, the proposals found in Making Decisions are not ideal as 
they currently stand. The proposed Court of Protection, whilst it will take an inquisitorial approach, will lack 
the more balanced approach that a tribunal with equal input from lawyers, doctors and ethicists could achieve. 
As it is currently described doctors are unlikely to view it any more favourably than they do the present system. 
Making Decisions also fails to fully engage with the difficulties of ensuring that parties to decisions regarding 
the withholding and withdrawing of treatment are fully informed. There needs to be more openness about 
treatment options, success rates and the `selling' of decisions by doctors through the way they employ terms 
like `futility'. The casuistic approach that some judges have recently adopted shows commitment to openness. 
However, the Jonsen model fails to show how to balance the different factors once they have been identified 
although it is a useful tool for doctors since it can be drawn on a whiteboard for discussion. Without adequate 
protection, particularly for those patients who cannot speak for themselves, there is scope for the medical 
indicators and the doctors' estimation of the patient's quality of life to prevail over other interests. This is 
where ethicists, the courts and the legislature have a valuable role in identifying the interests to be protected 
and ways to protect or balance them when they are in conflict with each other. 
Many of the conflicts that arise over the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment occur as a result 
of failure to respect patients' rights to decide for themselves; or to respect patient/family preferences; or to 
ensure equity of outcome or equity of access to treatment, or to be honest about the necessity to ration 
healthcare in the NHS. Therefore, improvements to the decision-making process will need to address issues 
of autonomy, openness and distributive justice as well as the decision-making forum. The next chapter 
discusses these issues in more detail and proposes a new decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER 8 
WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING MEDICAL TREATMENT: 
A NEW MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING 
This chapter briefly summarises the findings of the previous chapters and restates the nature of the problems 
surrounding the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment. It then discusses the concepts of 
autonomy, openness and distributive justice that have been identified as key factors for improving the decision- 
making process. Using these as foundation stones, a system to improve the decision-making process is 
proposed. The emphasis will be on `ethical truth as a process rather than a result' with rights being seen as 
`conditions necessary to promote inclusion in the process'. ' 
8.1 Summary of the Preceding Chapters 
Chapter 2 shows that the recent history of the NHS is troubled by economic and political pressures and 
identifies the diverse nature of the conflicts that result because doctors are pressurised, overtly or covertly, by 
patients and their families, judges, other doctors, politicians and budget-holders. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate 
that decisions are primarily based on clinical prognosis but are flawed because the evidence-base is lacking. 
There is a lack of honesty over the effect of economic/resource constraints and a use of `trump' words like 
`futility' to `sell' decisions to patients, families and judges. Patient autonomy is not always well-supported as 
doctors seem to decide in their own minds what treatment options they are prepared to propose to the patient 
and only disclose their preferred options. Decisions may be based on the social circumstances, age or disability 
of the patient. The way decisions to withdraw treatment are made differs from the way decisions to withhold 
are made thereby resulting in greater scope for value judgments when treatment withdrawal is under 
consideration. The wishes of the family and the burden on the family are also more relevant in withdrawal 
cases. Whilst ethically, there may be no difference, it would be wrong to ignore this. Chapters 2,3 and 4 also 
demonstrate the emotional nature of decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment and the anxiety 
doctors have regarding non-treatment. Chapter 5 shows that there are many models bearing on the issue which 
seem to be isolated from each other, each proposing only a partial solution to the multifaceted problem of when 
to treat and when not to treat. Consequently research into what constitutes a medically, socially and ethically 
acceptable decision is necessary in order to discover how best to balance individual needs against societal 
needs. Chapter 6 demonstrates judicial support for patient autonomy and openness in decision-making. 
However, determinations of patient `best interests' are strongly influenced by medical determinations of quality 
of life, so elderly and learning/physically disabled patients are insufficiently protected against discriminatory 
practices. When decision-making moves from the bedside to the courts, the change in focus from medicine 
to law creates tensions as each side has its own prejudices about the ability of the other to make the right 
decision so the validity of input from each other's discipline may be strongly resisted, as Chapter 7 
demonstrates. Chapter 7 also reveals that recent proposals suffer from problems in that they do not show how 
to tie together all the different issues; doctors end up having to juggle patient autonomy, patient best interests, 
'Kuczewski MG. Fragmentation and Consensus: Communitarian and Casuist Bioethics. 1997 Georgetown University Press, Washington 
DC at PI 10. 
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family demands and the demands of their other patients. Although Klein asserts that it is `positively 
undesirable" to search for a set of principles that will make the decision and all that is needed is to improve 
the `process' by which decisions are made, ' it is clear that the principles of autonomy, openness and distributive 
justice are important in structuring that process. The decision-making process can be improved if these three 
principles, underpinned by anti-discriminatory practice, are given greater support by doctors, judges, healthcare 
purchasers and politicians. The process needs to address the complex issues of finance, law, professional 
conduct and ethics and, if possible, reduce the number of factors the doctor has to juggle when making 
individual non-treatment decisions. As Kuczewski states, `advances in technology and changing social roles 
have raised problems in everyday professional life for which guidance is needed'. ' It will also be necessary to 
find ways to provide emotional support for all the parties to the decision-making process, including doctors, 
particularly when the decision is liable to result in the death of the patient. There will never be a final, 
immutable answer because science, disease, populations and politics are not static, but better decision-making 
is possible. 
8.2 Underpinning Concepts 
In developing the decision-making process that will be described later in this chapter certain ideas have been 
influential. In particular, Kuczewski's communitarian casuistry' addresses some of the weaknesses identified 
in the previous chapter in Jonsen's approach to individual decisions. ' Dworkin's `prudent insurance' concept 
suggests ways to address macro resource allocation problems' although a greater ethical input will be needed 
than he suggests. The balancing and inquisitorial methodology adopted by some judges recently is important 
when the non-treatment decision involves a patient with impaired autonomy. The recommendations O'Quigley 
makes regarding ways to enhance autonomy within the legal decision making process, which I have already 
argued can be successfully adopted within the healthcare setting, have great value. ' Finally, for those who 
anticipate long-term or permanent loss of capacity, the judiciary's acceptance of the validity of clear advance 
directives is particularly significant as are the recommendations in Making Decisions. 9 
8.2.1 Autonomy 
Doctors have to act within a legal framework grounded in historical tradition and precedent. The traditional 
separation of medicine from law no longer exists as medical decisions are scrutinised by the courts. Medical 
negligence rose out of the belief that certain standards are required and, as shown earlier, standards are no 
longer solely medically determined. 10 Just because a doctor is proposing to act in the same way other doctors 
would act this conduct will not necessarily be accepted as proper or lawful by the courts. Medical ethics is no 
longer a matter for clinicians alone. Surgery, and pharmacology, have become things people `volunteer' 
for 
2Klein R. Dimensions of rationing: who should do what next? BMJ 1993; 307: 309-311 at p310. 
3Ibid, at p311. 
4Kuczewski, op cit nI at pp1-2. 
'Ibid. 
`Jonsen AR, Siegler M, Winslade WJ. Clinical Ethics: A PracticalApproach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine. 4th Edn. 1998 McGraw 
Hill, New York. 
7Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 2000 Harvard University Press, London, in particular, at pp 307-319. 
80'Quigley, A. Listening to Children's Gietivs: The Findings and Recommendations of Recent Research. 2000 The Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, York. 
'Lord Chancellor's Department. Making Decisions Cm4465 1999 The Stationery Office, London. 
"'See, for example, Bolitho v City, and Hackney HA [ 1998] AC 232 and discussion earlier in this thesis. 
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rather than simply have as a desperate attempt to save life. Autonomy has become increasingly important as 
consent to treatment has developed into a medico-legal doctrine. Its value is well recognised by patients, 
doctors, judges and ethicists. Respect for autonomy requires that competent patients are involved in their 
treatment decisions, particularly when the consequence of withholding or withdrawing treatment is death. 
However, the empirical evidence obtained for this thesis suggests that it is over-optimistic to state that the 
medical profession accepts the concept of informed consent as `a fait accompli'. " In order to make free. 
autonomous decisions patients need information in an understandable format and adequate time to assimilate 
it. 12 Expressing autonomous choice can be difficult but it should be encouraged despite the over-optimism of 
viewing man as `eminently educable and capable of self-knowledge'. 13 The `prevalence of cognitive, visual, 
auditory and language deficits"4 which impair comprehension can be addressed by encouraging treatment `try- 
outs'. It would be important to recognise that consent would only be valid for the limited period of the `try- 
out'. If fresh consent is not obtained, treatment should be stopped. Some doctors may be reluctant to accept 
this, particularly with experimental treatment, where their reputations depend on the results. 15 Problematically, 
this thesis found anecdotal evidence that patients, once persuaded to `try' treatment like dialysis, simply 
continue with it rather than positively affirming that this is what they wish. Consequently, pressure on 
resources increases. 
When autonomy is undermined, or threatened, conflicts can occur. Doctors need to improve their 
communication skills, particularly when dealing with children or patients under a disability so as to enhance 
their ability to act autonomously. As Teff notes, `(o)ffering patients dialogue has more therapeutic value than 
offering them consent forms'. 16 The O'Quigley recommendations are valuable in enhancing autonomy. " 
Medical advances mean that the barrier between life and death has become blurred and living death is possible. 
Decision-making then becomes particularly problematic partly because the legal restraints of murder and 
manslaughter offences are no longer seen as appropriate in setting the boundaries of acceptable conduct in the 
medical domain and partly because the ability of previously competent patients to have their non-treatment 
preferences met after loss of capacity has been poorly supported. Although many senior lawyers and medical 
ethicists believe the courts are an inappropriate forum for medical decision-making" their role in conflict 
resolution and determining the lawfulness of actions is necessary. The courts have to engage with issues that 
were not previously their domain and, consequently, frequently defer to medical opinions of best interests when 
patients are unable to act autonomously. The use of advance directives should be encouraged and the 
legislature should facilitate national equality by giving all citizens the right to appoint proxy decision-makers. 
Good democracy and human rights demand this. Yet, for proxy decision-making to work well it must be 
recognised that proxies, like parents of minor children, will require `hospital and community-based support 
designed to meet their informational and emotional needs and, most of all, to facilitate their expanded role in 
''Mason JK, McCall Smith, Laurie GT. Law and Medical Ethics 5th Edn. 1999 Butterworths, London at p288. 
'2Olde Rikkert MGM et al. Experienced consent in geriatrics research: a new method to optimize the capacity to consent in frail elderly subjects. 
J. Med. Ethics 1997; 23: 271-6 at p271. 
"Jinnett-Sack, Autonomy in the company of others in Grubb A. Choices and decisions in health care. 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 
pp97-136 at p101. 
14Olde Rikkert, op cit n 12 at p271. 
15An example of a surgical `try-out' could be the grafting of a hand onto a patient. This is experimental treatment, and now, the first patient to 
be treated this way wishes the hand to be removed: Whittell G. `Remove my hand' The Times 20 October 2000. This was eventually carried 
out: Nathan A, Chohan N. Doctors amputate 
first transplanted human hand. The Sunday Times 4 February 2001. 
'6Teff H. Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor-Patient Relationship. 1994 Clarendon Press, Oxford at p238. 
"O'Quigley, op cit n8 at ppvi-vii. 
'See, for instance, the approval given to the views of Dr Grant Gillet by the Attorney General in AucklandAHB v Attorney-General [ 1993] 
NZLR 235 at p 241. 
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the decision-making process'. 19 
However, ethics must not lapse into `the safeguarding of mere personal preferences'. 2° It is necessary to have 
a concept of the `common good' in order to prevent this. 2' Supporting autonomy cannot mean fixing the 
boundaries between persons in a way that denies the relevance of `shared cultural inheritances'22 or changes 
in society and medicine. Practical reason is needed in order to help individuals understand `the personal, 
institutional, or societal narrative and help us determine when it is time for a new good to govern the particular 
situation'. The examination of the personal, institutional or social narrative and the balancing of different 
interests has become an increasingly important part of the judiciary's role when they are called upon to resolve 
disputes between patients, families, doctors and budget-holders. For example, the Court of Appeal decided in 
Re A (Conjoined Twins) that not only did Mary's sanctity of life not trump Jodie's right to live but the 
prohibition on necessity as a defence to murder was not absolute. 23 This can be interpreted as reason 
determining that it was time for `a new good to govern that particular situation'. 
8.2.2 Openness 
8.2.2.1 Openness about Treatment Costs and Success Rates 
There needs to be openness about treatment options, costs and how decisions are made. As Kuczewski 
highlights, there is a need for `public legitimation of norms and social policies and for a distinction between 
an ethical action and the process by which one promulgates an action as ethical'. 24 Greater openness about the 
costs of treatment to society will help enable ways to determine how societal interests should be balanced 
against individual need. However, the `rules' by which non-treatment decisions are made by governments, 
budget-holders and doctors are characterised by a lack of openness which, as the public, often influenced by 
the media, becomes more questioning and demanding, has led to an erosion of trust. Consequently, the 
legitimacy of rules and guidelines is questionable. 25 Democracy is weakened. 
The success rates of different centres and different practitioners should be openly available and in a form that 
allows valid comparisons to be made. 26 Good science requires openness and honesty about results. Patients 
should have the option of knowing as much or as little as they want about the different treatment options (NHS, 
private, foreign, experimental), success rates and prognoses. If this information is incomplete, and much 
medical knowledge is uncertain, this should be admitted. The lack of knowledge should not be interpreted as 
"Barber PA, Marquis JG and Rutherford Turnbull III H. `Parental Perspectives on Treatment-Nontreatment Decisions involving Newborns with 
Spina Bifida. ' In Caplan AL, Blank RH, Merrick CJ (Eds). Compelled Compassion. 1992 Humana Press, Totowa, New Jersey pp123-153 at 
p150. 
20Kuczewski, op cit nI at p2. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid, at p109. 
"Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2001 ]1 FLR 1. 
24Kuczewski, op cit n1 at p 111. 
25Ibid. 
26For instance, The Sunday Times recently published a comparison of hospitals. Quoting capitation rates for the number of nurses or doctors 
per hundred patients is meaningless if a substantial number of these are part-time employees. 
Similarly, mortality indexes reflect only one type 
ofoutcome. Outpatient appointment times reflect access. Equality of outcome is not necessarily the same as equality of access 
(see discussion 
earlier in this thesis) so a hospital can achieve well in one category but poorly 
in the other (see, for instance, University College London Hospitals 
which did well on the mortality index 
but poorly on outpatients appointments and West Middlesex University Hospital which did well on 
outpatients appointments despite having substantially 
fewer doctors but scored worse on mortality). The failure to recognise and address these 
weaknesses makes interpretation of such tables 
difficult and possibly exacerbates public anxieties. Jarman, Sir Brian. The Good Hospital Guide. 
Parts 1 and 2. The Sunday Times 14 January 2001 and 21 January 2001. Available on www. Sunday-times. co. uk/hospitalguide Accessed 14 
January 2001. 
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a fault, either of medicine or the individual practitioner, since this could encourage doctors to cover up their 
deficiencies. However, identified weaknesses in individual knowledge that can be addressed, should be 
addressed, or the patient referred to someone with greater expertise in the patient's condition. An important 
part of medical expertise is the interpretation of clinical information and diagnosis, not necessarily healing. 
Doctors should be encouraged to separate their healing role from their diagnosing and informing role. At 
present, if they cannot cure, either because the condition is incurable, or because the resources are not available. 
they may be less open about diagnosis and prognosis thereby undermining the ability of patients to make 
autonomous choices. Greater openness will enable autonomous patients to make informed choices and will, 
likewise, help others who have to decide for the incompetent patient. Openness can help guard against value 
judgments based on third party estimations of patient quality of life being made. It can prevent discriminatory 
practices occurring. If words like `futility' are used, there should be openness about the meaning to avoid 
distorting the decision-making process. There should be openness about what treatments do physiologically 
for patients. For example, in cases where the kidneys have failed, providing artificial nutrition shortens the 
dying process by allowing toxins to accumulate. Hiding this fact is dishonest and prevents debate as to whether 
this is acceptable. There needs to be openness about the fact that those who are involved in delivering care take 
into account different factors when withholding or withdrawing treatment. Pretending such differences do not, 
or should not, exist means the decision-making process will continue to be flawed as relevant reasons for the 
decision will be hidden to avoid censure. There needs to be openness about the way doctors practise, 
particularly when a palliative care model of treatment has been adopted. 27 It should be openly admitted that 
non-treatment decisions create great anxiety at times. 28 Doctors are not immune from the emotional drain that 
the threat of litigation, their possible criminal liability and their own desire not to fail their patients creates. 
This seems to be under-recognised because it is possibly seen as a weakness. Team-work and a culture of 
openness can help reduce anxiety. 
8.2.2.2 Openness about Expertise 
There needs to be openness about what the NHS can achieve and where its expertise lies. Its role has still never 
been clearly identified. In theory, it could be seen as to diagnose and treat all patients in a timely and equitable 
manner but it seems clear that this is beyond its resources. Therefore, rationing techniques, including a lack 
of openness about options, are used. Primary care concentrates on keeping patients out of hospital but this is 
not the full solution. Some patients will need hospital care. Medical advances mean that the ability of GPs 
to accurately diagnose illness has been weakened and it is increasingly necessary to refer patients to specialists. 
Consequently, some patients are not diagnosed in time for treatment to be useful or curative. Other patients 
get their diagnosis but do not necessarily receive the most appropriate treatment for their condition because 
of economic constraints. Not all of these patients are informed that better alternatives are available. Some 
receive this information but are told that the only way to potentially access the better treatment 
is to enter a 
research trial. Some patients are told of the economic or waiting time barriers to them receiving treatment and 
are able to access treatment privately or lobby health authorities or anyone they perceive 
has having a 
responsibility for resource allocation decisions. Equality can be enhanced if the NHS acknowledges that 
it 
cannot deliver timely diagnosis and treatment to all patients. Delays 
in diagnosis lead to inappropriate 
withholding of treatment. Concentrating on speedy diagnosis coupled with a commitment to openness about 
"Corner J. More openness needed in palliative care. BMJ 1997; 315: 1242. 
'Door Goold S. Williams B, Arnold RM. Conflicts Regarding Decisions to Limit Treatment. JAMA 2000; 283,7: 909-914. 
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treatment availability and options will reduce unnecessary deaths whilst patients are awaiting referral to 
specialists for diagnosis. Government initiatives such as medical audit, more GPs, NHS Direct, drop-in clinics 
and breast cancer referrals show a commitment towards delivering speedy, and accurate, diagnosis. This 
should be enhanced. The NHS is ideally situated to deliver diagnosis even if it cannot always deliver treatment. 
Being open about what it can deliver and engaging in a process of identifying how individual need is to be 
balanced against societal interests will be the first step towards ensuring the NHS can survive as a universally 
accessible healthcare institution. Informed patients, armed with their diagnosis and a schedule of the different 
treatment options, statistical outcomes, costs and providers, would then be able to make decisions about 
whether to wait for their local NHS hospital to provide treatment or go elsewhere. Computer technology and 
medical audit make this a real possibility. 
The role of doctors as `expert in medical science"' must be reflected by any decision-making model. However, 
this does not mean that only medical science is decisive. If too casuistic an approach is taken, `facts' can 
dominate the decision-making process due to a lack of `clearly delineated principles or values to be 
employed'. 30 The uniqueness of each case must be maintained so patients are seen as individuals not as 
`another case similar to one earlier'. 31 It is also important to recognise that facts and values cannot always be 
separated. 32 Whilst science, medicine and law might aspire to neutrality, their actors are only human as are 
their critics. Ascribing someone to a particular role means automatically invoking the criteria by which that 
person will be evaluated. 33 Therefore, a 'good' doctor is one who makes decisions in accordance with his peers 
but his peers might also act in a discriminatory or paternalistic manner. Because medicine is not solely science 
but also ethics, conflicts arise between facts and values leaving doctors subjected, at times, to `a tyranny of 
universal principles' such as autonomy, beneficence and justice. 34 Many doctors lack expertise in law and 
ethics. As Campbell warns, `(c)onfusion about the ethics (or legality) of withholding and withdrawing 
treatment may... influence decision making in a subtle, but potentially dangerous way. '35 Doctors can become 
too involved with the patient or the family and too concerned about appearing in control. Training can help 
address this but it is inappropriate to expect mastery in another's speciality so the input of others should be 
welcomed rather than excluded. The prejudice expressed towards other inputs that this thesis has found is 
highly regrettable since the expertise of others with greater understanding of ethical, and sometimes legal 
issues, is important in helping doctors to make decisions and assisting in complex cases. 
The expertise of judges lies in law, balancing different views, logical, dispassionate, rationalising argument 
and demarcating legal boundaries but they lack expertise in ethical analysis. Consequently, some patients under 
disabilities have lacked sufficient protection of their interests. 36 The English judiciary are gradually becoming 
more proactive and recognising that just because a medical team holds that a certain action is appropriate, 
necessary, or the only course open to them, this is not always true. Therefore, judges are requiring more 
openness in the way doctors inform them about treatment options. 37 However, although a new Court of 
z9Kuczewski, op cit nl at p 13. 
30Ibid, at p 113. 
"The `Blue Peter Model' of reasoning - see Chapter 5. 
32Kuczewski, op cit n1 at p 11. 
"Ibid, at plO. See also, ppl1-12. 
'albid, at plOO. 
35Campbell AGM. `Baby Doe and Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment. ' In Caplan AL, Blank RH, Merrick CJ (Eds). Compelled 
Compassion. 1992 Humana Press, Totowa, New Jersey pp207-236 at p225. 
16For instance, In Re Y (Venial Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [ 1997] 2 WLR 556. 
"For instance, see Rv St George 's Healthcare NHS Trust exparte S [1998] 2 FLR 728; Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [20011 
1 FLR I and discussion earlier in this thesis. 
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Protection is proposed38, it would be better to acknowledge the limits of judicial expertise. As Kuczewski 
argues, `(t)he solutions of a law court are not always the answer or the proper authority... so the ultimate nature 
of the decision-maker is something that must be worked out for each range of cases'. 39 At present, decision- 
making moves from the bedside, possibly via a case conference, to the courts. That cannot be helpful. Too 
often the referral is because doctors are seeking legal security for themselves rather than trying to discover what 
is ethically right for the patient. 40 It would be better to have in-house ethics committees which could advise 
on individual cases but would have the ability to recognise when the issues to be resolved were beyond their 
remit or expertise. There should then be a tribunal system modelled on the successful ones that already act as 
an intermediary forum in the case of employment and welfare disputes. This could have inputs from people 
with appropriate expertise whose opinions are weighted equally. 
8.2.2.3 Openness in the Decision-Making Process 
However, simply accepting the need for openness is insufficient. The decision-making process needs a system 
that effectively builds openness into its structure rather than merely accepting it as a value to aspire towards. 
The process must identify who to ask, what to ask and how to ask. Since it is natural that some will be better 
at `practical reasoning' than others it is important to be able to identify `what goes into good practical 
reasoning, ... recognise when someone is doing it well, and be able to find ways of training people to improve 
this capacity'. 41 It must also be accepted that `a finished product based on a theory of the nature of ultimate 
reality' can never be achieved. 42 Instead, the system that will be proposed can only be one small building block 
in the process of developing medical decision-making prowess. 
8.2.3 Distributive Justice 
Liberalism, according to Kuczewski, takes a `posture of neutrality' which `treats all choices as equivalent in 
the public domain and accords equal rights and opportunity' but, in so doing, `rules out any attempt by 
government to aid or abet a notion of the common good'. 43 In reality, when macro resource allocation decisions 
are made, decisions are underpinned by notions of the common good and `individual rights' turn out to be 
`mere fictions' because individuals belong to families and wider communities. 44 It is impossible to conclude 
from this limited piece of research exactly how the balancing of individual and societal needs is best achieved. 
More research in this area is needed and it is suggested that this is a matter for government to facilitate. 
However, the research must be robustly constructed unlike the recent survey that underpinned the NHS Planas 
since `if the methodology used is predicated on an inequitable epistemology, which disenfranchises or is 
insensitive to the particular needs of certain groups, then any resulting... analysis will necessarily be 
inequitable'. 46 To that end, it would be more appropriate for such research to be conducted in a completely 
independent manner with guarantees that its findings will not be suppressed as occurred with the Black 
38Lord Chancellor's Department, op cit n9. See discussion in the previous chapter. 
39Kuczewski, op cit nI at p119. 
"'Nys H. Physician Involvement in a Patient's Death: A Continental European Perspective. Medical Law Review 1999; 7,2: 208-246 at p246. 
"Ibid, at p12. 
42Ibid, at p17. 
43Ibid, at p 103. 
441bid, at p105. 
"Department of Health. The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform. Cm4818-1 2000 The Stationery Office, London. Available 
on wvww. nhs. uk/nhsplan accessed 7 August 2000. 
"Mannion R, Small N. Postmodern Health Economics. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 255-272 at p265. 
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Report. 47 
In balancing the demands/needs of the individual against the wider needs of society, it is necessary to identify 
what `society' means. It could mean local community such as the communities for which PCGs will be 
identifying healthcare options and priorities. It could mean national community or cultural/ethnic community. 
Veatch describes how changes to organ allocation processes to prioritise need on a national scale have been 
resisted due to a belief that local community, a sort of extended family, should be looked after first and 
foremost. 48 National inequalities will continue under the PCGs. A proper decision needs to be made as to 
whether equality of outcome or equality of opportunity is the goal of state-funded healthcare. This should not 
be a purely medical or purely political decision since Veatch identifies that physicians are prepared to sacrifice 
some equity in favour of maximising efficiency whereas non-physicians give higher priority to fairness. 49 If 
it is accepted that all those engaged in analysis of healthcare decision-making, whatever their discipline, are 
`essentially engaged in mutual discovery of the good' each contribution can be given proper value. 50 Doctors 
have medical expertise; economists fiscal expertise; lawyers analytical expertise and ethicists philosophical 
expertise. Adopting a monopolistic approach to non-treatment decisions is unhelpful. Engaging in 
`deliberative public dialogue on our moral and ethical problems' will help. 5' 
The role of doctors as agents of rationing on the grounds of limited resources needs to be reduced. It is clear 
it is a source of anxiety and can lead to inequity. Some, like Vollman, believe it is right for doctors to `consider 
the principle of justice, which prohibits wasting resources needed by others' since treatment decisions `ought 
to include the needs of other members of the community... who may be denied medical help because of limited 
resources'. 52 Others, like Friend, suggest that the doctor and family are only required to act in the interests of 
the patient, `without regard to other unknown insured people' since, `(a)bstract notions of distributive justice 
cannot supersede the rights of a named, identified patient'. 53 If Vollman's argument is taken to its logical 
conclusion, no doctor could realistically justify the expenditure of any large sum of money on any patient unless 
s/he could demonstrate a significantly probable certainty that the patient will recover. However, it seems 
obvious that both justice and good medicine require that treatment is discontinued when it really is clinically 
futile. 54 There is an urgent need for better data in order to enable outcomes to be predicted more accurately and 
it is appropriate to consider outcomes when making decisions but decisions of distributive justice cannot be for 
individual doctors to make alone. 
8.2.4 Non-Discrimination 
The predominantly utilitarian model of healthcare delivery is clearly problematic so a way to balance societal 
interests with respect for individuals is necessary. Regarding macro decision-making, `neither the concept of 
47Black, Sir Douglas (Chair). Report of the Working Group on Inequalities in Health. 1979 HMSO, London. 
48Veatch RM. A New Basis for Allocating Organs for Transplant. Kennedy Institute of Ethics J. 2000; 10,1: 75-80. 
49Ibid, at p78. 
s°Kuczewski, op cit n1 at p 101. 
5'Ibid, at p120. 
52Vollman J. For Love or Money: Commentary. Hastings Center Report 1995; July-Aug pp22-23 at p23. 
"Friend M. Commentary. Hastings Center Report 1995; July-Aug pp22-3 at p23. Harris has argued along the same lines: Harris J. Justice 
and Equal Opportunities in 
Health Care. Bioethics 1999; 17,5: 392-404, in particular see p404. 
54 Dickenson D. Can Medical Criteria Settle Priority-Setting Debates? The Need for Ethical Analysis. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 131-137 
at p133. 
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equity nor that of need is of much help' so decisions are made according to `political expediency'. 55 This, and 
the need to consider fiscal requirements and re-election prospects mean the NHS is subjected to pressures that 
affect not only the lives of those it is delivering care to and their families but also those it employs. 
Consequently, the NHS is in a demoralised and inefficient state. Emphasis on market forces and encouraging 
individual responsibility for healthcare has changed to individual responsibilities for adopting healthy lifestyles 
but discrimination is potentially set to increase as government support for genetic screening increases, abortion 
of disabled babies is encouraged, and the elderly are deemed `unsalvageable'. National values take precedence 
over cultural ones to a certain extent. This is important in guarding against discriminatory practices such as 
withdrawing treatment earlier from infant girls but national values become distorted by a politicised healthcare 
framework. 56 People with the same condition should receive the same opportunity to benefit from treatment 
regardless of where they live if a truly national health service is to be achieved. 57 The public perception is that 
`the NHS is failing to provide an equal standard of healthcare for all'. 58 Kuczewski argues for a balancing of 
individual and societal interests by adopting communitarian casuistry so that the `deliberative activity of rich 
case-analysis' includes `the kind of public consensus and method of promulgation that is necessary to 
legitimate authority'. 59 Stoll suggests establishing `consensus on the treatment... appropriate to certain groups 
and stages of disease' with society approving the criteria used for deciding priorities in the face of limited 
resources. 6° However, whilst a more open debate about issues of distributive justice is needed in order to reduce 
arbitrariness in decision-making and variability in practice in different regions of the country this could result 
in agreements that discriminate against certain groups. For instance, it may be decided that `(i)n times of 
resource scarcity, advanced age is a morally relevant way of selectively limiting the use of life-sustaining 
technologies at the public policy level' although `gender, race, ethnic background, intelligence level and 
religious beliefs of patients are not'. 6' Campbell's fears that seeking societal consensus as to how to limit 
healthcare could lead to anxiety amongst the elderly and vulnerable that they are to be considered burdens on 
society who are failing in some unspoken obligation to end their lives could be addressed by a statement of 
protections. 62 The value of all individuals within society needs to be recognised and the decision-making 
process needs to be not just non-discriminatory, but anti-discriminatory. The methodology adopted must not 
be one that `disenfranchises or is insensitive to the particular needs of certain groups'. 63 Concerns regarding 
racial discrimination 61 within the NHS must be addressed. 
One way to improve macro decision-making and address inequalities and discriminatory practices is to allow 
government to continue to take responsibility but with constructive, impartial and informed input from patients 
and healthcare professionals. 65 At present, NICE and CHI are coming on line but they are both firmly situated 
within the political process. Political expediency has overridden scientific rigour in the selection of treatments 
to evaluate. Both NICE and CHI are concentrating on clinical issues and/or financial issues to the exclusion 
"Klein R, Day P& Redmayne S. Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting and Rationing in the National Health Service. 1996 Oxford University 
Press, Oxford at p26. 
56Subramanian KN, Paul VK. Care of Critically Ill Newborns in India. J. Legal Med. 1995; 16: 263-275. See discussion earlier in this thesis. 
57Harris J. Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care. Bioethics 1999; 13,5: 392-404. 
58British Medical Association. Healthcare Funding Review 6 February2001 BMA, London (web. bma. org. uk/public/polsreps. nsfaccessed 15 
February 2001) Chapter 2 `Public'. 
"Kuczewski, op cit n1 at p 118. 
60Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at p21. 
G' Weir RF. Abating Treatment i, 'ith Critically III Patients: Ethical and Legal Limits to the Medical Prolongation of Life. 1989 Oxford 
University Press, New York at p383. His emphasis. 
62Campbell A, et al. Medical Ethics 2nd Edn. 1997 Oxford University Press, Oxford at p142. 
63Mannion R, Small N. Postmodern Health Economics. Health Care Analysis 1999; 7: 255-272. at p265. 
64Millar B. Race against time. Health Service Journal 18 March 1999 at pp9-10. 
`'Alexander M. Real democracy demands a willingness to listen to genuine local voices. Health Service J. 18 February 1999 at p19. 
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of ethical issues. Whilst the framework for deciding questions of funding is really a separate issue from 
examining the withholding and withdrawing of medical treatment from individual patients, non-discrimination 
requires that account is taken of ethical values not just finances. 
A better way to improve macro decision-making would be to separate healthcare funding from the process of 
identifying what treatments should be delivered through the NHS and which should be withheld. This could 
be achieved by having an independent body which has the role of establishing what the healthcare priorities 
should be and what treatments should be available on the NHS. Having a logical and independent appraisal 
of what treatments should be offered would enable government to identify what resources are needed in order 
to deliver timely and effective treatment. The BMA hints at such a body in its review of healthcare funding 
so it should command support from doctors although they over-emphasise medical and cost-effectiveness 
aspects of defining `need' at the expense of ethical factors. " Unlike the Oregon modelt', which over- 
emphasised the importance of public opinion, the strategic body would need to have expert medical, legal, 
ethical and financial input. It is clear that there are some treatments which none would consider appropriate 
to withhold on financial grounds (eg appendectomy). Equally, a point which Dworkin fails to recognise 
sufficiently in his over-reliance upon medical effectiveness, there are some treatments which none would 
consider acceptable to provide on ethical grounds (eg female circumcision). Some of the treatments withheld 
may be available privately whereas others, on ethical grounds, may need to be prohibited by law to prevent 
human rights abuses. It may also be appropriate to legislate that certain conditions (eg smallpox) must be 
treated as a matter of public health and safety and individual refusal of treatment is not an option. In addition 
to examining the medical effectiveness of different treatments for different conditions, the ethical and financial 
limits of what it is acceptable for the state to fund or not fund could be identified by the strategic body. Having 
such a body would answer Butler's criticism that `(n)ot only is the search for a morally correct solution to the 
problem of rationing a chimera, so too must be the belief that a consensual solution, were it ever to be found, 
would be technically feasible'. 68 The strategic body would be able to produce greater equity within the system 
as called for by Bell. 69 However, it is recognised that the recommendations of the strategic body may result in 
pressure being brought to bear upon government to increase the funding given to the NHS but that should be 
a small price to pay for achieving a nationally equitable healthcare service which delivers care in a non- 
discriminatory and anti-discriminatory fashion. 7° Such a healthcare service could then be a beacon for the 
world to follow. 
8.3 A New Approach to Macro Resource Allocation Decisions 
8.3.1 The Work of the Strategic Body 
Once an independent strategic body has been set up the process of identifying which treatments should be 
available on the NHS and which withheld can begin. Given the impracticality of immediately evaluating every 
`British Medical Association, op cit n58 Chapter 2 `Public' p3. 
67Discussed earlier in this thesis. 
68Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. 1999 Cassell, London at p233. 
69Bell A. It's not fair: issues of equity in NHS health care. BrJHealth Care Management 2000; 6,12: 580-581. 
70In fact, the BMA suggest that politicians may be over-sensitive because `increased spending on public services need not involve great political 
sacrifices.. and could... be a sign of efficient management of public 
finances rather than the opposite': British Medical Association, op cit n58 
Chapter 4 `The Af'ordability Gap' pl. 
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possible treatment option, an initial identification of those conditions most agree should be treated and those 
most agree should not be treated on the NHS should be made. To a certain extent, that will be based on 
commonsense as Dworkin recognises. " Once these have been decided, the clinical and cost effectiveness of 
the different treatment options can be assessed. This will allow fine tuning of the list to begin. The strategic 
body could identify treatments which will always be available on the NHS, for instance, appendectomies, 
antenatal care and delivery, childhood vaccinations and treatment for broken limbs. If the strategic body 
decides that treatment should be available then the funds for this should be made available by the state. These 
treatments and the funds for them could be ringfenced to ensure that they will be available to all in a timely 
fashion. Even sufficient bedlinen could be a ringfenced cost. Unlike hypothecated taxes which are popular 
with the public but not with governments", ring-fencing of some of the NHS funding could command both 
public and government support. Doctors would be free to select from the list of available treatments freely, just 
as they do very much at present with many treatments and drugs. 
In between the always give and never give treatments, there are `grey areas' which need to be addressed by the 
strategic body. 73 Within the grey areas there will be some treatments which are a matter of resources and others 
which are a matter of ethics. Tattoo removal could be considered a matter of resources since tattoos are not 
life-threatening and the person was a volunteer in the first place. Gender reassignment or separation of 
conjoined twins are ethical issues. Currently, debate is dominated by clinical opinion with ethical input often 
being of an extremist nature. 74 The order in which full clinical and cost-effectiveness evaluations are conducted 
of treatments falling into the `grey' area where there is disagreement over whether the NHS should provide 
them could be determined by a wider public dialogue. This is because the decision-making process needs to 
move beyond the assertion of Auld U that, `(i)n establishing priorities - comparing the respective needs of 
patients suffering from different illnesses and determining the respective strengths of their claims to treatment - 
it is vital for an authority: (1) to accurately assess the nature and seriousness of each type of illness; (2) to 
determine the effectiveness of various forms of treatment for it; and (3) to give proper effect to that assessment 
and that determination in the formulation and individual application of its policy. '75 In order to protect `the 
legitimate claims of the patient on the community' it is necessary to adopt `a notion of the duties of the 
community to the person'. 76 Rights are not just for safeguarding private individual interests but also have an 
`instrumental aspect regarding the life of the community'. " Communal discussions can assist in developing 
a jurisprudence that balances individual interests with societal interests but government must recognise that 
`some issues are better handled... through promulgation by policymakers and indirect assent by the citizenry'. 78 
The flawed consultation exercise preceding the NHS Plan demonstrates political expediency at the expense of 
research robustness. 79 However, handled well, communal deliberation `permits the possibility of shaping the 
social world and engenders responsibility for helping create the future'. 8° Stoll's call for societal approval of 
"Dworkin, op cit n7 at pp313-314. 
"British Medical Association, op cit n58, Chapter 4 `The Affordability Gap' at p2. 
"Ibid, at p316. 
"Catholic papers claimed the courts were `legalising involuntary euthanasia' in the case of Re H (A Patient) [1998] 2 FLR 36: Caldwell S. 
Euthanasia Fear Grows - Feeding may be denied crash victim. The Universe 24 November 1996. 
75R v North West Lancashire HA, ex parte A, D&G [2000] WLR 977 at pp991-992. 
76 Kuczewski, op cit nI, at p107. 
"Ibid, at P109. 
78Ibid, at p 112. 
79See discussion earlier in this thesis. 
BOKuczewski, op cit ni at p108. 
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rationing criteria could be answered. 8' A `public dialogue in which we enter as equals'82 seems appropriate 
for deciding how to balance the interests of groups of individuals against societal interests once the larger 
question of what percentage of revenue should be allocated to the NHS over and above that which is needed 
to fund those treatments identified as `must treats'. So, for instance, the question of whether infertility 
treatment represents a proper use of NHS funds and should be prioritised over other `desirable' treatments 
could be made by the strategic body. That way, because it would be completely separate from government, 
unlike NICE, its decisions could gain greater societal acceptance. 
Once the strategic body has identified the treatments that all agree should be given in a timely manner, a 
costing exercise can be done. It is submitted that the government should ensure that sufficient funds are 
available so that the `must-treats' can be treated in a timely, effective and nationally equitable manner. Once 
this has been done, regional inequalities can be tackled effectively. At present, the government aim is to reduce 
regional inequality in certain key treatment areas without identifying how to tackle inequalities in 'grey' areas 
where some hospitals offer more advanced diagnostic or screening tests, treatments such as IVF or laser 
treatment, novel techniques such as artificial hearts or a particular expertise in certain types of surgery. At 
present, there is merely speculation that because less is spent compared with equivalent countries like France 
and Germany the NHS is underfunded. However, it is submitted that the percentage of GDP that is put into 
health in the U. K. may really be insufficient to meet adequately the needs of its citizens. An independent, 
rigorously conducted appraisal would yield the information necessary. If the strategic body says these 
conditions must be treated and these are the best treatments, in our opinion, taking into account ethics, medical 
effectiveness etc then the government is going to have to face hard questions if delivering those treatments to 
all citizens in a timely manner is going to exceed what it wants to put into healthcare. For example, it may be 
that the `must treats' already swallow up 90% of the present amount allocated to health and the NHS is trying 
to deliver some of the `desirable but not strictly necessary' treatments as well. To deliver those `desirables' 
in a timely and equitable manner would perhaps cost 20% of the current budget but there is only 10% of the 
budget left so some people don't get timely `must treat' treatments because other specialties in their area are 
swallowing up moneys that should be going their way. Government must meet this challenge because 
otherwise, as medicine advances, the desirables will start eating away further at the `must treats' budget and 
then ways to restrict who will get the `must treats' such as age-limits will become increasingly prevalent at a 
time when people are actually able to live longer and more healthily than before and these restrictions are likely 
to become increasingly arbitrary or discriminatory. Ultimately, the state should fund the NHS sufficiently so 
that all hospitals and specialties achieve the level of care of the better ones and all patients receive the same 
opportunities. However, if the government of the day refused to fund in full the recommendations of the 
strategic body, the body would have to set priorities in a medically robust, open, fair and equitable way that 
recognises the value of all citizens. At the same time, government under-funding could be challenged through 
the democratic process. 
New or experimental therapies and treatments that are not strictly addressing a matter of ill-health would also 
fall into Dworkin's `grey area'. What is needed is `rigorous evaluation of therapies, a technique that modern 
medicine is only now learning to perform in theory and has far to go in applying to practice'. 
83 Jonsen 
81Stoll BA (Ed) Ethical Dilemmas in Cancer Care. 1989 The Macmillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke at pp24-26.. 
'2Kuczewski, op cit nI at p112. 
83Jonsen et al, op cit n6 at p56 
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approves Moore's sentiment that `(t)here must be some likelihood of success before the desperate remedy 
becomes more than a desperate search for an opportunity to try a new procedure awaiting trial'. ' The 
treatment proposed for Child B was experimental and what was eventually tried had never been tried before. 85 
An appropriate safeguard would be to have a code of practice that sets out ethical, legal and scientific standards 
that should be met. This could set out whether approval should be sought prior to the new treatment being 
given and who should give such approval. It could delineate the evaluations a doctor should make where the 
situation is an emergency. These need not be onerous and would probably reflect the analysis that the best 
doctors automatically make in such situations already. The doctor who can demonstrate scientific and peer 
support for an experimental procedure will have little to fear but the maverick would be partly controlled. 86 
The decision as to whether the state will fund experimental treatments could be taken by the strategic body who 
could delineate any special requirements such as whether funding approval should be sought. 
There could be a separate, nationally or locally administered fund for purchasing treatment in the private sector 
or funding experimental treatment. Treatments such as IVF and tattoo removal that will only rarely be given 
could be subject to a special demand fund the size of which would be determined by government and subject 
to other demands on its revenues. There could be competition for these treatments, or for funds, by patients 
or hospitals. Whilst this might be unpopular initially with some doctors who wish to expand their expertise 
and enhance their personal reputations, anomalies such as IVF treatment being provided for a lucky few whilst 
the funds for an MRI scanner have to be raised by local endeavour should disappear as the equipment and 
facilities for diagnosis are prioritised. The BMA, itself, implies support for this proposal since it believes that 
encouraging `a private sector market for those (treatments) which do not meet the criteria for public funding, 
and research funding to develop cost-effective solutions in the long term, will help to maintain incentives for 
further innovation'. 87 
The investigations of the strategic body may yield information that is hard to handle. For instance, some non- 
treatment options may be more costly for society whereas some may save society money. More costly options 
include autologous blood transfusions and patients remaining in hospital because they refuse surgical 
treatments like amputation. Society possibly needs to consider whether patients whose choice is more costly 
to society than what the doctor recommends should be asked to fund the difference or whether society is 
prepared to accept this extra cost. As with education, it might be decided that the state should provide a basic, 
`non-denominational' service for all but additional costs that arise due to religious preferences will have to be 
met by the family or their religious community. Perhaps the extra costs balance out because some patients will 
die because of their refusal and some patients will die because they do have treatment but, at present, this is 
unknown. If respecting autonomy is more costly to society, perhaps the rationality or plausibility of the 
patient's decision would then be determinative of whether society will cover the extra costs. The question 
whether there is an ethical obligation on society to provide treatment at extra costs to satisfy someone's 
personal preferences, whether inspired by religious/cultural values or not, needs to be openly addressed by the 
strategic body with appropriate inputs. In order to protect the `genuine interests of health care service users' 
the NHS needs to safeguard key aspects including `the provision of advice, information, and services which 
84Ibid, at p51. 
85Ham C, Pickard S. Tragic Choices in Health Care: The case of Child B. 1998 Kings Fund, London at p30. 
161t is recognised that the determined doctor who wishes to act outside legal and ethical parameters will al), N ays be able to find a way to do so but 
measures such as regular appraisal and audit can eventually detect Shipman-type mavericks. 
87British Medical Association, op cit n58 Chapter 4 `The Affordability Gap' at p2. 
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are aimed at real human needs and are in accordance with acceptable standards of efficiency and professional 
excellence'. 88 This safeguarding can be strengthened by accepting a concept of rights as `procedural 
guarantees'. 89 There should be a key statement that an overriding principle is that in establishing the 
framework, discrimination on the grounds of age, sex, culture, religion, ethnic background or disability is 
totally unacceptable. As Harris affirms, `(e)qual opportunities recognise the existential or intrinsic value of 
people'. 90 
Regarding patients who refuse recommended treatment, the strategic body may recommend that hospitalisation 
should not be provided without the patient accepting intervention. So, the patient who refuses medical 
treatment, but still requires nursing care, could be moved to a more appropriate centre although the option to 
change his/her mind and accept treatment should be made clear. In other words, the patient who refuses 
treatment will be treated just the same as the patient who no longer needs 24 hour medical care available. The 
strategic body would have to consider time-restricting certain treatments. Questions have to be addressed such 
as, if improvement is likely to be minimal, is continued funding of care justified? It may be appropriate for 
individual and societal interests to be balanced by deciding that the state will ask that artificial nutrition and 
hydration are withdrawn if a patient has remained in a vegetative state longer than some minimal period that 
should be decided with input from the public, medical experts, ethicists and lawyers. Whilst some suggest that 
patients in low awareness states should be classed as dead since this would `eliminate the physicians' 
responsibilities to these patients' and `(d)ebates about appropriate care, rationing, and futility... would become 
irrelevant if these patients were defined as dead'9' this is too far a step at present as recognised in Re A 
(Conjoined Twins). 92 Not only would difficulties arise regarding threshold-setting but emotionally, it seems 
unlikely that families could accept this. 
8.3.2 A New Model for Making Decisions at the National Level 
The strategic body should ask... 
1. What is the condition? 
2. How serious is it? 
0 Life-threatening but treatable - presumption in favour of treating to save life and preventing 
spread of disease 
9 Life-threatening and incurable - presumption in favour of providing palliative care to ensure 
the best possible quality of life. 
0 Reduces quality of life significantly - presumption in favour of treating where quality of life 
can be improved. 
0 Reduces quality of life slightly - funds may be available once other, more serious conditions 
have been treated. This may be a condition that is not an appropriate one for public funds 
to be spent on. 
"Campbell AV, GillettG. `Autonomy Revisited. ' In Campbell AV, GillettG. Ethical Issues in Defining Core Services. Discussion, National 
Advisory Committee, Wellington, New Zealand pp 50-66 at p60. 
89Kuczewski, op cit nI at p101. 
90Harris J. Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care. Bioethics 1999; 17,5: 392-404 at p399. 
"Payne K, et al. Physicians' Attitudes about the Care of Patients in the Persistent Vegetative State: A National Surrey. Ann. lnt. Med. 
1996; 125,2: 105-110 at p 108. 
92Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [200111 FLR 1. 
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3 Does the law require that the condition is treated regardless of patient consent because it is necessary 
for public health and safety? 
" Treatment is legally required - funds should be ring-fenced to ensure the most ethically 
acceptable and medically effective treatment possible is given. The presumption that the 
legal requirement for the condition to be treated is based on a sound medical and ethical 
basis should be regularly reviewed. 
0 The law is silent - consider the ethical acceptability of treating the condition. 
4 Is treatment of the condition ethically acceptable? 
0 Treatment of the condition is ethically required - presumption in favour of ensuring 
sufficient funds are available. Consider the ethical acceptability, the medical effectiveness 
and the cost effectiveness of different treatments for the condition. 
0 Treatment of the condition is ethically acceptable - consider the ethical acceptability, medical 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness of different treatments for the condition. 
" Non-treatment of the condition is ethically acceptable but may be desired by individual 
patients - consider ethical acceptability, medical effectiveness, lawfulness and cost- 
effectiveness of different treatment options. 
0 Treating this condition is ethically unacceptable - treatment will not be available and may 
possibly be a candidate for prohibition by the legislature. 
5 What is the ethical acceptability of the different treatments for a specific condition? 
9 The treatment is ethically acceptable - consider medical effectiveness, lawfulness and cost- 
effectiveness. 
0 There may be some treatments where the ethical status is uncertain or possibly controversial. 
Further analysis will be necessary and guidelines should be issued by the strategic body for 
when it may be appropriate to discuss the treatment with an individual patient or refer the 
decision regarding an individual patient to an appropriate tribunal or ethics committee. 
" The treatment is ethically unacceptable - this treatment will not be offered. 
6 How clinically effective is each ethically acceptable treatment option? 
0 The treatment is highly effective - presumption in favour of making this available. Consider 
lawfulness and cost-effectiveness. 
0 The treatment achieves an acceptable level of effectiveness - consider lawfulness and cost- 
effectiveness. 
0 The treatment is of little efficacy - the less effective a treatment is, the less likely that it will 
be made available, unless more effective treatments are not available. 
7 Is the treatment option lawful? 
0 The treatment option is lawful - this treatment can be provided subject to cost-effectiveness. 
0 The legal status is uncertain - further consultation is necessary and the ethical status and 
medical reasons for providing treatment should be considered more fully. If necessary, 
guidance should be issued to doctors for use with individual cases which will set out the 
procedure to follow in order to have the lawfulness of the option established. 
0 The treatment option is prohibited by law - it will not be offered by the NHS. Whether the 
current legal position is out of step with medical and ethical values should be clarified. 
8 Is the treatment option cost-effective? 
0 Financially acceptable options should be offered by the NHS. Certain treatments for a 
condition could be identified as first-line options with more expensive options as second-line 
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unless individual characteristics of the patient indicate that first-line treatment should begin 
with the more expensive option. Guidelines should be issued to support good medical practice 
at the individual patient decision-making level. 
" The treatment option is not ethically required and represents an inappropriate use of scarce 
public funds so it will not be available on the NHS. 
The decision-making processes of the strategic body should be open to public scrutiny and the reasons for the 
decisions explained. Also, as Dworkin says, `its results must be... open to revision on the basis of further 
evidence of public preference as well as medical technology and experience'. 93 The results must also be open 
to revision in light of emerging ethical and human rights insights. 
8.3.3 A Diagrammatic Representation of How the Model Works 
0= Treatments accepted as Ethical 
Q= Treatments accepted as Medically Effective 
0= Treatments accepted as Lawful 
F-I = Ethical and Medically Effective but not Lawful 
= Medically Effective and Lawful but not Ethical 
= Ethical and Lawful but not Medically Effective 
= Treatment is Medically Effective, Ethical and Lawful 
This model represents very simplistically whether particular treatments are ethically acceptable, medically 
effective and legally permissible. The strategic body will use its medical, ethical and legal expertise as filters 
to identify which treatments fall into which of the three main zones. Many treatments which are already being 
offered by the NHS will fall into all three zones and hence are placed in the central White zone thereby forming 
the first stage of a `medical-social triage' in healthcare. 94 Some treatments will fall into two zones but not the 
central White zone. All the zones will be fluid and sometimes there may be uncertainty as to where different 
treatments belong. This `greyness' will be for the strategic body to identify and work out how to address either 
by means of recommending further medical research, requesting that the government commissions an inquiry 
into the associated ethical and legal issues or issuing guidelines to assist in individual cases. 
8.3.3.1 The White Zone Treatments 
A State funded healthcare system should concentrate on delivering, to whatever extent is compatible with 
national priorities and budgets, treatments in the White zone since these are the ones where medical 
effectiveness, lawfulness and ethical acceptability are in concordance. It is accepted that it may not be possible 
to provide timely treatment to all citizens of every treatment that falls within the White zone but it is 
inappropriate for a state-funded system to provide treatments which are outside the White zone when it is 
93 Dworkin, op cit n7 at p318. 
941 am indebted to Professor Carol Leppa, University of Washington, Seattle, for coining this phrase for me. We believe it is original. 
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having to limit White zone treatments on cost grounds. The treatments in the White zone should include 
palliative care for patients who cannot, or do not wish to, be treated. Once the initial zoning has been carried 
out, fine-tuning can begin. The expertise of the strategic body will enable it to begin to identify that within each 
of the three zones, there will be some conditions that it is ethically, medically or legally required that treatment 
is made available. These can be placed within circles at the centre of each of the three main zones. Where these 
circles overlap into the central White zone this indicates that the opportunity for treatment must be made 
available on the NHS - it is unacceptable to leave treating the condition a matter of individual finances (and/or 
personal choice in the case of conditions which are so threatening to public safety that treatment must be given 
regardless of personal wishes). In making its recommendations, the strategic body should give the highest 
priority to the `must treats' and the funds for these should preferably be ring-fenced by government. Examples 
of `must provide' treatments are effective pain relief in palliative care on ethical grounds and treatments for 
diseases, such as smallpox, that pose such a serious threat to public safety that legislation provides for treatment 
regardless of patient consent. An example of a `condition' where there may eventually be a legal requirement 
for `treatment' to be given regardless of patient consent, or the willingness of psychiatric units to provide 
treatment, is `dangerously severe personality disorder'9s 
As seen, fine tuning allows the identification of treatments that must be made 
available on ethical and/or medical and/or legal grounds. 
Then the process of prioritising the `desirable' treatments for conditions that it may be appropriate for the state 
to offer to fund treatment for its citizens begins. The medical and cost effectiveness of different treatments 
within the White zone for the same condition should be examined. The Statement of Protections will be relevant 
in assisting how to set priorities between different White zone treatments for different conditions to prevent 
discrimination. However, some treatments may represent a disproportionately large part of the overall healthcare 
budget if they were to be provided completely freely so it may be appropriate for the strategic body to use its 
ethical, medical and legal expertise to draft guidelines which may help doctors identify which patients should 
be offered these treatments. Examples of such treatments which may need supporting guidelines, as NICE has 
recognised, could be Arocept for Alzheimer's or Relenza for influenza. The drafting of guidelines should not 
be left for the state to do because decisions could be dominated by costs and possibly by inappropriate 
considerations such as the worth of certain individuals to society. On the boundaries of the White zone are 
treatments which fall into either the Purple, Orange or Green zones. Medical advances and changes in society's 
views (possibly reflected in legislative changes) mean that all the zones are fluid. Treatments which presently 
fall into the White zone may become less effective compared with new drugs or operations and so fall out of the 
medical effectiveness zone and consequently, fall out of the White zone. Changes in societal attitudes towards 
medical advances or individual disability may mean that treatments seen as ethically acceptable are no longer 
seen as that. Conversely, medical advances and changes in ethical and legal opinion can mean that new 
treatments move into the White zone whereas, before, they were only in one of the bordering Purple, Orange or 
Green zones. The strategic body will need to continuously monitor the treatments 
"Secretary of State for Health. Reforming the Mental Health Act (Cm50161) December 2000. The Stationery Office, London. 
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it is recommending should be provided. 
8.3.3.2 The Red Zone Treatments 
Achieving consensus as to what constitutes ethical practice may be more problematic than identifying what is 
medically effective or lawful. What is seen as ethical may be either politically driven or in political dispute. 
Professional training as well as personal beliefs may influence attitudes. The question could be asked, whose 
ethic informs decision-making? By addressing these issues openly, it is submitted that a greater convergence 
between different ethical approaches could be achieved and the medical-social triage which the strategic body 
will be looking to achieve would command public acceptance. It is unlikely that many treatments would fall 
solely into the Red zone because ethical acceptability must be doubtful if the treatment is neither medically 
effective nor lawful. There may be ethically acceptable treatments which are of poor medical efficacy but, since 
English law tends to permit what has not been specifically prohibited the likelihood of an actual prohibition 
is remote. An example of where ethics could be out of step with medical practice and the law may be uncertain 
could be when artificial nutrition and hydration of a patient is in question. The medical treatment could, in 
the case of a severely brain-damaged patient, be of little efficacy but it would be ethically acceptable to either 
withhold or withdraw treatment or to continue treatment. If the law had to determine the lawfulness of the 
treatment/non-treatment options and decided that treatment was unlawful, it could be seen to be requiring non- 
treatment despite the fact that treatment could be seen as ethical. In such a situation, the non-treatment 
decision would be forced upon doctors and patients/families. Where treatment could be ethical and possibly 
effective the law must be cautious about insisting the treatment option is unlawful. In contrast, in some 
situations the treatment option might be non-treatment. Problems would arise where, for instance, even if 
treatment is of low efficacy but might possibly save life (hence could be ethically acceptable), non-treatment 
seemed unacceptable legally (either because of legislation or through the impact of the tort of negligence). 
Doctors could end up treating patients against their better judgment because they fear `the judge over their 
shoulder'. At that point, treatment could be seen as becoming unethical depending upon the circumstances 
of the individual patient. 
8.3.3.3 The Yellow Zone Treatments 
Treatments that fall solely in the Yellow zone are ones that are medically effective but neither ethical nor 
lawful. An example could be carrying out a kidney transplant using a kidney that the patient had bought on 
the Internet. In such a case, the law has actively prohibited such transplants taking place in Britain because 
of the ethical unacceptability of trade in human organs. Another example, may eventually be the 
development 
of the ability to successfully clone human beings. As with the other zones, the boundaries 
between the Yellow 
zone and adjoining ones will be fluid. Ethical opinion and laws may change to meet changing circumstances. 
In the past, there has been a tendency for medical efficacy to dictate what was ethical and 
lawful. As new 
treatments are developed by doctors pushing out the boundaries of medical science, the strategic body will 
have 
to continually re-appraise the ethical and legal acceptability of the advances. 
8.3.3.4 The Blue Zone Treatments 
Treatments that fall solely in the Blue zone are legally acceptable but neither medically effective nor ethically 
acceptable. Treatments which 
fall solely in the Blue zone may represent out-dated practices and the strategic 
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body should investigate whether the law is out of step with ethics and should be modified or whether it is 
sufficient merely to provide guidance to doctors so that they avoid giving treatment that merely has its 
lawfulness to recommend it. An example of a Blue zone treatment could be the use of regression therapy with 
patients suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. The treatment is lawful but is of no medical efficacy for this 
particular condition and, in fact, could be positively harmful (hence, unethical). Of course, if a patient were 
to receive this treatment, and suffer harm, the doctor may be held negligent. In that case, it would then become 
apparent that the treatment was not a lawful option for that condition. The strategic body would need to 
monitor the appropriateness of different treatments for different conditions so that its recommendations were 
not out-dated. 
8.3.3.5 The Purple Zone Treatments 
It is a waste of scarce state resources to fund treatments which fall in the Purple zone since these represent poor 
value for money because they are not medically effective or only poorly effective. However, it may be 
appropriate, as part of the process of developing more effective treatments and/or cures/symptom- 
relievers/symptom-controllers, for the state to agree to fund some of these treatments under controlled 
conditions. For instance, some of the Purple zone treatments might fall into research trials and delivered under 
ethical and scientific protocols. Novel or experimental treatments, such as the treatment for which Jaymee 
Bowen's father sought to secure NHS funding, fall into the Purple zone. An example of a Purple zone 
treatment that is currently being provided on the NHS in some areas is in-vitro fertilisation treatment for 
infertility. It may be appropriate for guidelines to be developed, based on best research evidence to date, which 
will suggest when it may be appropriate for patients to receive these treatments. This could be part of the role 
of the strategic body. That way, treatments which may be of increasing medical effectiveness as greater 
knowledge and understanding about how and when they work can start to be recommended for provision on 
the NHS. For instance, guidelines could help target the use of beta interferon for multiple sclerosis towards 
those patients it could benefit. 
8.3.3.6 The Orange Zone Treatments 
Treatments which fall into the Orange zone represent examples where, for some reason, the law is out of step 
with what is held to be both medically effective treatment and ethically acceptable treatment. It cannot be seen 
as appropriate for a state-funded healthcare system to fund treatments which, if provided, are liable to result 
in the providers (and possibly the recipients) in facing criminal charges. This could represent a situation where 
medical advances and changes in philosophy have out-stripped the law or where legislators have been 
influenced by a vociferous, but not necessarily representative, group. An example of an Orange zone treatment 
could be abortion. Prior to the legalisation of abortion, it was considered ethically acceptable 
by many people 
and could be carried out in a medically effective way but most doctors were unwilling to carry out abortions. 
A second example could be euthanasia. There is a pro-euthanasia lobby which would 
like to see the law 
changed. Some doctors are prepared to extend the Doctrine of Double 
Effect to the boundaries of lawfulness. 
A lack of state-funded palliative care support means that euthanasia could become seen as ethically-required, 
not just, as at present, ethically acceptable to some people and 
in some forms. Consequently, the pressure for 
legislative change would increase. Another example is that of surrogacy where, admittedly, as with euthanasia, 
opinion is divided over whether 
it is an ethically acceptable remedy, so perhaps it does not belong in the Red 
(ethically acceptable) zone at all. The law has intervened to set out restrictions upon surrogacy. It can not be 
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seen as acceptable for the strategic body to recommend any treatment for provision on the NHS which it would 
be impossible to provide within the boundaries of the existing legislation. Opponents of legislative restrictions 
upon treatment that is generally accepted as ethically acceptable and medically effective will have to use the 
tools of democracy to bring about a change in the law. However, the same democratic tools are available for 
those who believe the law should restrict certain treatments and they also may campaign for changes. For 
example, the pro-life lobby believe that abortion laws should be changed. The strategic body should consider 
whether certain treatments are becoming available which could be of questionable lawfulness and should issue 
guidelines to assist doctors in making decisions and/or refer concerns to an investigative body which could 
report to parliament as has been done with regard to issues of human fertility 
8.3.3.7 The Green Zone Treatments 
Treatments which fall into the Green zone are both medically effective and lawful but their ethical acceptability 
is doubtful. These treatments may be ones that have been carried out by doctors, behind closed doors for years 
and the law has not intervened because it was possibly unaware of what was happening. At some point, the 
legal system may be involved and have to carry out an examination of what is lawful. The over-reliance of the 
judiciary on medical opinion in the past has lead to situations where both the lawfulness and the ethical 
acceptability of the treatment in question has been dictated by medical practice rather than expert ethical 
opinion. An example of a Green zone treatment could be the use of hysterectomy as a method of controlling 
the fertility of people with learning disabilities. Although applications to the court for a declaration of 
lawfulness are required when the patient is an adult, no such application is currently required if the patient is 
under eighteen years and the doctor considers the operation `therapeutic' so medical opinion and parental 
consent can result in what many consider to be unethical practices. Another area where the ethical 
acceptability of treatment may be in doubt is the use of plastic surgery to modify the typical facial features of 
children with Down's syndrome. Some of the treatments which fall into the Green zone may be ones where 
the law dictates that a certain condition exists and must be treated regardless of the consent of the patient, for 
instance, severe mental illness or smallpox. If treating a certain condition is legally required, but the treatment 
is ethically unacceptable, alternative treatments should be sought. If it is not possible to treat the condition 
except by using an unethical treatment strong representations should be made by the strategic body that 
parliament should reconsider the legislative compulsion and that research should be conducted to try to develop 
ethically acceptable treatments. Ethically-prohibited treatment should not be an option. In cases where there 
is a legal requirement to treat, the type of treatment that is most ethically acceptable to the patient, least 
invasive and least abusive of the patient's human rights should be used. The strategic body should issue 
guidance for use with individual patients. The strategic body needs to be alive to the potential for abuse of 
human rights in the name of medical efficacy and the burdens that some patients place on their families and/or 
society. It would not seem appropriate for the strategic body to recommend treatments for provision by the 
NHS that were of dubious ethical acceptability. Nor should it be a part of the remit of the strategic body to 
decide who presents a burden upon society nor how that burden should be relieved. 
8.3.3.8 Treatments which Fall Outside the Zones 
With some treatments it is impossible to know, without examination of individual cases, whether treatment is 
going to fall into any or all of the zones. For example, in the case of the conjoined twins, there was a certain 
amount of uncertainty about the results of the separation operation for the twin (Jodie) whom the doctors hoped 
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to save. There was a risk that she would die during the operation or within a few months of it. She would 
certainly need further operations but no one could state for certain how many, or what. No one was able to 
state for certain whether she would be able to walk, have bowel control, or have children. Therefore, it was not 
possible to say definitely that the separation represented medically effective treatment. Ethically, it was clear 
from the surrounding debate, that opinion was divided upon whether the separation should go ahead. The 
operation would cost the twin (Mary) her life and that raised issues about sanctity of live versus quality of life. 
In the long run, the burdens of treatment for Jodie might end up outweighing the benefits of treatment. Opinion 
was divided as to whether the parents should be allowed to refuse the separation. Not all doctors would have 
taken the same approach as the Manchester team. Legally, the position was uncertain and it fell to the civil 
courts to examine both the questions of the children's best interests and issues of criminal law. Consequently, 
the legal process dominated a highly sensitive ethical issue of medical treatment or non-treatment although 
it is accepted that the judges did their best to investigate both the ethical issues and the medical uncertainties. 
Added to the uncertainties of ethics, medicine and law, was the issue of costs. Obviously, costs were not 
determinative but they cannot be considered as irrelevant when rationing of treatment is a reality in a state- 
funded system nor should they been seen as irrelevant when carrying out treatment means that a commitment 
to continuing treatment and further operations is needed yet may not be forthcoming from the country of origin. 
If the case could have be considered by an independent tribunal consisting of equally weighted legal, medical 
and ethical opinion, a more satisfactory, though not necessarily different, decision could have been made. It 
could be seen as appropriate for the strategic body to issue guidelines to assist in making decisions for 
individual patients. 
8.4 A New Approach to Decision-making for Individual Patients 
8.4.1 Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment from Individual Patients 
Where there is evidence of the patient's own beliefs or preferences, these should be relevant, though not 
decisive, factors since respect for persons demands that they receive due consideration. Whilst a patient- 
centred approach to scarce resources is important it cannot be appropriate for patients, or families, to restrict, 
for selfish reasons, the access of those who might benefit more from using the resource. Individual rights to 
life have to be balanced against the rights of others to life and not to have scarce societal resources wasted. 
`Futility' is misused and inappropriate decisions are made based on `quality of life assessments' rather than 
a premise that life is valuable. Obviously, the `grading of human beings according to "value" is both repugnant 
and highly dangerous"' but the limits to society's resources have to be recognised. To prevent discrimination 
or abuse there will need to be certain protections such as respect for the right to life and minimal interference 
in order to protect vulnerable patients. At present, once the patient is older, or clearly mentally incapacitated, 
albeit not severely, non-treatment starts to become the medical rule and there may be no relative to challenge 
the doctors. Although such patients represent an economic drain upon society a `social cost-benefit analysis' 
is inappropriate for doctors. 97 Some of the necessary protections are found in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
96 Davis A. All babies should be kept alive as far as possible. ' In Gillon R, Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
Chichester at pp629-641 at pp630-1. 
97See: Airedale NHS Trust i" Bland [ 1993] AC 789 at p896 per Lord Mustill. 
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The fact that decisions are not purely clinical needs to be better recognised. As Thorpe LJ said, '(i)n deciding 
what is best for the disabled patient the judge must have regard to the patient's welfare as the paramount 
consideration. That encompasses issues far wider than the medical. Indeed it would be undesirable and 
probably impossible to set bounds to what is relevant to a welfare determination'. 98 All decision-makers must 
bear this in mind. The effect of family wishes and burdens on the family needs to be recognised. Relatives 
may, with love, consider withdrawing active treatment. 99 Differing circumstances legitimately play a part in 
the decision-making process. 1°° The `costs to others - whether family members, other participants in insurance 
pools, or society generally"" must also be addressed. It is unrealistic to expect doctors, families and patients 
to be totally dispassionate and solely focused on the patient when making decisions because of the emotional 
burden of caring for someone over a period of time. Healthcare organisations need to provide peer and 
administrative support so that individual feelings and emotions do not dominate the decision-making process. 
Families need support particularly when a non-treatment decision will result in death. This need is likely to 
be particularly strong when the family is isolated and displaced from its culture or country of origin. It should 
be possible within a relatively cash-rich society like the U. K. to be able to institute or continue therapy, at least 
short-term, where some benefit of value to the individual patient can be gained. A holistic approach is needed 
and providing or continuing treatment for the psychological well-being of the patient10' and/or family need not 
be unethical. "' When withholding or withdrawing treatment it is necessary to recognise that `(f)amilies may 
also suffer harm'. 104 Most doctors are motivated by `the special needs and circumstances of each patient'. '°5 
This is why guidelines, though important as a way of ensuring good standards of care, should not be applied 
in an unthinking manner. Considering the spirit of the guideline is more important than merely considering 
the actual words. 
Doctors should not have exclusive rights over the decision. The patient's views expressed through advance 
directives should be given a place. Likewise, although families are often less close nowadays, the role of 
relatives, or significant others, can be legitimate. "' It would be inappropriate to exclude any opportunity for 
independent scrutiny or conflict resolution as the government recognises in Making Decisions. 107 When there 
is conflicting evidence as to what construes a patient's best interests the courts can investigate the value of 
what, if anything, the patient has indicated about his/her future wishes1°8; whether different members of the 
family concur 1°9; whether different doctors concur1'; whether the spokesperson is appropriate"' and whether 
98Re S (Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389 at p403F per Thorpe LJ. 
99See Whitelaw A, Thorensen M. Ethical Dilemmas around the Time of Birth. In Gillon R (Ed). Principles of Health Care Ethics 1994 John 
Wiley & Son, Chichester pp617-627 at pp624-5. 
1°°Ibid, at p619. 
'°'Buchanan AE, Brock DW. Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision-making. 1990 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
at p202. 
102 To provide futile treatment for psychological benefit is considered acceptable by a number of ethicists. See: Smith DH, Veatch RM (Eds). 
Guidelines on the Termination ofLife-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying. A Report by the Hastings Center. 1987 The Hastings 
Center, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indiapolis at pp19 and 32. 
"'Paris JJ et al. Physicians' refusal of requested treatment: the case of Baby L. NEJM 1990; 322,14: 1012-1014 at p1013. 
i°4Saunders J. Medical futility: CPR in Lee R, Morgan D (Eds) Death Rites: Law and ethics at the end of life. 1994 Routledge, London at pp72- 
90 at p77. 
1°5Sugarbaker PH et al. Quality of life assessment of patients in extremity sarcoma trials. Surgery 1982; 91: 17-23 at p23. 
"'Grubb A. Treatment decisions: keeping it in the family. In: Grubb A. Choices and Decisions in Health Care. 1993 John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester at pp37-96. See also: Meyers D. The family and life and death decisions. In Sutherland E, McCall Smith A (Eds). Family Rights: 
Family Latin and Medical Advance. 1990 Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh at pp59-79, in particular, at p64. 
107Lord Chancellor's Department, op cit n9. See discussion earlier in this thesis. 
1O8Sommerville A. Rememberance of conversations past: oral advance statements about medical treatment. BMJ 1995; 310: 1663-5. 
"'Tilden LP, et al. Decisions about life-sustaining treatment. Arch. Intern. Medicine. 1995; 155: 633-8 at p637. 
""See. for example, Re .4 (Conjoined Tivins: Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1. 
I "Tilden, op cit n 109 at p635. 
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the truth is being told. "' The courts play an important role in protecting the vulnerable against both doctors 
and the state. 1' However, the overriding of non-treatment decisions by adolescent patients should be 
approached with caution as should the setting aside of parents as the persons best placed to make decisions for 
their infant children. The present intimacy of most decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment should be 
maintained but the decision-making process will need to determine when it is necessary to move outside the 
doctor-patient relationship to either an institutional, judicial or political process. However, the boundaries 
regarding `which issues we must resolve in common and which privately' will be fluid since there can be no 
a priori principle fixing this. 14 The dividing of medical decision-making in problematic cases according to 
the age of the patient, as proposed in Making Decisions, should be resisted strongly as it will dilute judicial 
expertise at a time when judges are beginning to move away from the adoption of clinical judgment as their 
own. 
8.4.2 A New Model for Making Decisions at the Individual Patient Level 
The role of the doctor is to help patients to make the best decisions for themselves or help others (whether 
parents, patient-appointed proxies, court-appointed managers or the courts) to make the best decision possible 
for the incompetent patient. In the case of a clearly incompetent patient the existence of a lawful proxy may 
be immediately evident but, if this is not the case, it will be necessary to identify whether there is such a person 
prior to making the treatment/non-treatment decision. In other cases, the initial presumption will be that the 
patient presenting for diagnosis and treatment is competent. 
The doctor should ask... 
1 What is the diagnosis? 
2 Is the patient suffering from a condition which the law stipulates must be treated in a specific manner? 
" Yes - treatment must be carried out in accordance with the law. There should be a 
presumption in favour of providing the most ethically acceptable and clinically effective 
treatment so that infringement of individual autonomy is for the minimum length of time 
possible and of the least intrusive nature. 
" No - treatment is a matter of personal choice 
by the patient or patient best interests if 
incompetent. Establish the clinical effectiveness of different treatment options then discuss 
with the patient/proxy. 
3 What treatment options are there? 
" Some treatments are considered completely ethically acceptable and are established as 
standard NHS treatments by the strategic body - these can be discussed freely. 
40 Some treatments are considered completely ethically acceptable but are established as non- 
standard NHS treatments, or second-line treatments, by the strategic body - follow the 
guidelines on when these should be discussed with/offered to the individual patient. 
" Some treatment options are completely ethically acceptable but will not be available on the 
NHS - the doctor should be prepared to disclose the existence of these to the patient/proxy. 
112 Relatives are not the only ones who lie - Dr James Wisheart misled two families by quoting mortality risks half what 
he was actually achieving: 
Anon. GMC find that Dr James Wisheart had misled two. The Lancet 1998; 351: 1900-1901. 
1 "For instance, by requiring certain decisions to have the prior sanction ofa High Courtjudge and advising on making certain diagnoses: Practice 
Note from the Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court on 1 egetative State [ 1996] 2 FLR 375. 
114Kuczewski, op cit nl at p121. 
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" Some treatment options may raise ethical and/or legal concerns. This may include 
experimental treatments or treatments only available through a research trial. If there are 
guidelines already in place, these should be followed. These may indicate when it is 
appropriate to discuss the treatment option with a patient/proxy and what procedural 
safeguards should be followed. If there are no such guidelines the doctor should seek 
specialist ethical and/or legal advice which may be through a nationally or institutionally 
specified route. Whether such treatment options are disclosed to the patient/proxy prior to 
establishing the ethical acceptability or legality of the option should remain a matter for 
professional judgment. 
0 Some treatment options are unlawful although some might consider they are ethically 
acceptable - these should not be offered. Doctors who offer to provide unlawful treatments 
must be prepared to accept the legal and professional consequences of their actions. 
4 Explain the clinical effectiveness of the different options, the risks and the side-effects to the 
patient/proxy to the extent that is desired. This should also include the hospital/department or 
individual practitioner's success rate with a particular procedure if this information is available and 
desired by the patient/proxy. 
0 The presumption should be in favour of fully informing patients. Doctors should be alert to 
barriers which may impair patients being fully informed. 
0 Some patients/proxies may wish to be fully informed - this should be respected. 
0 Some patients/proxies may indicate that they do not wish to be fully informed - this should 
be respected but it should be made clear that they are entitled to receive fuller information, 
clarify issues and raise questions concerning treatment when they are ready to do so. The 
reasons for not being fully open should be recorded and available for scrutiny as part of 
professional audit and clinical governance. 
5 Establish the patient's preferences. 
0 There should be a presumption that the patient is competent to express preferences. This 
presumption should include adolescent children even if the preference they are expressing 
may result in death. 
" There should be a presumption in favour of meeting patient preferences if the patient is 
competent, whether for treatment or non-treatment, providing the treatment option has been 
established as ethical, lawful, representing a fair use of resources and does not threaten 
public health and safety. 
" If the patient's preferences cannot be met by the standard NHS treatment option(s) 
alternatives should be discussed in accordance with any guidelines that have been issued with 
regard to these alternatives. 
" If the patient/proxy preferences cannot, or should not be met, the reasons 
for this should be 
explained. 
" If the patient is incompetent, or there are doubts over the patient's competence, the patient's 
competence should be established using either statutory guidance (if any exists) or 
best- 
practice guidance. The reasons for holding a patient incompetent should be documented, 
available for scrutiny by the courts or an `in-house' ethics committee. The preferences of an 
incompetent patient, whether expressed contemporaneously (personally or through a legal 
proxy) or in the form of an advance directive, should be given due weight in the decision- 
making process. 
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" If there is doubt over whether an advance directive is applicable, or whether the proxy is 
acting/capable of acting as decision-maker, the case should be referred to an appropriate 
forum to decide these issues (guidance on how and when to do this should be available for 
doctors). In the meantime, there should be a presumption in favour of saving life. 
" There should be a presumption that parents of minor children (including parents who are 
minors themselves) and legally appointed proxies are competent to act. 
6 Identify barriers to treatment being given, accepted or continued. 
" Some contextual features will have a significant impact upon whether the patient/proxy 
accepts or refuses treatment. 
" Address patient/proxy fears regarding contextual issues where possible and appropriate. 
" Refer patient/proxy to appropriate sources of advice, information or help (guidance should 
be available for doctors to access and identify referral procedures). 
0 Recognise that individual cases may have an emotional impact upon the whole healthcare 
team, including the doctor, and access support and help in the decision-making process when 
necessary (training and guidance on how to recognise such cases should be available and 
institutional support should be available). 
0 Where the healthcare team, either individually or as a whole, is subjected to violent attack 
by the patient, it should be possible for the team to refuse to provide treatment unless 
adequate protection for their health and safety, and that of other patients, can be ensured. 
7 Identify treatment goals and acceptable outcomes with the patient/proxy. 
0 Markers should be agreed with the patient/proxy so that once treatment has commenced the 
point at which it will be evaluated again is known. 
0 Agree that starting treatment does not mean a commitment to continue it ad infinitum has 
been given. 
" If the treatment fails to deliver the desired outcomes consideration should be given to 
discontinuing treatment or moving to an alternative treatment option. 
8 In the case of a clearly incompetent patient, with no indication as to his/her preferences, establish 
what constitutes the patient's best interests in accordance with good ethical and professional guidance. 
0 There should be a presumption in favour of saving life unless there is clear evidence that the 
burdens of treatment are disproportionate to the likely benefits. 
" The quality of the patient's present life will be a significant, but not decisive, factor. The 
opinions of those who know the patient and/or are closely involved in caring for the patient 
should be given an important place in establishing the quality of the patient's life and 
deciding the patient's best interests. 
0 The age of the patient will be a significant factor when considering the efficacy of treatment 
but should not be a decisive factor in deciding whether to treat or not to treat. 
0 Treatment/non-treatment decisions should be made in accordance with best practice and 
follow an anti-discriminatory model which protects human rights. 
0 The least intrusive means of treating the patient's condition should be chosen. 
0 Identify how well the standard NHS treatment options meet the patient's best interests. If 
the patient's best interests are poorly served by the standard options consider whether 
second-line, experimental or research trial options would be appropriate. Non-standard 
treatment should be an option where this will give better protection of the patient's rights 
and/or is less intrusive or distressing. Guidance should be available from the strategic body 
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to assist in identifying whether non-standard treatment should be used. 
" If there is doubt over what constitutes the patient's best interests, or it is suspected that the 
proxy is acting with self-interest rather than in the patient's best interests, the case should 
be referred to the appropriate, nationally or institutionally identified, decision-making forum. 
Guidance should be available to doctors so that the appropriate forum is selected. 
9 Gain consent to the treatment/non-treatment plan. 
0 If appropriate, or required by national, institutional or professional guidelines, obtain written 
consent. 
" Competent patients will give their own consent. 
" Proxy decision-maker, if one exists, to give assent in the case of incompetent patients unless 
approval of the treatment plan is to be obtained from the courts or a court-appointed 
manager, in which case, assent will be obtained from appropriate person/authority. 
0 If no proxy decision-maker, and none is required by national, institutional or professional 
guidelines, record the reasons for holding the patient incompetent and the reasons why it is 
believed that treatment/non-treatment is in the patient's best interests. This documentation 
to be available for scrutiny by appropriate persons or authorities. 
0 Refusals of clinically-indicated treatment should be recorded. A record of the discussion 
with the patient/proxy should be made. 
0 The right of the patient to change his/her mind should be reiterated. 
8.5 Supporting Recommendations 
No models can address all the weaknesses that this piece of research has identified in the way decisions to 
withhold and withdraw treatment are made. Consequently, some of the necessary improvements can only be 
through other means. In reality, whilst the setting up of an independent strategic body is recommended it 
seems unlikely to happen in the near future. However, improved training of doctors with regard to 
communication skills, ethical analysis and the process of decision-making is feasible. Whilst medical schools 
are already working on this, greater opportunity to work together on problem-solving with people from other 
disciplines, including healthcare managers and lay persons could be useful for both students and qualified 
doctors and could encourage a willingness to value the input of ethicists and lawyers. Greater emphasis should 
be placed on post-registration training to develop communication and decision-making skills. Likewise, ethical 
education opportunities should be available for all members of society so that patients, families and proxy 
decision-makers will be able to contribute in a reasoned and rational manner. This cannot just be left to the 
media to do. Organisations should work to encourage a culture of openness and support for all parties involved 
in decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment, particularly life-prolonging treatment. However, whilst 
`(i)nformation, choice and impartiality may be essential ingredients in progressing moral belief systems, they 
do not in themselves settle any significant value disagreements'. "' Therefore, a statement of protections should 
be drafted with input from a wide cross-section of professional and lay persons and guaranteed by government. 
Amongst other protections, this could state that every resident of the United Kingdom is entitled to free at the 
point of entry healthcare and that no one will be denied any of the ring-fenced, life-saving treatments identified 
by the strategic body on grounds of inability to pay, lack of residency or citizenship. It could also emphasise 
'Campbell T. Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy. J. Law and Society 1999; 26,1: 6-26 at p18. 
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that discrimination on the grounds of age, sexuality, refugee status, religious or cultural beliefs, wealth, postal 
address, race, ethnic origin, disability, gender or marital status is unacceptable. It could reiterate commitment 
to ensuring that all those who have the same condition will receive the same opportunities to benefit from 
treatment. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the way consultant doctors make decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. 
It has identified a number of problems and proposed ways for addressing these including a new model for 
decision-making. Ultimately, decision-making will only improve if all the parties to the non-treatment decision 
learn to respect the views of others and work together to discover what constitutes an ethically, medically, 
legally and economically right decision. Then it will be possible to meet whatever new challenges medical 
technology will produce in the twenty-first century. This thesis is only one small part of trying to find a better 
way of decision-making for patients like `Emily', Jaymee, `Jodie' and `Mary'. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
LETTER SENT TO CONSULTANTS REQUESTING INTERVIEW 
Dear 
I am a PhD law student at the University of Bristol and my thesis is centred on how decisions are made to 
Withhold or Withdraw medical treatment from patients. Would it be possible to interview you in person to 
discover how you, as a hospital consultant, make decisions about withholding or withdrawing medical 
treatment? Your answers will be treated completely confidentially and no identification will be made in my 
thesis or at any time. 
I am writing to consultants from a wide range of specialities to gain a qualitative sample rather than targeting 
consultants in 'high tech' areas as the research is concentrating on patients who could be treated and who are 
not in a vegetative state. For instance, patients like Child B, elderly patients requiring dialysis and patients 
requiring treatment for non-life threatening conditions eg hip replacements. The purpose of this novel piece 
of research is to attempt to identify the principles which currently guide such decisions and which should be 
adopted as the basis for a national model of decision-making. I have spoken with Dr........ who has confirmed 
that this research does not raise any ethical concerns/it has been arranged with Dr...... a member of the 
....... 
Local Research Ethics Committee, that...... will receive a copy of my thesis just before submission in order 
to confirm that confidentiality has been maintained as intended. * 
In addition to my degree in law I am also a qualified medical laboratory scientist which means that I am well 
placed to understand the difficulties faced by doctors at this time of budget restraints conflicting with medical 
advances. My supervisor is.......... who can be contacted on....... for confirmation of my status. 
I will look forward to hearing from you shortly. 
Louise M Terry LLB FIBMS 
* At hospital D, the arrangement was for one of the consultants to check over 
the thesis prior to publication. 
At the other hospitals, this was not considered necessary 
by the consultant regarded as ethics expert. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
CONSULTANT REFERENCE NUMBERS AND SPECIALTIES 
HOSPITAL A 
Al Obstetrics A19 Anaesthetics 
A2 Renal Medicine A20 Paediatrics 
A3 General Medicine A21 Renal Medicine 
A4 Psychiatry A22 Geriatrics 
A5 Anaesthetics A23 Orthopaedic Surgeon 
A6 Anaesthetics A24 General Medicine 
A7 Neonatology A25 Neonatology 
A8 Urology A26 Urology 
A9 General Surgery A27 Oral-Facial Surgery 
A10 Renal Medicine A28 Pyschiatry 
All Anaesthetics A29 Gynaecology 
A12 Neonatology A30 Renal Medicine 
A13 Paediatrics A31 Anaesthetics 
A14 General Medicine A32 Otolaryngology 
A15 Renal Medicine A33 Cardiology 
A16 Orthopaedic Surgery A34 Anaesthetics 
A17 General Surgery A35 Infectious Diseases 
A18 Obstetrics and Gynaecology A36 Paediatric Renal Medicine 
HOSPITAL B 
B1 Geriatrics B11 Community PaediatricsB 12 
B2 Neurology B 12 Physician - Care of the Elderly 
B3 Cardiology B13 Accident and Emergency 
B4 Plastic Surgery B 14 Neurosurgery 
B5 Oral Facial Surgery B 15 Neurosurgery 
B6 Gastroenterology B 16 Neurosurgery 
B7 Neurosurgery B17 Neurophysiology 
B8 Paediatric Neurology B18 Physician - Care of the Elderly 
B9 Plastic Surgery (Burns) B 19 Gynaecology 
B 10 Plastic Surgery B20 Neurosurgery 
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HOSPITAL C 
Cl Endocrinology C 12 Paediatric Endocrinology 
C2 Orthopaedic Surgery C13 Urology 
C3 Obstetrics C 14 Paediatrics 
C4 Oncology C15 Neonatology 
C5 Oncology C16 Urology 
C6 Gynaecology and Urology C17 Paediatrics 
C7 Ophthalmology C18 Anaesthetics 
C8 Gynaecology C19 Accident and Emergency 
C9 Paediatric Surgery C20 Dermatology 
CIO Oncology C21 Anaesthetics 
C 11 Ophthamology 
HOSPITAL D 
DI Anaesthetics D 10 Orthopaedic Surgery 
D2 General Surgery DI I Gynaecology 
D3 Pathology D12 Radiology 
D4 Orthopaedic Surgery D13 Psychiatry 
D5 Cardiac Medicine D 14 Physician - Care of the Elderly 
D6 Anaesthetics D15 Accident and Emergency 
D7 Orthopaedic Surgery D16 General Medicine 
D8 General Surgery D17 Obstetrics 
D9 Physician - Care of the Elderly D18 General Medicine 
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APPENDIX THREE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1 What is your particular specialty? 
- Have you any input into how resources are allocated to this specialty? 
2 Have you had to restrict the medical treatment available to certain patients as a result of limited 
resources? 
- If so, how has this been carried out? 
- Are QALYs used? 
3 How can decision-making regarding the allocation of resources by health authorities be improved? 
- What place is there for local population involvement? 
4 Regarding the individual patient, when deciding to withhold or withdraw certain medical treatments, 
- Which criteria are used? 
- Which criteria should not be used? 
5 Who should be involved in the decision to treat/not to treat a particular patient? 
- Who should make the final decision? 
- Should relatives have a say? 
6 Have you ever had conflict with the patient, their relatives or other members of the hospital team over 
the decision? 
- If so, how was it resolved? 
7 How can the process of making decisions about individual patients be improved? 
- Should there be national guidelines? 
- Should there be more 
involvement by non-medical professionals such as lawyers, 
philosophers and social scientists? 
8 What has been the hardest decision to treat/not to treat a patient that you have ever 
been involved in? 
- What principles guided you? 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology employed in this thesis is mostly based on the definitions given by Lord Walton of Detchant: 
Walton. Dilemmas of life and death: Part One. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 1995; 88: 311-5 at 
pp312-3. In other cases definitions have been used which differ slightly from those given by Lord Walton or 
which were not considered by him: 
Advance Directive/Living Will: a document executed while the patient is competent concerning his or her 
preference about medical treatment in the event of becoming incompetent. 
Coma: loss of consciousness from which the patient cannot be roused. Complete or partial recovery, whether 
due to head injury or brain disease, is possible. 
Cure: 'the eradication of the cause of an illness or disease, to the radical interruption and reversal of the 
natural history of the disorder'. (Pellegrino and Thomasma's definition in Pellegrino ED & Thomasma DC. 
Helping and Healing. 1997 Georgetown University Press, Washington DC at p27). 
Curative treatment: treatment given in an attempt to heal the patient or halt the progression of the illness or 
medical condition. 
Double Effect: the act of a doctor or other person who gives pain-killers or other drugs to relieve pain or 
distress in the knowledge that a probable consequence is a shortening of life. 
Euthanasia: a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending life so as to relieve 
intractable suffering. 
Healthcare team: the doctors, nurses and other professionals involved in the care and treatment of the 
individual. 
Involuntary Euthanasia: the killing of a patient who is competent to request or consent to the act but does not 
do so. 
Locked-in Syndrome: the subject is conscious and alert but paralysed in all four limbs and unable to speak or 
swallow: communication is only possible through blinking or voluntary eye movements. Recovery 
is unknown. 
Non-voluntary Euthanasia: the killing of a patient who is not competent to formulate a valid request or to 
withhold consent. 
palliative care: care given when it is no longer possible or appropriate in the circumstances to try to cure the 
illness or medical condition and which is focussed on attempting to alleviate the distressing or disabling 
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symptoms of the illness or condition. 
Passive Euthanasia: the withdrawal or withholding of treatment needed to maintain life. 
Proxy Decision-maker: someone appointed to make decisions on behalf of an individual who cannot make 
them for him or herself. 
Terminal Illness: one which is inevitably progressive, whose effects cannot be reversed by treatment. (Walton 
included the phrase 'which will inevitably result in death in a few months at the most' which I consider an 
inappropriate restriction on timescale). 
Treatment: any procedure, surgery, therapy, care, medicine which is given to a patient with a view to curing 
illness or disease or alleviating the disabling or distressing symptoms of the illness or condition. 
Vegetative state: a condition in which the body cyclically awakens and sleeps but expresses no behavioural 
or cerebral metabolic evidence of possessing cognitive function or of being able to respond in a learned manner 
to external events and stimuli. (American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs) Significant 
improvement after 12 months from a persistant vegetative state diagnosed by an experienced neurologist with 
the aid of appropriate tests is exceptionally rare. (The terminology 'Persistant Vegetative State' was used for 
a long time in this country but the consensus of opinion now is that the word 'persistant' is unnecessary and 
should be omitted but Walton employed both). 
Voluntary Euthanasia: the bringing about of the patient's death at his or her own request. 
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